It would seem that...
(1) voting for a law that permits abortion is not categorically evil.
(2) voting for a candidate who supports abortion rights is not categorically evil
Shouldn't we, however, make it clear how (1) and (2) are compatible with (3) and (4)?
(3) voting for a law because it permits abortion is categorically evil.
(4) voting for a candidate because he or she supports abortion rights is categorically evil.
"...voting for a law that permits abortion is not categorically evil."
I think the way this is stated is deceptive. Voting for a law that fails to ban all abortion is not categorically evil, as long as it increases restrictions on abortion or reduces its incidence. Voting for a law that permits or reduces restrictions on abortion is categorically evil.
So if we buy the analogy from law to candidate, voting for a candidate who is pro-life but fails to outlaw all abortion is not categorically evil. But voting for a candidate who supports and reduces restrictions on abortion is categorically evil.
Notice too that there is no legitimate argument that says "voting for a law that decreases the restrictions on abortion is licit as long as that makes it politically practical to pass a different law granting more money to the poor".
So the pro-Kerry argument is DOA. A vote for Kerry is a categorically evil act; period.
I'm with Zippy...great analysis by both of you!
To me, a lot of the discussion on voting this week ignore this scenario:
Candidate A has views that the church says cannot be justified, so you choose not to vote for him.
Candidate B has views that in your prudential judgement may make him uncomfortable to support because of his views on the poor, death penalty, war, etc., but he's basically anti-abortion.
You cannot vote for A. A vote for Candidate C who cannot win weakens the ability of Candidate B to defeat candidate A, thus making your vote function like a vote for A.
Not voting again may function like a vote for A.
Question: Do you vote for B?
Do you vote for B and then try to work to support those issues you think B is wrong about?
Do you immigrate?
Sue:
If I understand these guys correctly, you can vote for C, so long as by doing so you don't *intend* for it to result in the election of A or B. I personally would not want to stand in line at the Pearly Gates, waiting to be interviewed for admission, while rehearsing *that* explanation of my conduct. I'll be very happy, rather, to defend my decision to abstain.
Voting for a law that fails to ban all abortion is not categorically evil, as long as it increases restrictions on abortion or reduces its incidence. Voting for a law that permits or reduces restrictions on abortion is categorically evil.
But your first category is a sub-category of your second category, so your second category can't be categorically evil.
That said: Yes, there is a categorically evil sub-category of "voting for a law that permits abortion," and yes, the non-categorically evil sub-category is extremely narrowly defined.
So the pro-Kerry argument is DOA. A vote for Kerry is a categorically evil act; period.
Oh, we're not there yet! We need to figure out how a vote for a law, which is what the Pope and CDF mostly write about, maps to a vote for a candidate.
And I'll just make clear, for those playing at home, that "categorical evil" is a stricter standard than "objective evil." Don't expect me to wind up claiming a vote for Kerry is in conformity with the true good.
A vote for Candidate C who cannot win weakens the ability of Candidate B to defeat candidate A, thus making your vote function like a vote for A.
No it doesn't. A vote for C increments C's vote count, leaving A's and B's vote counts unchanged. A vote for A increments A's vote count, leaving B's and C's vote counts unchanged. A vote for C is no more a "functional" vote for A than it is a "functional" vote for B.
Which is to say, a vote for a third party candidate does not function like a vote for a major party candidate.
Whom do you vote for? My answer: the candidate you want to win.
"But your first category is a sub-category of your second category, so your second category can't be categorically evil."
No. It is exactly that misunderstanding that I am attempting to eliminate. The way I read the magisterial texts that have been presented in this debate, if abortion is already legal it is licit to vote for a law that further restricts it, even if it does not fully ban it. Voting for a law (for which abortion is the subject matter) that decreases restrictions on abortion is a categorical evil.
You are a scientific guy. Think of it as a moral ratchet: it is categorically wrong to vote for a law with a positive first derivative of the abortion function. So if I stipulate that the lawmaker/law relation has a corresponding voter/candidate relation then it is categorically wrong to vote for a candidate who will loosen restrictions on abortion.
Tom,
Your functional vote explanation is good in theory but in practice it could end up like this:
Candidate A is bad.
Candidate B is better but not ideal.
Candidate C is ideal.
If C where not in the race, I would vote for B. There are others who feel this way. Candidate C has no realistic chance of winning. Those who would vote for A, would almost definitely not vote for C. So if C were not in the race, all of his votes would go to B.
So while in theory a vote for C, does nothing to the vote counts of A and B, in practice, it would almost definitely result in A getting elected. Which is a result you did not want, because A is bad.
So, people should vote for pro-life (ha!) Bush, even though he promises to support things he cannot, in fact, deliver? Saying that he would sign anti-abortion legislation is meaningless, as things stand now. Saying that he would appoint pro-life judges to the SCOTUS is contingent on things he can't control.
I have pretty much decided that the man I would consider morally fit to vote for for president would be unfit for the office, because he would have to be a pacifist and therefore couldn't do his job.
How about this functional analysis:
1) Voting for candidate A is an evil act.
2) Voting for candidate B is an evil act.
3) Voting for candidate C is not practically ideal, but is not an evil act.
You can vote for C or not vote at all, but voting for either A or B is _an evil act_. It can't be made not-evil by a means-end analysis.
A sin does not become not-a-sin just because of its (putative) practical consequences.
Tom,
I think your argument is flawed. I may be saying the same thing as Zippy, but I am not sure. You say:
"Thus, voting for a law that permits abortion is not categorically evil."
Voting for a law that restricts abortions, but does not outlaw all of them is not voting for a law to permit abortions. The law to permit abortions is already in place. Therefore I don't believe a law that restricts abortions falls into the same category as a law that permits abortions. So I think the premise I quote is incorrect.
Zippy,
I agree with your functional analysis. That is the rub, is voting for G.Bush an evil act?
It's been my personal experience that although functionality of splitting votes shouldn't have a moral effect, in the real, flawed world we live in, the results often make me feel like Pilate washing his hand of the situtation, for the real world results sometimes have really evil consequences....
Is it enough to say I voted for the right candidate and watch the evil that results if candidate A wins because I split the vote?
Given my qualms, I would probably vote for B and try to work for the right causes, because I feel the danger of letting A in outweighs the danger of letting B in, who, although is not perfect is better than A.
Dan--
At some point yesterday, I surmised that the ultimate problem is that we can't achieve the consensus that would allow us to draw up a list to use to decide what's immoral (or evil) and what's not. To me, Bush is obviously more evil, across the board, than Kerry (although I also dislike Kerry.) But I seem to be in the minority, because abortion effectively trumps every other evil.
To come up with that list, I'd appeal to the New Testament. That does not seem to be a popular plan, either.
Let me try it this way:
Consider these three categories of human acts:
A. "Voting for a law that permits abortion"
B. "Voting for a law that permits abortion, but imposes new restrictions on it"
C. "Voting for a law that loosens restrictions on abortion"
The acts in Category B are not categorically evil (see EV 73). Category A contains Category B. Therefore, the acts in Category A are not categorically evil.
The acts in Category C are categorically evil. Category A contains Category C. Therefore, there are acts in Category A that are categorically evil, but not simply because they're in Category A.
"Is it enough to say I voted for the right candidate and watch the evil that results if candidate A wins because I split the vote?"
It isn't just enough. It is morally mandatory.
Tom,
I really appreciate your precision on things generally, but here you are hair-splitting. It isn't as though John Kerry is neutral on abortion. It is unequivocally, publicly, clearly true that he supports a further loosening of restrictions on abortion. Therfore voting for him is a categorically evil act, full stop.
-Zip
Tom,
I cannot argue with your last post. The logic is flawless. My point was that we already have:
A."Laws that permit abortion"
so that
B."Laws that restrict abortion"
are not a subcategory of
A."Laws that permit abortion"
As an example, if you have a law that says "Anyone who is 18 may drive a car." The a year later, you pass a law that says "Only those who are 18 and pass a driving test may drive a car". Is that new lay a law that is of the category of permitting driving? I would submit that it is not, but a restriction on a law of the category of permitting driving.
Am I making any sense?
So while in theory a vote for C, does nothing to the vote counts of A and B, in practice, it would almost definitely result in A getting elected.
No! A vote for C does not "result in" A getting elected. A vote for C is a vote for C, not a vote against B.
Zippy and Dan are correct.
Voting for a more restrictive law is not in the same category as voting for a more permisive law.
The principle of double effect may apply here, where the primary intention and action is to restrict abortion, and the unintented double effect is to fail to restrict other abortions.
However, Tom is right when he implies that even if Zippy is correct, what EV adresses is votes for laws, and not votes for candidates, and the logic of one may not map over on to the other.
But the real issue, I think is that people gernerally fail to appreciate the magnitude of the Horror of Abortion. Here is some perspective:
WWI: 12.5 million deaths
WWII: 50 million deaths
Mao: 20 million deaths
Iraq War: 10 thousand deaths
Culture War in America: 40 million deaths
To suggest that Abortion isn't the single most important issue of the day is prima facie evidence of irrationality.
I couldn't do that, Zippy. Because candidate C has no chance of winning, I would consider it moot to vote for him, so in my conscience, it would really be a choice of A, a candidate impossible to vote for, and B, a candidate I find fault with, but less fault than A. If I voted for C, I would feel I would have committed a sin if it split the vote and let A in. I suspect these are the hard decisions people with conscience have to wrestle with.
Sue,
It sounds to me that you're making the mistake of thinking that how you vote will affect who ends up getting elected. You needn't worry about *that*. Whoever gets elected, we can be sure that it will be by more than a margin of one or two votes.
Zippy, Tom, et al.,
I think you may have hit on an interesting legal/philosophical issue here.
Take, for example, the following law: Abortion will be legal for the first trimester, illegal after that.
As I understand him, Zippy is saying that voting for this law would not be categorically evil in a country where aboriton was 100% legal, but would be categorically evil in a country where abortion was 100% illegal. But how can the act of voting for a law be categorically evil in some circumstances but not others? After all, I thought that a categorical evil was something that was evil regardless of the circumstances.
It seems to me that what you're saying is that it isn't actually the same law in the two cases, and that part of the essense of a law is how it affects the pre-existing legal regime.
If so, then that is quite interesting.
Dear Rob,
It's uncanny how clearly you give voice to my own reservations.
shalom,
Steven
After all, I thought that a categorical evil was something that was evil regardless of the circumstances.
It is. The problem is, different circumstances move different particular acts into different categories of acts.
This is why I don't think identifying categorical evils is as useful as it may seem.
Am I making any sense?
Yes, but you're also using English in a way I don't.
Maybe the way to keep this all clear is for me to stop using "a law that" and only use "a law to".
It is unequivocally, publicly, clearly true that he supports a further loosening of restrictions on abortion. Therefore voting for him is a categorically evil act, full stop.
You need to establish two things before you reach your full stop:
1. That voting for Kerry is morally equivalent to voting for further loosening of restrictions on abortion.
2. That voting for Kerry cannot be construed as voting for a restriction on the disregard for the right to life that a second Bush term would manifest.
I don't think #2 is terribly difficult, though it does need to be done. #1 is, for me, by far the more interesting matter.
Yes, but you're also using English in a way I don't.
Can you please elaborate?
I will try to clarify again. If abortion is already legal, laws that restrict abortion are not the cause of abortion being legal.
Can you please elaborate?
As I use it, a "law that permits X" is a law under which X is legal. So "Only those who are 18 and pass a driving test may drive a car" is a law that permits driving, and I'd find it very unnatural to say otherwise.
What it's not is a law to permit driving.
But you've explained how you use the term, so I think we understand each other now.
Keep in mind, by the way, that one direct teaching of EV 73 is that rigorism -- saying you couldn't vote for a law to restrict abortion without outlawing it entirely -- is invalid in this case.
Just out of curiousity...
Suppose the following were the case.
1) abortion was currently illegal in the U.S.
2) there are two proposed laws are before the Congress. One loosens the current restrictions on abortion, but still leaves it illegal in many circumstances. The other fully legalizes it.
3) A majority of legislators will vote for the more liberal bill if it comes to the floor. However, there are enough representatives willing to compromise and reject the more liberal bill, if the less liberal bill is passed instead.
Question: in these circumstances, is it morally licit to vote for the less liberal bill?
To me, Bush is obviously more evil, across the board, than Kerry (although I also dislike Kerry.) But I seem to be in the minority, because abortion effectively trumps every other evil.
If I believed what you believe about Bush, Rob, I'd probably think he was more evil than Kerry, too. For me, it's not that abortion trumps every other evil, but that Kerry's fanatical devotion to abortion rights makes it easy for me to see that I won't ever vote for him, which leaves me nearly seven months to decide whether I can vote for Bush.
Question: in these circumstances, is it morally licit to vote for the less liberal bill?
Absolutely not! Abortion is a matter for the states.
Ha! I slay me.
My provisional answer is yes. EV speaks of voting for "a more restrictive law... in place of a more permissive law already passed or ready to be voted on." You'd have to be morally certain the more liberal bill will pass if the less liberal bill fails, though.
Josiah, I've been a somewhat political activist many years, worked polls, registered voters, attended county level conventions, made phone calls, and watched carefully. Never assume that the vote you cast won't be a key vote...just look at what happened in last presidential election and and the craziness about chads if you think your vote will just be swept up in the great tide of votes. Many local elections are very very close...occasionally a dead draw.
I have to vote as if my vote counts like it was a deciding swing vote. It very well might be.
Sue,
I think the mess in Florida is a perfect illustration of my point. Even this extremely close election was decided by over 500 votes. Change any of the tallies by one, it won't affect the outcome.
And if a single vote in Florida in 2000 wouldn't have changed the outcome, then I think I can be very certain that my single vote never will.
Tom--
I can decide not to vote for Bush over the episode where he mocked condemned prisoner, Karla Faye Tucker, for the benefit of conservative reporter, Tucker Carlson, prior to condemning the apparently spiritually rehabilitated woman to death, rather than commuting her sentence to life without parole. This was clearly a political move on his part; he let the woman die to curry favor with his electorate. It was his call; no official "duty" compelled him to turn thumbs down. That one act exposes a multitude of negative aspects of Mr. Bush's character. By his fruits you can scope him out.
Rob-
You can decide to not vote for Bush for any reason you want. The debate is about whether Catholic teaching requires that we not.
Any Catholic whose judgment of Bush agrees with Rob's would, I think, be required by Catholic teaching not to vote for him.
Matthew:
I would not vote for Bush simply on the basis of his political ideology. But, what I am trying to get at here is whether, or not, there are also *moral* reasons for a *Christian* to choose not to vote for him. In my opinion, such moral reasons have been demonstrated by his public behavior.
Reality check!!! I agree that it cannot be moral to vote for Kerry, who not only wishes to permit abortion, but wishes to protect the practice and to promulgate it at home and abroad through the use of public funds.
HOWEVER, the crabbed view of “restrictive” laws implicit in this blogstream seems absurdly and unnecessarily focused on laws that criminalize abortion. One might conclude, in some circumstances, that use of government education/welfare/tax law in an anti-abortion campaign might actually restrict/limit abortion more than an unenforceable and ineffective criminal law (especially if, for example, abortion can be secured easily through efficient, even if illegal,abortifacient drugs -- as might plausibly soon become available). What is more important: A
symbolic, but relatively ineffective,criminal prohibition or a more effective alternative that saves more lives, but that does not involve criminal restrictions on abortion practices?
FURTHER REALITY CHECK!! Even more crucially, the formula that many seem to prefer is that one may vote for a law that permits abortion if a more “restrictive” law cannot be had), but never for a law that renders
abortion less “restrictive.” But this leads to absurd results if “restrictive” is narrowly understood to mean “criminal.” For example, this would mean that one may only vote to increase the criminal penalty on abortion, but never decrease it, even if a present severe criminal penalty in fact renders an anti-abortion criminal law virtually unenforceable – as a law that, for xample, provides the death penalty or life in prison for women who procure abortion would certainly be. Again, this makes no sense if the purpose is limit or reduce abortion.
Yes! Changing the hearts of prospective practitioners of any immoral behavior is, in the long run, the only fix that rescues both the prospective sinner and that sinner's potential victims. This should be the goal.
What is more important: A symbolic, but relatively ineffective, criminal prohibition or a more effective alternative that saves more lives, but that does not involve criminal restrictions on abortion practices?
You're right, I haven't been thinking of the case where the legislature can choose to either overturn or completely abrogate a pro-abortion law or pass a bunch of other laws that reduce the incidence of abortion more than overturning or completely abrogating the pro-abortion law would, but not choose both.
I'm not sure I'd call bringing that case up a "reality check," though.
In any case, the Pope writes in Evangelium Vitae 71: "While public authority can sometimes choose not to put a stop to something which-were it prohibited- would cause more serious harm, it can never presume to legitimize as a right of individuals... an offence against other persons caused by the disregard of so fundamental a right as the right to life."
But this leads to absurd results if “restrictive” is narrowly understood to mean “criminal.”
I don't see why.
The term "restrictive" is used in EV 73 to mean "aimed at limiting the number of authorized abortions." A "more restrictive law" is to be chosen over the status quo "when it is not possible to overturn or completely abrogate a pro-abortion law."
If two laws both prohibit abortion, they are both equally -- viz., completely -- restrictive. One is not "more restrictive" than the other simply because its penalty is more severe, and a law that reduces the criminal penalties of abortion is not a pro-abortion law per se -- at least not as I read EV.
"However, Tom is right when he implies that even if Zippy is correct, what EV adresses is votes for laws, and not votes for candidates, and the logic of one may not map over on to the other."
Well, to be clear about who said what, I was stipulating the mapping because Tom had asserted it.
"It seems to me that what you're saying is that it isn't actually the same law in the two cases, and that part of the essense of a law is how it affects the pre-existing legal regime.
If so, then that is quite interesting."
Yes, it is interesting. The language of the magisterium defines our categories in terms of more restrictive or less restrictive legal regimes. The moral categories we have been given are based on the degree and direction of change from the current regime.
To be clear, here is where (it seems to me) Tom asserted the necessary mapping of our known lawmaker-law relation onto a voter-candidate relation:
"Thus, voting for a law that permits abortion is not categorically evil. From which I think the conclusion necessarily follows that voting for a candidate who supports abortion rights is not categorically evil."
And I have stipulated such a mapping in our discussion. The lawmaker-law mapping is a one-way street: a lawmaker can vote for a law that is more restrictive (lets stipulate that this is in T. Marzen's broader sense). If the voter-candidate relation necessarily follows then it is also a one-way street: the voter can vote for a candidate who will make the regime more restrictive than it currently is.
Now it is true that it is a factual determination as to whether Kerry will work to make the abortion regime less restrictive. If he will, then voting for him is categorically evil. And it seems to me that probably even the wolf boy would have to admit that he will, on the question of fact.
"You need to establish ... That voting for Kerry is morally equivalent to voting for further loosening of restrictions on abortion."
It is slightly more nuanced than that, I think. It has to be established that one element of the pork-barrel is the loosening of restrictions on abortion. You can't buy the rest of the barrel with the thirty pieces of silver.
And I don't think there is any reasonable doubt whatsoever that loosening of the restrictions on abortion is one element of the Kerry pork barrel.
Dear Mr. Sullivan,
I tried to respond last night, but commenting was down. I wanted to say that I appreciated the distinction you made. Yes, indeed, there are two ways in which it can be inappropriate to vote for a candidate: one of those is strictly by doctrine, which I think serves the case of Kerry well enough. The other, which is just as strong, is by conscience. As you so rightly point out on this basis it may be permissable for some to vote for Bush; however, those who find it impossible, have as strong a case as those who rely upon doctrine. The conscience convicts with the same sentence as does defiance of doctrine.
shalom,
Steven
Well, to be clear about who said what, I was stipulating the mapping because Tom had asserted it.
I haven't yet asserted a complete mapping. All I've said so far, I think, is that if one thing is not forbidden while voting for a law, the analagous thing is not forbidden while voting for a candidate. If something is forbidden while voting for a law, is the analagous thing forbidden while voting for a candidate? Only if the differences between voting for a law and voting for a candidate does not change the moral character of the vote.
Dear Rob,
I couldn't possibly agree more. Until hearts and minds change fundamentally, we can argue all day about legislation, and abortion will remain an issue. Changing hearts and minds is not a political issue--it is a fundamental Christian issue which, to my mind, starts with a deep sympathy for those to whom the thought of abortion presents event he least attraction. We need to weed out societal factors that make this option have any appeal whatsoever. I think of the young, frightened teenager, or even of the older young woman who finds herself pregnant and without recourse. Yes, she landed herself in the situation but that should not stay our sympathy and our work to eliminate the disadvantage at which such a person starts life. Right now, that is simply not the case. And while this inequity persists, abortion will always have an appeal.
However, we must not limit our activity to mere corporal provendor. More importantly we must continue to lovingly and gently point out the way of morality and Christianity to a society completely consumed in self. To my mind that means first making certain sacrifices that allow us not to collude with society. I suppose that's why I'm constantly harping on the theme of detachment, disentanglement from the spurious attractions of the world.
shalom,
Steven
Steven--
Very well said!
I seem to remember reading in a history book once (one of the real ones, not the watered down for college student survey classes) that one of the things that attracted the pagans to the Christian communities was their high standard of personal morality in a world that was frankly lacking in meaning and values.
[I am afraid today that because Christians too often have co-opted with the secular garbage that passes for culture today (I know that is a biased, loaded way of putting it, but I just read a disgusting news story), the beacon of morality and meaning is often passing to the local muslim community.]
But when we do live up to our calling it has an effect, a noticable effect around those whose lives we touch. Standing up for what we know is true and right and against the relativism that makes the west the morass it is today is definitely one of the steps we should be doing.
"I haven't yet asserted a complete mapping. All I've said so far, I think, is that if one thing is not forbidden while voting for a law, the analagous thing is not forbidden while voting for a candidate."
It seems a bit ... convenient ... to me to interpret the grant of a specific license in an explicit case as necessarily and in isolation implying a license in nonexplicit analogous cases; we can't in good conscience neglect corresponding prohibition in nonexplicit cases. I don't think it is rigorist to say that if the license transfers then so does the prohibition.
So if we stipulate that what the magisterium has said about the lawmaker-law relation applies analogously to voter-candidate at all then you've got to take the prohibitions with the licenses.
And when it comes to lawmaker-law, the magisterium couldn't be more clear: a lawmaker is not permitted by a well formed conscience to vote for a law that permits abortion unless that law increases the restrictions on abortion.
Is there not a sense in which a vote for *either* Bush or Kerry is vote for the *political system* that made abortion legal in the first place? Is it not possible that, finally, the Christian thing to do is just to stay home and pray?
Steven,
You said:
We need to weed out societal factors that make this option have any appeal whatsoever.
Isn't killing wrong no matter how much appeal there is? I know you agree, but I think that you are presenting a false dichotomy. We need to change hearts and minds AND we need to outlaw abortion.
Because of man's fallen nature, sin will always be appealing. But certain very grave sins need to be outlawed period.
Of course the ideal would be a nation that was nurturing and compassionate so that no woman felt her pregnancy a burden. Should we work towards that? OF COURSE! Will we ever get there? I don't know. But I do know that even if the conditions exist to make a woman want to kill her unborn child, we as a nation must say it is wrong and illegal to do so.
Dan:
Yes must say that it's wrong. It's not obvious to me that we must say it's illegal. I'd like to outlaw capital punishment, along with abortion. But that isn't something that should obviously be illegal to the majority of Americans--unlike most of the rest of the world. I'd like to say that "preemptive" wars are illegal. But, guess what...?
Rob, I quote: "The consequence of this fundamental teaching of the Second Vatican Council is that «the lay faithful are never to relinquish their participation in ‘public life’, that is, in the many different economic, social, legislative, administrative and cultural areas, which are intended to promote organically and institutionally the common good».[10]" from Doctrinal Note
on some questions regarding The Participation of Catholics in Political Life.
To me that says we don't have a right to withdraw from public life...We can't pull an Amish way and refuse to participate. Does that mean you can never skip an election? I doubt that's its meaning. But if we live in a democracy, I think we have the obligation to try to participate. We as Christians are obligated to take our witness out into the world and in societies like ours, this is how you do it.
Sue:
Does that mean that if you were a Catholic in Nazi Germany, you would be obliged to participate in the activities of the German State, willy nilly? I don't think so. To state that we must participate in the activities of the government we live under, here and now, to is state that you must either contribute to it, as it is, or oppose it, if we find it morally insupportable. If the best way to oppose it is to not participate in it, I would think that this is a valid moral position for a Christian to take.
Rob,
If killing an innocent human life should not obviously be illegal, then I don't if anything should obviously be illegal.
Truthfully, I am shocked at your statement. Maybe I misunderstood it. I agree that we can't make it illegal to miss Mass, but "Do not kill", is not just a Catholic precept but a precept of natural law, which all laws should be grounded in.
I am against capital punishment in most of the developed world, but there are cases where it is morally licit. In a society that did not have prisons to properly protect its citizens from murderers, for instance.
Opposition is part of the democratic process, Rob. In America, it is an absolute requirement that if you don't like something, you not only have the right, but the obligation to squawk about it. This is how our country was set up.
In Germany in the 30s, there were people who spoke up, acted on their consciousness, and made differences. Many ended up as political prisoners, others worked in the underground, and some fled to work out of the country. But morality didn't just die.
Sometimes, being salt and light requires a heavy price - but it is what we are called to do - to be witnesses. Not just on Sundays, but by our daily actions, choices, decisions, in little and big things. Refusing to participate in a democratic society means you are stuck with others choices only. And when Christians turn their backs on the public sphere and do not stand up for the truth, Satan wins. Always. As in Germany.
I don't think it is rigorist to say that if the license transfers then so does the prohibition.
The license is, "A legislator can legitimately vote for Law X, which does not prohibit evil Y." The transferred licence is, "That a legislator will vote for Law X, which does not prohibit evil Y, does not mean a voter cannot vote for the legislator."
The prohibition is, "A legislator cannot vote for Law X, which expands evil Y." What is the transferred prohibition, corresponding to the transferred licence?
Dan:
What I'm saying is that there are many people--apparently a majority of people in this society--who do not believe that abortion is murder. They are atheists, or religious people who do not believe that life begins at conception. To pass laws reflecting the religious belief that abortion is murder would be politically consistent only in a theocracy. Moreover, any anti-abortion law that did not treat it as first degree murder would be inconsistent within secular law. I think it's better to leave it up to the individual conscience.
Sue:
Yes, you have a point. But, although up to now I have never missed voting in an election, I have been stuck with other peoples' choices about 90% of the time. And, in the other 10% I have necessarily voted for the lesser of two evils. I'm beginning to face the futility of it as the reality. I think that I accomplish more simply by trying to live a moral life and by encouraging others to do so, as well.
Sue
Rob and I have a small disagreement on this point as he tends further to the withdrawal side than do I. However, I do believe that there is a point at which it is legitimate to say that voting for one person or another is choosing the lesser of two evils. IF that is the case we are required by our consciences and Church Teaching. As Tom has often pointed out, we may not do evil that good may come of it.
Opposition may take the form Rob supports and in this limited instance I strongly feel now that I endorse. You withhold a vote from either candidate and use whatever forum you can find to make a point about why that is a legitimate action. You agitate for a NOTA amendment that requires new candidates in the event that no one is elected.
I do believe the political system can be redeemed, I'm not so sanguine about the upcoming election.
shalom,
Steven
Dear Sue,
I suppose I should say that I do support the outlawing of abortion; however, I don't think making it illegal will necessarily curtail it. Those who are wealthy enough will go to place where it is legal and have it done. Those who are not will resort to the black market. Will it curtail the market? I don't know. It is so much a part of the culture at this point that I suspect that there will be corner abortionmills that will gladly sacrifice child and mother both in the name of almight Dollar.
I would rather work to make the option so utterly alien to thought that legislation is unnecessary, even if it does occur. At one time we had such a society. True, abortions occurred even then; however, the thought was so utterly alien, so truly abhorrent that the true deterrent was not simple legality, but the whole societal mindset. That is what I would like to work for and see again.
shalom,
Steven
As I've said often, "participation in public life" is not the same as "voting in an election."
Rob may be advocating more of a removal from public life than the CDF thinks proper, but I wonder whether "turning your back" isn't, in some circumstances, a legitimate way of participating in public life -- maybe even the only legitimate way.
Steven--
As is usually the case, you have stated what I meant to say about abortion as moral and societal blight better than I have stated it myself.
Except, of course, that we disagree about outlawing it. If it's murder, it's murder. It is always premeditated. Therefore, if you truly want to make it illegal, you also need to support the idea of prosecuting abortionists and their "clients" under existing murder statutes, including, where applicable, capital punishment as a sentence, I would imagine. H-m-m.
Better work and pray to re-stigmatized it. I truly believe that, while grieving that I need to consider the question in the first place.
"The prohibition is, 'A legislator cannot vote for Law X, which expands evil Y.' What is the transferred prohibition, corresponding to the transferred licence?"
By inspection: 'A voter cannot vote for politician X, who has been quite publicly explicit about his intention to vote affirmatively for laws which expand evil Y'.
Now, it might be possible to outright reject a mapping from the magisterially explicit circumstance of lawmaker/law to the analogous one of voter/candidate. But again, if one is to engage in analogy at all without distorting morality one must map both the affirmations and the anathemas.
Tom--
It will be possible to vote in the 2004 election without pulling the lever for either Kerry or Bush, which is what I will most likely end up doing. As a citizen of my community, I do feel an obligation to show up to vote for the local candidates and issues. But, where killing babies is concerned, I consider Kerry to be a witless accomplice, whereas Bush is a deliberate, calculating perpetrator.
Clarification of the above: What I will "most likely end up doing" is showing up to vote for local issues. There is no question that I will NOT be voting for Bush or Kerry.
But again, if one is to engage in analogy at all without distorting morality one must map both the affirmations and the anathemas.
True. But there isn't an exact parallel between affirmation and anathema.
On the affirmation side, we observe that the effect (a legislator voting for Law X) of an act (voting for the legislator) is not evil. Therefore, there is no reason given for why the act might be evil, and what is not proscribed is permitted.
On the anathema side, though, we have an effect (a legislator voting for Law Y) of an act (voting for the legislator) that is evil. But an evil effect does not necessarily mean an act is evil; the effect must be intended, or the evil must outweigh the good that is done. So what makes voting for a legislator who will vote for an objectively evil law objectively evil? (Not a rhetorical question.)
Dear Rob,
No, I don't think we even disagree there all that much. If made illegal, I'd be prone to prosecute providers but not necessarily clients. As you point out this leads to an endless morass, and the better way would be to make abortion truly anathema to the thinking, caring person.
shalom,
Steven
Steven-
I doubt that under the precedent of existing law you could successfully prosecute the abortionist without also prosecuting the "client" as a willing accomplice to his crime. (We prosecute the person who hires and pays the hit man, don't we?)
One more reason not to go that route, imho.
Dear Rob,
Concur; however, there is a sort of validation that goes with something that is in the law. You will note however, that I lean more toward your view than otherwise. I guess I would like to see criminalization ex post facto--after the real need for it has been addressed, more as a milestone than as a significant legal barrier. In part because I concur with those who say that no legal barrier will stand. One way or the other activist courts or blackmarket as long as there is a market for execution, executions will occur.
shalom,
Steven
Steven--
Yes, the ex post facto concept appeals to me, too.
"So what makes voting for a legislator who will vote for an objectively evil law objectively evil? (Not a rhetorical question.)"
I simply assume that if transitivity applies to license it also applies to prohibition. Transitivity giveth and transitivity taketh away.
If transitivity doesn't apply at all then the business about lawmakers and laws that permit abortion doesn't apply at all; and we already have a general prohibition against acts which are contrary to life, for which we are provided the occasional apparent exception (which are not really exceptions at all, but merely rejections of a rigorism that puts arbitrary limits on the good by insisting on instant perfection (or, as they say, immanentizing the eschaton)).
As far as the intent/culpability discussion goes, I think we already dealt with that. The question on the table isn't about culpability in an improperly formed, uninformed, nonconformed conscience; it is a question of objective categorical evil. The question isn't whether the boy raised by wolves would be culpable in committing the objectively evil act of voting for John Kerry; the question is whether a properly formed, informed, and conformed Christian conscience would be culpable.
Zippy:
I thought the question was whether it was MORE culpable to vote for Kerry than to vote for Bush? I will stipulate that Kerry is evil incarnate, because of his support of abortion. But, is Bush any less evil? I think not. In fact, I think Bush is worse. But, abortion is cut and dried. What criteria do I appeal to in order to equate the murderous acts of Bush to Kerry's abortion policy?
"So what makes voting for a legislator who will vote for an objectively evil law objectively evil?"
An entirely different approach, which I believe Father Rob or someone in his comments took some days ago, is the accessory-to-murder approach. Ignore the business where legislators (with properly formed, informed, and conformed consciences) are permitted to vote for a law that further restricts abortion but does not outright ban it.
You hold a knife. You know for a definite fact that if you give it to Bob, he will use it to stop a robbery. You know for a definite fact that after he has done so, he will then use the knife to sacrifice an infant to Moloch, and there will be nothing you can do about it. Is it licit for you to give the knife to Bob in order to stop the robbery?
Clearly not.
Not even if you have no other way to stop the robbery?
Nope.
That is the legislator/law modality. What happens when we are once removed from the process?
You have a knife. If Fred gets the knife, you know for a definite fact that he will give it to Bob.
Is it now licit for you to give the knife to Fred?
Clearly not.
Rob wrote:
"I thought the question was whether it was MORE culpable to vote for Kerry than to vote for Bush?"
We are discussing categorical evil; whether an act falls into the category "evil" or not. We are not discussing how evil one act may be relative to another, because it doesn't matter: we cannot do evil in the hope that good may result.
Personally I will be abstaining. I think the public case that voting for Kerry would be a categorically evil act is cut, dried, and delivered. The case of Bush is more complicated, and hinges on a great many more debatable facts about which we are not epistemically certain.
Nevertheless it isn't unreasonable, in my view, to conclude that a vote for Bush would be an objectively (though not necessarily categorically) evil act.
My own decision not to vote for Bush doesn't hinge on a worry that it might be sinful to do so as much as on a practical judgement that I don't think it is a very good idea. Plus there are my own peculiar reservations about democratic voting in a pagan society in general, as well, which I have discussed elsewhere.
If nothing more comes out of this discussion than that people consider that it can, in fact, be a sin - something that must be confessed, resolved to do no more, and absolved - to cast a particular vote then that will be significant progress.
Zippy--
You've won me over. I also have grave reservations about democratic voting in a pagan society. Of course, I would argue that there is precious little that is democratic in the voting that goes on in this society anyway. But that's a different discussion.
Zippy:
You've convinced me talk of "mappings" from legislator's act to voter's act is unhelpful, so I'll drop it.
I think the accessory-to-murder analogy fails to correspond to the vote-for-a-rotter scenario at just the points where it needs to succeed to work. Can you adapt it to correspond to the legislator voting for a bill to restrict abortions?
"I think the accessory-to-murder analogy fails to correspond to the vote-for-a-rotter scenario at just the points where it needs to succeed to work."
Yeah, I see your point, but I had already posted the comment! Intent/personal culpability versus objective evil does actually seem to be the tricky bit to tease apart.
I've gotta run for a bit, but I'll think on the adaptation and at least let you know whether I come to the conclusion that I am (or am not) too clueless to take it anywhere!
OK, I owe an answer (or at least a response) here. The inverse of an accessory to an evil act is an accessory to a good act. I don't see any problem with being an accessory to a good act whenever you want to as long as it doesn't involve choosing evil.
That seems pretty lightweight and obvious, though, so I don't think I really understand the question.
The Quaterlex constitution is where I wound up trying to adapt the "give Bob a knife" analogy, so there's no doubt I don't know what's going on anymore.
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