It would seem that...
For me, the real jaw-dropper on that thread was this:
"Anybody here ever notice that in one of His parables, Jesus mentions torture, even torturing to the point of death, and didn't give the slightest hint that He disapproved of it? If anything, His words could almost be taken as tacit approval. (I mean the parable where Jesus talks of a criminal being handed over to the torturers until he had paid back his debt -- since the debt could not be repaid in one lifetime, that means the criminal was tortured until he died from it.)"
It's the most perverse form of "What would Jesus do/say/advocate?" I think I've ever seen.
Ignorance of Scripture may be ignorance of Christ, but that doesn't mean knowing Scripture is knowing Christ.
Good post, Tom.
I totally agree with you on this Tom.
This is just another one of the issues I had to submit myself when I entered the Church. The arguments for torture always seem to use the case of the ticking nuclear bomb as if you can do something wrong because of the size of another wrong.
This view says that life is our highest end and not conforming ourselves to Christ so that we may live with him forever.
Torture is just a form of relativism for some conservatives.
Greetings Tom!
When Jeff Miller and I agree on something, those Catholics who disagree with us need to examine themselves.
I stand with Tom and Jeff above and all others who see it as extrordinarily clear that the Gospel and the Church do not condone torture under any circumstances.
I am about as liberal as Catholic bloggers get, and Jeff is pretty darn conservative. When you have both poles in the church calling something into question, along with Tom's fine quotation from an Ecumenical Council, it's time to admit you are not thinking with the Church.
PEACE
"Unless a see Holy Father issue the infallible statements, and put my hands on the document, I will not believe."
I think one of the things we need to analyze is the, for lack of a better term, atomicity of an act.
Those "advocating torture" seem to either stretch the act way out (torturing the criminal is only part of the just fight against terrorism, and the great struggle of Good against Evil!), or way down (swinging my foot is not intrinsically evil, therefore kicking a prisoner is not evil, therefore kicking him to make him give me information is not evil).
Pardon me if you've covered this before, but I think it would be helpful to dig into how we define an act. How broad cen we be before we slip into ends-means justification. Where do we get so fine that we're losing meaning?
It seems that Guadium et Spes
shows us where we cross the line into thinking that the ends can justify the means. The document holds two restriction:
"whatever is opposed to life itself . . . [and] whatever violates the integrity of the human person"
For all times, the Church has held to these two truths--where they were appropriately applied by individuals or not--the Church has maintained them.
How can torture ever NOT violate the integrity of the human person?
It seems that we have gotten into this problem because we (humanity) have begun to devalue the human person and are slowly robbing ourselves of our dignity and our intergrity.
You can justify torture if what you are torturing isn't human. Hence the rhetoric from those in charge of calling them "beasts, terrorists, murders;" but never anything that shows human value.
Pardon me if you've covered this before, but I think it would be helpful to dig into how we define an act.
I agree, but I've never had a good handle on how we define an act.
Right now, I think the way to do it is to start with some "atomic act" everyone agrees with -- say the physical act of swinging my foot -- and building up, er, "molecular acts" by adding intention and circumstances -- so we might get the act of "kicking someone in his teeth" by adding "swinging my foot," the object of kicking someone in his teeth, and the presence of someone with teeth to be kicked (or whatever).
At any point, these acts can be evaluated objectively -- i.e., according to "the good toward which the will deliberately directs itself." Once an act is seen to be objectively immoral, every act built upon it by adding intentions and circumstances is also objectively immoral.
Do we have a good definition of toture to work with when discussing this topic? Does loud rock music, sleep deprevation, or injecting sodium penethol qualify as torture?
It seems that we have gotten into this problem because we (humanity) have begun to devalue the human person and are slowly robbing ourselves of our dignity and our intergrity.
I think it's fairer to say we are getting ourselves out of this problem because we have begun to value the human person and are slowly acknowledging to ourselves our dignity and integrity.
Past failure to recognize the value of the human person explains (at least in part) the Church's adoption of torture and slavery from the surrounding culture. I think the debates over capital punishment show the Church has not yet fully embraced the idea of "human dignity."
There's also a particularly clear statement of the intrinsically evil nature of torture in Veritatis Splendor:
"80. Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature "incapable of being ordered" to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are the acts which, in the Church's moral tradition, have been termed "intrinsically evil" (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances.
Continued (2):
Consequently, without in the least denying the influence on morality exercised by circumstances and especially by intentions, the Church teaches that "there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object".131 The Second Vatican Council itself, in discussing the respect due to the human person, gives a number of examples of such acts: "Whatever is hostile to life itself, such as any kind of homicide, genocide, abortion, euthanasia and voluntary suicide;
Do we have a good definition of toture to work with when discussing this topic?
The U.S. DOD evidently used to have a neat working definition of torture: that which, if it were done to an American P.O.W., we would consider torture.
But as I commented on yesterday's post, I think "an act the object of which is the infliction of physical or mental torment" suffices for comment-box purposes.
Continued (3):
whatever violates the integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, physical and mental torture and attempts to coerce the spirit; whatever is offensive to human dignity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary imprisonment, deportation, slavery, prostitution and trafficking in women and children; degrading conditions of work which treat labourers as mere instruments of profit, and not as free responsible persons: all these and the like are a disgrace, and so long as they infect human civilization they contaminate those who inflict them more than those who suffer injustice, and they are a negation of the honour due to the Creator".
http://www.vatican.va/
holy_fathe...plendor_en.html
Since JPII says that "Reason attests" here, this teaching about the wrongness of torture would be a deliverance of the natural law.
The problem with the definition "an act the object of which is the infliction of physical or mental torment" is that there are many inflictions of physical or mental torment that no one would consider to be intrinsically evil, like chemotherapy. Now, I suppose that the infliction of torment is used for the purpose of promoting the integrity of the subject whereas most forms of torture are not. But what about the kinds of the run-of-the-mill mind games that is used by law enforcement officials in the Law and Order show to get criminals to confess their crimes? What about a tough Perry Mason cross-examination? That could be considered torture by your definition.
...there are many inflictions of physical or mental torment that no one would consider to be intrinsically evil, like chemotherapy.
Is the infliction of torment the object of chemotherapy? If chemotherapy destroyed the cancer cells without inflicting torment on the patient, would the good toward which the chemotherapy was directed be achieved?
What about a tough Perry Mason cross-examination? That could be considered torture by your definition.
Could be, if any mental torment inflicted is the means to a confession.
Patrick,
The "object" of the tough Perry Mason cross exam (or attempting to obtain a confession) should be to get to the truth (or to get the witness to recant or admit to something). If the object of the lawyer's cross-exam is to inflict mental torment on the witness, it is evil.
I guess if the object of the "infliction" is to extract information, it isn't necessarily evil ...wait a minute ... now what?
Tom,
I don't understand this part :-
>>Insisting on the specific words "torture is intrinsically evil" is not thinking with the mind of the Church, it's morality by incantation.
Excuse my ignorance, but exactly what is "morality by incantation" ?
I do find it very disturbing that the Church itself once practiced torture. I think this is one reason why modern man finds it very difficult to take the Church seriously.
However, it is also a sign of hope. Today the Church proscribes torture. One day we will proscribe war.
God Bless
Tom, in what sense are we defining "object." Sometimes we think of object as the act chosen, but sometimes we are speaking of the "object" as the end or the purpose. I just want to make sure we are defining terms in a way that I can understand.
Excuse my ignorance, but exactly what is "morality by incantation" ?
Specific formulas are required, as I understand it, to cast magic spells. The morality of an act is not determined solely by the existence of a specific formula in Church documents.
Tom, in what sense are we defining "object."
I am trying to use it in the same sense as the Catechism, which I assume is the same as the sense in traditional moral theology as found in the "object-intention-circumstances" model of human acts.
Quoting the Catechism (1751): "The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act."
As JohnMcG suggests, I think the trick is to scope the human act properly. But if the object of an act is a good toward which the will directs itself, you can narrow the scope by asking, "How does this direct the will toward the good?"
In Gene's example, the object of an act is "to extract information." How does the act extract information? By getting someone to talk. How does it get someone to talk? By making talking preferable to not talking. How? By making not talking too painful.
You keep asking, "How?" and at every stage you need an objectively moral answer.
Conversely, you can increase the scope of the act by asking, "Why?" and if at some point you hit an immoral object -- Why are you swinging your leg? Why are you kicking him in the teeth? -- every further answer to "Why?" is an end obtained by immoral means.
IMO, using double effect reasoning here (to justify torture) runs into the problem that the evil effect (the pain or the threat of it) cannot be the means to the good end (getting the information/saving other lives).
That's one reason you can't simply "direct your intention" to the good end of getting the life-saving information, and excuse torture thereby.
Good point David.
Thank you for posting this Tom. I too was growing increasingly disturbed by some of the comments over at Mark's place, but you were able to express thoughts that I had much better than I could.
I also agree that torture is immoral and absolutely prohibited.
But I am having trouble discerning the definition of torture here. I'm not the sharpest tack around, so bear with me. This philosophical stuff is hard to follow.
It seems that if torture is physical or mental torment, just about anything other than a reward for talking would be torture. If I put a guy alone in a room for three hours and he cracks, did I torture him because he found not talking too mentally painful?
Okay, so that guy was subjectively a wimp, so maybe it wasn't objectively torture. But it just seems to me that smacking a guy in the head a couple times to get some answers is not torture, but it seems that this thread suggests that any physical pain inflicted for these ends is wrong.
Is there any level of physical or mental violence that would be permissible? What say you all?
I a related note, the Catechism says that you can't use torture to punish the guilty. Perfectly resonable, to my mind. But again, if the definition is "any physical violence" it seems that this rules out any form of corporal punishment as legitimate. I do have a problem with such a definition, but, as always, would defer if this was actually the Church's teaching. I am very suspect that it actually is, however.
1) The terms "torture" and "human dignity" AS OBJECTIVE DESCRIPTORS IN *THIS PLACE AND TIME* are simply "capture the flag" rhetorical terms that have no meaning. Indeed, the stronger the condemnation of them gets, the broader the bedwetters, the pacifists, the anti-Americans and the cosmopolitans seek to define them. I mean, why take seriously the characterizations of particular circumstances from an institution whose objectively pro-Saddam secretary of state gets his panties in a twist over the offense to the dictator's human dignity of a dental exam.
2) That Catechism passage is a complete and utter distortion of history that would take more than a 1,000-character comment box to detail. Suffice it to say (a) that rulers who did NOT set up Inquisitions that used torture were threatened with excommunication or a national interdict (I forget which, but for the point I'm making ... that the Church was not some innocent bystander preaching mercy ... it doesn't matter), and (b) the Church does not teach and never has taught that clemency and mercy are an absolute duty for Caesar (if it did, um ... that's anarchy).
I must add that I find it darkly amusing that disputes over the precise terms of condemnation, and thus whether circumstance can justify something, is dimissed here as "an argument based on semantic games."
A couple of quick points since you've used me as whipping boy for two quotes.
First, I think it is uncharitable of you to quote me out of context. Yes, I did say that I would favor torturing "that guy," but won't you fail to note is that I am speaking about a person who essentially could have prevented 9/11. A little context would have been nice. I am not a fan of torture. I am simlpy asking whether torture is ever morally justified.
Second, it seems to me that the CCC implicitly sanctions the use of torture in some extreme instances. I'll let you look at the text yourself, but that's how I read it.
(continued)
(continued)
Third, I am not proceeding from emotion on this issue. I am simply noting that the answer seems to me far from clear as to whether torture is ever morally permissible.
Third, if torture is always wrong then how can a devout Catholic ever support the death penalty? These aren't mutually exclusive issues, are they?
Finally, I think that it is unfair to impute evil motives to those of us who fail to buy into your all or nothing interpretation of the Church's teaching on torture; epsecially when torture is essentially being used as a form of self defense. It seems to me that the Church had an opporuntunity to unequivocally condemn torture in all instances in the CCC, and failed to do so.
make that "what you fail to note"
Whoops! I used two "thirds" too. Sorry 'bout that.
A little context would have been nice.
The whole point of everything I've ever written about torture is that context doesn't matter.
...if torture is always wrong then how can a devout Catholic ever support the death penalty?
Torture and the death penalty are morally distinguishable acts. The object of one is torment, which is always and everywhere immoral; the object of the other is death, which is not always and everywhere immoral.
...I think that it is unfair to impute evil motives to those of us who fail to buy into your all or nothing interpretation of the Church's teaching on torture....
I am not imputing evil motives to you. I am stating that you are supporting objective evil.
I'm not sure I understand how torture could be used as a form of self-defense.
Tom-
What about the CCC? Why does it fail to condemn all forms of torture unequivocally if torture is always objectively evil?
BTW, I apologize for calling you a nut over at Mark's blog. That was ungentlemanly of me, and I hope you will accept my apology.
Josiah-
Here's an example:
X is locked in a room with Y and a ticking time bomb (5 hours to go before it exploads) and can't defuse it. Y is the only one who knows how, and X has a gun and metal rod. can X use those implements to force Y to defuse the bomb?
I can come up with more if you like.
...it seems to me that the CCC implicitly sanctions the use of torture in some extreme instances.
The CCC says, "Torture which uses physical or moral violence to extract confessions, punish the guilty, frighten opponents, or satisfy hatred is contrary to respect for the person" and is not "in conformity with the legitimate rights of the human person."
From which we conclude what? That torture which uses physical or moral violence to save lives isn't contrary to respect for the person and is in conformity with the legitimate rights of the human person?
If the meaning of this passage is that it is the intent, not the object, of torture that makes it immoral, are we to read an implicit sanction for torture for any reason not explicitly proscribed?
This sort of reasoning leads to the double effect problem David points out. If why I'm torturing someone is what makes it good or evil, then I can torture someone for the amusement of others, or for whatever medical breakthroughs it might lead to, as long as the good of the amusement or breakthrough outweighs the purely physical evil of the victim's suffering.
Tom-
Well, I am a lawyer so that probably effects how a interpret text. There is a rule of statutory construction, Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means "to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other."
The Catholic Church says torture is bad with respect to a, b, c, and d. To me, that implies not that e is o.k., but that something between e and z might be morally acceptable.
But this leads me back to my question? If your right, and torture is always morally repugnant, then why not say so unequivocally in the CCC?
"how I interpret text"
and
"If you're right, and torture . . ."
Sorry for the typos.
The question about the CCC section is whether the four examples (extract confessions, etc) are an illustrative list or an exhaustive list. The more I read other Catholic documents quoted, the more I become convinced that the list is illustrative. That is to say, the CCC does not mean to suggest that torture is o.k. if you have the correct objective in mind when you do it. The four circumstances are example of torture, and not the only four circumstances where torture is evil.
Placing a comma after the words "Torture" and "hatred" in the CCC section might be a clearer statement that torture is not in conformity with the rights if the human person.
I think what we have here is a conflict between Latin and Anglo-Saxon law.
Gene brings up a good point over which I have puzzled since this passage from the Catechism was first brought up on the thread at Shea's site. Here is an instance where matters of semantics and punctuation are important. The Latin word used here is "qui," translated as "which." Correct me if I am wrong, but the word could also be translated as "that." The significance is in how these two words are used in English for relative clauses. "That" denotes a restrictive clause, which limits the scope of what is being modified. "Which" denotes a non-restrictive clause, which adds non-essential information about what is being modified. "Which" clauses are supposed to be seperated off from the rest of the sentence by commas, whereas "that" clauses are not. The official English translation uses "which," thus lending itself to Gene's interpretation that what follows is illustrative, but it would have been better had the translator(s) made proper use of the commas to make
... that clearer.
"Which" denotes a non-restrictive clause....
You know that, and I know that, but I'm not sure the English translators of the Catechism know that. There are other examples in the text where "which" is used with an unambiguously restrictive clause.
Even granting a restrictive clause, though, I don't think feddie's reading holds up, but that's a subject for a separate post.
"This is just another one of the issues I had to submit myself when I entered the Church. The arguments for torture always seem to use the case of the ticking nuclear bomb as if you can do something wrong because of the size of another wrong. This view says that life is our highest end and not conforming ourselves to Christ so that we may live with him forever."
If the view that torture is always and everywhere wrong is correct, then how does one justify the view that warfare is not also always and everywhere wrong? Isn't this an argument for pacifism, in other words?
As I pointed out in another thread, you have to be careful of the sense in which the word "confession" is used. We moderns tend to think of it as meaning "admit that we performed an act, as a matter of fact". That isn't the traditional Catholic understanding of "confession" though, which is to repent of an act that we are known to have committed; to admit that we were wrong to perform the act.
So perhaps proportionate punishment that gets a known-guilty party to repent and admit he was wrong is not torture; in fact it may be the very thing that saves his soul. But a physical or psychological torment intended to get someone whose guilt or innocence is unknown to "confess" to a crime is torture.
This understanding has the advantage of being consistent with the substance of what the magisterium has taught always and everywhere; yes, even Innocent IV.
That is, I pointed this out in the comments on another blog, not another thread on this blog.
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