Great post! It also demonstrates what I'd call progress, between Biblicial times and Chazal's times.
Very nice post.
Of course, I was with you until the last comment re reform/conservative judaism. I linked over here from volokh which i read occassionally but I have no time to check your bona fides. But the illogic of this last statement struck me given your familiarity with the talmudic rendering. (Today of course this material is available in English to even the uninitiated so that your bona fides remain an open issue, at least to me.)
Why, then, do the flexibility and practical wisdom of Talmudic scholars suggest a connection to R/C brands of Judaism? Reform Judaism rejects halacha altogether and Conservative Judaism rejects the foundations of the law (see Rambam, MT, Yesodei HaTorah and Perush Mishna, Perek Chelek). The assumption that traditional (what is referred to as "orthodoxy") legal scholars (poskim) were or are inflexible is not justified either by the explicit teaching of the Talmud (what you cite) and the actual history of rabbinic thought and legal decisionmaking.
Now your view my be that the Poskim have not been as "flexible" as you would like but the flexibility you cite in the Talmud has absolutely nothing to do with rejecting the foundation of the Halacha or of its fundamental purposes.
R. Nachman immediately order that the groom be lashed with palm branches because he must have visited prostitutes to have known this.
Ahh, such a wise and wonderful tradition we have!
I'm not sure what you mean by my "bona fides." If you mean an extensive knowledge of the Talmud or a yeshiva education, I do not have either. I have studied the Talmud only to a small degree, although Ketubot happens to be a masechta that I have studied.
Based on what I do know, I agree completely with your point that the Amoraim were flexible, clever, and bold thinkers. My point is that later rabbis have not been so clever and flexible, but instead have followed earlier rulings.
The agunah problem is a good illustration. Everyone agrees the problem is huge. But the Orthodox world cannot seem to come up with a solution short of ostracism and beating up the deadbeat husband. Saul Lieberman --- certainly no halachic lightweight --- did, but his solution, and all other solutions, have been rejected in the Orthodox world as violative of halacha.
Halacha is not, or should not be, that inflexible. The amoraim would have solved this. If the amoraim had this problem and Saul Lieberman had lived 1600 years ago, his clause would have been included in a ketubah (or they would have come up with some other solution), and the problem would have been solved.
My concluding point was simply that the Conservative movement, despite many other problems, has retained that halachic flexibility, while the Orthodox world has not. You are probably right that the Reform Judaism, self-described as a non-halachic movement, would not be heir to this tradition. After all, the Amoraim did in fact believe in halacha.
Ahh, such a wise and wonderful tradition we have!
Think structurally or functionally, not literally here. Certain controversies are justiciable; others are not. R. Nachman made this particular controversy non-justiciable. And perhaps it should be.
There is deeper wisdom here than a superficial reading shows.
Bruce,
"But the Orthodox world cannot seem to come up with a solution short of ostracism and beating up the deadbeat husband"
To be fair, an effective pre-nuptial conditional get has made strong inroads in many Orthodox communities.
But to the point, I agree that Halachic concepts shouldn't be as if etched in stone the way they are considered by Orthodox poskim. The law needs to be flexible enough to respond realistically to issues in real people's lives. Otherwise those seemingly harmless legal abstractions can really screw people over.
To begin.
[1] The Jewish Atheist: You criticism is exactly what? You find a sentence of whipping for some crime (in this case the Talmud suggests one of two crimes: fornicating w/prostitutes; or, false testimony--perjury) unenlightened or, do you find any punishment for these or any such crimes "primitive" or "unwise"?
Your quip is so casual it is as if the rest of those who might be reading along will just understand exactly what you mean to say. Again, I am a new visitor so I don't know the caliber of discourse here but clearly yours is of a kind known only to your most intimate fellows.
Bruce, your response is fair and considered but several matters would need to be addressed to even begin to have a serious discussion of this halachic question. First, you choose one of the more difficult of issues. I can of course bring an encyclopedia of halachic issues that were less difficult but no less important where flexibility was built into the landscape. Take for example, business dealings with idol worshippers in and around their holidays. Interest-based transactions. Enforced monogamy vs. polygamy. Dina d'malchuta dina. And the list goes on.
The aguna problem is a serious one to be sure but poskim throughout the ages have applied various approaches to the problem. The prenup is one as you mention being used today by many Torah communities.
But the real point of any discussion of "flexibility" in the law is that no common law -- and in this case since the Jewish People are without a Sanhedrin and cannot overturn the rulings of the Talmud it is a common law rendered by the "lower courts" -- change and flexibility must come slowly and in some cases painfully for the litigants who need resolutions immediately.
But, even for individual litigants, many individual Poskim grant "heters" and individual and "private" rulings suited for the specific case (as is allowed in the Halacha) as a way to provide an equitable ruling.
So, traditional Jewish law has the built in flexibility needed much as any good common law.
The problem with Conservative "halacha" is that without the foundation of the law (to wit, sourced in divine laws and based upon a human jurisprudence itself grounded in divine command), you have a system afloat which is precisely why Conservative Jews simply do not follow "conservative Halacha". In the main, their adherents simply don't care about a law that it neither divinely sourced nor sourced in a "representative political order".
A few observations from a Reform perspective.
Traditional Judaism sees the Reform (and Conservative) theological and ethical conversation hopelessly "afloat" once unmoored, as it were, from the traditional view of the source and binding weight of Torah and subsequent rabbinical interpretation.
But I see very little progress by traditionalists in the last two millenia in blunting the import of the Euthyphro dilemma -- the law is not moral merely because it comes from God. If that's true -- see Bruce's The Theory of the Other Theory post -- what is so wrong about using the wisdom of Torah and Jewish tradition as the basis for striving to lead a virtuous and meaningful life?
Furthermore, is the Reform conversation about how to lead a moral and ethical life in today's world, in the context of Torah and Jewish tradition and practice, really less relevant and important than studying "business dealings with idol worshippers" or "enforced monogamy vs. polygamy"? I do not think it is merely a question of inflexibility in interpretation, but also a question of being antiquated in light of current life and circumstances.
Steve: the Euthyphro dilemma is a blog all its own; I don't mind getting into it but having had the time to scan the blog entries here a bit, that discussion just is not appropos here.
What one can say to the Reform notion is two things. Again, well beyond the scope/depth of this blog, but worth mentioning. You and the Baal Habos assume "progress" in Time/History. This is as you must understand philosophically a real problem. It is in modern times the rendition of Hegel/Kojeve even unknowingly. But the critique of that view has been set out in clear enough terms by Leo Strauss in Natural Right and History, or by Eric Voegelin in his The New Science of Politics (even if they themselves leave their critique at "social science" and avoid the more problematic and axiomatic problem of science or the mathesis universalis--see, e.g., Jacob Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra [re Descartes]).
An even more indepth critique is on its way by Professor Robert Loewenberg on his work on Descartes.
There is no need to "drill down" here except to say that the dilemma posed by replacing Transcendency with History is hugely diabolical.
Reducing man to mathematical physics, which is in effect what you have done by turning to History/Time to gain some transcendency to remove yourself from a self-created relativism, you are left with two great dilemmas: infinite regression and the reduction of man to matter moved. The latter leads of course to the World State and murder simply. Do you not see that?
All the best.
David--
The rejection (or at least non-embrace) of the divinity of the Torah (and the rabbinic interpretation thereof) does not equal a rejection of natural rights or of all other non-relativist understandings.
And the Euthyphro dilemma does seem on point: if ethics are not merely what God says they are, but have some independent underpinnings, then reliance on the divine source theory doesn't really get you anywhere.
I won't speak for Baal Habos, but I disagree that the march of time and history necessarily effect "progress" -- if by "progress" you (or Baal Habos) mean ineveitable and necessary movement closer to some positive value or virtue. But I do reject the opposite view, too, which puts ancient texts and understandings on unnecessarily high footing.
To repeat part of my last post:
"Is the Reform conversation about how to lead a moral and ethical life in today's world, in the context of Torah and Jewish tradition and practice, really less relevant and important than studying "business dealings with idol worshippers" or "enforced monogamy vs. polygamy"? I do not think it is merely a question of inflexibility in interpretation, but also a question of being antiquated in light of current life and circumstances."
The three contributors to this blog have similar view on many things, but Steve's response points out one of the differences (perhaps in degree rather than kind) between the three of us.
Steve tends to see less relevance in focusing on traditional issues that are less relevant or applicable to contemporary Jews (dealing with idol-worshippers, etc.), noting that these are "antiquated in light of current life and circumstances."
I tend to see more relevance to such issues than Steve does, especially if one focuses on the deeper structure or premises behind the issue. So, for example, "business dealings with idol worshippers" involves a situation where a Jew has some relationship with a problematic person (the business dealings) but needs to limit the scope of that relationship (because of that person's idol worshiping). The deeper problem, as expressed this way, is directly relevant to all sorts of issues that contemporary people face.; namely, how do you deal with unpleasant or dishonest or less-than-admirable family members, business associates, acquaintances, friends-of-friends, etc.
It also touches on how we view ourselves in contradistinction to The Other. (I barely understand this issue; Diane is the real expert here.)
Steve:
The E dilemma is relevant although not decisive. The problem you have is the typical assumption that "morality" or "ethics" in Torah is predicated on Revelation. No serious examination of the Talmud would lead to that understanding. Plato's E was dealing with a world of gods trying to understand the source for their morality as expressed by men on earth.
Transcendance as given to man qua man, and certainly in Torah, is not about morality; it is about the Divine Ground of Being. It is ontological. The fact that Rabbis were given the authority to over rule the Halacha in the heavenly court (you will recall the laughing Bas Kol when the heavenly court was bested by man's judgment) makes this point in spades.
But you divert, do you not? Come in fact to your self-quote at the end. What is it about Reform that is not nihilistic? You have the problem I mentioned of the infinite regression. That is logic's way of pointing to your destruction of the divine ground of being and replacing it with what exactly?
David -- you noted that part of the reason we lack flexibility is that we do not have a Sanhedrin that can modify the lack. But this itself is the result of this lack of flexibility. The sensible solution is to reinstate the Sanhedrin, but the numerous attempts to do so over the past several centuries have all met with failure.
You also noted various ad hoc methods of smoothing over certain problems (prenups, heters, private rulings, etc.) These certainly work to some degree, but the underlying problem is still there to a large degree. For example, a married couple that did not enter into such a prenup is left with a potential agunah problem.
You also noted the problem with Conservative halacha is that it is not grounded in either divine revelation or the political order, and thus Conservative Jews do not see a need to follow it.
This is indeed a huge practical and theoretical problem.
At a minimum, all of halacha could be viewed as minhag (or custom). It carries some force simply as minhag, although not sufficient force to require adherence in the face of alternative competing concerns. And the more important or beneficial or meaningful one views these practices, the more likely one is to follow them.
In fact, part of the reason for this blog is to provide alternative or additional ways of thinking about Jewish practices, including halacha, so that non-Orthodox Jews (like me) will be more likely to want to follow them.
The issue is whether there is anything more to halacha, from a Conservative perspective. (I exclude Reform here, since Reform expressly claims to be a non-halachic movement.) The Conservative movement has addressed these issues, with varying degrees of success or failure, over the past century, and R. Elliot Dorff has collected these writings and commented on them in his book "The Unfolding Tradition: Jewish Law After Sinai." I'm about 80 pages into this book, although I set it aside for a while to pursue some other books. At some point, I will try to get back to this book, and I will blog about it.
I hope you will stick around for some of these discussions, David. We could use some thoughtful critiques from the Orthodox (as well as the secular) end of the spectrum.
David--
Why is the non-embrace of the traditional view of Torah and Mishnah's divinity equal to the destruction of the divine ground of being?
Steve
"Steve tends to see less relevance in focusing on traditional issues that are less relevant or applicable to contemporary Jews (dealing with idol-worshippers, etc.), noting that these are "antiquated in light of current life and circumstances.
"I tend to see more relevance to such issues than Steve does, especially if one focuses on the deeper structure or premises behind the issue. So, for example, "business dealings with idol worshippers" involves a situation where a Jew has some relationship with a problematic person (the business dealings) but needs to limit the scope of that relationship (because of that person's idol worshiping). The deeper problem, as expressed this way, is directly relevant to all sorts of issues that contemporary people face.; namely, how do you deal with unpleasant or dishonest or less-than-admirable family members, business associates, acquaintances, friends-of-friends, etc."
As you know, I do not reject the value of these traditional sources, nor their remarkable wisdom, nor their applicability to our modern world and to contemporary ethical inquiry.
But having studied Talmud with you, I do wonder whether it's worth it for me -- I repeat, for ME -- on a cost-benefit analysis. One does wade through alot of seemingly tangential material to get to the nuggets. (Reading through classical formulations of the 613 mitzvot must surely strike even traditional Jews as in many instances far afield of practical concerns.)
As lazy as it will surely seem to an Orthodox Jew, I find more value (again, from a cost-benefit analysis) in Telushkin's THE BOOK OF JEWISH VALUES than going straight to the Talmud or the Shulchan Aruch.
More globally, the Reform enterprise of addressing modern concerns within Jewish wisdom and tradition does not strike me as pointless yet alone nihilistic.
I agree. I think our differences here are in degree, rather than kind.
This (comparatively) small issue seems to have opened out onto a variety of very deep philosophical issues which are very interesting, if we wish to pursue them.
The first is the general issue of moral realism. Whether Divinely-given or not, some people not only endorse moral realism, but believe that the only alternative to moral realism is nihilism (aka, by means of an argument I will not rehearse here at this point, moral relativism). Since the latter view is a mistake, it does not provide a reason to believe in moral realism.
So one issue we might want to get clearer on is whether the dispute here is between two different sorts of moral realists (those who believe the correct set of moral principles are God-given and to be found in Torah, and those who believe the correct set of moral principles are to be identified in some other way, though Torah/Talmud might interesting inform that analysis), or between moral realists and moral non-realists -- quite a different dispute.
For what it's worth, I personally am not a moral realist, nor am I a relativist/nihilist. To put it an exceedingly condensed way, I believe morality is another of those products of the human meaning-giving enterprise (art is another and religion still another). I do not believe that in any of these enterprises "success" consists in correspondence between our creation and some independently-given reality (or Reality). But that also does not leave us unable to distinguish the better from the worse, or the deep and profound from the superficial. This is subject to a critique along the lines of the "hermeneutic circle" -- that critique is correct -- and yet, here we are.
For some people, my position may, in fact, be indistinguishable from nihilism -- if morality is something we "make" (which is pretty close to soemthing we "make up"), it can't be MORALITY in the way they desire. So be it. For me, THAT sort of morality does not exist -- but it NEED not, in order for us meaningfully to engage in very nearly all the moral practices we wish to engage in.
To bring this back home, for me, "Torah or nothing" -- the idea that without the Torah, humanity (or Jewish humanity) would be without access to the Divine, or to a reliable guide to life -- is itself just another hermeneutic stance. It is a way of relating to a text. It is not an independently-verifiable truth claim (though it poses as one -- that is the sort of stance it is).
Steve: I will beg your indulgence, but so we don't speak past one another, and assuming your question of the "non-embrace of the traditional view of Torah and Mishnah's divinity" refers to Reform J, why don't you tell me/us exactly what Reform J's moral weltanschauung is built upon?
Now if my assumption is wrong, then permit me to explain. You can reject Torah's call to Revelation in the way Christians have (adopted some other revelation), or even arguably approach the Divine ground of being as the Greeks did through Reason (understood as Plato and company understood that not the way modern men do -- to wit, ratiocination) and still be firmly grounded in the Terms of Existence as given.
But I understood you to argue for Reform J and one can hardly, in my view, claim a divine ground when the truth of existence has become symbol or mathematical physics = certainty and all else = opinion/belief= uncertainty. In other words, it is the replacement of Telos with Certainty.
Not surprisingly, Diane says it much better than I can:
"I believe morality is another of those products of the human meaning-giving enterprise (art is another and religion still another). I do not believe that in any of these enterprises "success" consists in correspondence between our creation and some independently-given reality (or Reality). But that also does not leave us unable to distinguish the better from the worse, or the deep and profound from the superficial. This is subject to a critique along the lines of the "hermeneutic circle" -- that critique is correct -- and yet, here we are. For some people, my position may, in fact, be indistinguishable from nihilism -- if morality is something we "make" (which is pretty close to something we "make up"), it can't be MORALITY in the way they desire. So be it. For me, THAT sort of morality does not exist -- but it NEED not, in order for us meaningfully to engage in very nearly all the moral practices we wish to engage in."
Amen.
I would add that the view does not necessarily deny the existence of God or human access to the divine.
I missed a few comments before including Diane's. Unfortunately, having addressed her comments and by implication Bruce's and Steve's, I somehow deleted them from this comment box and I am rushing and will leave off here.
Diane,
"For some people, my position may, in fact, be indistinguishable from nihilism -- if morality is something we "make" (which is pretty close to soemthing we "make up"), it can't be MORALITY in the way they desire. So be it. For me, THAT sort of morality does not exist -- but it NEED not, in order for us meaningfully to engage in very nearly all the moral practices we wish to engage in."
Ok great - but doesn't this whole moral conception leave you completely impotent if you have any interest in enforcing ethics on others? Just as you choose to 'engage' in a 'moral' enterprise some other guy might choose to 'engage' in a murdering enterprise. How could you possibly convince him not to and by what possible justification would you have to forcibly restrain him?
Orthoprax--
I think this "impotence" to "enforce" ethics on others is a fact of life -- communities (religious or otherwise) ultimately rely on some sort of communal buy-in to live shared ethics.
Societies (and their governments) also rely on actual "enforcement" through forcible means.
The Orthodox community is unique among Jewish denominations in that it has elements of both. But leaving judicial or pseudo-judicial enforcement aside, I would argue that the Orthodox are not "enforcing" their ethical standards any differently than any other Jewish community.
There is exceedingly broad agreement that murder is morally wrong, and at the end of the day that is far more important in forcibly restraining or punishing murders than all of the philosophizing and theoligizing. One could argue that the philosophizing and the theologizing are an important part of achieving this broad communal or societal consensus -- but the murderer remains unconvinced.
Orthoprax --
You raise a couple of interesting questions in a quite concise way. The first is whether the purpose of morality is to give one a standpoint from which to force other people to do things. The second is whether the purpose of moral PHILOSOPHY is to give one a standpoint from which to force other people to do things. In the spirit of Robert Cover's "Nomos and Narrative," I would like to suggest that the thinly-veiled aggression, violence, and desire for domination reflected by those questions has very little, indeed, to do with morality, moral philosophy, religion, or the Divine.
A deeper question lurking inside those questions is how do I convince MYSELF that one such enterprise is superior to another. For the first answer to that, see the Platonic dialogue involving Glaucon.
Still another question is here has to do with the relationship between morality, moral philosophy, and persuasion. It would be nice to believe that the superior view would always persuade the holder of an inferior view. Robert Nozick wrote (amusingly) about the philosopher's desire that the stronger argument would set up vibrations in the head of the target that would cause his head to explode if he didn't agree. But that is not how things are. WHY people fail to be persuaded when we think they "ought" to be is a complex and interesting question. But its answer has little to do with the truth or superiority of the rejected view, I suspect.
Finally, you ask what justification there is for forcibly restraining those whose (let's say) view of the good and/or theory of permissible conduct is inconsistent with mine. That is in part a question of morality -- and mostly a question of politics. What are the legitimate means of coercion is indeed a difficult question -- one you've actually made too easy (in a way) by choosing someone whose view supports murder. What justification do I have for restraining the murderer? The lives of his potential victims. What justification do I have for preventing persons from pursuing versions of the good life repellent to me but not a threat to my life or anyone else's? Now THAT's a difficult question. But pointing to a text, and claiming that an authoritative interpretation of that text permits me to restrain a human being? That just won't wash once at least some members of the community do not accept the authority of that text.
Steve,
"There is exceedingly broad agreement that murder is morally wrong, and at the end of the day that is far more important in forcibly restraining or punishing murders than all of the philosophizing and theoligizing. One could argue that the philosophizing and the theologizing are an important part of achieving this broad communal or societal consensus -- but the murderer remains unconvinced."
But if "morality" just means some abstract method of personal fulfilment then I fail to see how you can come to the conclusion that any act made by another person is right or wrong. You may disagree with the act since it doesn't jive with your 'moral program' but that doesn't get you further justification than if someone preferred chocolate ice cream over your favored vanilla.
Morality must mean something objective - and thereby be justifiable to enforce on others. It doesn't matter at all whether the offender agrees or not because the moral effort isn't bound by subjective preferences.
"Societies (and their governments) also rely on actual "enforcement" through forcible means."
Well, yes - and I have no problem with that. The point is how can you justify such coercion if morality is as objective as music preference?
Diane,
"I would like to suggest that the thinly-veiled aggression, violence, and desire for domination reflected by those questions has very little, indeed, to do with morality, moral philosophy, religion, or the Divine."
Actually I think my points are fundamental issues for practical morality. If moral actions are just means for personal progress, or what have you (I'm rather unclear as to what the purpose of morality is in your understanding), then they have no bearing on true issues of moral importance which must involve other people. One person's preference for Mozart over the Rolling Stones is of no significance. Another person' preference for child sacrifice over prayer as religious acts surely is.
"What justification do I have for restraining the murderer? The lives of his potential victims."
And? What interest do you have in his victims? How does this involve you in your meaning-seeking exercise?
If morality is not based on some objective reality or even some human condition that must be understood as a universally obliging ethic then it just amounts to subjectivity. And I fail to see how your subjective desire for his victims' continued lives trumps his subjective desire to end them.
To go further too, this is a point on justice - suppose he already killed but you are 100% certain he is never to do any violent act for the rest of his life - would you still punish him? If so, based on what?
"But pointing to a text, and claiming that an authoritative interpretation of that text permits me to restrain a human being? That just won't wash once at least some members of the community do not accept the authority of that text."
Of course. I agree. But to base it on noth
Sorry, got cut off:
Of course. I agree. But to base it on nothing (aka subjective preferences) certainly doesn't put you on any stronger ground.
Diane,
"Still another question is here has to do with the relationship between morality, moral philosophy, and persuasion. It would be nice to believe that the superior view would always persuade the holder of an inferior view."
Just for the sake of clarity, I wasn't referring to convincing the other guy as a matter of good rhetoric, but indeed the very concept of 'inferior' and 'superior' positions which inherently imply objective assessment.
You have no standing to convince another guy who prefers chocolate that vanilla is a superior flavor. But you should believe, even theoretically, that there is superior behavior and I believe that undermines any post-modern assertions about subjective-based morality.
This is a difficult conversation to attempt to have in this format -- it reminds me somewhat of my daughter teasing me and a Columbia professor of my acquaintance, for our IM exchanges, single sentences of which exceed the length limit imposed by the software. According to her, we don't "get" IM'ing when we write sentences of this length. And we probably don't "get" blogging, if we think it's the place to hash out these issues.
That having been said...
Your earlier post said, "How could you possibly convince him not to..." You later say, "I wasn't referring to convincing the other guy as a matter of good rhetoric..." However, "convincing" is PRECISELY a practice of rhetoric -- one does not "convince" or attempt to "convince" people about contested matters of fact of which they are mistaken -- for example, 2+2=4. Someone who thinks it's 5 misunderstands something (about numbers, about arithmetic, about the meaning of the sign '+') -- that person needs enlightenment, or redefinition, or clarification -- not "convincing." Same thing goes for someone who does not believe, for example, that the Moon is a small planet that goes around the Earth. We do not "convince" people of such things. Realists (about math and science) would say we "prove" them, or "demonstrate" them. Anti-realists would say something different -- but it would be along the lines of bringing people simultaneously into a shared language and a shared worldview -- and once you have those, you can adjudicate the claims to truth of propositions like 2+2=4 and "the Moon is a small planet that goes around the earth." (And you can do so without reference to God, or to what "is".)
VERY robust moral realists would say that claims like "murder is wrong" are of precisely the same kind, and they require only "proving" or "demonstration" (not "convincing"). A moral realist-intuitionist would say that proof/demonstration consists in a certain kind of reflection. A religious moral realist would say the proof consists in pointing to an authoritative revealed text. A natural law moral realist would point to -- well, "natural laws" I guess! The problem I have with your position is not your robust realism -- I don't share it, but I understand it. The problem is that you seem, like many realists, to think the ONLY alternative to your brand of realism is complete subjectivism/relativism/anything goes (what you also call "nothing"). You think your view is not only true, but NECESSARILY true. That is simply not the case, and insisting that it is, does not make it so. It IS correct that once one is not a realist (with a correspondence theory of truth), the criteria of superiority and inferiority among moral views becomes MUCH slipperier -- no doubt about it. Some of what we want -- like confidence about who we can kill with impunity -- we probably won't get. I agree that at the end of that spectrum lies chocoolate/vanilla and Mozart/Rolling S
(oops! too long here also...)
Mozart/Rolling Stones. You might want to attend to the fact that in looking for examples of "pure" subjectivity, you slip over from ethics into aesthetics (Kant's Critique of Judgment, what laypeople would call "taste"). De gustibus non disputandum est, as they say -- and yet people DO dispute, endlessly -- and some people get the better of those disputes. It is one of several anti-realist moves, in the end, to unify ethics and aesthetics on the ground of aesthetics -- and I can understand why that might look to you like nihilism, but it is not.
I believe that, in the end, "convincing" people about morality is like convincing them about matters of taste -- not easy, but not impossible either, and no shortcuts are allowed by way of the Divine. Put another way, a moral ideal of human life is very much like an aesthetic ideal of human life, and in the end, I believe one is either "moved" or not moved by it. The Greek tragedians figured this out, and I think it is the deepest reading of the Talmud's ideal of halakhic man as well (though that's another conversation). It is a terrifyingly unmoored universe, and we're all in it together -- the security we want, is not to be had.
Many religionists [my addition] "think the ONLY alternative to your brand of realism is complete subjectivism/relativism/anything goes (what you also call "nothing"). You think your view is not only true, but NECESSARILY true. That is simply not the case, and insisting that it is, does not make it so. It IS correct that once one is not a realist (with a correspondence theory of truth), the criteria of superiority and inferiority among moral views becomes MUCH slipperier -- no doubt about it."
"It is a terrifyingly unmoored universe, and we're all in it together -- the security we want, is not to be had."
Yes, yes, yes! This is where Diane and I are in violent agreement.
And what's more -- Diane also makes this point, but in passing to other territory -- "convincing" others of this realist view is NO DIFFERENT in any practical way than convincing people of any other view, whether about morality or cuisine. How does one PROVE these things?
But I am always puzzled why so many religious people find this reality so troubling. As Diane points out, the unrepentant murderer is the "easy case" as a practical matter -- there is no serious debate going on anywhere in the world about whether murder is a good idea, only how to stop it (including in places where it is tragically commonplace). And this is ultimately a question of politics and governments.
Indeed, the harder question is how to define and lead the good life.
For me, personally, the beauty and importance of Judaism does not lie in its power to "dictate" or "convince" that murder or theft or adultery is wrong. (However, as I noted in my prior post, Judaism was critical in helping to develop this broad consensus.) Rather, it lies in a system of study, prayer, and communal observance and activity that encourages simple kindness and justice (and, very importantly, helps define what these consist of). I would argue that the consensus on murder or theft is much broader than the consensus on visiting the sick or being patient.
The ultimate "test" of Judaism, and other religions, and other modes of governing one's life, is whether their principles and practice (and especially the latter) make people's lives better -- not whether they meet some "objective truth" test. (On the other hand, if they are demonstrably inconsistent with our experience and understanding of reality, this can lead to all sorts of practical problems in putting stock in them. As I see it, this is where most of Orthodoxy finds itself.)
And when I say making people's lives better, I do not mean only the adherents.
And, yes, this too is not something that can be objectively "proven." But we can at least empiracally test whether people are better off by visiting the sick (and being visited when sick); by respecting their parents (and being respected by their children); by keeping Shabbat; by keeping kosher than by not doing these things.
And empirically speaking, I really can spell empirical. At least some of the time.
Diane,
"However, "convincing" is PRECISELY a practice of rhetoric -- one does not "convince" or attempt to "convince" people about contested matters of fact of which they are mistaken -- for example, 2+2=4. Someone who thinks it's 5 misunderstands something (about numbers, about arithmetic, about the meaning of the sign '+') -- that person needs enlightenment, or redefinition, or clarification -- not "convincing.""
Um, I think you're making a big deal about nothing much here. All you guys are lawyers, aren't you? The question of whether your client is guilty of the crime or not is an objective fact - but you still need to convince the jury of it.
In a similar way ought we talk about morality in general. We don't need to rely on some 'divine book of client guilt' but we do rely on rational argument which corresponds to reality.
"You think your view is not only true, but NECESSARILY true. That is simply not the case, and insisting that it is, does not make it so."
I don't think it's necessarily true as a matter of theory, but as a matter of morality we must consider it so for morality to mean anything at all. If morality is not about right and wrong but 'what moves you' then if can mean virtually anything. No doubt many people are 'moved' by sex, power, money, etc.
"It IS correct that once one is not a realist (with a correspondence theory of truth), the criteria of superiority and inferiority among moral views becomes MUCH slipperier -- no doubt about it."
Ok, so explain to me how morality is different from being merely a matter of taste. If there is no difference then I can dismiss any moral argument as easily as I dismiss the effete reviews of restaurant critics.
"You might want to attend to the fact that in looking for examples of "pure" subjectivity, you slip over from ethics into aesthetics"
I didn't slip - it was intentional. It's clearly absurd to penalize people for listening to the wrong kind of music so it's equally absurd to penalize people based on moral lapses if they're both based on the same philosophical construct. Murderer/Healer = Mozart/Rolling Stones.
Steve,
"And what's more -- Diane also makes this point, but in passing to other territory -- "convincing" others of this realist view is NO DIFFERENT in any practical way than convincing people of any other view, whether about morality or cuisine. How does one PROVE these things?"
There are several ways to argue about an objective ethic - particularly regarding social utility. One can have subjective beliefs about the magnificence of murder, but a society which accepted such a concept wouldn't be likely to be very successful. Alternatively we can show how valuing one's own life cannot be rationally reconciled with devaluing the lives of others. And so on.
"But I am always puzzled why so many religious people find this reality so troubling. As Diane points out, the unrepentant murderer is the "e
Cont'...
"But I am always puzzled why so many religious people find this reality so troubling. As Diane points out, the unrepentant murderer is the "easy case" as a practical matter -- there is no serious debate going on anywhere in the world about whether murder is a good idea, only how to stop it"
How convenient. The fact that there is no debate is testament to the fact that most everyone recognizes the moral imperative of human life. But you, in your subjectively-based morality, cannot rely on a common belief to justify oppression of those who follow a different subjectively-based morality. Murderers aren't wrong, they just don't agree with you.
I'm not worried as a practical matter - I'm demonstrating the bankruptcy of your position.
"Indeed, the harder question is how to define and lead the good life.
For me, personally, the beauty and importance of Judaism does not lie in its power to "dictate" or "convince" that murder or theft or adultery is wrong."
That may be, but I'm not talking about Judaism in particular. I'm talking about morality.
"But we can at least empiracally test whether people are better off by visiting the sick (and being visited when sick); by respecting their parents (and being respected by their children)..."
Indeed - and this is one way how one can objectively demonstrate a good or bad ethic. By looking at its fruit.
It would be helpful, in my view, not to refer to positions you do not understand well enough to agree or disagree with them as "bankrupt." You continue to insist that the only choices are moral realism of an extremely robust type (with "correspondence" to objective reality, etc.) -- and nihilism. Those are simply not the only two choices. There are more choices in ethical theory between objective and subjective (and your remarks about ways to prove an objective ethics -- social utility and so on, will not, I'm afraid, take you where you want to go.)
You ask me to do what I have already said cannot, in the end, be done -- to distinguish between ethics and aesthetics. That suggests you did not understand my prior post -- which was precisely to the point that in the end, the one reduces to the other Maybe I should say a few things about which way the reduction works and why that matters, because you also seem not to understand that.
You start from the standpoint that aesthetics is subjective, and that there is no genuinely better and worse. You then suggest that in reducing ethics to aesthetics, I reduce ethics to something subjective. But I reject that approach. I don't think aesthetics is subjective in the way you do ("anything goes"). I think the enduring ideals of the person are inextricably both aesthetic and ethical -- and NEITHER is either objective or subjective in the way you use those terms (i.e., objective = ONE way is right, subjective = NO ways are right). I think there is more than one (but not an infinite number) of equally deep, profound, worthwhile, valuable, and yet distinctively different ways to be a human being. Judaism has no monopoly -- which is not to say it is not one of those ways, because it assuredly is. The "fruit" of EVERY ethic is the many people who live in and under it, together with all the products of that culture. Again -- here, Judaism has no monopoly on the beautiful, worthwhile, etc. None of these ethics is "truer" than the others.
And finally...
I will make a point familiar to lawyers, law students, and law professors (well-represented in this group), but clearly unknown to you. You "convince" juries because you are persuading them -- NOT reaching "the truth." Juries do not find "the truth." If what we cared most about was the truth, we would not have, for example, the exclusionary rule (Israel doesn't have it, for example). The way evidence "proves" things in court, is very different from the way evidence "proves" things in a laboratory -- to the extent of being almost a pun on the term. Your repeated use of language of persuasion indicates your concern is with power and coercion, not truth. These concerns are distinct -- although in our world, those who exercise power (especially life and death power) are deeply invested also in being "right" and knowing "the truth."
OP - I think a definition or an explanation of your terms can help clarify this debate a little.
We commonly call a fact objectively true if it accurately describes a corresponding external objective reality. And I think this is the way you are using this term. (There are lots of philosophical issues and problems with this, many of which I don't understand, all of which Diane understands, and all of which I am skipping over). For example, if I say "My dog Fido weighs 25 pounds" (and everyone knows what all these words mean), the statement is true if there is an actual dog Fido and he weighs 25 pounds. And one could verify this by finding and weighing Fido.
But if you say "Stealing is wrong" what exactly is the objective thing that this corresponds to? We know what stealing is (putting aside borderline cases here), but what does the predicate "is wrong" mean and why do you call it objective.
Diane,
"It would be helpful, in my view, not to refer to positions you do not understand well enough to agree or disagree with them as "bankrupt.""
I apologize if you don't like the term, but as a theory of any moral weight whatsoever it does accurately represent how I understand your position.
"You ask me to do what I have already said cannot, in the end, be done -- to distinguish between ethics and aesthetics. That suggests you did not understand my prior post -- which was precisely to the point that in the end, the one reduces to the other"
I understood that that is what you said, but I don't understand how you don't see the consequences of your position or that you consider them acceptable.
"I don't think aesthetics is subjective in the way you do ("anything goes"). I think the enduring ideals of the person are inextricably both aesthetic and ethical"
Ok, here's the question that will cut through all this: according to you, is it possible for a person to have a "deep, profound, worthwhile, [and] valuable" "way to [be] a human being" that lauds the murder of children?
If yes then your moral theory *is* 'anything goes.' If not, then I think you must accept some form of moral realism.
I purposefully chose murder at the very beginning because it's the most obvious case of *wrong* but if your theory cannot account for it then it shows a striking weakness in your way of thinking.
"You "convince" juries because you are persuading them -- NOT reaching "the truth." Juries do not find "the truth.""
So the conclusions of any given legal system has no correspondence to reality? Of course it does. And the best legal system is the one which has the _most_ correspondence to reality.
Of course all legal systems exist within a larger society and sometimes the interests of particular justice doesn't jive with the interests of general society so things like the exclusionary rule are invoked, but that's not particularly relevant one way or the other. To note, scientific research of all stripes have ethical guidelines too and papers will not be published if they blatantly violate them.
I know the legal system is not a science - but I also think that's true of the moral enterprise. We use rather crude methods of ascertaining the 'moral truth' but it's really, at best, an approximation of lasting moral ideals.
"Your repeated use of language of persuasion indicates your concern is with power and coercion, not truth."
Actually I'm interested in both. But, pointedly, if you cannot say why a murderer ought to be penalized then your uncoercive search for meaning is of no consequence to anyone but yourself - though it is detrimental to the public pursuit of justice.
Bruce,
"But if you say "Stealing is wrong" what exactly is the objective thing that this corresponds to? We know what stealing is (putting aside borderline cases here), but what does the predicate "is wrong" mean and why do you call it objective."
What 'wrong' means in it's most true sense is an abstraction akin to some Platonic form that means "that which humans ought not do."
Practically we can only assess what is 'wrong' through limited methods in terms of social loss, pain and suffering, loss of potential, etc. In part, based on our common human condition there is an ideal code by which humans ought to behave and through which we collectively maximize peace, health, material comfort, emotional security and so on.
These are objective methods and objective goals. This is not an exhaustive explanation but it's a good place to start.
What 'wrong' means in it's most true sense is an abstraction akin to some Platonic form that means "that which humans ought not do."
The problem as I see it is that terms like "ought" are prescriptive, not descriptive.
Under this definition, wrongness will be different for different people and different societies. Now, this does not deny the possibility that some actions will be wrong for all people and all societies (analogous to the economist's "corner solution").
Let me offer a simple but I think illustrative example. Suppose you have an cow and do not build a fence to keep her in. She wanders into your neighbor's yard and tramples her petunias. Were you morally wrong, or similarly, were you legally negligent?
One would think yes. After all, you could have prevented your cow from doing so. And in fact this is the law in most places (called "fence-in" jurisdictions).
But some more rural areas are "fence-out" jurisdictions. There, grazing animals are common, and they often graze in common areas. It is not negligent there to fail to fence in an animal; instead the burden is on others (your petunia-growing neighbor here) to fence out such animals. If she wants to protect her petunias, she needs to build a fence around them.
Thus, the legality and the morality of this situation depends on the economic conditions, the societal relations between these people and the animals and the land, and custom and expectations. There is no objectively correct answer here; once you start asking the deeper questions, you get a lot of "it depends" as responses.
I think the more serious ethical situations (stealing, murder) work the same way. Stealing depends on complex views of property rights, of ownership, and of the self and others. In our culture, I feel confident that stealing is wrong. And we could have a long discussion about the lines you have suggested and show how this accomplishes the exactly goals you have identified: reducing "social loss, pain and suffering, loss of potential" and maximizing "peace, health, material comfort, emotional security and so on."
In a different society, governed by different social rules, this discussion would look different. But in every case that I can think of, the discussion would come out the same: stealing is wrong.
Perhaps some details around the edges would differ. I could imagine a society where some of the the ethical rules involving the use of public goods (copying software or movies or ideas, for example) would be different.
But the analysis of why stealing is wrong would have the same general structure as why fencing in your cow is wrong.
Importantly, none of this suggests that the analysis is arbitrary or can be varied for convenience. It cannot. And this does not suggest that the issue is trivial.
Bruce,
"The problem as I see it is that terms like "ought" are prescriptive, not descriptive."
Well, yeah. That's the classic is-ought problem.
"Under this definition, wrongness will be different for different people and different societies."
Within limits, yes. Naturally humans tend to come with baggage, be it cultural, situational, what have you and that will impact the ideal ethical code. But it's only a matter of pragmatic compromise not fundamental differences in ethics.
"Now, this does not deny the possibility that some actions will be wrong for all people and all societies (analogous to the economist's "corner solution")."
Of course. This is key. Just as we see repeating patterns from wildly different organisms (think blood vessels, nerves and tree branches/roots) there is a common moral denominator between all human societies. It's no secret that the golden rule has popped up independently from most societies in one form or another.
I'll just pick up on a few threads here.
First, you conflate Platonism (the strongest possible sort of realism about ethics or anything else) with utilitarianism. That is such a wildly optimistic view of human history and human nature that it beggars credulity. Why in the world should it turn out that the "right" thing do, independently of outcomes (Platonism), is also the right thing to do, BECAUSE of its outcomes (u'ism)? Here, the Heideggerian comment is apt (as it so often is): Only a God can save us. And by "us", here, I mean YOU. Only a God could insure the equation you make. It would be super-terrific if that turned out to be true. But argumentatively, it's fatal to the persuasive project of a secular ethics.
I DO see the consequences of my position (i.e., that ethics and aesthetics reduce to one another). Those consequences are terrifying. But they are no less real, for being terrifying (cf global warming). Your view is akin to saying that my view is "too bad to be true." But that is a non sequitur -- the badness of the outcome is not a proof of the truth of the alternative! This is why we MUST come to grips with Heidegger -- anything else is simply moral wishful thinking (I believe this is the most accurate gloss on moral realism).
As for the best legal system being the one that most reliably finds truth -- NO WAY. There are methods of torture dramatically more accurate than the Federal Rules of Evidence -- but I don't endorse them, notwithstanding their lower error rate where truth is concerned. I have other values, and I wouldn't take a 1% increase in truth against any increase in torture. You disagree?
And finally, "lauds the murder of children." Well, it all depends on how you define and classify. Does a society that permits abortion, euthanasia, or fertility treatment involving selective reduction "laud the murder of children"? Did the U.S. in using an atomic weapon arguably to end the war "laud the murder of children"? Does the U.S. today, in fighting in Iraq instead of relieving AIDS in Africa "laud the murder of children"? Does a society with a juvenile death penalty "laud the murder of children"? Or does a society WITHOUT the juvenile death penalty "laud the murder of children" (their victims)? Are you asking about what we SAY, or what we DO?
Diane,
"Why in the world should it turn out that the "right" thing do, independently of outcomes (Platonism), is also the right thing to do, BECAUSE of its outcomes (u'ism)?"
That's not what I said. Things are not right _because_ of their consequences, but only that we can objectively measure the 'rightness' of an act by its consequences. I say that intrinsic to the human constitution is an ideal ethical code that induces optimal circumstances - like how certain temperatures and pressures conspire to make water freeze, but we didn't learn of this relationship until we actually went out and measured them. I think this is almost obvious.
"Your view is akin to saying that my view is "too bad to be true." But that is a non sequitur -- the badness of the outcome is not a proof of the truth of the alternative!"
That's true. It is of no ontological help whatsoever. But morality has no meaning in your view of things (as evidenced through the pointed question which you refused to answer) and I say that one actually has a moral obligation to believe that morality is real. Otherwise you are theoretically permitting child murder and what have you as long as the other guy finds it meaningful.
"As for the best legal system being the one that most reliably finds truth -- NO WAY. There are methods of torture dramatically more accurate than the Federal Rules of Evidence -- but I don't endorse them, notwithstanding their lower error rate where truth is concerned. I have other values, and I wouldn't take a 1% increase in truth against any increase in torture. You disagree?"
I see that you don't permit unqualified statements. Clearly a decent legal system has interests besides truth. Like justice, for instance. And torturing innocent men would eggregiously be poor service to justice. But within the conditions of a decent legal system, those which find more in accordance with reality are better than those which find less.
"And finally, "lauds the murder of children." Well, it all depends on how you define and classify."
Don't try to warp the question. Take the most obscene form of child torture and murder you can imagine and a given 'moral' system that approves of it and practices it daily and tell me whether you think that can be an equally "deep, profound, worthwhile, [and] valuable" "way to [be] a human being" as your personal subjective system.
I think I'm in the middle here.
I agree with Diane on the basics, but I'm not so sure that the situation is quite that bad. And I agree with OP on some of his conclusions, although not his reasoning.
Within any system, even aesthetic systems, there can still be correct and incorrect answers to important questions that are not a matter of will or free choice. To take the trivial example we have been using, if someone really does prefer vanilla to chocolate, that person cannot simply choose to like chocolate better. The person can choose to eat chocolate, but in doing so will actually have made an aesthetic mistake. (Note that foods are not the best example here, since most of us prefer variety and sometimes choose chocolate and sometimes choose vanilla (except for my wife, who always chooses chocolate). But take any person's choice at any particular time, and my example works.)
A better example might be the comparison between vanilla ice cream and sauerkraut-salami ice cream. That is obviously a subjective choice, but given the way people are constituted, everyone will prefer vanilla.
The easy ethical issues (murder, stealing) might fall within this category. Starting with any reasonable idea of ethics, it would not be too hard to show that murder or stealing is unethical.
As a purely descriptive matter, stealing will increase unhappiness, make people feel less secure, violate our sense of what is ours, lead to an inefficient allocation of resources (since the thief might value the stolen object less than the victim), lead to an unnecessary "arms race" of better protection and better stealing tools and methods, etc. The thief must reduce the dignity, value, and importance of the victim in his own mind, and this leads to a general coarsening of attitudes and the promotion of a radical selfishness. It reduces the ability to love, or even like, others.
For someone to argue that stealing is ethical, one would have to accept the above facts as true but argue that they are somehow desirable or beneficial. Although some aspects of what is desirable or beneficial vary based on people and societies, some do not. And while I won't say that the results of stealing could never be beneficial or desirable, I cannot imagine any society or person --- even in theory --- for whom and which this would be good. Stealing here is like sauerkraut-salami ice cream.
Thus, I agree with Diane that there are no a priori ethical rules and they these rules are ultimately relative and subjective. But they cannot necessarily be freely chosen and are not a matter of will, but instead are largely a function of human nature. Thus, I also agree with OP that there are some easy ethical rules that as a practical matter are the same in every known and conceivable culture (although I leave open the theoretical possibility that this might not always hold).
If this is right, I think it is inspiring, not dispiriting. Instead of looking fo
If this is right, I think it is inspiring, not dispiriting. Instead of looking for otherworldly reasons for rules of conduct, we need to focus on what these rules accomplish and why this is good and bad. And there is a lot of creative and persuasive work for people to do. Doing so will make the world a better place, or, equivalently, bring godliness into the world. And that's pretty inspiring.
Bruce,
"A better example might be the comparison between vanilla ice cream and sauerkraut-salami ice cream. That is obviously a subjective choice, but given the way people are constituted, everyone will prefer vanilla.
...The easy ethical issues (murder, stealing) might fall within this category."
I think I may be repeating myself at this point, but don't you see the major problem in your theory? Ethics are just a matter of taste!? Would you punish someone for eating sauerkraut-salami ice cream? You've completely pulled the rug out from anyone holding any sort of moral authority.
"For someone to argue that stealing is ethical, one would have to accept the above facts as true but argue that they are somehow desirable or beneficial."
Does somebody first need to argue that he prefers sauerkraut-salami ice cream? Would you try to stop a person if he was going to eat some? How do you make the leap from subjective preference to morality? I'm just not seeing it. "I don't like" does not equal "that is wrong."
I think that you're somehow conflating utilitarianism with emotivism but they're really not the same thing.
"Thus, I agree with Diane that there are no a priori ethical rules and they these rules are ultimately relative and subjective."
Well, this here directs a much wider philosophical point. Ultimately I believe that everything of importance is 'a priori' simply because I don't believe in massive coincidences. I don't believe the human condition is a fluke of nature. That we are the lucky (or cursed) recipients of blind circumstance. That being the case, what is 'built in' to our beings, part and parcel of the human constitution determine codes of behavior that lead to ideal harmony.
At the moment of the Big Bang there were no atoms, no chemical bonds, no electrons circling protons and yet somehow the rules of hydrogen bonding between water molecules were 'a priori' written in the fabric of creation. Morality is like this.
The different moral codes demonstrated by existing societies is like what happens to the freezing temperature of water when you mix in impurities like salt. The equilibrium shifts but it's still on the chart.
Naturally you don't need to agree with my big-view understanding, but you can still recognize (as you have) that humans are still basically the same. Basic commonalities in ethical constructs display our common conditions.
Ethics are just a matter of taste!? Would you punish someone for eating sauerkraut-salami ice cream?
Maybe --- it sounds pretty terrible. On the other hand, maybe eating sauerkraut-salami ice cream is punishment enough. : )
You raise 2 questions: the basis of ethics and the reasons for punishment.
I would not punish the ice cream eater because they are only harming themselves. But if someone steals my car, they are harming me.
I think most people who steal do so without trying to justify their actions in any deep way. They would agree that stealing is wrong, but they did so anyway.
But if they did not agree, the clash of ethical views is unavoidable. Either they will steal and harm me (in my view) or I will prevent them and thereby harm them (in their view).
Let me back up and ask you what you would say to a person who argued that stealing was morally acceptable. You probably would start with the obvious stuff (see my last comment). But suppose the person responded by asserting that he just did not see things that way. Life would be just fine if people treated others poorly; that's fun for both parties if you just look at it the right way. Life would be more exciting if no one were secure in their possessions. Think of the glory if you were able to take something from someone important, or the glory if you prevented a great thief from stealing from you. The opportunity for such glory would greatly dwarf the relatively small benefits of just having stuff. Etc. And suppose he was perfectly serious, had thought this all out, and just had a sincerely-held but idiosyncratic view of the world. What could you say to this person?
Ultimately, I don't think there is much you could say. I fully admit that his psychological makeup is sufficiently different from mine, and that for him and people like him, a society that permitted stealing would make sense.
And that's fine. But for me and people like me, it does not. And our society is made up of people like me, and so he better not steal here. I have no problem preventing him from stealing here. But if he formed a new country with people like him that permitted stealing, I wouldn't claim it was unethical in any serious way, only really weird.
Of course, this is all an overextended hypothetical. There are no such people like that. But it is a good heuristic, and it does focus us on the reason that stealing is unethical. It is not because it matches up with some Platonic form, but because of much more pragmatic concerns.
Bruce,
"Ultimately, I don't think there is much you could say. I fully admit that his psychological makeup is sufficiently different from mine, and that for him and people like him, a society that permitted stealing would make sense."
See, I just cannot conscience a worldview that lends moral equivalency to the horrors of history. Even with fear of accidentally tripping Godwin's law, the truth is that when I'm talking about the philosophy of morality the Holocaust is not far from my mind. If a given philosophy cannot, with due clarity, call Nazi society evil then it is a failed moral theory.
"Let me back up and ask you what you would say to a person who argued that stealing was morally acceptable."
I would say that he's wrong. He is factually incorrect that stealing would lead to a lasting society. It's also internally inconsistent to value your own property while undermining the concept of property through legitimizing stealing. His selfish nihilism is a danger to all of human progress and society and all of humanity should consider him an enemy.
It sounds to me that the foundations of Bruce's ethical system are not very far from the foundations of natural law theory.
1. Bruce agrees that most people hold many basic values in common. Therefore he would agree that a non-subjective moral argument can made in some cases. If Bruce meets someone who thinks arson and theft are permissible, but who holds the exact same values as Bruce regarding property, security, and family, Bruce could convince him to change his mind by showing that the prohibition of stealing and arson are good ways for this person to pursue his values.
2. A small fraction of humans have values that do not match up with the prohibitions of stealing, arson, and murder. Bruce doesn't say he's wrong, but he does say that "his psychological makeup is sufficiently different from mine". And it's also clear that Bruce thinks this guy's makeup is different than the vast majority of people.
So it's not that much of a jump from this position to saying that this guy has a psychological defect of some kind. He is unwell. So perhaps it would be better if he were cured.
Only one more jump is needed: This "unwell" person, due to his odd of values, cannot achieve true happiness. His pursuit of pleasure has become warped, like the drug addict whose compulsion to seek out short-term gratification prevents long-term satisfaction. Therefore, this "unwell" person is unwell not only by our standards, but even by his own standards if he could see deeply enough into himself. This means that we can, without imposing our values in an improper way, take (limited) steps towards helping this person to become "well".
I am not suggesting that Bruce woudl support this step. I'm just pointing out that the distance from Bruce's view and natural law theory isn't that great. Because once this step is taken, we concede that there is an underlying value system (perhaps a very limited one) that all human beings have, unless they are sick, and even the sick ones will be happier if they become well. And there is some system of norms (perhaps a very limited one) that can be imposed on people in pursuit of these common values.
3. Of course, a theistic natural law system takes one more step: These core values were placed in human beings by God.
Once this point is reached, the debate between those who say that God's commandments are arbitrary, and those who say that morality is independent of God, is revealed to be a false dichotomy. God could not, on Sinai, have commanded us to commit murder and arson. This would be contrary to human nature. But this nature was created by God, and therefore is not independent of it. On some other planet, God may have created a species whose innate good is furthered by murder and arson, but we are not such a species.
OP wrote:
I would say that he's wrong. He is factually incorrect that stealing would lead to a lasting society. It's also internally inconsistent to value your own property while undermining the concept of property through legitimizing stealing. His selfish nihilism is a danger to all of human progress and society and all of humanity should consider him an enemy.
This sophisticate proponent of murder would agree with all that --- he would just value other things.
This person would agree with all your "facts on the ground." He would agree with you about the way the world works and your characterization of things. The would agree that his ethical rules might lead to an unstable society, are internally inconsistent in that individuals value themselves differently than others, can be described as "selfish nihilism", are dangers, and others who disagree should consider him an enemy.
But, he would argue that other values trump. Think Nietzsche here. For example, he might argue that your petty values are all less important than glory, bloodlust, and victory. In his society, people can be champions. They can defeat other great champions, and be the best, in the ultimate match of live and death. They murder and get murdered, and live with danger, risk, and heroism. If they survive, they have lived life to the fullest, and they know it. There is nothing better than that.
What do you have to offer, he would ask. Stability? To sit at Starbucks and drink coffee, to do little good deeds for each other, to slave away at some dull job, get money, and collect petty trinkets. This is not life. Give each of these people a double-sided battle axe and let the last one standing collect all the others' trinkets as booty. That's life! The losers die as real men, and the winner knows he is the ultimate heroic champion.
In other words, the murder proponent would not disagree with any of your facts. He would simply value other things more. I would say his world would be a terrible place, but I cannot show this to be the case the way that I can show that water is made up of hydrogen and oxygen.
Yes, this is the classic is-ought distinction, and I think Hume was right: you cannot get an ought from an is. You cannot show this murder-advocate that he is making a factual error. He is not. Only that his world is undesirable. And here, really undesirable.
Does this reduce to ice cream flavor perferences. Not at all. They are in the same category --- normative values --- but that are at extreme ends of the spectrum.
I think Larry's description is largely accurate. Some people with really odd values might actually be mentally ill. I don't have any good insights into this complicated but important area.
I'm not sure that this point, though, allows people to completely escape the Euthyphro dilemma. Certainly some ethical values derive from the way we are (e.g., stealing, arson), and thus are not arbitrary. They are dependent upon God as creator but not as lawgiver. That is, if God had created us and the world but never said not to steal, it would still be wrong to steal. As such, divine commands serve an informative function: they let us know what is already wrong.
And of course some people believe that we and the world came into being without God. If so, ethical and God would be independent.
The Euthyphro dilemma has an important implication that Larry's point does not address (and which I think Larry would agree). It refutes the argument that without divine commands there can be no real or meaningful ethics. Is does so by noting that any particular good or bad act is either good or bad independently of whether God said so, or the only reason it is good or bad is that God said so, and thus it is arbitrary.
I do very much agree with your last point.
Indeed, I would go further than that. God cannot do things that are contrary to his own nature (for example, he cannot lie, nor can he wish that he didn't exist). Therefore, having created us with a nature that contains certain embedded ethics, he could not have given commandments on Sinai contrary to these ethics that he had embedded in us.
Of course, there is a separate question as to whether some of God's commands concern things that our nature does not weigh in on at all. God could not have endorsed murder, but could he have endorsed eating lobster or a five-day week instead of seven? (My answer is yes, but this thread has probably gone on too long....)
I'll try to keep it brief, but I'll probably fail! And I'll try to apply the philosophical principle of charity I learned at John Rawls' knee, because arguing against *bad* versions of an argument is much less useful than arguing against *good* ones.
To go from Divine creation and robust moral realism, to natural law, is truly to leap out of the frying pan and into the roaring inferno (argumentatively speaking).
To say that the consequences for the way we live, prove or disprove the "truth" of moral claims...well, we're killing the planet and the 20th century was the most murderous ever, so I guess that disproves the usefulness of what we were given at Sinai? Or, does the argument go a different way?
My position was never that *every* possible ideal of the human being is as good as *every* other one. Only that there might be more than EXACTLY ONE ideal. Before things went off the rails with a country full of Nietzschean ubermenschen thieving salami-ice-cream-eaters, I thought attention was moving in the right direction -- as I read history, both Classical Greece and medieval Europe (to take our own intellectual forebears, leaving aside Africa and Asia) present ideals of the person almost unrecoverable for us. Universalism in ethics as in all things is a fantasy (and in fact, it too was "invented" at a particular place and time)(which wasn't Sinai).
Bruce,
"In other words, the murder proponent would not disagree with any of your facts. He would simply value other things more. I would say his world would be a terrible place, but I cannot show this to be the case the way that I can show that water is made up of hydrogen and oxygen."
True, but if we project out this kind of perspective on a global scale how long do you think it would last? People would fear for their safety and immediately form cooperative groups to protect each other from the murderous Nietzcheans. From there we see the basic foundations of society and moral values. Being pro-murder is not a tenable perspective for the human condition.
"Does this reduce to ice cream flavor perferences. Not at all. They are in the same category --- normative values --- but that are at extreme ends of the spectrum."
I don't know how the spectrum matters. What if people *really* dislike vanilla ice cream?
Diane,
"To say that the consequences for the way we live, prove or disprove the "truth" of moral claims...well, we're killing the planet and the 20th century was the most murderous ever, so I guess that disproves the usefulness of what we were given at Sinai? Or, does the argument go a different way?"
It might if it were specific or relevant, but it's pretty clear that the great murderers of the 20th century were not following any moral contruct that included "don't murder" as a precept.
"My position was never that *every* possible ideal of the human being is as good as *every* other one. Only that there might be more than EXACTLY ONE ideal."
Ok, so we're getting somewhere - you agree then that there are ideals of the human condition, that situations exist where people are objectively better or worse off? The question for you now is how you differentiate between any one of those ideals and child murder.
True, but if we project out this kind of perspective on a global scale how long do you think it would last?
But how long things last is itself a value, and one that our "Nietzschean ubermenschen thieving salami-ice-cream-eater" does not care about. Permanence is a value only for little people, he would reply. As I march into town with my battle axe (or uzi, or whatever), I'm thinking of being a heroic champion, with blood and gore galore. I'm thinking of glory, not little concerns about whether something will last or whether I can will something to be a universal maxim or how my victims will feel. If they feel that bad, let them try to kill me. Good luck! Ha! Now, where's my sauerkraut-salami ice cream?
In other words, the ubermench will agree with all your factual assertions and consequence predictions. But he cares about different things than you do.
I just don't see any way you can win this argument on factual grounds.
Bruce,
"In other words, the ubermench will agree with all your factual assertions and consequence predictions. But he cares about different things than you do."
He can believe whatever he wants, but the facts are that a human society cannot last with his system in place. It is intrinsically unstable - anarchy _always_ falls into some sort of leadership structure eventually.
His system is not consonant with human nature and is doomed to failure.
Separately, I do confess that my basic assumption in morality is to care about human beings and humanity. Consider it a moral axiom. Every single human construct - be it math, physics, law, history, whatever depends on unprovable axioms. The moral construct is no different.
"Ok, so we're getting somewhere - you agree then that there are ideals of the human condition, that situations exist where people are objectively better or worse off? The question for you now is how you differentiate between any one of those ideals and child murder."
That there is more than one ideal of the person is NOT, at all, to concede that "situations exist where people are objectively better or worse off." Why in the world would you think the latter follows from the former?
And as for what "lasts"...on the one hand, as John Maynard Keynes said, "In the long run, we're all dead." And on the other hand (maybe it's the same hand?), the honor-and-glory oriented ideal of classical Greece lasts and lasts. So too the Abrahamic ideal. So too, the Buddhist ideal. So too, the Confucian ideal. Maybe also the Jesus ideal, and the Mohammed ideal (they're comparatively new). But they are most assuredly NOT the same as one another.
All manner of unrelated things are being conflated here. Chinese and Hindu societies are arguably among the most stable -- and radically unjust -- of any that have ever existed. Experiments in democracy are fragile. What of it?
And -- please spare us the claim that only YOU (representing moral realism) "care about human beings and humanity." EVERYONE, in every system, cares about (at least some) human beings, and (at least some) aspects of humanity. Which ones? That's the question.
And moreover, what you are asking for (from the likes of me, and maybe Bruce, and maybe Steve), is that we try or pretend to believe something you think the world needs in order to put it on a firm moral foundation. We don't think we need to believe those things, and moreover, we simply CAN'T (since believing cannot be chosen in the relevant way). Speaking for myself, I don't think those beliefs are necessary or sufficient (which is a good thing, since I believe they are false), to improve our world, to recognize justice, to encourage kindness, and so forth. We can agree about a great deal in terms of how to live, without agreeing about metaphysics -- so people of my ilk are always somewhat mystified as to why those of your ilk engage in such metaphysical bullying. It is not enough, apparently, that we refrain from (and condemn, and will go to great lengths to prevent and punish) child murder -- we must do it for precisely the metaphysical reasons YOU prefer, or else. Why?
OP,
We're going in circles. The ubermench (in between bites of ice cream) will agree with any criticism or prediction you make and say "But I don't care about that. I don't even ask that question." You can't "prove" him wrong.
If you start with unprovable axioms (perhaps not a bad way of going), he will just start with a different unprovable axiom.
You have rested much of your argument on the claim that provable factual assertions are much better and stronger than unprovable value judgments. The latter as the same, more or less, as preferences for ice cream flavors.
But lots of things we hold dear are in the latter category. We cannot prove that we should love our spouses, family, and friends (as opposed to loving other people), and in fact those relationships are personal and specific to us. There is much more variation in whom we love than in which ice cream flavors we like. But no one would argue that such relationships are not significant simply because the criteria for choosing whom to love cannot be objectively determined.
Our preference for specific loved one and our preference for ice cream flavor are in the same category (subjective relative judgments), but there is a tremendous different in degree. I don't know what that reduces the importance of the former.
Diane,
"That there is more than one ideal of the person is NOT, at all, to concede that "situations exist where people are objectively better or worse off." Why in the world would you think the latter follows from the former?"
Is an ideal state of man not better than a less ideal state?
If there is no better or worse then what is your meaning of the term "ideal"? And what makes an ideal different from not ideal?
"So too the Abrahamic ideal. So too, the Buddhist ideal. So too, the Confucian ideal...."
So too the Nietzschean ideal? Why not?
"All manner of unrelated things are being conflated here. Chinese and Hindu societies are arguably among the most stable -- and radically unjust -- of any that have ever existed. Experiments in democracy are fragile. What of it?"
More stability does not automatically confer a judgement of more just, but intrinsically unstable indicates a system inappropriate for the human condition. A sensitive test is different from a specific one and you keep confusing those qualities.
"And -- please spare us the claim that only YOU (representing moral realism) "care about human beings and humanity.""
Consider yourself spared. Good thing I hadn't intended on claiming anything like that.
"we must do it for precisely the metaphysical reasons YOU prefer, or else. Why?"
No, I actually don't care how you conceive of it, but if your philosophical predilections cannot permit you to morally condemn gross atrocities then you open the door to them. It's frankly insufficient and downright dangerous. I haven't forgotten that question you still have not answered.
"Speaking for myself, I don't think those beliefs are necessary or sufficient...to improve our world, to recognize justice, to encourage kindness, and so forth."
Oh, "improve" - but without any conception of better or worse. "Justice" - which is a subjective matter and can mean anything to anybody. I'm glad we can think normatively on similar wavelengths, but your metaethical system is built on stilts supported by the shiftiest of shifting sands.
You can't pull the rug out of moral authority and then try to speak with any moral authority.
Bruce,
"If you start with unprovable axioms (perhaps not a bad way of going), he will just start with a different unprovable axiom."
Yes, but he is demonstrably wrong. It's not even about what people ought to do, people simply will not act the way he thinks they ought. His concepts are so against the nature of man that it would be like trying to herd cats or freeze water at 500 degrees.
"But lots of things we hold dear are in the latter category. We cannot prove that we should love our spouses, family, and friends (as opposed to loving other people), and in fact those relationships are personal and specific to us."
It doesn't matter what the target of your subjective, personal value is or how strongly you value it/them since it only has relevance to your personal behavior. In distinction, relevant moral directives are telling other people what they can and cannot do.
I don't see how you can, in a moral sense, go from "I like" to "you should." For example, why would you think your love for your family could in itself obligate me to anything?
I don't see how you can, in a moral sense, go from "I like" to "you should." For example, why would you think your love for your family could in itself obligate me to anything?
But you have the same problem with going from "X exists" to "you should." Hume was right --- you can't bridge that gap.
On a practical level, this is not much of a debate. Most (all?) murderers and thieves are not making a sophisticated argument that the rules are different, but they are simply not abiding by the rules. The ones that don't --- Charles Manson, for example --- adopt arguments that are so incoherent that one would reasonably conclude that the proponent is insane or the arguments are just an after-the-fact attempted justification.
My love for my family might not obligate anyone else in deep sense to do anything. But our society is almost exclusively composed of people who recognize such love (and lots of other things) as important and have instituted rules against harming others. I concede that at its deepest level, this is an exercise of will and force, not an exercise of careful observation and deductive logic.
But I don't have a problem with that. As framed that way, the issue becomes what (legal or ethical) rules should we adopt that lead to a better world. It does not become what rules can we find sitting out there as part of the ontological furniture of the universe. I strongly believe the former framework is more likely to lead to better results, and the latter framework is more likely to lead to really odd mystical and metaphysical claims.
Bruce,
"But you have the same problem with going from "X exists" to "you should." Hume was right --- you can't bridge that gap."
Like I said, I'm willing to start with basic axioms. Technically you can't logically bridge the gap from, say, "I perceive" to "X exists" either. But so what? We obviously are not solipsists and neither should we be nihilists.
"As framed that way, the issue becomes what (legal or ethical) rules should we adopt that lead to a better world. It does not become what rules can we find sitting out there as part of the ontological furniture of the universe."
I don't see a difference between these two. How do we figure out such rules without appealing to our objective observations of humanity and reality?
The difference is that I say that those rules once discovered are in fact objective moral rules - right (correct) makes right, whereas you say they're just a matter of collective will and that only might makes right. And, suffice it to say, that's a dangerous road to walk on.
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