Though this is a topic near and dear to my heart, I'll just pause here to note for a moment that it kind of assumes the argument to claim that the notion that there is no "truth" nor no "higher moral principle to be bound to" are "myths."

These are the questions under consideration, IMO. While issues of truth call in a lot of philosophy of language (like Paul Horwich's deflationary theory of truth) that is probably not appropriate for this forum, the notion of there being a robust ethics without higher moral principles is both hotly disputed (in the current debate on moral particularism) and quite timely. I, for one, believe, and I will argue in my dissertation, that moral principles are either absent or uncompelling, because abstract notions like justice and autonomy are only given content in particular cases.

What two agents mean by "justice" could differ quite dramatically depending on the context. Under this way of reading principles, they may or may not be be important, but they are morally thin. Moral thickness resides in the particular, or so the argument goes.

I'm not saying you or anyone else needs to be convinced by this; most aren't. But it does suggest that caution is needed before terming any view of ethics that eschews higher principles a dangerous myth.

JMO.
Daniel | Homepage | 02.13.08 - 4:50 pm | #