Chris,
I agree with your analysis in large part. I do wish the M-4/M-16 was less tempermental in regards to jamming when dirty. And the assualt rifle concept is the right way to go, I wholeheartedly agree, and for the same reasons you mention, but in Operation Anaconda, a few troops were making repeated 500-meter kills with their M4s. That is well outside of the weapon's advertised performance parameters -- it just so happend that these troops were that good. It would be nice to have an assault rifle that could somehow be quickly adapted for >500 meter effectiveness for that one time when the battle plan breaks down and airpower and arty are not available. Also, Army doctrine follows your take on assault weapon tactics pretty much exactly, but the Marines train a little differently and do not rely as much on the volume of suppressing fire and place more emphasis on target acquisition and accuracy.
However, I suspect that this debate will become moot in another 10 years when "smart" small arms become the norm for the U.S. soldier.
Enjoyed the read, thanks.
Gadfly, did you check out my post "The Myth of AR unreliability"?
I also updated the post a bit (fixed some typos, added a couple of filler graphs, and a little bit more on intermediate cartridge possibilities).
It would be nice to have a weapon that is both useful as an assault rifle, and effective to 600m, but I don't know how to do that with the same caliber, except by providing differential loadings, and that causes supply and training issues.
As it is, I think the Marines have something approacing the right idea with individual marksmanship training, and the focus on "every Marine a rifleman".
As I said, I want more extensive and more effective weapons training for all, and I epecially want to see a higher percentage of designated marksmen.
I think we should train our people to make the 300m shots all day long, and to be confident out to 500m with their basic infantry weapon.
If we teach them the fundamnetals of good marksmanship, and give them the practice they need, and continuing training, then they can, and will be able to make those great shots easier, and more often.
It seems as though it will in fact cost quite a bit of money. But it seems as though a man dying in the field will cost quite a bit more. Soldiers will still die as war is dangerous but if through propper weapons training (and the associated general awareness) perhaps we could reduce casualties by 10 or 20 percent. That would more than offset the additional training costs. Between the red tape of paperwork and forms plus the payout to the familly of the fallen man, I can't even imagine what it costs the Gov (eg taxpayer) every time a man is killed.
We will always achieve our objective. Accomplishing it with the smallest number of casualty is the name of the game.
I hope to see your ideas implemented.
Chris,
After reading the post you linked, I'm not going to say that you were comparing apples to oranges, but I think you might have been comparing Washingtons to Granny Smiths 
What I mean is, your weapon wasn't made by the lowest bidder in lots of 10,000 units. Your weapon is cared for by someone who knows its design backward and forward and has the maintenance protocol memorized. Obviously, any truly good soldier would have the same knowledge and care for his or her weapon. You'd never find a Seal with a weapon that would jam. I'm sure those guys fine stone every articulating surface in the action until they're perfect.
We know that it was Washington bureaucrats who changed the original AR design that made the first large batch of rifles so shitty in Vietnam. The original rifle didn't have those problems and subsequent versions were far superior. But the fact remains that a soldier must concentrate on the care and maintenance of his M4 in the desert, otherwise it will be unreliable. There are too many stories coming out of Iraq about weapons jamming (if I've heard of three or four instances, I would suspect that it's probably happening quite a bit). My wife's (ex) weapon jammed during Desert Storm and I rode her ass constantly about the importance of cleaning and caring for her rifle in the desert. Now, you and I both know that it's entirely likely that pretty much every case will be a direct result of improper maintenance. But the sad fact is that the competition doesn't have that problem. The Kalashnikov (Russian made ones only) variants are utterly reliable even without regular maintenance, for the same reasons that an M1911 is utterly reliable even without proper maintenence. I wish Stoner had spread out the components that didn't have to be in close proximity to make the weapon more tolerant of contamination. Yes, it would have taken more, finer engineering to maintain the weapon's accuracy, but in the end, we're talking about an American soldier's ass -- it's worth a little extra expenditure.
I apologize for the extensive rant. This is a topic that I feel passionate about. I consider you highly intelligent and knowledgeable on the subject, so if anybody could change my mind, it would be you. And you' have said that you don't mind a gentlemanly debate 
Of course not. It's not fun if everyone agrees all the time.
If the AK had slightly better ergonomics (like a safety that wasnt horible in every way and a trigger that didnt suck), and was made to modern American or German standards of manufacure, I would have no reservation issuing it as a general infantry weapon.
Actually there ARE AK's built to those standards, the Valment, the R4, and the Galil.
Oh, and I'd want to hot up the 7.62x39 just a bit as well (as described in the post for this comment thread). With a decently made gun, there should be no problem upping the power level to 125gr at 2450fps.
Oh and Gadfly, yes I'm intimately familiar with the lowest bidder problem, that's why I point out that I think the maintenance and acceptance staddards for our service rifles are far too low.
The best M4s I've issued were made by DPMS or Bushmaster for JSOC contracts. Colt and FN are just spotty with their quality control on U.S. contract guns (though surprisingly not under the guns they make for Israel and others).
Another thing you're right about here, the first thing I did every time I recieved a weapon was break it down, inspect it, replace any part that didnt meet my standards, and modify it to suit.
A micrometer, a set of calipers, an abrasive eraser, some polishing compound, and a set of spyderco ceramic stones can do wonders.
As far as I'm concerned, any soldier (including technicans and support troops) should have the same level of weapons knowledge, and pay the same attention to the details of their weapons.
Yes it's time consuming, but you're there to fight wars, kill the enemy, and not be killed yourself. That's serious business, and you should treat your tools appropriately.
Long range engagements between infantry units were common during the Falklands campaign.
Still, I agree with most of what you say, except for the reliability of the AR system. A lot of the problem arises not from runninng through 5000 rounds at a time, but running through 500 rounds a week for several months. The gases tend to act as a glue, which will get gunk to stick to it and foul the firing cycle.
I know you are probably rolling your eyes at me right now, but my experience with the M16 family of weapons is that they are reliable only when clean, and powerful only at shorter ranges. While they can be accurate out to 500 meters, that is under ideal conditions, which do not happen in combat. I would prefer that they simply had a piston actuator. That would be all necessary to correct this error. Anyway, you may want to look at the Robinson arms XCR as a possible match for your integrated weapons table of equipment.
Actually the three primary options for the assault rifle slot that I have been looking at are the XCR, the SCAR, and the XM8.
I think the XCR is the best weapon of the bunch, but Robinson is never going to get a large military contract.
As to your comments on AR accuracy and reliability, you are entirely correct. The AR does require regular and through maintenace (though not as much as some would say), my point is that this maintenance should be an automatic part of every soldiers life and routine (as I say in the post on AR reliability, and clarify further in the comments).
Ideally we should have a weapon that doesnt NEED that sort of maintenance, but whether we need it or not, our soldiers (and marines such as yerself, and airmen such as myself) SHOULD be trained to do it anyway.
Chris said: "Under 100 yards, from a long barreled SMG a good high powered pistol cartridge will be almost as effective as a .223, and under 50 yards it will me more effective, with less recoil, muzzle blast, weight, cost, really everything all down the line."
As a tanker, the situation where I needed a weapon that was not part of my vehicle inventory (i.e. an individual weapon) was under 100 meters, and 90% of the time under 50 meters. This is why I have so vehemently objected to the US Army equipping tank crews first with the M-16 for this purpose, followed by the M-4. I'm sure it's a reasonable compromise for an infantry weapon, you laid out some good reasons why it is (although I think standardizing on a new caliber, like 6.5mm, would make a lot of sense). As an infantry weapon I have no real objection to the M-16, although I know a lot of infantrymen who really didn't like it either. But as a tank crewman I thought it was an awful choice. And the M-4 was an even worse choice. Give me a good 9mm SMG any day of the week. If you are more than 100 yards from my tank I have GPMG's (7.62mm M240) and an HMG (.50cal M2HB), I'm not going to use an M-16. Closer than 100 meters and what I need is a fast, easy to use weapon that is reliable with a fair amount of stopping power. I'm deep kimchee at that point and I want to take the threat down and be done. The M-4 just doesn't fit that bill, especially at 50 meters. Nice post.
Chris,
Yeah. Pretty much all of my concerns would be removed or well mitigated by your desire to see more weapons training. Better weapons training and more of it. I could not agree more.
I am afraid that I am one of those of the opinion that the AR requires too much cleaning for campaign conditions. During combat, you may be undergoing such a constant operations tempo that weapons maintainance may become little more than half the squad breaking down their weapons shotgun-style, and scrubbing their asses off for five minutes, then the other half of the squad takes their turn. I also want to point out that the M16A2 that I carried was a 5.56mm Battle rifle. As you stated, that just isn't right. It really should have been a heavier weapon, or smaller. My main weapon was my radio (Forward Observer, trained with ANGLiCo), so perhaps I should have had an M-4. As it is, I carried a 9mm, an M16A2, and a radio. Of the two firearms, neither of which were my main weapon, they were both underpowered for the job they were respectively supposed to do.
All in all, I agree with you, except for the reliability. There were far, far too many times when the M16 would jam, especially towards the end of an extended field operation. IIRC, the ambush where that girl Jessica Lynch was taken prisoner by the Iraqis was successful partially due to the fact that so many of the M16s these guys had simply failed. These were rear eschelon units that neglected maintainence of their weapons partially due to the pace of operations and partially due to being pogues who do not think like grunts. Grunts understand that your weapon will fail you most when you need it most, so you must force it through constant diligence to be infallible.
Anyway, had they had AKs, the outcome might have been a lot better.
The 5.56 is adequate in a carbine for ranges under 200 meters. Over that, you should really start thinking about something with more punch. SMG's are effective out to a max of about 100 meters. Pistols max out at 50 meters, usually less. A battle rifle should be able to reach out 500-600 meters without a problem. Snipoer rifles should be effective out to ranges of almost 1000 yards.
Anyway, let me know if you are ever down Houston way.
A very nice, thoughtful post.
I still say we should start passing out Garands & be done with it :P
But I'm curious - I've suggested the multiple loadings for a single cartridge as the best way to knock out multiple tasks (as opposed to having multiple cartridges). You mention it briefly & I was wondering if you'd mind expanding on your reasoning as to why it's a worse idea than the multiple cartridge plan?
Pub,
The multiple loads in the same chambering thing has been tried a few times in the past, and in each case it has caused training and supply problems.
For example, anyone who fires a full powered 7.62x25 SMG round in a CZ52 is going to get a very nasty surprise.
Also, having a shorter and lighter round for those weapons that dont require the longer, allows those weapons to be shorter and lighter themselves.
There are certainly advantages, the commonality of accessories and magazines for example, but those advantages just increase the risk of accidentally loading the wrong loading in the wrong gun.
Chris,
what's been tried before has been really hot loads for certain guns. What I think would work is having say a 7-08 standard load in addition to a 7-08 reduced power load. Taking it the other direction in other words. You have your full power 7-08 that's capable of being fired in any firearm so chambered & you have your short range/full auto reduced power load that's capable of being fired in any firearm so chambered.
So at worst you have a round that's either too powerful or too weak to be ideal in the situation - not a case where your firearm may explosively disassemble. (& yes - bad puns are always intentional)
Do you see the same concerns for having a standard power & a reduced powered loading as you do for what's been tried in the past?
Food for thought, and most people already covered what I had to say - save this:
Stopping vs Killing power (Part II)
I would submit that if we're willing to make the distinction (and I understand why you did), killing power drops to the bottom of the list - to me the ability to carry more, control it better, and ballistic accuracy outweigh 'killing power' - from a tactical perspective - again, if we accept that the two are usefully seperable.
At that point, stopping v kiling is a discussion for people who quibble about using a .50 against troops vice materiel.
Pub- The Japanese tried that with their 7.62mm service rifle (the name escapes me). They had a reduced-power 7.62N load for normal use, based on the idea that Japanese soldiers were lighter and smaller than Euro/Ami soldiers and couldn't brace a full-power battle rifle firing bursts as well as someone who was 6" taller and 50 pounds heavier. If I remember, this worked well enough that they stayed with it for a number of years, but than again they weren't exactly getting a lot of deployments to places they'd have to USE those rifles now were they?
Japanese Type 64 rifle
The Japanese Type 64 rifle used a reduced power cartridge more for full auto controllability than training reasons. Of all the 7.62 NATO caliber rifles the Type 64 is the most controllable due in part to very low cyclic rate, low recoil line and massive muzzle brake. Even with it's reduced power load the Type 64 fires a NATO weight bullet at a velocity equal to a 7.62x39 caliber AK.
Caliber, ranges, roles and doctrines
This is an awfully fluid region. If "modern combat" so precludes long range engagement of infantry targets by individual soldiers, why did the Army spend so much time and money developing the OICW XM-29 which had the goal of improving the chance of hitting out to a range of 1000 meters?
The history of twentieth century infantry weapons was of the creation of brand new categories of weapons (or rediscovery of old ones) which most military authorities didn't even believe had a usefull place in warfare until hard experience proved otherwise. The most classic example of which was the submachinegun.
So there are no real fixed categories. Some descriptions such as "battle rifle" are very artificial and not very useful. As small arms have evolved they have expanded and cross pollinated so much that it isn't hard to find a concrete weapon which violates an abstract boundary.
Is the 6.5mm Federov rifle a "battle rifle" or an "assault rifle"? Is the 6.5mm Type 37 BAR a light machinegun or an assault rifle? Is a 9mm parabellum machinegun with a bipod a submachinegun or a light machinegun?
Firepower vs mobility
The goal of course is to give the infantry company the right mix of the categories of small arms that provides the best balance of firepower and mobility.
The Japanese 11 man rifle squad equipped with 7.62mm NATO caliber weapons had eight Type 64 rifles (all of which were select fire, had built in grenade launchers and bipods) and three Type 62 belt fed machineguns (one of which with a tripod mount). Tons of firepower, but not much mobility.
Key questions
1)does the individual rifle need full auto capabilty? If not there seems little point in using a small caliber cartridge. Large caliber semi-auto fire provides more conservation of ammo than small caliber full auto fire.
2)Are iron sights obsolete? Should all individual rifles have optical sights? Telescopic or CQB or both?
3)How many light machineguns does an infantry squad need? What is the minimum caliber required? Are two men with RPK's better than a BREN gun crewed with gunner and assistant gunner?
3)How many grenade launchers? What caliber? What about the small caliber mortars? Should one be used in preference to the other?
4)How many and what type of anti-tank weapons? One shot disposable types which could be issued as needed, or reloadable types which are more suitable for training by cheap firing?
5)What about anti-bunker weapons? Can anti-tank weapons fill the bill, or should anti-bunker weapons replace some or even all anti-tank weapons in the company?
6)what is the right mix of mortars and machineguns? How many and at what organizational level? Should they be in the HQ or in a seperate squad/platoon?
What is the ideal infantry company?
I would very much like to see your ideal infantry company organization and it's armament. To make things simpler use any small arm that is or was at one time in production. No experimental or wish list dream weapon, just to avoid disagreements and to stick to solid measureable facts. Imagine that you are in charge of re-equipping some small or medium sized nation's army, such as the army of Singapore. What would you choose for your infantry?
The one thing I haven't seen addressed here is penetration. The full load 7.62/7.65 fired from either a semi auto or gpmg will penetrate through paractically any wood wall and most masonary walls as well as light breast works on trenchs and non re-enforced bunkers. This is not the case with the 5.56 or any intermediate cartridge I know of. I have read of the marines blowing doors and charging into rooms in Fallajah. In my feeble old mind twenty rounds fired through the wall and out the other side before making a grand entrance is the way to go. These rounds will also penetrate rolled steel up to a quarter of an inch at reasonable range. Now that is a good thing as Martha says
Brad,
Thats a tall order. Do you want a full TO&E here, at least in terms of operational gear, and manning table?
Are we going to assume a 120-160 em + command section infantry company, or a 200 man heavy company etc....
Are we talking light infantry, mech infantry, heavy infantry?
...
I basically jsut wrote a 2000 word article in the comments, but erased it. I'll save that one for later.
clarification
Pick any type of infantry company you like whether it is re-equpping an existing company or a fantasy company built according to your own thoughts. What I want is to see is how your weapon choices are combined with organization.
I did not have in mind a light company (which usually means paratroops) or a mech company (60 man dismount strength for a Bradley company is a joke, it's hard to call that an infantry company anymore) because of the added complications such specialization adds to the company. Those kinds of companies are bound up more by how they are moved than how they fight once their boots hit the ground. But if a light or mech infantry company is what you want to do, please go right ahead.
Alright, I've got a post in the works on the topic, and it's going to be a looong one. It'll be up later this week.
Issue SMGs to troops?
A very poor plan.
The only real problem with the M4 carbine's performance is due to the M855/"SS/109" round. Using the lighter M193 ball round an M4 has a longer lethal range. The M855 was a mistake. It was designed to meet ivory tower standards that had nothing to do with the real world. We don't need a bullet that can penetrate a steel helmet in the next county over, we need a bullet that will make big holes in important parts of enemy soldiers within a few hundred meters.
Most of the "improvements" involved in the adoption of the M16A2 were similar steps backwards: they took a light handy rifle and bulked it up to one that weighs almost as much as a 7.62mm NATO rifle, added a fragile rear sight designed for the target range rather than the battlefield, and a lengthened buttstock that's fine when you're wearing a shooting jacket and a tight sling, but is too long for 90% of troops when they're wearing armor.
An M4 loaded with M193 is much more lethal than an MP5 loaded with 9mm ball. At a cost of less than half a pound in weight and about 3 inches of length. Restore the M16A1-style upper receiver and rear sight, or a simple back-up rear sight like the ones made by Cavalry Arms and LaRue, and the weight difference would decline even more.
The SMG is obsolete. End of story.
And that's before we even address the issues of training and logistics.
Training of non-combat arms troops is already poor enough, even though we're tasking them with more and more combat arms jobs. If there's a lesson we should be (re)learning in Iraq, it is that there is no such thing as a "non-combat" soldier in a guerrilla war.
Then there's the logistics matter. Just supplying enough rifle and MG ammunition has been a problem one than once in the last few years. The last thing we need is to complicate matters with new calibers. Likewise magazines: in both the first Gulf War and this one there have been shortages of M16 magazines. Adding another magazine to the mix would only add problems.
Most of the "weapons problems" and "failures" in Afghanistan and Iraq had simple explanations: poor maintenance of weapons and poor operator training. A direct result of poor leadership. Small arms are not taken seriously by any branch of the US forces. Not even the Marine Corps. What we need far more than any band-aid solution involving new weapons and new cartridges is a change in the mindset regarding soldiers (in the broadest sense) and their individual weapons. Beginning with making individual proficiency with the rifle an unavoidable unwaiverable requirement for not just promotion, but retention. In 22 years in the Army and reserve I saw a lot of troops kicked out for being on the fat-boy program, but never for being unqualified (or even unsafe) with their rifle.
The "profession of arms" has to start being more than a pompous phrase.
Earnan, are you sure you actually read what I wrote?
Read all three articles, and come back to me.
I enjoyed your discussion of the assault rifle concept. I had previously thought of the assault rifle as simply being a comprimise between the battle rifle and the SMG, meant to fulfill those roles adequately without requiring the soldier to carry both weapons.
If it were possible (technical problems aside), what would you think of a battle rifle sized weapon, capable of selective fire, that had an interchangeable chamber/mag well? Assume in full-auto mode it would fire at 300 RPM with 7.62x51, 450 RPM with 7.62x39, and 900 RPM with 7.62x25. Also assume it was reasonably reliable, reasonably accurate, and the conversion inserts weighed about 1 KG or 2 pounds each and took less than 60 seconds to exchange under bad conditions. The x39 mag well would use AK magazines. Would that imaginary gun be a better primary arm than assault rifles are?
The Robinson XCR and FN scar are both designed to do just that Charles, while being a bit smaller and lighter than a true battle rifle.
When the money allows it, I plan on buying an XCR with all of the caliber kits
A couple of comments on .45 vs. 10mm; the .45 is more effective in ball ammo on unarmored targets, and I think due to the Hauge Convention that's a compelling enough reason in itself. But, in full-power loads, the 10 probably has better penetration than the .45 Super vs. protective clothing, because the 10 has better sectional momentum. Also the 10 can be (and too often is) dowloaded to ..40 S&W levels, so it has the same advantages as the .45 Super/ACP pairing.
Honestly though I love the 10 myself, and have considered .45 Super for my next carry gun, I think the full-power 10 or .45 Super is too much for the least common denominator soldier. .40 S&W or .45 ACP might be more appropriate considering the smaller male or medium female soldier.
"The Robinson XCR and FN scar are both designed to do just that Charles, while being a bit smaller and lighter than a true battle rifle.
When the money allows it, I plan on buying an XCR with all of the caliber kits"
I am also thinking of buying an XCR when the .308 version comes out.
I think you may be mistaken about either the XCR's capabilties or the capabilities of my imaginary weapons; the XCR seems to be designed to change the barrel not just the chamber, and it also seems the mag well does not change so all calibers need an M16-sized top to the magazine. I'm not too sure about the SCAR.
The imaginary weapon I propose allows one to change the chamber and mag well, but retain the rest of the 7.62 barrel so the soldier doesn't have to carry extra barrels. It also allows very fast automatic fire with the very light 7.62x25 for suppressing fire or SMG-like use. I'm inspired in all this by the Pederson device. Of course, you may not want to waste time thinking about it because it doesn't exist.
Ahhh, I was just thinking of the ability to fire multiple calibers with a quick change, not necessarily the specific mechanics of that change. Functional solution vs technical solution as it were.
I have yet to see a chamber insert type design (and there have been a few including the pederson device you mentioned) that didnt have reliabilty and accuracy problems. If someone can come up with one, I dont see why not.
Robinson has said the 7.62 XCR will also be convertible down to the 5.56 and 6.8. I assume they will do this with a magwell insert, (and the already existing quick change barrels) but I'm not sure. I have heard they will use FAL magazines, but again, I dont know.
Another possibility is that the 7.62 version will have a detacheable magwell, and use a tilt in magazine for 7.62 (as with the VEPR .30
, and the magwell for 6.8 and 5.56. The M96 system allows the feed to be reconfigured from bottom, to top, to side, so Robinson has experience with changeable mag well systems.
As to the caliber of our next sidearm, I believe the military is thinking of the sidearmsmission incorrectly, and training and issuing it correspondingly incorrectly.
The sidearm is not intended to be any more accurate than absolutely necessary, and the primary consideration (aside from reliability) is power, specifically penetrating power against soft armor, and stopping power.
The sidearm is the last ditch weapon, and it will be used against people at close range. What we need it the ability to put a couple shots into an 8" circle at 10-15 yards, and if you can't do that with .45 super or 10mm, then you cant do it with .45acp or .40s&w.
I agree that full power 10mm has the advantage over .45 super in armor penetrating capability, but I believe .45 super would be a more effective stopper with hardball, while having less tendency to overpenetrate in soft targets. It's really jsut a question of how rapidly the .45 round slows down in the body vs the 10mm. Most .45 supers wont make the FBI max penetration standard, full house 10mm is specifically designed to do so.
My second factor in chosing the .45 was the suppressability issue;.45acp has proven stopping power at subsonic levels (where in fact most .45 acp is and always has been laoded), while .40s&w subsonic loads (and by extension 10mm) have shown poor stopping performance.
The xcr will be interchangable between 5.56 and 6.8 spc by means of a barrel change and bolt swap. The magazine dimensions for these two calibers are very similar, and do not require a magwell insert.
I'm looking forward to seeing whether robinson plans on using standard AK style 7.62x39mm magazines for that caliber, or if they will be using a proprietary design. Rumor has it that the 7.62x51mm XCR will utilize G3 style magazines, but that might be just conjecture. Seeing as the XCR seems to use an AR style mag release, it might be interesting to see how they will make use of these two rock-in styles.
Well the XCR uses AK mags for 7.62x39 without any modification (at least it looks like it in the videos), and a "propietary" 6.8 mgazine (actually an AR mag with redimensioned feed lips as far as I can tell); so it must have a hybrid magwell and catch in the standard 5.56 configuration.
The real issue is whether the 7.62Nato is convertible down to 7.62r, 6.8, and 5.56, as they said it would be, and how.
If the XCR IS down-convertible, will it have a large magwell for 7.62x51 and use a magwell insert; or will it have a 5.56 magwell, and remove that magwell for the 7.62x51.
Robinson has posted an update on their news page.
I was an armorer in the NG and RA for ten years combined. I carried the M16 during Desert Storm and on innumerable training exercises, so I have some credibility to talk about it. The AR is designed to fail, there is no other way to describe it. First you have too many close tolerances which requires a lot of lube, so when dirt gets in, it stays in. Second the exhaust gas used to cycle the action is routed through the bolt carrier where it deposits carbon and slowly but surely impedes the movement of the bolt. Of the many M16's I fired on the range and in the field, I rarely ever got one to fire a full magazine without malfunctioning. My current weapon of choice is a CETME in 7.62 NATO, which I have been torture testing for two years now. It has been cleaned twice since I got it; once when new to remove the cosmoline, and again about a year ago. It's had about 1000 rounds since its last cleaning, and only malfunctions about once per few hundred rounds. Its realiability is several orders of magnitude greater than any AR, so I will take its greater weight and heavier caliber in trade for guaranteed reliability any day.
I understand why the intermediate caliber is the best choice today but I don't understand why Special Forces like the Navy SEALs are still using 7.62 NATO M60's and now the MK 48 LMG?
Is it tradition? They can handle 7.62 NATO very easily? What's going on?
The 7.62n is a FAR better machine gun caliber than the 5.56 in a heavier weapon than a battle rifle; and in a firesupport/base of fire weapon.
The only problem there again is weight, but the newest generation M60 and the MK48 are quite a bit lighter than the '60s issue weapons.
Of course you still have the ammo weight issue to deal with, but yes, operaters are stronger, and trained better with a far greater physical endurance than many other troops; and yes they can and will make that weight/power tradeoff.
Dear Chris:
It looks like you've thought this through pretty thoroughly, and I agree with most of what you said. Like one writer, I would be interested in how you would set up a table of organization for a rifle platoon.
Many years ago, about the time the .44 Automag came out, I had some thoughts concerning the 7.62x51 case shortened (which was done in this weapon), and then necked down to different calibers to fit the need.
My idea was for a "wire" buttstock (actually pretty heavy-gauge rod) to collapse inside the space inside the recoil springs, making this weapon carriable from the hip, or usable from the shoulder. The cartridge, of course, could be adapted to heavier basic weapons, such as the Stoner.
With a magazine in front of the trigger guard, where it belongs, there would be no limit on cartridge length, and it would have no affect on grip size, as it unfortunately did on the Automag.
With the rotating Johnson/Stoner bolt and an accelerator, there would be no problem containing reasonable pressures, nor would cold climate or relative lack of cleanliness be of such concern. This would, of course, be a recoil-operated weapon, not gas.
We made a serious mistake during World War II in for the most part overlooking the Johnson operating system. Stoner used parts of it, but there was nothing wrong with the recoil operating principle. I've shot the Johnson in various configurations and found it comfortable to operate, both semi and full-auto, and I'm not a big guy.
I would be interested in a response, if you care to send one to my e-mail address. I operate a small shop, Ammo Specialties, dealing mostly in manufacturing obsolete or specialty rounds, but I'm always interested in progress in military weaponry.
Enemy killed or injured by rifle fire now is analogous to enemy killed or injured by bayonet during WWI. It is pushed by high command levels, but doesn't show up so much at the the aid stations. Snipers should shoot 120mm cannon if they wish to be really effective. If they can't they should be armed with radio, GPS, Compass and laser range finder, so marke and call in targets for 120 mm cannons.
First, I agree that the caliber issue should be decoupled from the rifle issue. That is why I developed a 'folded delay blowback' action that permits a 24 inch barrel in a compact 28 inch rifle. Further, I use two magazines, and the follower when it comes up switches the feed from the empty magzine to the full one. The ejection path is straight down, between the magazines. It is set up so that the soldier can convert from 5.56 to 7.62 with a quick barrel change. Further, it can convert to either 12 gauge or .45ACP (silenced), the latter using straight blowback. That is right, no adjustments are needed. Barrel change is in 3 seconds with a hot barrel.
Second, the "Stopping Power' issue is less important. Last year I re-read Teddy Roosevelt's book on the war in Cuba. According to him, The 7mm Mauser scored a kill if it hit in brain, spine or heart. If it hit anywhere else, the soldier recovered, and quickly.
It is important to note that Lavoisier (the French scientist) was sentenced to death by guillotine. As his final experiment, he arranged to have a friend time how long he blinked his eyes after being decapitated. The answer: 16 Seconds. Even with the head severed from the heart, he maintained his control.
Infantry adapted during WWII by using the German Jaeger or French Chausseur model: Heavy armed infantry with machineguns, grenade launchers, mortars. A major cause of US efficiency in WWI was its training by the sadly depleted French Chausseur units.
To continue to adapt, modern Infantry should be based on fire teams (4 to 6 men) in small armored carriers, and the armored carriers should each have a chassis mounted breechloading mortars/missile launchers, about 120mm caliber. It should also have 4 cupola/turrets with machineguns or grenade launchers, with one non-turret station for the driver, and one non-turret station for a command position (squad leader or platoon leader, platoon sergeant.) I would usually arrange the turrets with one .50BMG, one .7.62MG and two 12 gauge smoothbore grenade launchers, but they should be able to adapt to their situation (all 4 .50 BMG may make sense in a desert, all 12 gauge may make sense in urban/riot control situations).
Totally hilarious post. Because it is based on clear thinking, common sense, and the US Military will take 15 years to adopt 10% of it.
It might get some fans in the various special forces think tanks though.
What's clear is that small units need weapons EXACTLY suited to their mission to optimally perform.
Great points, I enjoyed reading this. I give kudos to the commenters for providing good insight. I understand your recommendations but lets look at this in a big picture view.
In the military we have all solders train to be basic infantrymen but the fact is there are very few that are de-facto infantrymen. You have artillery men with all its various roles, Armor men, cooks, radio men and so on an so for. Each one of these areas are armed to some extent to perform the primary mission with a small part going to selection for their secondary mission as basic infantry men. Nevertheless the army must have sufficient standardization such that the supply logistics are sufficiently simple to accomplish. Thus DoD looks at the requirements presented by the army at large then at the other branches and they make Consensus decisions where all the parties at the table agree that they have found a common set of agreeable denominators.
Point 2
The infantry squad still 11 men (12 if you are in a field artillery section) Each squad is divided into 2 fire teams thus we have some limits on the arsenal that the team can carry. CQB, LRP, SRP and perimeter guards duties all have a their distinct optimal load. Having more SMG and MMG is just adding to suppressive fire. Consistent and accurate fire is what brings down the bad guys. Lets not re-live the metrics of the past where x rounds = y Enemy KIA. This is not a proportion engagement, this is about accomplishing the mission objectives. So what do we need?
A sufficiently modular weapon that can be transformed into the weapon that is best suited for the mission objectives.
The modules for such a weapon must be easy to swap by basic infantrymen without any tools.
Unloaded weapons need to be as light as possible and easy to maintain. Cleaning the weapon should be as simple as running a bore snake, wiping the weapon down and changing out expendables like batteries etc.
The combat load of ammo should be no less than 200 rds per soldier (as you suggest close to 400). The weapon must have an easy quick way to change a empty magazine out with a fresh full one in minimal time and the magazine capacity should be large (30-50 rnds).
The weapon should be able to fire from the closed bolt position for accurate intentional fire and the open bolt for suppressive fire.
holographic 1x Optical aiming devices should be part of the weapon and the device must be small, sturdy , light and reliable.
The weapon in mission configuration should not be heavier than 8.5 pounds.
The weapon must allow for the user to fire from a prone position with a full capacity magazine at a position where the shooter is at the same height as a shooter in the prone position firing an m16 with a 20 rnd magazine in the weapon. This is to minimize the target size of the shooter.
The weapon must be able to hit targets at 300 meters and a drop no more than the height of the weapon with the barrel in the horizontal with the projective having at least 80% of the energy and velocity as measured from the muzzle.
The weapon maximum length shall not exceed 30 inches.
The weapon shall be able to achieve at least with no malfunction the firing of 400 rnds with 4 moa aimed at center mass compensated by projectile drop sequentially without maintenance after the weapon has been fired 100 times after been submerged then 100 times after been buried in a homogenized mixture of 30% diatomaceous earth 30% sand of eroded limestone (white sands sand) and 30% Arkose sand. (the only maintenance allowed before the 400 rd test is a shake of 3 seconds between firing cycles)
Weapon recoil must not be able to crack a grade b egg when placed between the weapon but and the shoulder pocket during firing. Weapon fire report should not exceed 90 Db measured from behind the weapon at the butstock.
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