"dogs appear to "love" us precisely because we've selected for just that impression over millenia of canine domestication."
googlebooks won't let me read the whole thing, but provided this speculation is accurate how is this any different from love in humans?
also how would one morally distinguish between levels of pain if the only acceptable measure is the subjective experience of humans?
i guess these are sort of old boring questions. but still!
When you talk about morally distinguishing between levels of pain, are you talking about how we choose between human pain and animal pain? I think in the absence of a machine that lets us see what it's like to be a dog we can rely on the relative neurological complexity of the animals in question. In general
* Avoid hurting animals unnecessarily;
* on the those occasions when it is necessary to hurt animals in order to prevent human pain, hurt them as little as possible.
seems like a good starting place for an ethical maxim.
Or is that not what you were aiming at?
sorry, both questions (love and pain) were directed at the incomplete dennett excerpt -- he starts to say something about 'serious suffering' and consciousness that gets cut off. from what i know of his position he thinks pain is an exception to the whole qualia thing, but was hoping you could clear that up.
Commenting by HaloScan
