"One is enriched by even following the logical steps involved. It's a real brain teaser. Even if it doesn't totally succeed (and I agree with Alvin Plantinga that it ultimately doesn't, in terms of proving God's existence -- I don't think any one argument does that."
So first up he doesn't really believe it proves God's existence. He (and you) just enjoy the argument. Am I following?
Second I am very much disturbed by your comment that no argument proves God's existence. If no argument can independently prove the existence of God then his existence can not be demonstrated (and you turn into just a "probability"). Vatican I says reason can demonstrate the existence of God. What do you mean? I'm hoping you just edit your original comment a little (pretty please) 
I believe he is saying that no single argument proves it. That is, it is a cumulative argument as opposed to one slam-dunk proof. If there were, we wouldn't have non-believers.
The problem with natural theology at this point in time is that it is essentially "preaching to the choir." That is, those who accept God's existence will applaud it and those who doubt God's existence will largely remain unmoved. Anyone who is so moved by a proof of God's existence (or God's nonexistence, for that matter) to switch sides in the debate were probably either moving in that direction or had not critically thought through their position. Men like Anthony Flew, who recently moved from atheism to theism because he found the former position logically untenable are few and far between.
To illustrate this, the opening assumpiton of thinking of a morally perfect anything will be challenged by those who relativize morality to cultural norms. In other words, three quarters of academia get off the bus before it leaves the depot. It is an unfortuante situation that this is true, but it is true none the less.
Natural theology is successful when the one you are attempting to convince possesses two things:
1) the ability to think logically - that is , to follow coherent arguments from assumptions to conclusions.
2) wisdom - as is relevant to our case, some ability to understand what is natural to assume.
As it stands today, about half of academia can do the former. The rest argue rhetorically or dialectically. A far smaller percentage could in any sense be called "wise."
Thanks, Dave, for these links. Your old papers were worth much more than the recent link.
From your description of your philosophical background we have about the same (limited) education in philosophy, although from your comments I dare say you've understood what you were taught better than I. However, I also have a pretty strong background in math and logic. I was disappointed, therefore, to see that you removed the propositional logic symbology from your papers.
I had long held OA in contempt: I would assert that "Anselm can no more define God as existing than David Hume can define miracles as not existing." Then I encountered Anselm's argument presented in propositional logic. I struggled to be sure that the propositional logic actually said the same thing that Anselm did, and that each step in the logic made sense, and after several days left convinced that Anselm is actually right, and he has proved the necessity of Divine existence.
I'm disappointed to read that you don't believe OA proves God's existence, as I am quite convinced it does so to anyone who understands it. I may just find myself in the enthusiasm of the recently converted, of course. However, isn't Patrick's argument that the position that OA merely establishes the possibility of God is logically untenable?
DelRayVA writes:
"However, isn't Patrick's argument that the position that OA merely establishes the possibility of God is logically untenable?"
I think you must have either inadvertently left some words out of this sentence, or added some in. I can't quite follow what you're saying. It _seems_ like you're attributing to me the view that the OA merely establishes the possibility that God exists. If so, you've misread me. The claim "God is possible" is the _premise_ in the OA. so that's clearly not what the argument purports to establish.
But since the conclusion follows from that premise, the discussion regarding the soundness of the OA will all have to focus on that premise. So to reject the conclusion, one has to claim that God is impossible. In order to claim that the argument is sound, one has to claim that God is possible. That's why I do think the argument turns crucially on the question of God's possibility. But to claim that the argument establishes, or tries to establish, that God is possible would be a mistake. That's what the argument claims as its premise.
As to the question of proof, I think there's a terrible ambiguity in the way that word is generally used. Plantinga--and, I think, Dave--seem to take it that a proof must be able to convince any rational person who considers it. This is certainly not Thomas's position. (Consider his lengthy discussion of why God's existence is revealed, even though it _can_ be known: it's because lots of people--including, of course, plenty of rational ones--just aren't capable of understanding the proofs.) In my opinion, George Mavrodes, in his little book _Belief in God_ presents the best take on what ought to count as a proof. But I don't have time right now to go into that. Maybe later I can come back and say something on that, if people have any interest.
Note further, however, that Vatican I doesn't actually tell us that God's existence can be _demonstrated_. It says only that it can be known with certainty by unaided human reason. That seems to me to allow a wide range of acceptable views on how we come to know his existence with certainty. In my humble opinion, even Plantinga's epistemology (which is unrelated to his treatment of the OA) might count. Although, as a Calvinist, he doesn't see himself as bound by the conciliar decrees.
Isn't Plantiga Catholic?
Righty oh let me clarify a few things.
"I believe he is saying that no single argument proves it. That is, it is a cumulative argument as opposed to one slam-dunk proof. If there were, we wouldn't have non-believers."
Yes, I knew that. That's precisly the problem. If every argument in the book can't individually by itself (I used the word "independenly" in my first post)prove God's existence then throwing a whole pile of them together doesn't solve your problem because each one has no weight.
Secondly, I disagree with your second sentence. If God's existence were self evident we wouldn't have any non believers. It is a terribly optimistic view of human nature. If I had the time I would dig up the part in the Summa where Thomas goes through several reasons why people resist the truth. One of them is they don't want what is true to be true.
"Note further, however, that Vatican I doesn't actually tell us that God's existence can be _demonstrated_. It says only that it can be known with certainty by unaided human reason."
I'm sorry. If I want other people to admit to a mistake I will have to admit to mine too. I confused my references. What I was thinking of was Pius X's Oath Against Modernism. Sorry!
"And first of all, I profess that God, the origin and end of all things, can be known with certainty by the natural light of reason from the created world (see Rom. 1:90), that is, from the visible works of creation, as a cause from its effects, and that, therefore, his existence can also be demonstrated."
Well, at least my mistake led me to dig up the original references
The statement that it can be known with certaintly by the light of human reason leads to the fact that it must demonstrable otherwise you don't have anything that can REALLY show that is true and hence demand acknowledgement that human reason can do it. You might have a few "interesting" "suasive" arguments, as they call them, but you couldn't blame the agnostic for being who he is. At least Pius agrees. Note how he says "and therefore" it can be demonstrated.
Isn't Plantiga Catholic?
No, but he is professor of philosophy at Notre Dame.
Patrick quotes me and comments:
"'However, isn't Patrick's argument that the position that OA merely establishes the possibility of God is logically untenable?'"
"I think you must have either inadvertently left some words out of this sentence, or added some in. I can't quite follow what you're saying. "
Sorry for the confusion. What I meant to say is that I understood Patrick's argument to be that it is untenable to assert that OA merely establishes that it is logically consistent to believe in God's existence.
Great comments, guys.
It's a huge discussion, but briefly, I do believe in a "cumulative argument" notion of proof for both God and Christianity. It is the convergence of many kinds of evidences and reasonings all leading to one conclusion that is compelling.
One can attain to a "practical certainty" which is not "mathematical certainty" but so close as to be practically indistinguishable. I believe that this is roughly the equivalent of the certainty of faith. Cardinal Newman expressed this point of view in his Grammar of Assent. I had already believed something akin to it for years before I read that work (c. 1991), though, of course, he explained it infinitely more eloquently and clearly.
It all turns on what one means by "proof" and "rational demonstration" too. OA is a completely non-empirical argument. Thus, many will not find it compelling, since we obtain most knowledge (or all, in some views) by the senses.
I myself, find the cosmological argument the most compelling, and almost an absolute proof of God's existence, but not quite. Actually, it can be argued that it compellingly proves a First Cause of the universe which is consistent with, but not identical to, a theistic God (even a deistic one, but not the "god" of eastern religions). It is another step to reason oneself to the Christian God. So it is not airtight, but very close, IMO.
>Plantinga--and, I think, Dave--seem to take it that a proof must be able to convince any rational person who considers it.
Nope, not by a long shot. There are far too many factors which influence the predisposition or willingness or ability of a person to accept a proof, even a compelling one. One can't hang the validity of any proof on human response to it.
>If every argument in the book can't individually by itself (I used the word "independenly" in my first post)prove God's existence then throwing a whole pile of them together doesn't solve your problem because each one has no weight.
That's not true. If you have, e.g., 50 arguments, and each is highly plausible, and each points to one particular conclusion over against others, that conclusion is extremely probable, enough for one to reach a practical certitude which is scarcely different from absolute demonstration or logical compulsion.
This is how the real world usually works, and how our brains and minds implicitly operate, whether we are aware of it or not. This is why, as Newman argues, we often feel that we "know" something without being able to rationally explain all the details of how we know what we know.
I use "proof" in a very strict sense (that's why I generally prefer to use the word "evidence"). If any reasonable doubt can be introduced, then that can create a problem.
For example, with OA, the starting premise, "God is possible" can be questioned all over the place by an atheist or agnostic. He would argue that you can't assume the possibility of an entity that you are trying to demonstrate because this is circular reasoning.
He would say that we need to know what "God" is before we can say that He is possible, or that the sentence is meaningless because God's existence isn't self-evident and concretely observable by our senses; therefore the sentence has no meaning until more work of demonstration and reasoning is presented and accepted by all parties.
Etc., etc. Some of these are valid concerns from a certain "objective" standing-outside-looking-in perspective; at least enough for me to believe that the argument is not compelling. I regard the cosmological argument as the most likely candidate for a compelling theological proof, because it is empirical and can be supported by current cosmology, physics, and astronomy.
"Nope, not by a long shot. There are far too many factors which influence the predisposition or willingness or ability of a person to accept a proof, even a compelling one. One can't hang the validity of any proof on human response to it."
I was going to say exactly the same thing to this comment. Well done Dave. I was hoping you didn't really accept this idea of proof as Patrick was speculating you might.
Now, my feathers have been somewhat unruffled by the below.
"I myself, find the cosmological argument the most compelling, and almost an absolute proof of God's existence, but not quite. It is another step to reason oneself to the Christian God. So it is not airtight, but very close, IMO. "
All I would be concerned is you believe it can prove the existence of a one supreme God. It's airtightness is not affected by whether it is the Christian God because that is then moving on to other things. Vatican I (and Pius X) simply talk about the fact that human reason can work out that he exists - nothing more or less. Nothing about him being, indeed, the revealer of the Catholic religion. So I think you fine. But it would be nice if you revise or tweak that original comment for clarity (if you haven't).
God Bless
P.S It goes without saying that there are sevearal cosmological arguments each with their own distinctiveness. Unlike most people I find argument 1 (from motion or change - whatever you want to call it) to be my favourite. Most people tend to go for 2 or 3 (causality and contingency). It is a highly misunderstood argument too and the modern mind tends to find it difficult to cope with (which is why as you said we can't measure an argument by human nature - because that has nothing to do with its validity). It is nearly always presented as saying that whatever moves is moved by another. That is not what Thomas's argument was. After all God moves - just other things that is! What it says is that whatever is IN MOTION is put in motion by another. I find atheists phrase it the incorrect way (well it's so much easier to knock over then isn't it?)
>But it would be nice if you revise or tweak that original comment for clarity (if you haven't).
No need to, because I've written so much about my basic philosophical and apologetic and epistemological preferences in many papers. If one is all that conmcerned about what I think in this regard, they are there for their perusal (as well as this latest clarification). One has to work a little bit to fully understand what someone's opinions are, if there is significant substance in them.
How about I try to make it simple
Do you assent to Pius statement that the existence of God can be demonstrated? I might as well add Thomas in too. He argues that in the article before God's existence.
I don't know what you mean by cumulative proof. Certainly sevearl arguments for God's existence makes it better. I understand cumulative in that sense. But not a scenario where we have something like:
"Well lets reason through this argument...(an hour later) Now we are at the end we realise that, while interesting, this doesn't prove God's existence. It got close and looked good at one stage but it doesn't ulitmately follow. Ok here's a another... same result ....and another... same result. Ah ha even though none prove God's existence throwing them all together makes the case even none of them do by themselves!"
You don't think like that do you? I hope that is a complete caricarture.
Still I'm at a loss as to what you meant originally by saying no argument actually proves God's existence.
DelRayVA said:
Thanks, Dave, for these links. Your old papers were worth much more than the recent link.
Since the "recent link" was mine, I offer the following excuse: I do try! I'm sorry I disappointed you. 
-Theo
I've already explained, Matthew. If that was insufficient, then I will have to refer you to relevant papers of mine because the issue gets very complex and it is too much work to write all this stuff out that I have already written about in papers. I would recommend these:
Catholic Apologetic Method, Epistemology, and Open-Mindedness
http://ic.net/~erasmus/RAZ64.HTM
The Philosophical Premises of Newman's Views on Doctrinal Development and Religious Belief
http://ic.net/~erasmus/RAZ213.HTM
Questions & Answers on Cardinal Newman's Philosophical & Epistemological Commitments http://socrates58.blogspot.com/
2...825395597249132
I agree with almost all of Cardinal Newman's positions on these matters.
Theo, I hope I didn't offend because of my brevity. Dave's old papers were worth much more towards understanding the subtleties of OA. Your paper offered an interesting line of thinking regarding the reactions through history of OA, which was not the focus of Dave's papers. In this case, the "worth" function is entirely dependent upon what aspect of OA happened to be interesting me right now. I'm sorry for being a little too flip in my assessment.
Thanks. I hope I have the time to give them the attention they deserve.
I've enjoyed reading the discussion on this topic and I thank you, Dave, for posting it.
While I do believe that there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of God (and there have been many papers/books from simple to very detailed written), I do not think the OA does this.
Plantinga says that at first the Argument appears as a "parlor trick," but then goes on to say, "An interesting feature of this argument is that all of its premises are necessarily true if true at all." But is this really the case? I think not. The assumption upon which the proof is based has the flaw.
That assumption (as outlined by Plantinga) is that "God exists in the understanding, but not in reality." There is a huge difference between understanding that something exists and having it exist in your understanding. Whatever exists in your understanding is limited by your own finite nature. However, you are not prevented from understanding that something exists, but is beyond your limitations. For example, I can understand that supersonic jets exist, but the ones I understand in my mind are limited by my own knowledge of aerodynamics, structures, thermodynamics, etc. In fact, the jet which I conceive in my mind might not even fly! It is not truly a jet at all.
So it is with the OA. As finite beings we might be able to understand that an infinite being (God) exists (or could exist), but even with that understanding, God does not exist inside of us. What we do understand falls far short of who He is, and internal to our understanding there is no supreme being. Thus, the contradiction never occurs.
Now, if the assumption were correct, then the proof would be flawless from a mathematics/logic viewpoint. But with all things, we need to look at the assumption which is the foundation. In this case, that's where the OA fails.
Fortunately, the other evidence (sited by Dave in his papers, and sited by others in their works) is overwhelming. And with that overwhelming evidence, I can be certain in God's existence even when I don't trust the OA.
This has been a fun venture for me. Again, Dave, thanks for bringing it up!
You're welcome, Jamie. Thanks for your insightful comments. My friend Pedro actually "brought it up," though. I linked to his post and then added my links for related stuff.
Jamie:
I think you're misreading what's going on in the Plantinga passages. This is probably Dave's fault (bad Dave!), since he's got the order reversed. Look at the citation carefully: "God, Freedom, and Evil, New York: Harper & Row, 1974, 111-112, 85-88." The first passage in Dave's post, the one about possible worlds, is Plantinga's modal version of the OA. That's the piece from pp 111-112 of Plantinga's book. The second passage in Dave's post, the one about God existing in the understanding, is from pp 85-88 of that book. It comes first in the book because it's a venerable version of the argument that Plantinga thinks is a complete failure. After dispensing with this version, and others, he presents his modal version. So Plantinga would agree with you that St. Anselm's version of the argument doesn't work. But notice that your objections to St. Anselm's version simply do not apply to Plantinga's version.
DelRayVA, you write: "I understood Patrick's argument to be that it is untenable to assert that OA merely establishes that it is logically consistent to believe in God's existence."
The claim that I've made for the OA is this: it shows that if you want to deny God's existence, you have to deny that God is (metaphysically) possible. That is, all the action in the debate is on the premise. If you accept the premise, then you find yourself committed to God's actual existence. So the argument can tell us that it's logically tenable to believe in God. But it only tells us God actually exists if we grant its premise, which, of course, we may not be rationally compelled to do.
Dave, I'm puzzled by your response re: "proof." On the one hand, you write: "I use "proof" in a very strict sense (that's why I generally prefer to use the word "evidence"). If any reasonable doubt can be introduced, then that can create a problem." On the other hand, you write: "There are far too many factors which influence the predisposition or willingness or ability of a person to accept a proof, even a compelling one. One can't hang the validity of any proof on human response to it."
So it almost sounds like you're saying as long as there's any _reasonable_ doubt, then you don't really have a proof. But then you deny the definition of proof I offered (which I reject, but Plantinga accepts), which is that a proof has to be a valid argument that convinces any _reasonable_ person who considers it.
Certainly, one might reject a theistic argument on moral grounds (i.e. if that argument worked, I'd have to give up fornication!). That's a predisposition to resist the conclusion, but it's not a reasonable doubt. It lies outside of the arena of rationality. If the person were to set aside such nonrational considerations, he would be convinced, right? So in this case, the argument would convince the person if he were rational.
This is a bit muddled, I'm sure, because I'm tired out right now.
Hi Patrick:
>Dave, I'm puzzled by your response re: "proof." On the one hand, you write: "I use "proof" in a very strict sense (that's why I generally prefer to use the word "evidence"). If any reasonable doubt can be introduced, then that can create a problem."
Stricty definition; very high standard; yes.
>On the other hand, you write: "There are far too many factors which influence the predisposition or willingness or ability of a person to accept a proof, even a compelling one. One can't hang the validity of any proof on human response to it."
IOW, non-rational factors usually lie behind or influence even the conclusions of very reasonable folks.
>So it almost sounds like you're saying as long as there's any reasonable doubt, then you don't really have a proof.
Correct
>But then you deny the definition of proof I offered (which I reject, but Plantinga accepts), which is that a proof has to be a valid argument that convinces any reasonable person who considers it.
But "reasonable" people approach things in many different ways; see different emphases, emphasize certain things and underemphasize others. They differ on strength of premises, or on their fundamental axioms, etc. Their ultimate commitments color their perception.
Whatever turns out to be true, I don't think can be determined by who believes it and who doesn't. The "proof" has to lie in reason and facts themselves. That was my main point, but my head is spinning like yours. I think we agree; perhaps if you can present what you believe on this, I can tell you if I agree with you or not.
>Certainly, one might reject a theistic argument on moral grounds (i.e. if that argument worked, I'd have to give up fornication!). That's a predisposition to resist the conclusion, but it's not a reasonable doubt. It lies outside of the arena of rationality.
Yep. I was including those kinds of things in my conclusion.
>If the person were to set aside such nonrational considerations, he would be convinced, right?
Not necessarily, because of various factors in how men think - not just extraneous considerations that affect their reasoniong, however it proceeds.
>So in this case, the argument would convince the person if he were rational.
Perhaps most of the time, but not all of the time. I think it is (for lack of a better description) "psychologically" naive to think that. I like Polanyi's treatment (what I've read of it, which ain't a lot) of how so many things in our predispsitions affect our reasoning. The fascinating thing to me is how people arrive at premises, far more than how they arrive at conclusions.
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