Since you seem so well-read, have you read A.M.Weisberger's Suffering Belief? She's written over 40 pages on the Free Will Defense. Have you read the essays in The Impossibility of God? I don't think so. There are still versions of the logical problem of evil that have not been answered, by Quentin Smith, Richard La Croix, and Richard Gale. Just because Plantinga answered Mackie's formulation, and just because Mackie admitted it, doesn't mean that all formulations have been answered. This is just bogus. But Christian philosophers like to tout any successes they have till their blue in the face, since they have so few. But it's propaganda, plain and simple, coming from an old boys club of guys who hang around togethers in the Society of Christian Philosophers.
"There are still versions of the logical problem of evil that have not been answered, by Quentin Smith, Richard La Croix, and Richard Gale. Just because Plantinga answered Mackie's formulation, and just because Mackie admitted it, doesn't mean that all formulations have been answered."
Ah, the atheist equivalent of trying to nail Protestant jello to the wall.
"But Christian philosophers like to tout any successes they have till their blue in the face, since they have so few."
If Christian philosophers have so few successes, why are there tons more educated, intelligent Christians than there are educated, intelligent atheists?
I'm hardly any kind of expert in these matters, but I'll just say that in my experience I've not yet found an atheist argument against God's existence that wasn't fatally flawed logically. It's hypothetically possible that Smith, La Croix, or Gale have finally come up with a logically sound and intellectually complete version of atheism, but I'll just say that I'll believe it when I see it.
Dave,
I appreciate your paper very much, and I can see that nothing good can come from discussing this problem with Dr. Loftus. Whatever you say, he will surely come back with some other essay that he doesn't think you have read. If he is so well read himself, why doesn't he just present arguments, rather than just name dropping?
I had some concerns about Plantinga's arguments that maybe you can help me clear up:
The first is with item (19c): "(19c) An omnipotent and omniscient good being eliminates every evil that it can properly eliminate" It's not clear to me from your paper whether Plantinga argues that this is necessarily true, or just a proper characterization of the atheistic argument. If so, it would seem to necessitate Candide's (mock) philospophy that "This is the best of all possible worlds." (per Voltaire). Does Plantinga argue that 19c is true? If so, does 19c necessitate the Candide assertion?
Second, I'm troubled from a Catholic moral perspective with the following statement from the beginning of your paper: "Why then does God put up with all the evil wrought by generations of human beings through the ages? God does so, Plantinga argues, because on the whole it is for the best—or, at least, for the better." We know from Catholic moral philosophy that it is never moral to do evil so that good may come of it. Is God not bound by this? Well, let me qualify my statement, for God forbid that I should ever accuse my Lord of doing evil. Does Catholic moral philosophy state that one may permit evil through non-action so that good may come of it? Is this what Plantinga is accusing God of? If so, is he accusing God of violating Catholic moral principles? Does the fact that God exists in eternity, and knows all of the future, even the contingent future, mean that moral principles that apply to mortals do not apply in the same way to God?
I realize these questions are off-topic from your particular defense against the problem of evil, but they are interesting issues, I think, raised by your Plantinga paper.
Thanks,
A further comment on Dr. Loftus' apparently continued adherence to the now-defunct classical Problem of Evil argument: it would appear, judging from Dave's paper at least, that the best atheist minds have conceded that Plantinga's argument has shifted the grounds of the debate. According to those atheist thinkers, it's not just Mackie's formulation that he rebutted, but the very classic Problem of Evil argument itself. Therefore only if the arguments of Smith, La Croix, and Gale provide something different than the classic argument would they be worth our time to consider. But really, since Plantinga has shown that the existence of human evil is not a fatally objection to God's existence and God's goodness, we can conclude that no formulation of the classic argument is valid.
Answer the paper then, John (if you think it fails in its purpose), rather than send me to someone else. Show me where the logic didn't succeed, and where it has holes in it.
If you want to simply send me to others, then I can do the same. I'll just send you off to Plantinga (other papers and books of his) or Swinburne or Polkinghorne or van Inwagen or Adams or Mavrodes or Alston or Craig or Sennett or Moreland, etc., etc., etc.
Philosophy is your game, so I would expect you to be able to answer this stuff, and show us why and how it is wrong, rather than expect me to answer big-time philosophers, when I have already freely conceded that I would obviously be over my head trying to do so (not being a philosopher or even an academic).
Though I would try to poke holes in their premises if I run out of things to do . . . .
Note that before John said I was totally ignorant on the topic. After I produced this, he quickly changed his tune to mockery and garden-variety atheist chutzpah and hubris (knowing that he can't dismiss Plantinga himself):
"Christian philosophers like to tout any successes they have till their [sic] blue in the face, since they have so few."
[I should think defeating the most notorious and vaunted atheist argument and showing that it has been utterly misguided for centuries is quite a distinguished feat. Any philosopher would love to have such a "notch" on his rifle]
"But it's propaganda, plain and simple,"
[how could a true "success" somehow mutate into "propaganda" in the space of two sentences? Scratching my head . . .]
". . . old boys club of guys who hang around togethers in the Society of Christian Philosophers. "
[of course there are no analogous old boys clubs of atheists. Only we cliquish Christians do that]
I see. What happened to the argument, pray tell? Are you saying that Plantinga's reputation is overblown? I used to go to meetings of the philosophy dept. at Wayne State University where Plantinga used to teach. These guys (mostly atheists, and many who knew him personally) had almost a hushed respect for his work. I noticed the same on the atheist list I used to be on for months.
But here you are mocking his accomplishments. I think it speaks volumes. You can't give any credit at all to any Christian thinker, unless he writes a blurb on the back of your deconversion book (Sennett, as I understand). Then he has great integrity, etc.
Hi DelRay,
Excellent questions. I love when people do that.
>The first is with item (19c): "(19c) An omnipotent and omniscient good being eliminates every evil that it can properly eliminate" It's not clear to me from your paper whether Plantinga argues that this is necessarily true, or just a proper characterization of the atheistic argument.
The latter. He says, "suppose, for purposes of argument, we concede the necessary truth of (19c). Will it serve Mackie's purposes? Not obviously." Then he proceeds with his argument. This is probably a flaw in my abridgement.
>If so, it would seem to necessitate Candide's (mock) philospophy that "This is the best of all possible worlds." (per Voltaire). Does Plantinga argue that 19c is true? If so, does 19c necessitate the Candide assertion?
Plantinga uses the "other worlds" routine to establish that even God can't create any possible world. The upshot is that free will limits even the hands of an omnipotent God, because it introduces allowed contingencies that even God can't control, by definition (thus introduces inherent contradictions as the logic is followed through, thinking of all these possible worlds God is supposedly able to create).
If a creature is free, he is free to do evil, and God has to allow that in order for the creature to truly be free and to truly love and do good as well.
Plantinga denies (Lutheran philosopher) Leibniz' contention that this is the best of all possible worlds, or that it necessarily is, from the nature of omnipotence. He calls that "Leibniz' Lapse." I didn't include that part, either. I hope others aren't confused by my policy of editing to make a shorter version available!
>Second, I'm troubled from a Catholic moral perspective with the following statement from the beginning of your paper: "Why then does God put up with all the evil wrought by generations of human beings through the ages? God does so, Plantinga argues, because on the whole it is for the best—or, at least, for the better." We know from Catholic moral philosophy that it is never moral to do evil so that good may come of it. Is God not bound by this?
Yes. The above is meant in the sense of God permitting evil in His permissive will, not predestiniing or foreordaining it.
>Well, let me qualify my statement, for God forbid that I should ever accuse my Lord of doing evil. Does Catholic moral philosophy state that one may permit evil through non-action so that good may come of it?
One may never do evil so that good may result; this particular situation might be a sin of omission. There are situations where not doing something, with the result that some bad thing may happen beyond one's control, is permitted. It would depend how personally responsible you were for the outcome.
But God allowing the evil that comes from free creatures is not positively committing evil or sanctioning it. It is the necessary outcome of allowing freedom. God is not to
(cont.)
blame in the slightest.
>Is this what Plantinga is accusing God of?
He doesn't accuse God at all; He is defending the Christian God from charges that He is either weak or less than good or not there at all.
>If so, is he accusing God of violating Catholic moral principles?
No, of course not.
>Does the fact that God exists in eternity, and knows all of the future, even the contingent future, mean that moral principles that apply to mortals do not apply in the same way to God?
No. Our morals are grounded in God. God is holy and can be no other. He can't contradict goodness and true morality. We can choose to do evil, but God is so purely Good that He cannot. He always chooses the good and can do no other, by His very nature. It's like saying a circle can only be a circle. If it ceased to have the quality of circularity, it would cease being what it is. To be a circle is to possess the quality of circularity (and not to have any corners or straight edges, etc.). To be God is to be holy, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, etc. It can't be otherwise. That's what His Pure Being entails.
Thanks, Dave! Great answers. I really appreciate it.
Cheers,
Say. I remember saying that I did not know Richard Dawkins' political leanings. I have recently stumbled upon his shockingly sad mockery of Pres. Bush. I only mention this because (correct me if I am wrong) I believe it was Dawkins who calls for complete mockery of religion wherever it is found. Granted, this probably has always been a feature of atheism, but I wonder if this site is taking its cues from Dawkins.
On the relationship between God's goodness, human free will, and the existence of evil that free will makes possible, I've long seen free will and the resultant evil not as indications that God doesn't exist, but (paradoxically) as indications of God's goodness and of His love for us. It just seems to me that it is a more loving thing for God to make us capable of freely choosing to love or to hate Him than it is to make us incapable of choosing freely, or to deprive us of the ability to experience the consequences of our choices. Making us animals or automatons, or keeping us forever in a pumpkin shell, just doesn't seem like something an all-wise, all-good, all-loving Creator God would do.
I would recommend Gale's article with Pruss on the new cosmological argument for God's existence. As for the problem of evil, Snyder and Hawthorne (woo-hoo for (former) Rutgers philosopher! he is in Oxford now) has a nice article which criticizes some of Plantinga's argument. Oh and Rowe even said that Plantinga took out the logical problem of evil.
Dave, The problem with philosophy is its flexibility. Is there a single major problem in philosophy that does not continue to have numerous answers and numerous counter replies to those answers, thus maintaining the problem?
Philosophy also begins with one part of our entire experience, summing it up in a single word, like "Good," and attempts to squeeze something other than "Good" out of it, in this case "Evil, and/or Unaccountable or Irrational Pain and Suffering."
But if you begin with "God" who exemplifies a free-willed Being of ultimate Goodness, and who creates literally everything "in the beginning" out of "God's own will intent desire power and perfection," then whence comes "evil, chance, pain, suffering, imperfection?" The Christian "solution" is to argue that everything evil, irrational, unaccountably painful and imperfect, is part of a bigger plan, but others disagree as to whether or not there is a plan that is plainly apparent to all, or proven in any philosphical sense. And regardless, going from a "God" of perfect power, and perfect goodness, and perfect free-will, to things so much less in every which way, seems to indicate limitations in "God."
I once asked Plantinga over the phone that if God is the author of all things and only God existed in the beginning (without any pre-existing matter), then how could there ever be any "room left" for imperfection in anything that came out of "God" in the beginning? He hadn't considered what I would call the most basic questions, as outlined above. He hadn't considered how philosophy itself works, beginning with an abstract word based on a mere segment of reality (goodness), and then trying to squeeze out of that lopsided beginning, something new like (evil,badness).
And besides the problem of evil/pain, there's the question of the "hiddeness of God" itself that the philosophers who believe in God still have to deal with.
Why is there an unwillingness to answer whether La Croix's and Smith's version of the POE successfully handles the free-will defense? Is it because they have? And we don't have an answer? I'm sorry, but the celebration is more than premature.
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