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Church Fathers on the Immutability, Simplicity, Atemporality, and Impassibility of God
[20 January 2009]
http://socrates58.blogspot.com/
2...mutability.html
St. Augustine: In God, however, certainly there is nothing that is said according to accident, because in Him there is nothing that is changeable.
This is an important point. As a friend recently pointed out to me, time is one of the nine accidents. Since there are no accidents in God, He must be timeless.
I have added 12 citations to the Passibility section: Clement of Alexandria (2), Novatian, Hippolytus (2), Athanasius (3; also in Simplicity), Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen, John of Damscus, and Origen.
Added at 1:45 AM EST, 1-21-09.
@Ben Douglass
Could you explain the phrase, "time is one of the nine accidents" ? Doe that have to do with physics? or is it a mystical statement? when i saw that i immediately thought of this video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H...h?
v=HvgwR9ERCBo
Can't remember which forum i saw it linked previously.
Not physics exactly, but Thomist philosophy (though I suppose centuries ago physics would probably been seen as a kind of "natural philosophy").
I'm not sure Lactantius is arguing that God has emotions. It seems rather that he is countering those who says that God has no wrath but still does have kindness and pity and mercy. He is arguing that if God you say God can't have anger toward evil then neither can you say that He had pity and kindness or shows care for anyone or anything. But it's not clear that Lactantius is identifying God's wrath or mercy or kindess as emotions; he might be speaking in biblical anthropomorphisms.
Of course Lactanius probably did get things wrong at times (I believe he may have thought of hell as annihilation, though again his language is unclear so there is doubt about that), so he may have erroneously attributed emotions to God, but I'm uncertain the passage you cite is actually saying that.
I don't see how you can think this, seeing that he wrote:
"Therefore the arguments are found to be empty and false, either of those who, when they will not admit that God is angry, will have it that He shows kindness, because this, indeed, cannot take place without anger; or of those who think that there is no emotion of the mind in God."
If he thinks "no emotion in God" is "empty in false," then he is obviously arguing for the contrary, no?
My point is that he isn't necessarily arguing that God "gets" angry or "develops feelings" of pity or affection -- that would be the "motion" or change in "emotion" that contradicts impassibility and invariability. He talks of God being "angry" all the time, and being piteous and kind all the time. It seems he's not necessarily arguing that God has "emotions," but that it is wrong to see God only as a happy, fluffy, all-accepting, all-tolerant Goo of LOVE LOVE LOVE -- rather, we must also see Him as uncompromising opposed to evil, that is, "angry with the wicked all the time" as the Psalmist says.
I could be wrong, though, but I try to exercise caution with the early Fathers, some of whom, for example, rejected "the immortality of the soul" as a pagan error -- because in those days "immortality of the soul" always entails the eternal preexistence of the soul (something Origen dabbled with). Later "immortality of the soul" came to mean something else. When the meaning changed, the term became acceptable -- but the Fathers weren't wrong who rejected the soul's "immortality" once we understand what they were rejecting. Something like that may be going on with Lactantius: I don't know, but he may be using language in a way that it seems he's attributing emotion to God when he's not really doing that at all.
I wish someone would address the following points made earlier. The more I think about it; and after readind what the Fathers had to say (on both sides of the issue), this seems to clear it up. Here's the comments, slightly adapted:
PREVIOUS COMMENTS: "I think the distinction between God ad intra and ad extra clears up any confusion. Obviously an immutable God cannot change; and since the mind of God is inseparable from his nature, it is not possible for God to truly change his mind. Thus, God ad intra cannot change.
But with respect to God ad extra there can be, what could be called, a "change" (as the Bible calls it) due to a change in the actions of men, which then brings about a corresponding "change" in response from God (a "change" that was foreseen by God all along). Although it would be a true change, it is not an actual change in the mind of God since God knew from all eternity what the final outcome would be; rather, it is a change from one POTENTIAL outcome to another.
Since God is all-knowing, He would have been able to foresee, not only what the final outcome would be if man change from good to bad, or visa versa; but also what the outcome would have been had man not changed. For example, just as God knew that Nineveh would repent and be spared, so too God, who knows all things, would know what the outcome would have been if Nineveh did not repent.
The two potential outcomes - both of which God knew - would fall into the category of ad extra: two potentialities resulting in one final act - with the act having been foreseen by God ad intra the whole time.
FINAL POINT: The mind of God ad intra and the "mind" of God ad extra
If we can distinguish between the mind of God ad extra (His actions towards man), and the mind of God ad intra, the "problem" is solved. The mind of God ad intra (what you, Dave, are referring to), and the mind of God ad extra, which is the "mind of God" in a secondary sense? That is, the mind of God as it judges circumstances as they exist at a particular time.
If we distinguish between the mind of God ad intra (which is quite obviously unchanging), and the mind of God ad extra (which does changed based on the free will decisions of man), it not only explains why the Bible says "God changes His mind", but also other points as well, which I have been considering over the past few days.
I hope someone will comment on this.
Another point with respect to the above comments.
Without distinguishing between the ad intra mind of God and the ad extra mind of God, how can we explain why God did not destroy Nineveh when He specifically said he would?
God's saying He would destroy Nineveh was not an anthropomorphic statement. He didn't say "I am angry with Nineveh". He said "I will destroy Nineveh". That statement can't be explained away as an anthropomorphism.
Yet if we distinguish the ad intra mind of God from the ad extra mind of God, it makes perfect sense.
According to the ad extra mind of God, He would indeed destroy Nineveh if they continued on their current path. But since God acts toward man according to what man does or does not do, the judgment and prophecy must have been only a potentiality; a potentiality that existed along with another potentiality. This shows that, although God is pure act with no potency, the ad extra mid of God does included potency.
And since God specifically said that He would destroy Nineveh, it seems that on some level He must have had a mind to do so, or else it would have been a lie - which God cannot do. Yet the mind of God is immutable and cannot change. He knows all possibilities as well as all possible outcomes and the final outcome. So how could he say He would do one thing and not do it? The distinction between the ad intra and ad extra mind of God solves the problem.
I could be wrong here, and I am open to any critique or correction, but the more I think about it the more the ad intra and ad extra mind of God clears up a lot of apparent contradictions.
Without distinguishing between the ad intra mind of God and the ad extra mind of God, how can we explain why God did not destroy Nineveh when He specifically said he would?
Simple: the statement "I will destroy Nineveh" bears within itself the implied qualification "unless they repent."
Robert,
I have avoided responding to your comments thus far since I don't want to distract the discussion from issues of settled Catholic teaching into a Thomist, Molinist debate, but I'll go ahead and respond to your positions from a Thomist perspective.
God is in no sense in potency with respect to, or determined by creatures. Whatever He wills with respect to creatures, He wills from eternity. There is no such thing as "God ad extra," merely the works of God ad extra, these latter being determined by Him from eternity.
The reason not all men are saints is because God does not will the salvation of each man simply. He wills the salvation of all logically antecedent to the consideration of individual men and their individuating circumstances, circumstances which include the good God can draw from permitting them to be wicked, e.g., "if I permit Alexander to be wicked and persecute Paul, he will be an instrument of Paul's sanctification."
Whatever good God wills simply for a man from eternity, he will infallibly receive that good and no other, whether the good of existence in Hell or the good of beatitude.
Hi Robert,
I responded to your comments earlier and said that I basically agreed with you. Augustine, Aquinas, and others taught that the apparent changes were in men, not God. Because His actions towards us appear to "change" from our temporal perspective, we attribute the change to God.
I agree with Ben about Nineveh. One must interpret the Bible as a whole. Many other passages teach, "if you don't repent of your wickedness, God will judge you, but if you repent and change your ways, God will spare and bless you."
So the Nineveh statement should be considered within that background context. Not every statement has to contain within it every particular. Of course, if anyone repents, they won't be judged. The Bible makes that abundantly clear.
God's saying He would destroy Nineveh was not an anthropomorphic statement. He didn't say "I am angry with Nineveh". He said "I will destroy Nineveh". That statement can't be explained away as an anthropomorphism.
Why not? Would you say the same of Gen. 6, where God says, "I'm sorry I ever made man"?
Thanks for the replies. I'll keep thinking about it.
Ben,
Quick question: How can potency not be implied in a statement such as: "If you do not repent such and such will happen". If there are two possible ad extra actions of God, how can potency not be implied?
I understand that God knows from all eternity what the final outcome would be, but a statement that gives an either or consequence (based on the actions of men) seems to imply potency resulting in one final act by God. What am I missing?
I think you are thinking in unhelpful "either/or" terms: pitting man's actions against God's omniscience. God can't change His mind.
Even on a human level, this scenario implies no change of mind. I tell my own kids, "if you behave and act good, you won't be punished, but if you disobey, you will be punished."
So one of them misbehaves and is punished. But did I change my mind? No. I determined to act in a certain way based on what they did. So even without omniscience and timelessness, a result of a conditional promise is not a change of mind. All the more so for God, Who knows what will happen before it does, and Who resides in an eternal "present" and outside of all time and temporality whatsoever.
Scientific laws provide another analogy. If we say, "if the temperature falls to 10 degrees tonight, the shallow stream in the park will freeze, but if it is 50 degrees it won't.
It goes down to zero degrees and the stream freezes. Does it follow that the laws of science "changed their mind" in order for this eventuality to happen? No, not at all. They are what they are, and what happens, happens as a result of cause and effect, given the laws of physics and chemistry with regard to H2O and the temperature of the surrounding environment.
Likewise, there are unalterable, intrinsic laws of judgment and right and wrong that are carried out by God as Judge. These do not in the slightest entail His changing His mind. They apply to men based on their free will actions and beliefs.
The very concept of "a changing mind" with regard to a Supreme, Immutable, Omniscient Being is ludicrous.
Pope John Paul II wrote in his Apostolic Letter, Mulieris Dignitatem (On the Dignity and Vocation of Women) on 15 August 1988:
The anthropomorphism of biblical language
8. The presentation of man as "the image and likeness of God" at the very beginning of Sacred Scripture has another significance too. It is the key for understanding biblical Revelation as God's word about himself. Speaking about himself, whether through the prophets, or through the Son" (cf. Heb 1:1, 2) who became man, God speaks in human language, using human concepts and images. If this manner of expressing himself is characterized by a certain anthropomorphism, the reason is that man is "like" God: created in his image and likeness. But then, God too is in some measure "like man", and precisely because of this likeness, he can be humanly known. At the same time, the language of the Bible is sufficiently precise to indicate the limits of the "likeness", the limits of the "analogy". For biblical Revelation says that, while man's "likeness" to God is true, the "non-likeness"27 which separates the whole of creation from the Creator is still more essentially true. Although man is created in God's likeness, God does not cease to be for him the one "who dwells in unapproachable light" (1 Tim 6:16): he is the "Different One", by essence the "totally Other".
This observation on the limits of the analogy - the limits of man's likeness to God in biblical language - must also be kept in mind when, in different passages of Sacred Scripture (especially in the Old Testament), we find comparisons that attribute to God "masculine" or "feminine" qualities. We find in these passages an indirect confirmation of the truth that both man and woman were created in the image and likeness of God. If there is a likeness between Creator and creatures, it is understandable that the Bible would refer to God using expressions that attribute to him both "masculine" and "feminine" qualities.
We may quote here some characteristic passages from the prophet Isaiah: "But Zion said, 'The Lord has forsaken me, my Lord has forgotten me'. 'Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she should have no compassion on the son of her womb? Even these may forget, yet I will not forget you'". (49:14-15). And elsewhere: "As one whom his mother comforts, so will I comfort you; you shall be comforted in Jerusalem" (66: 13). In the Psalms too God is compared to a caring mother: "Like a child quieted at its mother's breast; like a child that is quieted is my soul. O Israel, hope in the Lord". (Ps 131:2-3). In various passages the love of God who cares for his people is shown to be like that of a mother: thus, like a mother God "has carried" humanity, and in particular, his Chosen People, within his own womb; he has given birth to it in travail, has nourished and comforted it (cf. Is 42:14; 46: 3-4). In many passages God's love is presented as the "masculine" love of the bridegroom and father (cf. Hosea 11:1-4; Jer 3:4-19), but also sometimes as the "feminine" love of a mother.
This characteristic of biblical language - its anthropomorphic way of speaking about God - points indirectly to the mystery of the eternal "generating" which belongs to the inner life of God. Nevertheless, in itself this "generating" has neither "masculine" nor "feminine" qualities. It is by nature totally divine. It is spiritual in the most perfect way, since "God is spirit" (Jn 4:24) and possesses no property typical of the body, neither "feminine" nor "masculine". Thus even "fatherhood" in God is completely divine and free of the "masculine" bodily characteristics proper to human fatherhood. In this sense the Old Testament spoke of God as a Father and turned to him as a Father. Jesus Christ - who called God "Abba Father" (Mk 14: 36), and who as the only-begotten and consubstantial Son placed this truth at the very centre of his Gospel, thus establishing the norm of Christian prayer - referred to fatherhood in this ultra-corporeal, superhuman and completely divine sense. He spoke as the Son, joined to the Father by the eternal mystery of divine generation, and he did so while being at the same time the truly human Son of his Virgin Mother.
http://www.vatican.va/
holy_fathe...nitatem_en.html
Ben,
Quick question: How can potency not be implied in a statement such as: "If you do not repent such and such will happen". If there are two possible ad extra actions of God, how can potency not be implied?
Robert,
God is the one who, infallibly, causes the repentance of those who repent. He determines whether the condition will be fulfilled or not.
I realize that I'm getting outside issues of settled Church teaching and into an area of controversy, but I think it becomes a logical necessity at this point. I agree with Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange that God is either "determining or determined, no other alternative" (Predestination, p. 30
.
I tell my own kids, "if you behave and act good, you won't be punished, but if you disobey, you will be punished." So one of them misbehaves and is punished. But did I change my mind? No.
Dave,
Nevertheless, your action is dependent upon the actions of your children. If God's actions are dependent on the actions of creatures, then He is to that extent determined by them.
He's not determined by free actions (that He Himself allowed to occur), otherwise we can have no free will without a determined, fatalistic, Islamic-like God, or God is free and all our actions are predetermined beforehand, which is equally objectionable and impausible.
The Church teaches neither. God's actions are not determined: they are free, and so are ours.
To say that I punish my children when they do wrong is simply what might be called "domestic justice." It's the way things are.
Likewise, there is cosmic justice and it is foolish to say that God is dependent on His creatures because He decides who is saved and who is damned. We know (from Church teaching) that those who are damned, are so because of their own rebellion and wickedness, not because God predetermined it.
That is one reason why I am a Molinist, because it makes perfect sense that God would take free will actions of men and how they will react to grace into account when He predestines the elect, because there is a parallelism to how He decides to decree that the damned are damned.
For those who struggle with reconciling free will and predestination, I heard a nice explanation from a Catholic who said that we have a similar paradox when it comes to God's Omnipresence: God is present everywhere, yet we ourselves are distinct from God.
So omnipresence is affirmed while pantheism is denied at the same time. The heart of the "answer" to this paradox lies in the fact God transcends all.
ROBERT: Quick question: How can potency not be implied in a statement such as: "If you do not repent such and such will happen". If there are two possible ad extra actions of God, how can potency not be implied?
BEN: God is the one who, infallibly, causes the repentance of those who repent. He determines whether the condition will be fulfilled or not.
MY REPLY: When you say God is the one who infallibly causes the repentance, I agree as long as it is not understood to mean that man's free will cooperation (the secondary cause) is not necessary. God may move man's will in the right direction, and may give man an additional grace to help him correspond properly; but man's cooperations must be considered as real and necessary. And if we go so far as to reduce the cooperation of man's free will to the point where it is virtually neutral, as God moves it with one grace, then another, we make a mockery of free will. We must maintain the mean between the two extremes. While it is true that the will of man requires God's grace to repent, it is also true that man must do his part by corresponding to that grace. I think that is made clear in the Council of Trent.
With respect to God truly changing his mind: Just so it is clear, I fully agree that God cannot truly change his mind. God knows all things, including all possibilities as well as the final outcome. As such, there is nothing to change.
What I have been wondering about out loud, and trying to consider in light of the ad intra and ad extra works of God, is whether there can be a way in which it can be said that God "changed His mind" in a secondary and qualified sense.
Obviously, it would not be a true change of mind; but I wonder if there is a way to consider God's "mind" in the sense of how He will act (or would act) given certain circumstances as they exist at a particular time, vs. how he will (or would act) act if the circucumstances change. In other words, we are not speaking of God's unchanging mind (his actual mind), but rather His mind as it relates to events at a particular time. Do you see what I mean? Considering God's mind on this two-fold level squares nicely with what the Bible says.
That's why I distinguished between the mind of God ad intra, and, what I called, "the mind of God ad extra". By the mind of God ad extra I was referring to how God WOULD act based on particular events as they exist at a given time.
And I think this speculation is reasonable. After all, God did say that he would destroy Nineveh. While I agree that implied in the statement is that He would not destroy Nineveh if they repented; nevertheless, God did say that He would destroy them (if they didn't repent). This indicates that God had a mind to do it given the circumstances at the time. When the circumstances changed so to did God's "mind" (in a secondary and qualified sense).
Again, I'm not implying that God had a real change of mind, only wond
it is foolish to say that God is dependent on His creatures because He decides who is saved and who is damned.
You have constructed a scenario in which God's actions depend on what His creatures do, just as your acts of domestic justice (whether you reward or punish your children) depend on, i.e., are determined by, what your children do.
We know (from Church teaching) that those who are damned, are so because of their own rebellion and wickedness, not because God predetermined it.
God did not do so actively, but He willed to permit it. He certainly could prevent it if He so desired. "The king's heart is like channels of water in the hand of the LORD; He turns it wherever He wishes" (Prov 21:1).
Great, thanks for the resources Dave. And thanks to Ben Douglass for the other information, too!
BEN: God is the one who, infallibly, causes the repentance of those who repent. He determines whether the condition will be fulfilled or not.
wow..... just wow
Yes, His grace truly is amazing, isn't it, Anon.
You have constructed a scenario in which God's actions depend on what His creatures do...
How do prayers of petition come into all of this. Why bother?
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