Why is this a surprise? Kissinger was an advocate of pure national self-interest in US foreign policy so he has always opposed the "neo-con" agenda (the intellectual roots of which were actually amongst pro-Vietnam War Democrats) of using the US' military strength to export democratic values and deal with humanitarian crises - same brand of conservatism as the Brit Tories who armed Saddam in the name of regional stability and stood back and failed to stop ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.
Well an intersting point made to me recently by someone in the Brtish military, is that withdrawl may also be difficult for the Amercians.
For example, when the yanks withdrew from Vietnam the South Vietnamese army was still able to hold the line; when the Russians (perfidiously?) withdrew from Afganistan the Afghan army was able to hold the line while they did so.
But what of Iraq? it would take at least a month to withdraw the heavy armour south - either into Kuwait/Saudi or to ships via Um Qasr. meanwhile every one will be queuing up to have a pop at them, as soon as they leave their defensive positions.
If the Americans have to conduct their own rearguard action to defend their withdrawl, they will litterly have to fight their way out, or leave the armour behind and run for it as fast as they can.
Either way they would look like a defeated army - which would be absolutley dissatrous for them, and therefore they are likely to stay - however disastrous the mission becomes.
Luke
I didn't say I was surprised. The so-called 'realist' school in the US international relations establishment has been against the project from the get-go. Mearsheimer, for instance, has been highly critical.
But it's a good stick to beat the 'pro-war left' with, so I seized it.
If you have that bastard onside, you've got a problem (and I don't mean Cde Akehurst). If it's a choice between Kissinger and the neo-cons, I'm neo-con every time.
I am not sure that Kissinger is "on side". We have recently been finalising the speakers for the 2nd December demonstration at RAF Brize Norton, and his name wasn't put forward by anyone.
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Well in 1973 Kissinger succesfully argued for an end to the Vietnam war - it didn't mean he was "on side" with the Viet Cong (not their real name, but you know what I mean) or "on side " with the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. It meant in 1973 he knew the US were losing - He feels a similar way now, as do other establishment types (Gen Dannat, the Baker Commission etc).
Iraq has had a "Tet" moment - even Dubya accepted that. However, be wary , because Kissinger saw Tet as heralding a defeat - and his response was launching secret wars in Cambodia and Laos. Like a cornered bank robber, the US govt may try and shoot their way out of Iraq, lobbing munitions at border states and reclacitrant Iraqi's to try and keep the "balance of power" while they exit:
That's what all that "go big" "go long" "go short" gibberish means in today's Guardian.
A little military lnowledge is a dangerous thing :o)
It is worth clarifying that iraq may have had a Tet moment in the limited sense that American public opinion no longer beleive victory possible.
But further comparisons woud be misleading, as Tet was also a decisive defeat for the NLF, which meant that from then on Vietnamese military effort was switched from guerillarism to the conventional military forces of the NVA. The NVA also suffered a very heavy military defeat during Tet, under the same general who had commanded their forces at Dien Bien Phu.
Certanly therefore General Westmoreland believed Tet increased the chances of military victory, and partially the extention of the war to Laos and Cambodia was not desperation, but rather an attempt to land a knock out blow on the Vietnamese. The extention of the war for several more years after Tet was testiment to a complex unravelling of the US army as political dissent and continued Vietnamese resilience undermined a quite plausible game plan from Westmoreland.
Almost none of this is present in Iraq, no guerilla national liberation movement, no conventioanl army facing them, no plausible plan from the US military.
There is Iraqi resistance and guerillaism, but only in the sense of anarchic sectariam violence. So I think Soloman's fantasy of the Yanks escalating the war assumes that the US military are irrational fools - which they are not, nor have they ever been.
I believe Kissinger wrote in 1996, in "Foreign Affairs", after Tet that this was a ,
"watershed of the American effort. Henceforth, no matter how effective our actions the prevalent strategy could no longer achieve its objectives within a period or with force levels politically acceptable to the American people.” - which is I think pretty close to the situation now -
the strategy they turned to then was "vietnamisation" , which in many ways involved an intensification of the war - altho' shifting from the politically unacceptable ground troops to more intense air war in support of the S Vietnamese forces, and the secret wars on Cambodia and Laos (not secret from Cambodian's or Laotians)
I think this is pretty likely to be mirrored in the current US approach in Iraq - the US probably already has ramped up air power behind the rag tag Iraqi forces. the US will also be worried about the balance with the other regional powers (esp Iran and Syria) as they pull back - the point I am making is that they might respond here through negotiation - trying to talk the border states into helping - or force - trying to bomb them away from exploiting the position - or both.
I think it is likely (in a bad way, this is not a 'fantasy') that the US will retreat from commitments in Iraq, but they will lash out while doing so - certainly in Iraq, quite possibly against the other regional powers: the whole Baker "Study Group" approach is rational , but that does not mean the US will get all peaceful on the way out of Iraq over the next two-three years. I don't understand what Andy Newman thinks is the likely course of events - as his comment was a bit snide, I will add my own snideyness here - for all his professing great knowedge of the past, it seems to offer him no clue to the future
Oh no, the Trots have got Kissinger agreeing with them - the game's up.
yeah sorry Soloman, I had an unexpected bereavement at the weekend and i am unusually grumpy. You are right I was inappropriately snide with you.
All I am saying is that knowledge of the past is not much help in determining what they do next, as the situations are so different, and my exasperation was not even with you at all, but rather with people like Chris Bambury, who have hailed every slight military set back for the Yanks, as their Stalingrad, or Dien Bien Phu.
My guess is that the US will make no change of course as the military know there is no good option, adopting the principle of "if you don't know what to do - do nothing!"
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