The Sci Fi Catholic Yak Module
Actually his point ought to be well taken, and you simply are not well read in philosophy. Since Plato's Theatetus, the philosophical definition of knowledge has been "justified true belief." So for a particular belief to be a case of knowledge, a. one has to believe it, b. it has to be true, and c. one must be justified in believing it, which translates to something like "one must have considerable evidence in its favor." So, your belief that knowledge means "be aware of, understand, and be able to process and describe" is a definition you seem to have made up or gotten from some dictionary beside your bed, rather than a studied examination of the history of philosophy which is precisely what this teacher was focusing on. Granted he might have done this better, but he was neither indoctrinating her nor was he wrong about the material.
Now, having read the legal brief, I note two things. First, it is unclear at all that the instructor was demanding that the student give up her beliefs; a likelier story, supported by the evidence, is that philosophy provides ample literature that forces the critical religious thinker to recognize deep conceptual problems in the belief in the "deity" (his term). Now, he seems to have been demanding that, at least and perhaps at most, she recognize that these arguments call out in the critical thinker that belief in that deity ought not be believed uncritically. That is, he seems to be trying to get her to see that these problems call out in the believer a coherent and substantial response, rather than something like "oh, I see the problems raised by the problem of evil, but this doesn't at all affect my belief in the deity." In no other domain would such a response be intellectually respected. Imagine if a mathematician were told "ah, I see that this proof I believe in leads to an inconsistency. Well then, that's very interesting and all, but it won't have the slightest effect on my continuing to believe in this proof." Huh? Well it SHOULD! His math grade ought to suffer if that's his response.
So perhaps your judgment that he should be fired ought to wait to hear his side of the story. I am not defending all of his actions in the course (how could I?), but there are a large number of remedies in between doing nothing and firing him. If you pride yourself on critical thinking, you ought to apply a bit of measure to your own response to this story.
As a student in the sciences I had a difficult time with classes like these.....however part of College Student 101 is knowing what you need to do to pass the class. Sometimes you just need to be the bobble-headed doll and come to the realization that you only have to suffer through it for one semester, suck it up, and settle for the mercy C.
My Contemporary American Poetry class was like that..I also contributed many Scooby Do expressions.. a close second was Studio Art for Non-art Majors... barf.. that was the most difficult C I ever earned...
The problem with the philosophical definition of knowledge is part b)
You can think that something is true, and you can have valid reasons for believing it, but if in order to know something it **HAS** to be true, then the study of science becomes impossible, because all scientific knowledge is tentative. There is no scientific theory that cannot be disproved with further research, but until that research is carred out, the tentative conclusions are to be accepted as truth, and added to the store of knowledge (I am very grateful that science has reversed itself and decreed that chocolate is good for you).
In other words, the classical definition of knowledge is flawed - and maybe it is not a coincidece that the classical world was not noted for its scientific or technological advances - we had to wait for the Middle Ages for that.
I regret that I cannot sign the petition because it is sponsored by an organization that approves of torture. A relative of mine was tortured to death by the Argentine military, with the complicity of the US government.
I dispise torturers and their enablers, and I deny them the right to be incensed about *anything* in our society. If they swallowed the camel of torture, then they can swallow any kind of gnats our society throws at them. They abdicated their moral responsibility in order to further their political goals, and having abdicated it, they cannot claim it any more.
Please forward the above comments to the ACLJ in case I cannot contact the myself.
Actually, the professor is guilty of the fallacy of equivocation. It is perfectly possible to know the material without having to believe in the philosophy espoused by said material according to the definition of truth he gave. To do so one would have to believe that the philosopher or school of philosophy in question said X, justify this belief by one's reading of primary and secondary sources and have one's belief be true. Justified true belief.
The equivocation is with regard to the object of the student's knowledge. She is saying she can know what some philosopher or school or philosophy taught qua teachings of some particular individual or individuals. He is arguing with her about knowing what some philosopher or school or philosophy taught qua the truth about reality. The former is possible without believing the philosophy in question, the latter is impossible insofar as the teachings are false. I can know, for example, Kant's epistemology in the first sense. It is impossible to know Kant's epistemology in the second sense, since Kant's epistemology is false.*
* Yes, it is false. And I would be more than willing to get into a knock-down-drag-out with anyone who wants to say otherwise.
Anonymous, I can know the opinions of Francis Crick on racial intelligence. Do I have to believe those opinions? Or can I state "These are the opinions of Dr. Crick" without having to add "And of course he's right!"?
Actually his point ought to be well taken, and you simply are not well read in philosophy. Since Plato's Theatetus, the philosophical definition of knowledge has been "justified true belief." So for a particular belief to be a case of knowledge...
Actually, the professor is guilty of the fallacy of equivocation.
Good answers, both of you. I learned something today.
Fuinseoig:
This reminds me of Raymond Smullyan's riddles, and that there is a difference between saying "so and so is true" and "X believes that so and so is true". As long as X believes it, the second sentence is true, no matter what so and so is. It is perfectly permissible to a) expound some one else's beliefs and b) reserve judgement because you do not think you have enough data to corroborate or disprove it - while makeing some logical deductions from so-and-so if it were true.
Symbolic logic is a lot of fun if done properlyl
It is perfectly permissible to...reserve judgement because you do not think you have enough data to corroborate or disprove it...
I deserve the spanking I got from Anonymous here. My training is in archaeology and, alas, I still have many educational gaps to fill, such as the one in philosophy. However correct the professor's definition of knowledge may be, though, his use of it is still philosophical bullying: he has presented his argument, challenged a 101 student to contradict it, and then said the 101 student better change her view and agree with the professor since she can't mount a successful counter-argument. It isn't as if theists are all unaware of the arguments the professor is making and have no response, but the average student in an introductory Philosophy course can't be expected to have them at her fingertips.
Well, as someone who has academic training in philosophy and is, in fact, a thesis away from being qualified to do this professor's job, I will say that the he is, at least as far as the excerpts from the text he wrote for this class is concerned, a philosophical lightweight. His arguments are, quite frankly, a joke. He shows no evidence of having any familiarity with the fact that all his arguments were asked and answered centuries ago. If he doesn't think these answers work he needs to refute them, not simply restated, in a most primitive way, the same arguments over and over again. Though perhaps I shouldn't be surprised, as the modern world seems to often believe that the best arguments are the ones that are shouted the loudest.
I have never been a fan of self-advertising, but I went through the letter and answered his quoted text point-by-point here, if anyone is interested. If not, then please ignore. I'm "just zis guy, you know?"
Thanks, Brendon.
Brendon's response is more than sufficient, but I would add one thing; Anonymous said,
Since Plato's Theatetus, the philosophical definition of knowledge has been "justified true belief." So for a particular belief to be a case of knowledge, a. one has to believe it, b. it has to be true, and c. one must be justified in believing it, which translates to something like "one must have considerable evidence in its favor."
This is not actually right; the "justified true belief" definition is the traditional definition, but (as with many things in modern epistemology that are called 'traditional') has only been in common use, rather ironically, since Gettier wrote his 1963 paper, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", which presents what is widely recognized as a serious objection to it. Plato does toy with something like it in the Theatetus; and Gettier, of course, took himself to be summarizing the gist of what a number of his contemporaries thought. But it certainly has not been "the philosophical definition of knowledge" since Plato. There are plenty of views of knowledge that reject the JTB account; there are, in fact, despite its attractions, well-known problems with the JTB account, and even those who accept it recognize that they have to be addressed squarely. One thing that I find rather ironic is that someone who is so intensely against "Level 1" thinking, in which you think you adequately understand reality, simply takes as "clear" a position that has been known to have problems for as long as it has been clearly formulated.
In any case, in expounding someone else's view, the only true belief needed is that the other person actually said what he is reported to have said.
Otherwise, there would be no point in having policemen testify in court as to the statements made by the accused or any witness.
Anonymous here, responding to some nicely thought out comments.
1. Brendon, regarding equivocation -- Yes, I agree. And same goes for Fuinseoig.
2. Brendon, regarding your comment on Gettier. Yes, my statement was "actually right." Gettier's contribution is to show why the traditional definition has problems, or at least one particularly thorny problem. Are there alternatives? Yes. But there are alternatives to Darwinian evolution, too, but Darwin's is the standard account of evolution. Let's put it this way: if anyone wants to suggest that there is a better way of defining knowledge, s/he has to go through JTB. Are there alternatives to Descartes' dualism? Yes, but the are to be defended qua alternative to Descartes dualism.
3. Brendon, you claim that you aren't one for self advertisement; your remark about your philosophical training belies this. I've had that degree in hand for many years, now, and I welcome you to the club, whenever that comes.
4. Brendon, regarding your analysis on your own site: "I would agree with it. Insofar as I am Catholic "I believe and profess all that the Holy Catholic Church believes, teaches, and proclaims to be revealed by God." That is what it means to be Catholic. But what of it? Nothing about this makes what I believe absurd or illogical. The professor has certainly not, as far as I know, written anything that demonstrates my faith to be such."
If you recognize the context of the exchange, you'll see that this was an online course (or is one still! Semester's not over yet!) Unlike your take, I presume this exchange provided in the brief was not the material in the course, but an exchange about her participation in the course, and her take on, or her response to some basic difficulties that have become apparent over the years. (The context I mention above is also what answers your objection that the prof didn't acknowledge that the objections to which he refers have had responses from intelligent believers.) That you can draw from these intelligent believers and come up with coherent responses to many of the critiques does not refute what the professor was trying to illustrate to this student: that belief in God (traditionally understood) is not without serious difficulties. She was apparently not required to abandon her religious beliefs to do well in the course, but simply to recognize that to continue to believe in the face of such theoretical problems is refuse to live out the demands of intelligence. That, it seems to me, was what the prof was annoyed at. Had SHE come up with responses like you did, I'm sure we wouldn't be discussing this!
5. Lastly, "I do not know if Gina has a case against her professor for being unjust in his grading. But she certainly has a powerful case for his being a fool." Perhaps! And he probably has a case against her for refusing to engage the philosophical objections to her faith in a genuine way. His expression (I paraphrase) of her "stick
I won't wade into the philosophy here but wonder if the responses here bothered anybody for their tone? Because I've taught at several colleges/universities and in none of them would his comments have been considered to be professional. Challenging a student's perspectives on any subject requires humane respect and civility, and I couldn't read them as anything but contemptuous. I don't have any experience with online teaching and I find myself thinking that perhaps the loss of face-to-face contact with students presents added moral danger to profs tempted to contempt, anger, etc. (as if traditional teaching didn't have moral dangers enough!)Any thoughts on how online presentation might color this?
Anonymous, here. I too have taught online, and I can confirm your suspicions! But that is going to be true with the establishment for any new tool for any old job ... whatever foibles people bring to their job, with new ways to do their job they will be tempted to limp in the direction of their weaknesses. But, they will also be as likely enlivened to the possibilities of their talents. I haven't seen much of this contemptuousness myself, nor have I heard that much from students. (In my online classes, I ask in the very beginning whether students have taken online classes before, and what their positive and negative experiences have been. They've been forthcoming.)
More commonly, instructors are tempted to leave their students on their own too much. There have been complaints about long delays in communication, and lack of responsiveness.
Very frequently, however, these classes are mighty successful, and for the opposite reason you are concerned about! That is, online classes tend to be stronger communities with greater participation by students. In my online classes, students know each other better than in the tradclasses because they are constantly engaged in thoughtful discussion with each other for 15 weeks. You cannot sit in the back rows of the class and zone out! If you don't participate, you fail. And while at the end of the semester the number of students who remain are lower, their grades tend to be better. But it's not for everyone ... students and teachers included! So in sum, there is a certain kind of anonymity, but there is also an increase in intimacy. But this is true for the internet communities in general, isn't it? Tremendous growth in communities, in people connecting with one another in ways they never have before. But it is also the case that not all communities are functional, healthy, and generative. The more things change ..... yada yada.
Hi, Anonymous! You should get a cool handle! Your point about online classes having the opportunity to build community is really interesting. I can see how that could be effective in some classes I attended that had a lecture component & then smaller groups that were supposed to discuss primary sources. Replacing the discussion groups with online would certainly have made the job of the TA a lot easier.
Much of my experience has been with rhetoric and I'd be reluctant to have students give feedback on classmates' writing online. It has interesting possibilities for public speaking I'd never considered before.
Anonymous,
ad 2: Just FYI, Gettier was brought into the discussion by Brandon. He and I are different, even though are names are essentially the same except for one letter.
ad 3: You brought training into this when you objected to DGD's original post. I wanted to assert that I had such training, both as an undergraduate and as a graduate student.
ad 4: I did mention, in the preamble to my post, that I only had the data in the letter: "Now, I do not have enough information to competently judge Gina's performance in the course."
I also mentioned that I could only respond to the professor insofar as I had access to his own comments via the letter: "Perhaps he [the professor] has done so [responded to traditional defenses against his objections] and this was simply not quoted in the letter. Since, however, the letter is all most of us will see of his thoughts on the subject, I will now attempt to answer them point by point."
Had Gina come up with responses like mine it might have been because she had spent the last ~10 years of her life studying philosophy and theology both as a private individual interested enough in the topic to wade through primary and secondary sources during her every free hour and as a student at an academic institution under the tutelage of respected professors as I have. Since she was taking an introduction to philosophy course, this is unlikely. One cannot expect someone to run before they have been taught to walk.
You teach an undergraduate in an introduction to philosophy course the basic history of philosophy, the most prevalent answers to certain key philosophical problems and the basics of logic. You give them the tools they need to begin the study of philosophy. In short, you do not throw an undergraduate taking an introduction to philosophy course into the bear pit. That is for graduate students and professors who should be expected to take the heat and to think quickly on their feet.
But the tone of the professor's comments lead me to believe that this is exactly what he did. Perhaps that is a result of the medium over which he was communicating. But if a medium is one where ambiguity and miscommunication are more likely, then one has the duty take special care to make sure one is precise and clear. And the fact that he is the authority in the class makes this duty especially binding on the professor.
Brendon, sorry about the identity confusion! All you Bre/andon's are spelled alike.
I did see your preamble, but then you got all hot about his showing no understanding of responses to objections .... Ok, so naturally if the text we are going on is not even part of the course but a conversation about a student's performance in the course, one ought not castigate him for something one ought have no expectation that he would do in such a context!
Regarding Gina: The long days and eves you spent were not in trying to ask a question, but in trying to answer a question you took seriously at the beginning. This seems precisely what the instructor was wanting in Gina -- a recognition that objections to belief in (what is sometimes referred to as) "the philosopher's god" are serious objections and call out for a response in any reflective person. And since this was (or is) a philosophy class, his expectations that she would take serious objections seriously doesn't seem beyond reason. I exaggerated, of course, when I suggested that she might have responded with stuff similar to what you offered. But what about something like this: "Gee, Prof., these seem to be troubling problems. Have there been respectable philosophers who have tried to defend the religious believer in the face of such apparent problems?" Even if he thinks she's an idiot for still wanting to be a believer, he wouldn't be annoyed that she was discounting philosophical reflection simply because it conflicted with what she happened to have faith in!
Regarding your comments about his comportment: yeah, I think he could have handled himself much better.
I guess as a sum up of my own view about this whole mess: I think that Gina doesn't have a legal leg to stand on, but I think the instructor will not come out victorious, but looking "foolish" even (or especially) to his peers.
I have taken many on-line and correspondence classes over the years, in various formats. Just as in any class, the degree of success depends on several things. The most unsuccessful classes I had where when the professor tried to conduct the distance-learning class like he would a traditional brick and mortar class. Many students mistakenly think the on-line classes are easier since you're not going to class and so don't allow themselves enough time to successfully work out the assignments. It is also more difficult to get help or tutoring should you run into trouble. All goes back to College Student 101. If the professor was truely asking unfair questions or assigning work above the level of the students, there would have been more complaints. In just about every class I've taken there were always one or two students that whined about their grades. Perhaps a fairer set of questions to ask the young lady would be--How much time have you spent studying and preparing for the class per week?? A good rule of thumb is still 3-4 hours per credit hour OUTSIDE of class, IF you are not having trouble understanding the material..so I would figure minimum 12-15 hours per week study on this class, plus the time needed to read her assignments. The first couple submittals you can tell pretty much if you and the professor are on the right track--if not get help. If you really bombed ask the professor if you can redo and resubmit--if not for a better grade as to figure out what he is looking for. I did that for several distance-learning assignments with success. I only took one class with on-line participation--chat room format-- and it was a nightmare. It's not good if you can't type fast. Plus people could not stay on-topic and was very distracting.
Anonymous,
Ok, so naturally if the text we are going on is not even part of the course but a conversation about a student's performance in the course, one ought not castigate him for something one ought have no expectation that he would do in such a context!
According to the letter the objections I responded to were not simply the professor's personal comments to Gina. Rather, they were from the online textbook he wrote for use in the class.
I would note that the letter also states that "Gina has studied and discussed various philosophical arguments on whether God exists and whether He possesses certain characteristics such as being all-knowing or all-present." So it seems that Gina was willing to at least try to understand contrary views and attempt to defend her beliefs via philosophy. Just because Gina does "not feel a personal, inner drive to 'search the world for answers' through philosophy because her Christian faith provided them for her" does not mean she is unreflective. The fact that she is taking the course demonstrates that she is trying to become the well-rounded and thoughtful person that a liberal arts education is meant to produce. Not everyone is called to be Socrates, though I think that all people should have at least a basic understanding of the history of philosophy, important philosophical questions and logic. But that is exactly what an introductory course should teach. The fact she is taking the course is evidence that she is trying to acquire these things.
It also states that Gina would "not state that she personally believes that the idea of God is problematic or that she needs to reconsider her sincerely held religious beliefs." Why should she have to admit that the idea of God is problematic? I wouldn't. If there are answers to the objections, then the objections pose no problems.
I suppose it is possible that Gina did not really philosophically engage the apparent problems presented to her. She may have simply held to her beliefs because she trusted in the authority of Scripture or of the Church.
But to this I would side with the Venerable John Henry Cardinal Newman: "Ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt." Something that seems like a problem to one individual might not really be a problem because there exists an adequate and true answer to it. One may not have the all the answers, but if one has trusted authorities that one is justified in relying on, then one can be justified in believing them even in the face of apparent problems. No man can be the master of every art and science. In the end everyone takes somethings on faith, faith that is supported by trusted authorities. For example, most of us have to trust our doctors regarding our health, since they have hard-earned and specialized knowledge.
So the question is: If Gina could not answer certain apparent problems or difficulties with philosophical refutations, should she have begun to doubt? I see no reason th
Continued:
So the question is: If Gina could not answer certain apparent problems or difficulties with philosophical refutations, should she have begun to doubt? I see no reason that this must be so. If her trust in the authority of Scripture or the Church was justified by experience, then she has reason to trust this authority when she finds herself inadequate to the task of answering some difficulties. For example, she may have had the answers to at least some of the difficulties, which would be evidence that some of the thing she believes via authority are true. Thus she may be justified in believing that other things held on authority are also true. Or Gina may have found that living her life in accord with the precepts of the Scriptures or the Church made her life better, something which would again lend credence to her holding to other things believed on authority even in the face of apparent problems. And I will note that "better" does not just mean having nice feelings. Rather, it could mean a growth in virtue an self-control. These would be things that would justify her trust in authority when faced with difficulties she cannot personally answer.
I see no reason to hold that such belief is irrational in itself. No one can be expected to live their life in the state of skepticism that this would entail. Most of us, for example, would have no reason to follow our doctors' advice for our health, since most of us do not possess the medical training needed to verify that they are correct in their diagnosis. But most of us do our best to find doctors who we are justified in trusting, ones recommended by trusted friends and family, ones with longstanding and respected practices &c. The fact that most of us do not possess--or even, in some cases, cannot possess--a superabundance of medical knowledge does not make our having faith in our doctors irrational.
Now, continuing to have faith because of trust in the authority of Scripture or the Church in the face of difficulties might not be worth a good grade in an intro to philosophy class. I have already admitted that Gina might deserve her low marks. However continuing to persevere in her faith certainly doesn't merit being ridiculed. At least not unless most of us deserve being ridiculed ever time we follow our doctors' advice.
The fact that she is taking the course demonstrates that she is trying to become the well-rounded and thoughtful person that a liberal arts education is meant to produce.
Please. This is not only a stretch, it's laughable. I teach so many students who have negligible motivation and who are there because _____(parents make them, all their high school friends are at school, don't know what else to do, etc.) Even students who do well, like Gina, often are not in the philosophy class because of the reason you suggest, but because she wants to graduate with a 4.0 and get into an excellent 4-year school. I have, on average, 1 or 2 students out of 30 that are in the class for the reason you suggest.
Ok, on to more substantial issues. Regarding experiences that might provide evidence that backs up her authority-derived belief. First, had she offered anything like what you suggest, the instructor would have recognized that as an opportunity to engage her in more sophisticated conversation. This was/is a philosophy course and so if she just refuses to consider them as potential trouble-makers, this is inconsistent with the demands of the class. I'm not sure why you don't see this. There is a distinction between being convinced that these work against one's belief (i.e. that they are ultimately successful) and recognizing that experience and authority are always fallible and are not exempt from the claims of reason and further experience. You concede this at the end, admitting that her refusal to intellectually engage this is philosophically inadequate, perhaps deserving of a low grade.
Skepticism: Doctors are not infallible, and when patients inform themselves and remain vigilant when in charge of their own health, or stand in proxy for a loved one, things often go better. That's why we have second and third opinions, and this process is an improvement over the paternalistic system (and the church is the greatest example of paternalism) before the change in the mid 1970's. So I don't grant your analogy.
Nor do I accept your claim that doubt and scepticism too great for ordinary people of faith.We have held up Mo. Theresa as a paradigm of faith and the recent revelations of her deep doubt have made her faith all that more remarkable. The dark night of the soul, brought on by the recognition that my faith might be for naught is profoundly human, and I would say an essential characteristic of an intellectually respectable faith.
First, had she offered anything like what you suggest, the instructor would have recognized that as an opportunity to engage her in more sophisticated conversation.
I find this laughable. If I am assuming too much good faith regarding Gina's motivation, you are certainly assuming too much good faith on the professor's part, especially with the evidence we have of his words. I have dealt with far too many professors, both as a student and as support staff at colleges and universities, to hold otherwise.
This was/is a philosophy course and so if she just refuses to consider them as potential trouble-makers, this is inconsistent with the demands of the class. I'm not sure why you don't see this.
I do see it. I admitted it in my post. But admitting that it may be so is not the same as assuming it is so, and I have no reason--given the evidence available--to assume it is so. Moreover, even if it is so, it does nothing to make the professor less of a fool, since his foolishness is not evinced by the grade Gina deserves, but is rather evinced by the lack of wisdom found in his own writings.
and recognizing that experience and authority are always fallible and are not exempt from the claims of reason and further experience.
I don't recognize that all authority is always fallible. I hold the Church to be infallible when teaching on faith and morals.
So I don't grant your analogy.
Nothing you've said gives me any reason to doubt that it holds.
We have held up Mo. Theresa as a paradigm of faith and the recent revelations of her deep doubt have made her faith all that more remarkable.
Equivocation. As the Newman quote should have made plain, difficulties come about in struggling with apparent problems that one cannot resolve. Doubt is the loss of faith. Mother Teressa did not have any doubt, at least insofar as I was using the word. Difficulties certainly, but not doubt.
Perhaps we're both being idealistic. I have no doubt that this instructor has encountered students who entered his course as believers and continued to be so after the arguments explored in the course. I don't suppose the conversations between him and his students got to the level we see here. Is that because students were too afraid to keep their voice up? Perhaps. Perhaps most said, "Gee, I see that these arguments have some merit; perhaps I'll think more about how my faith could accommodate them." Most, likely, just forgot everything immediately afterwards. (I have enough experience as a teacher to not assume otherwise, to flip a phrase.) The problem, it seems, is not belief per se, but belief that is self-inoculated against intellectual scrutiny. And if that's so, I agree with the instructor.
Again, I admit that his behavior is unseemly. I think I used your term of "foolish." So never needed to convince me of this.
I don't think it's simply that she is a believer in God that gets to him, rather something else -- perhaps the disregard for philosophical exploration of the weakness of intellectual affirmation of existence of a purported reality for which there is a paucity (I exaggerate in favor of belief) of evidence.
I don't recognize that all authority is always fallible.
Uh, this is what is at issue in their class, or this part of it. On the basis of what do you not recognize the fallibility of authority? Faith? It would have to seem so. And this is then to beg the question. "I believe in God and the truthfulness of the church and because it's infallible I don't have to take seriously intellectual critiques of its authority nor of the authority of arguments in favor of the existence of god." That's no better than: "I believe in God because the Bible tells me so, and the bible is true because God's the author."
Oh, one more thing. Nothing I said "gives me any reason to doubt that it holds."? You drew the analogy between the church or the bible or whatever and medical doctors. I claimed that medical doctors are fallible and that our diligence as layfolk has added a layer of protection against the potential of their distraction, laziness, whatever. If they are not fallible, and clearly they aren't then the analogy between the patient and medicine and the believer and the church does not hold. So, perhaps I'm slow and you need to explain in more detail how the analogy still holds.
I don't simply believe God exists, I know God exists. My belief is true and it is justified by the fact that there are sound metaphysical proofs that God does exist. That others may incorrectly think I do not possess such knowledge is, in the end, irrelevant, since their belief has no effect on reality.
Fallibility and infallibility are not relevant in the way you seem to think they are. Doctors are fallible not because all authority is fallible, but because all humans are fallible. The authority of the Church rests not on man but on God. Its authority is infallible because God is infallible.
So the real question that exists in examining the authority of the Church is whether or not its claims to divine protection are justifiable. These claims in turn rest upon the nature of God and His revelation through Jesus Christ. I have both metaphysical and historical evidence that justifies my beliefs concerning the nature of God and the revelation of Jesus Christ. Thus my belief in the authority of the Church is justified. And if its true, then I suppose the divine faith is a species of knowledge, i.e. justified, true belief, just as the Church has always claimed.
Poor Gina..she was not successful in THIS class...drop the class before the GPA gets hosed (if that is what she is so concerned about) and retake the class with another professor, perhaps in a classroom environment, over the summer or work it into next fall's schedule. There's no shame in being a retread--ask a Calc I student 
And network with other students concerning a professor that might fit her style of learning better.
And to be blunt--it's not like she's attending Harvard or Yale or Notre Dame..she's at a Community College...she won't be out a ton of money....It will probably actually cost her more to drag this thing through than to retake the course. Google it for more info. And the universe is not going to implode if she cannot graduate... she can transfer to another school without her Associate Degree if that is what she is driving for.
Aside from the fact that I think your metaphysical proofs are more like swiss cheese, there is a leap you are making from belief in a creator and the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and, naturally, Jesus. That god is still an act not of reason, but of faith, as your Angelic Doctor has said. [I'm not interested here in teasing out the intricacies of cosmological arguments, but I would say that its weaknesses are significant and most adherents to the argument (or to the standard versions) feel safe and secure and do not venture out into world of scrutiny. One who has is Lonergan, but I'm not sure his variation in chapter 19 of Insight is any more successful in the long run.]
"Fallibility and infallibility are not relevant in the way you seem to think they are. Doctors are fallible not because all authority is fallible, but because all humans are fallible."
It was YOUR analogy! YOU were claiming that just as we are rational to have faith in doctors, so religious believers are reasonable to believe in god (or, I presume, the authority of the Church). Sheesh. I was the one showing that it doesn't work!
"The authority of the Church rests not on man but on God. Its authority is infallible because God is infallible."
But belief in THAT is a matter of faith, your claims notwithstanding, and THAT is precisely is what folks use to inoculate themselves against scrutiny.
*Peter Kreeft famously notes in his debates on the existence of God that even if many of the arguments aren't demonstrable in the Aristotelian view, the mass of them provides compelling reason to believe. Hogwash. If none of them is demonstrable, a bunch of nondemonstrable arguments do not provide anything demonstrable and nor do they provide any strong inductive support either. This to counter your paraphrase from Newman on problems versus doubts.
**In your response to the Mo. Theresa issue, you suggest that I'm equivocating, because why? Because YOU define it a certain way and expect me to know it? In the philosophical literature, doubt means nothing more than the absence of certainty or the admission that one does not know. Perhaps in certain Thomistic (or whatever) communities it is used in a more narrow way, but I do not equivocate. And the reason you think she did not have the loss of faith or the doubt, is because you have not yet read her own writings. I suggest you do so. I hold you are wrong on both accounts, the equivocation AND a proper understanding of the place of doubt (and loss of faith) in the spiritual and psychological life of Mo. Theresa.
My analogy had nothing to do with fallibility versus infallibility, so bringing fallibility or infallibility into the question does nothing to weaken the analogy. Rather it confuses the issue.
Faith is intellectually assenting to some truth based upon the witness of some authority. Faith would be fallible, i.e. possibly incorrect, when the authority is fallible and infallible when the authority is infallible. But the possible fallibility of infallibility does not make faith per se irrational. Ever man can make a mistake, yet people still heed their doctors' advice. We take any number of things on faith, including much of what most of us consider science. I haven't done the Michelson–Morley experiment, but that doesn't make it irrational for me to believe that the luminiferous aether doesn't exist.
Aside from the fact that I think your metaphysical proofs are more like swiss cheese, there is a leap you are making from belief in a creator and the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and, naturally, Jesus.
Its a good thing that I already stated that what you or anyone else thinks is irrelevant to the truth of things. And of course there is a leap. But the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the Triune God, the second person of Who became incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth is not a matter of metaphysical demonstration except insofar as it can be shown that nothing about conceiving God as such is contrary to what can be known by reason. The specific claims are particular, historical claims and so rest upon particular, historical evidence. I have no reason to doubt this evidence, especially since most of the arguments proffered against it are based upon incorrect metaphysical premises rather than contrary historical evidence.
If none of them is demonstrable, a bunch of nondemonstrable arguments do not provide anything demonstrable and nor do they provide any strong inductive support either.
Then I cannot see why anyone should believe anything scientists have to say, since the scientific method is not a demonstrable method. No science experiment demonstrates the truth of a hypothesis; experiments rather show that nothing currently demonstrates the falsity of said hypothesis and demonstrate the falsity of contrary hypotheses. If we cannot trust non-demonstrable arguments then we cannot trust science. As to inductive support, I'm sorry to say that the assertion of an anonymous internet commenter is not enough for me to doubt that they at least provide inductive support. But inductive support is irrelevant, since I have never encountered any counterarguments to the first and second of the quinque via that have held up.
As for Mother Theresa, first I would say that I did not mean to imply that you were purposefully equivocating, only that I was using the terms in the way Newman was, which sees a distinct difference between a difficulty, something that makes it difficult to have faith, and a doubt, something which is
Third sentence, second paragraph should begin: "But the possible fallibility or infallibility..."
Also, the fist word in the fourth paragraph, my third paragraph which is responding to the quoted text, should obviously be "it's" rather than "its."
I apologize for missing these in editing, especially as the first may cause confusion over my meaning.
Also, obviously all of that comment didn't post, so here's the rest:
As for Mother Theresa, first I would say that I did not mean to imply that you were purposefully equivocating, only that I was using the terms in the way Newman was, which sees a distinct difference between a difficulty, something that makes it difficult to have faith, and a doubt, something which is contrary to faith. Contraries cannot both be true, so one cannot both have faith and doubt at the same time and in the same respect. I realize that the word "doubt" is often used loosely, and so I apologize for not making my definition more clear.
Second, insofar as I am using doubt as stated I deny that Mother Theresa doubted. This has been the entire point of the debate in the media between Catholics and non-Catholics. Too often non-Catholics have held faith to be some kind of comfort or emotion and so say that Mother Theresa, in lacking comforting feelings, lacked faith. But Catholics assert that the very fact she continued to intellectually assent to the contents of faith, even and especially while feeling no comfort and consolation, demonstrates the strength of her faith, not its failure and lack. This has been continually attested to by the man who went through all of these writings and edited the published collection, the same man who is the postulator for her Cause of Beatification and Canonization.
With that I shake the dust from my sandals.
1. Definitions. Throughout this conversation you simply define things without giving any reason for defining them that way. No, this is not what faith is. This narrows the definition so that many other cases of faith don't count as such. I have faith in my wife's loyalty. I have faith in my own capacities. But this is mere annoyance, I admit, over a sort of scholastic (I'm using this in a negative sense), dare I say it, arrogance in your writing. You might have said, "Aquinas or the Catechism of the Catholic church defines faith this way, which I find adequate for the purposes..."
2. Faith. You point out that faith is all around us ... science, and so forth. Good. Then you suggest faith can be infallible if the source is infallible. Again, question begging! One cannot merely claim that one's belief is infallible because it comes from someone who is infallible. One then must justify why one believes that the source is infallible, and I claim that it always comes down to a fallible faith in something infallible, which converts the whole chain to fallible belief, which is not to be confused with knowledge.
3. "But the God ... is not a matter of metaphysical demonstration except insofar as it can be shown that nothing about conceiving God as such is contrary to what can be known by reason." Yes! And THAT's why the arguments from evil, among others, have teeth regarding the rationality of belief in God. You are admitting that faith in a god must, at least, be conceivable, otherwise it's, what, irrational? And if it can be shown that these arguments are strong arguments, then that faith, to be intellectually respectable, must be recognized as fallible. And that brings us back to Gina! Someone who encounters such arguments by refusing to acknowledge that their faith in a god, the conception of which is apparently inconceivable, is like the mathematician who shrugs when someone tells him that his proof results in a contradiction.
4. Science has inductive arguments because the evidence in favor of them are empirical. Not so for deductive arguments, nor failed deductive arguments that do not rely on empirical evidence. So either the arguments should be deductive or subject to empirical evidence, otherwise there is no way in principle to measure their inductive strength. So, gaping chasm between strong inductively supported empirical hypotheses and unempirical, non-experimental hypotheses of armchair thinkers.
5. If you don't want to call a lack of felt presence of god in her life for 30 years doubt, so much the worse for your conception of faith.She writes: "Where is my Faith — even deep down right in there is nothing, but emptiness & darkness — My God — how painful is this unknown pain — I have no Faith" And then: "So many unanswered questions live within me afraid to uncover them — because of the blasphemy — If there be God" I take her word for it. She doubt. She lacked faith and its that reason that was the source of the dark
I've been coming across a philosopher on Catholic sites for the last few days who keeps talking about the pursuit of truth being inseparable from CHARITY and HOPE. Have either of you come across it? Old guy, usually wearing white or red, Bavarian accent, blathering this morning about humility? Because I don't think this thread is showing much of those three virtues....
There is another aspect in Gina's position. The question of God and religion is strongly tied up in the emotions - and emotions do get in the way of reasoning.
Which means that she is wise no to get tangled in such debates because being a highly emotional topic she may not be able to reason properly. She needs to school herself in controlling her emotions, and recognizing when they try to take control before she attempts a debate on the topic.
Nothing shameful in that. The only shameful thing is to refuse to acknowlede one's emotional allegiance and go on as if they were not raging inside.
Adriana, a very interesting notion, and I think that the relation between emotion and reason is such a fascinating and complicated thing. We've been taught since Descartes that reason and emotions are opposed, and this has infused our thinking ever since.
There is a longer tradition of recognizing a kind of intelligence of the heart that was articulated beautifully by Pascal. The idea of "emotional intelligence" has been popularized as of late, and there is interesting work in neuroscience (see Gazzaniga, most recent books) that suggests that the cortical areas in the brain that subserve emotions are deeply connected with moral decision making and even planning.
It also makes sense evolutionarily -- when faced with an immediate threat or opportunity, it hurts us to think through it, which takes time, and pays to process all this info immediately, and it's thought that this is the primary function of emotions -- a sort of information processing of urgent matters.
This sort of turns the opposition on its head, or rather shows that the typical dualistic or oppositional thinking about reason and feeling is naive. There is also a wonderful book by the (Catholic) philosopher Dietrich von Hildebrand who beautifully articulates the many places that we should recognize the emotions as deeply reasonable. See his "The Heart: an Analysis of Human and Divine Affectivity" (http://staugustine.net/theheart.html)
Though I think it a mistake to interpret all this as justifying a sort of blind trust in emotion, or gut instinct, it does seem to have served us well.
But Anonymous said,
Brendon, regarding your comment on Gettier. Yes, my statement was "actually right." Gettier's contribution is to show why the traditional definition has problems, or at least one particularly thorny problem. Are there alternatives? Yes. But there are alternatives to Darwinian evolution, too, but Darwin's is the standard account of evolution. Let's put it this way: if anyone wants to suggest that there is a better way of defining knowledge, s/he has to go through JTB. Are there alternatives to Descartes' dualism? Yes, but the are to be defended qua alternative to Descartes dualism.
No, again you are simply confused. In fact, there are plenty of alternatives to knowledge in terms of JTB, and it is false to say, as you said in the original comment, that JTB has been standard since Plato. It is not standard in medieval Aristotelianism or Platonism, for instance; it is not Cartesian; nor is it a pre-Kantian empiricist account of knowledge; nor is it Kantian; nor is it nineteenth-century idealist. To get anything that looks like JTB, beyond some occasional toying with the idea, you have to look post-Gettier. As you would know if you took the trouble to look at historical work on the Gettier problem, it is in fact controversial whether the view Gettier criticizes was really traditional in Gettier's time; there is good evidence for its only receiving the label 'traditional' because Gettier formulated a very clear and attractive view that of which he thought the gist was common. But it is in fact very difficult to find anyone pre-Gettier whose affirmed account of knowledge fits the JTB analysis very well. Of course, the JTB has become very popular, but that isn't because it is the view that has been held "since Plato's Theatetus", as you had suggested, which was a completely silly claim, but rather because, in fact, Gettier formulated the view very clearly, in a way that brought out its attractions, while at the same time identifying an apparently fatal flaw in it. It therefore makes an interesting puzzle for philosophical literature, like the Monty Hall problem, or the Liar Paradox. It doesn't follow that it's reasonable to understand every usage of the word 'knowledge' as justified true belief, and it especially doesn't follow that it's reasonable for a philosophy professor to push it on a student as if it were "clear" when the whole account came to prominence because Gettier noted what has seemed to many to be a good reason to think it false.
As for alternatives to JTB, there are virtue-theoretical alternatives, for instance; and while some virtue-epistemologists discuss the relation between their view and JTB, the reasons for supporting virtue epistemology (or rejecting it) are utterly independent of JTB. You don't need to go through JTB to get them.
I don't want to divert this thread too much with technical discussion; so this is the last comment I'll post on the subject.
Technically, this is in violation of the last sentence of my previous comment. But two small added points:
* Ignore the 'But' that begins my comment; it was accidentally left in after a quick edit.
* For those who are interested in the subject but aren't familiar with Gettier or the justified-true-belief account, Stephen Hetherington has a very readable, and in general quite excellent, discussion of Gettier problems at the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Anonymous,
I think that the belief that we expect a mathemetician to give to his proof is primarily an intellectual assent. He may feel an emotional attachment to a theory, but the purpose of having such theories is not to be emotionally attached to them, but to add to the abstract knowledge of people.
The doctor analogy may not have the best track record in this discussion, but I think it may be a better comparison than the mathematician. The faith we put in a doctor is not primarily an intellectual assent to a proposition or proof. It is rather a judgement call (a matter of mind and emotions and heart, not just of the mind). If someone brings up to us intellectual arguments against having faith in that doctor, it may be reasonable for us to lose faith in the doctor, but it is not necessarily unreasonable for us to keep our faith in him, even if we cannot lay out intellectual counterarguments. Again, this is precisely because the faith we put in the doctor in the first place was not primarily intellectual assent, but a judgment call involving personal trust.
It is the same with God; the faith of most Christians is more like a personal judgment than it is like an intellectual assent. It is reasonable for intellectual arguments against his existence to cause doubts; but it ought not be considered to compel that doubt in the same way that a disproof of a mathematician's work ought to compel his doubt.
Or so is my opinion.
Chief Council Jay Sekulow has made some bad statements about Just War Theory and has come out in support of waterboarding, following the scary habit American Evangelicals have of saying the ends justify the means as long as it's a Republican doing it.
Oh, right, God forbid that Christians should ever employ torture to aid in a war-effort...
Torture..hhmmm..
Let's put this in a different perspective. Some creep just kidnapped your beautiful little daughter... except Lenny the Loser ends up getting caught in the process. He sits there in a chair, smirking at you, "I know where she's at, but I'm not gonna tell. " Every second that goes by is crutial to recovering your daughter.
Don't tell me that you would just sit there and say "Pretty please tell us where she is." Hell no..you'd use every tactic you could to get Loser Lenny to squeal like a little pig.
Expand a bit..we have terrorists trying to hold everything we hold near and dear about our country hostage. They have info about when the next bombing is, who the leaders are, where they are hidden, who is bankrolling them....I trust our military/FBI/CIA to do whatever needs to be done so that these guys SQUEAL so that our country remains safe. Anyone who wants to find out about torture..just ask John McCain... after what he went through in Viet Nam, he would be the expert. Let our military do their job and keep the press away. Maybe the soft-hearted liberals can do a better job getting info by bringing the prisoners punch and cookies..
Ah, Sara
So you got Lenny the loser and you do what it takes to get your little girl back.
Then, as you are self-righteously inflicting pain someone comes in and says
We found your child, and the guy who did it has nothing to do with Lenny.
The time you wanted inflicitng pain on this loser could have been better spent tracking down other clues. If you had not wasted your time, the little girl would still be alive.
You see, te beauty of torture is that it does not matter if they are guilty or innocent, or even the right people
- just ask that German-lebanese taxi driver who had the misfortune to have the same last name as a suspected terrorist - you just have your sick fun with them, you tell yourself that you are doing "God's Work" and that you are justified, and then you bury your mistakes in unmarked ground.
Sara, remember that Jesus was tortured and killed for being a danger to the rightufl authorities. If you feel that strongly about torture, I advice that you stop praying ot him.
The thing with our example Lenny is that he knows EXACTLY what is going on... so how are you going to convince him to talk?? He said right there I know exactly where she is.. and is being an uncooperative witness. You can also waste a valuable amount of time pursuing vague clues. We saw that with the Elisabeth Smart kidnappping here in Utah..went chasing vague clues when her sister had a perfect description of the kidnapper. If the police had even bothered questioning her sister Elisabeth probably could have been recovered withing 24 hours.
Mind you I am not condoning torture for torture's sake, and unfortunately there are governments that will abuse folks simply because you belong to the "incorrect" tribe--however torture has many different meanings... as an American Air Force member in Desert Storm we received training on "what to expect" should we be captured POW by Saddam's forces.. especially Christians and especially women. Just because we were US military. And it definitely wasn't kind and thoughtful and merciful.
I'll let the faith jab slide as you know nothing of me or my experiences. I put my life on the line countless times so that people like you have the freedom to express themselves. However, those who are unhappy with the way the US government handles things are more than welcome to move elsewhere in the world where it is so much better.. like Afghanistan or China or Sudan...I'll even buy ya the one-way ticket.
Sara:
I think that it is best if we say nothing to each other out of respect for our host.
The host deeply regrets the original post, but has at least seen an excellent philosophical discussion arise from it, and has gotten an education.
My co-hosts and I seem to have had something of a small string of ill-advised posts lately. We're currently regrouping in order to renew our regular uninterrupted train of irreverence, cheekiness, and occasional thoughtfulness (the last of which we borrow from other people). Regular posting will probably resume tomorrow.
But as far as we're concerned, what happens in the combox stays in the combox. We only ask for mutual respect between commenters, which means no flaming and minimum cussing. So far in this blog's history, we've never had to discipline a commenter.
God knows, I wouldn't want to be disciplined by Snuffles....
Sara, remember that Jesus was tortured and killed for being a danger to the rightufl authorities. If you feel that strongly about torture, I advice that you stop praying ot him.
Adrianna, remember that the Catholic Church has historically endorsed torture. If you feel that strongly about it, I advise you to find a new denomination.
That is, assuming that you are Catholic, of course. 
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