You make a very valid criticism. But following that point, and making sure not to let form interfere with substance, our Victorian rhetoric has had too much influence on our policy regarding Uzbekistan, or at least that's how I see it. We've been so so tough on Karimov while giving other cronies in Libya, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Equatorial Guinea, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere a free pass. I think it was misguided to get so high up on our moral high horse in this case. We had the general idea right, we just pushed it way too hard far too fast.
To address one specific point:
I hope Curzon isn't implying that the rift between the US and Uzbekistan is the reason Karimov is expanding his list of enemies, because that's not what the account he links to suggests. Rather, I think he's pointing out that US disengagement and condemnation isn't likely to put an end to Karimov's reign of terror.
I think Karimov is doing this to 1.) spite us, and 2.) do something he's wanted to do for a while but felt he couldn't do when we were breathing down his neck.
C: I'd really like to know if the rift really freed him up or whether this was coming no matter what. That would certainly help with what, in my mind at least, is a difficult assessment of what US policy should be.
As for general US policies of playing nice with thugs. Yeah, although Karimov is pretty high up there on my list of bad apples. The question I'd pose is this: was the current balancing act - the low-rent bargain, if you will - sustainable over the long-term, or were we going to wind up too far in bed with this guy to extricate ourselves? Obviously, a base + some aid is not enough to poison our relationship with the anti-Karimov crowd, but that's how plenty of "beautiful friendships" have started.
Obviously, it isn't clear to us outsiders what the final implications of the current spat are yet....
I think you're misreading what kind of partnership I'm talking about. I fairly clearly say that we should not let ourselves be forced into doing things we don't want, and I certainly don't think we should have the attitude that Karimov, Almatov, or any other single person is well-suited to serving our interests in the region.
Essentially what I'm saying is to hang back and work where we know we can have leverage--the military. Like Brad Plumer points out here, there are some positive benefits of this continued cooperation that go beyond my argument that it leaves us well-positioned for the post-Karimov period.
Something I've mentioned in the past that should be considered in addition to my point about the Uzbek public is that support for Karimov is surprisingly high even though dissatisfaction is very high. I think there's a bit of the bizarre trait that one sees in Russia where the headman is assumed not to be bad, just the people around him. For those who don't like Karimov though, a good number do not think their country is ready for him to go. There's an intense fear of chaos and a deep cynicism about opposition politicians. (well, all politicians). Not that this is a situation that will or should go on as long as possible, but it's worth considering. There's way too much cookie-cutter analysis of Uzbeks.
Uzbekistan is arguably more important to Central Asian security and stability than Afghanistan is. The state is becoming increasingly brittle. Any conflict there will almost certainly involve us. We don't want another Taliban trying to pop up after all. I am much more comfortable knowing that were the state to collapse through coup, public unrest, etc., we have warm relationships with bureaucrats and military officers. Like I said, don't bend over backwards, but keep it in mind.
P.S. Feel free to send the trackback again. For some reason I got it before the update was posted and deleted it.
"Something I've mentioned in the past that should be considered in addition to my point about the Uzbek public is that support for Karimov is surprisingly high even though dissatisfaction is very high. I think there's a bit of the bizarre trait that one sees in Russia where the headman is assumed not to be bad, just the people around him. For those who don't like Karimov though, a good number do not think their country is ready for him to go."
In historical terms, this is a very typical narrative in monarchies and princedoms, the idea of the "bad advisors" who mislead the fundamentally "good leader." It doesn't surprise me that it persists in various forms, particularly in the remnants of the Russian Empire. There are, of course, excellent reasons for executives to cultivate it as well.
I'm certainly not accusing you of advocating a very close relationship with Karimov. Why do you think I am?
I'll resend the trackback, of course, but perhaps this is a peril of your policy? 
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I mostly agree with Dan (not surprisingly). I too worry more about the reputational costs than the intrinsic costs of our policies in Uzbekistan.
To be fair, I noted previously that I wanted to know more about our strategic needs in the region (e.g. is K2 all that valuable/necessary) before I made a judgment either way, but I have yet to see solid evidence that strategically it is all that vital. So far when I have heard commentators discuss the importance of K2 they merely state that it is vital because we must win the GWOT--ok, but that doesn't tell us why that particular base (or Uzbek airspace) is irreplaceable.
As for using the opportunity to make nice with citizen's groups and NGOs in the country I would certainly be onboard except there is a point at which those groups will ask you to "clarify your identity", or more simply, take sides and if we are seen as backing (or excusing) Karimov then I fear all that work will be all for naught.
re: close policy
Because they way I interpreted the dynamics, they don't seem very possible with a minor relationship.
As for my policy, I think it might just be something with blogger or haloscan I've had it happen before occasionally.
P.S. I also need an occasional opportunity to let people know my policies are cruel and arbitrary
Really, I am having a problem with some guy right now, so I need to flare up a little. Hey, with any luck, Indymedia UK will write another smear piece about what a jerk I am
" President Karimov’s "enemies list"—which used to only contain Taliban-esque Islamists—has now been expanded to add "so-called democrats" to the roster."
That probably would have happened either way eventually.
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