Frankly, I think some of the blind spot concerning the imperial nature of American westward expansion in the 19th century is connected to the durability of the (ahem) canard that China and Russia were subjugating other existing polities (kingdoms, khanates, whatever), whereas the United States was merely sending settlers out into the untamed, unspoiled, and unpopulated wilderness, where there just happened to be a few Indians wandering around.
I also think a lot of Americans are still subconsciously (or perhaps not so subconsciously) influenced by Manifest Destiny, which *still* pervades high school American history textbooks. How can America be an empire when it is simply the expression of the natural evolution of the nation from sea to shining sea?
I wish both the empire-accusers and the empire-deniers would read and reflect on Dan's post.
Imperial exceptionalism is indeed annoying. Americans have long had the disease. The Soviets of course had it. "We're a Union of Republics," they said, "not an empire!" Yeah right. And the British empire was really a Commonwealth of Nations. Third World states possess it in spades. But one need only look at the small micro-empires that Uganda and Rwanda have seized in eastern Congo, wherein they plunder and loot. In fact, imperial exceptionalism is so widespread that I'm tempted to call the imperial norm. American exceptionalism, in this matter as others, turns out to be not so exceptional.
Of course, a polity that was formed in the past by imperialism, as were many or perchance most, is not therefore today an empire. Why? Ahem: things change! What something starts off as is not what it ends up as.
Definitions: Dan's defintion of imperialism seems to have four key bit: it's a strategy, of expansion, by subordination, for extraction. But ... is it always something as conscious as a strategy? Maybe it is often more a disposition or a tradition. Also, is extraction always the point? Sometimes the aim has been glory, or imposing order, or preemptive possession.
Back to the US. The question is raised why the US did not adopt an imperialist strategy after World War II. I merely note that Britain had avoided imperialism in Europe and (to a large degree) in Northeast Asia, even in 1815, even in a much less imperialistic climate.
Had the US tried imperialism in 1945 I venture to suggest it would not have succeeded. First, a European empire had been impossible for a Napoleon or a Hitler. So why would it now be possible for a Truman? The US in 1945 had no greater relative power over the states of Europe than Napoleon or Hitler possesed. Second, by 1945 there was too much anti-imperialism and nationalism all around the world (including within the USA itself). Hence the balance of morale and conviction would probably have been on the side of any anti-imperial opponents of American imperial conquest. Third, there probably would not have been much colonization. Why would land-rich Americans want to settle in overcrowded Asia or Europe?
Much of Russian expansion into Siberia, especially the sparesly populated taiga, was akin to the American west experience. See W. Bruce Lincoln's _Conquest of a Continent_.
Russian expansion into Central asia, Transcaucasia and the Chinese border region was traditional European great power imperialism of subjugating polities.
Dan,
Just wanted to say bravo on a stimulating post (not that its a surprise). Your discussions of the dynamics of Empire never cease to impress me.
Some thoughts.
About the US can never be an imperial power. The attitude cited to support it is real. I would think that this is why the US could only have an “informal empire” there are too many who would object to a formal empire except for a small number of “special cases”
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Rome did not become an empire until over 90% of its expanse was taken by the Republic.
Napoleon was not crowned Emperor until he had captured most of Europe.
Queen Victoria was not crowned Empress of India until India and most of the colonies were firmly in British rule.
Wilhelm, King of Prussia did not become German Emperor until after Bismarck fought three wars to unify Germany.
Almost no one called the US policies Imperialistic until 1898 and later.
I think the historical examples show imperialism to be a policy of maintaining a status quo rather than expansion.
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An empire that lasts over a large area for a long time must have some synergetic benefits for the subordinate elements as well as the central government. Otherwise the cost of maintaining the Empire will rise to unacceptable. This does not mean it will be any more popular.
Hank, I agree completely with your last comment. Excellent and important point. Someone in the periphery has to benefit (even if it is a narrow strata of elites) or the empire is unlikely to survive for long.
I don't, however, think the examples you give in the second section of your comment undermine my argument about imperialism. For one thing, becoming an "emperor" in name has little bearing on the question of imperialism (a term whose general usage postdates many of your examples). In most of these cases, becoming "emperor" had very specific normative significance.
For Wilhelm, it meant assuming the legacy of the Empire and establishing the Second Reich. For Napoleon, it also involved a claim to that legacy (after all, he forced the abolition of the Holy Roman Empire) and a privileged position in Europe. I'm not sure what the politics of the British Raj were in this respect, but it doesn't strike me that this has much to do with the issue of imperialism "defensive" either.
In fact, while I've been accused of offering idiosyncratic understandings of "empire," I'm using fairly textbook definitions of imperialism here.
Hi Dan,
the 'empire' thread at CT is closed now. You said:
I guess we’d have our best evidence if the Japanese tried to do something that ran totally against the “bargain,” and the US reacted with some sort of very costly stick.
Yes, we did have some of that in places like S.Korea, Greece, even Italy, not to mention Central America and some other places.
But the most striking evidence in my mind is the path taken by the 'unallied' countries in Europe: Sweden, Denmark, Finland. Yes, Japan happens to be politically stable now (big deal, Albania is stable too), but I think one could plausibly argue that without US not-so-subtle (IMO) influence (specifically: some serious union-basting that started during the occupation) it would've evolved into something much more similar to Sweden or Finland than what it is now.
IOW, the US influence, exercised thru military - first the occupation, then (less obvious) the bases - shifted the paradigm there from syndicalist to corporate.
IOW, the US has, in effect, coerced the country to accept - and maintain! - the economic model it wanted. If this is not a quintessential imperial project, then I don't know what is.
"I merely note that Britain had avoided imperialism in Europe and (to a large degree) in Northeast Asia, even in 1815, even in a much less imperialistic climate." - Paul - not so sure about this - the expansion of control over the British Isles by governing institutions based out of London / south-east England (I hesitate to use 'English' as so some extent state consolidation precedes the formation of England) is not that dissimilar to the processes Dan notes in his post.
Interesting though that it ended up being a somewhat differentiated process - of state consolidation (ala Tilly) in the case of England/Wales, with a dinstinctly separate state consolidation process in Scotland, and a somewhat more kixed picture in Ireland, developing into a (London dominated) amalgam of states in the case of the United Kingdom of Britain and Ireland, and its reformulation in the 20th century with southern Ireland breaking away in 1922, partial reconstitution of governing relations with Northern Ireland (devolved Unionist parlaiment 1922, direct rule in the early 1970s, attempts, and new devolution attempts - Sunningdale in the 1970s and Belfast Agreement in the 1990s)and devolution for Wales and Scotland, again in the 1990s....
Good stuff. What's at stake in this debate?
JM
If we look at the UK example I mentioned above, I guess one question is differentiating between state consolidation and imperialism for areas that are directly adjacent to the core. Could it be that the processes may be identical at the outset (land grab, dispossession of existing residents, disruption of their social networks and a combination of their expulsion and / or assilimation with the core - allowing that they may also influence the overall texture of social relations within the newly formulated state), but that proximity to the core allows for a more complete follow through on these polices over a longer period of time...not that distance is the only criteria - Gibraltar is thoroughly British, while southern Ireland elected to go its own way...
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