One begins to wonder if the situation would be better if Taliban-linked militants did have their own (recognized) state in the border region. In that case, military ops against them could not, of course, be construed as violations of Pakistan's sovereignty. Not that this is going to happen....
Your point about the Pakistani constituency and government got me thinking about the multiple overlaps that something as seemingly simple as 'sovereignty' affords. If I think about it in relational terms, as I'm presuming some of us are generally inclined towards then I think there's a fascinating piece of research brewing here. From my own travels through some regions within FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) I know all too well the general feeling of a lack of safety as well as feeling alien-like within one's own country. The same kind of feeling is also present sometimes in a city as cosmopolitan as Karachi - at least in the 1980s when ethnic strife between Muhajirs and Pathans exploded (and it's never been the same again but that's a longer discussion and perhaps irrelevant here) - since the different communities have ended up, perhaps not deliberately, in cleavages that reflect the ethnic and social groupings found within Pakistani society. But I digress. I think what's relevant to your post here is that while the Pakistani government has little to no say in terms of the everyday running of things in FATA, the arrangement between these two actors is explicitly grounded within the understanding that they are still considered a part of Pakistani territory. That these folks have more in common with similar tribes in Afghanistan is of course an interesting dilemma. However, that they remain a part of Pakistani territory is part of the political calculation by both actors. Thus, politicians hailing from FATA often strive to introduce what they think is a more appropriate form of 'Pakistani-ness' in local politics. (This is not to deny, however, the presence of movements that might be classified as separatist). So to respond to your post, perhaps if one keeps in mind the way in which 'sovereignty' and 'being Pakistani' are legitimated by these actors then the conundrum you point out re: US actions as affronts to Pakistani territory can be seen as logical.
[Relevant aside: my next research project that is just now beginning to take shape overlaps significantly with the kinds of issues you point out here. Presuming my paper is accepted, my next ISA stint is going to be a first stab at that argument - or rather at beginning that research.]
Imagine that during a time when the USA was militarily weak, our government agreed that a foreign nation could send robot warplanes anywhere they wanted over the USA to bomb anybody they thought was working against them.
We'd be pretty upset, right?
Now suppose that they were only going after people who were planning an insurgency in cuba, and only in southern florida, and they were only interested in targetting cuban-americans. We'd still be upset, but for most of us it wouldn't feel so *personal*. Right?
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