On this note, I have to recommend this wonderful interview with Justice Ginsberg: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/1...&
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If you don't admit to having bias, how are you ever going to compensate for it? Bias isn't inherently wrong, unless admitting you have a bias might be taken as an admission that one's "truth" is less than absolute. And to see that as evil would require a kind of absolutism that would refuse to perceive any evidence that contradicts one's prior point of view.
Oh. Never mind...
I guess I am tempted to go farther, even, and not call it bias, because that suggests the possibility of un-biasedness and the desirability of aspiring to it, but instead call it perspective or postionality, which could be seen as a positive, or a contribution ....
"Feminist scholars (generally and in international relations) have long argued that “disinterested” or “objective” knowledge is neither possible nor desirable; instead, that objective knowledge is only the subjective knowledge of privileged voices discussed as neutral"
Yes they do. It is a preface to the special pleading arguments that these scholars are advocating so that they can feel morally righteous about fully embracing their own political biases (and psychologically innoculating themselves from criticism) rather than attempting to overcome their influence.
Analytically, the latter is a lot more work and perfect objectivity is, as they argue, unlikely to be achieved ( the one point of the critique the feminist scholars have correct). Accomplishing perfect objectivity, however, was never an intellectual standard used in practice to judge whether or not someone was advancing a rational argument. Instead, the intellectual dialogue was meant to chip away at the errors and bias that interlocuters bring to the table so that analysis can hopefully become more accurate and the argument more sound than previously.
But hey, arbitrarily designating political opponents as the "privileged ones" whose discourse is "unrepresentative" saves a lot of time.
I've been caught! I am a feminist because it is politically expedient and easy!
I am a feminist because it makes my political ambitions easier to achieve. It makes getting grant money and tenure easier. It makes arguing with rationalists easier. I especially enjoy the attendance at my conference panels, the fact that no one laughs when I utter the word "feminism," and I never get a rejection from a job or journal because "we wish you did something more serious." Psychologically, I always feel good because people always treat me and my work with respect and dignity. I am a feminist because my personal and intellectual life is just easier that way.
OR you're way off base.
Let's start at the bottom of the flow (yes, I like Dan and PTJ, am a former debater):
A) "arbitrarily designating political opponents as 'privileged ones' whose discourse is 'unrepresentative' saves a lot of time."
1) Let me tell you how much time I spend responding to stuff like this ...
2) There are plenty of people I agree with who are privileged, and whose opinions are unrepresentative. In fact, certainly, I consider myself one of them.
3) You cannot ignore the fact that privilege goes into being heard, in politics and in academia. The TRIP survey last year figured out that something appalling like 18% of full professors in IR are women - which - before you go counting - is under-representative even of women who got their Ph.D.s long enough ago to be senior faculty. Ergo - the discipline is defined mostly by men for men. That isn't totalizing, but it matters.
4) The best piece I've read on this is a journal article by Lena Hansen called "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma" - which points out the problems of people who cannot speak/be heard in security discourses.
B) "The intellectual dialogue was meant to chip away at the errors and bias that interlocutors bring to the table"
1) I was (not-so-subtly) suggesting that this is a fallacious approach - that "bias" implies that an opposite, "objectivity" both a) exists and b) can be reached individually, and "error" implies that this "bias" is negative instead of positive. The Sandra Harding book that I cite in the post makes the argument that "objectivity," if it can be approximated, not only tolerates but needs a diverse group of "biased" (as in, coming from different perspectives) voices in order to be approximated.
2) I was also not-so-subtly suggesting that perhaps rationality isn't the best standard to judge whether or not we "know" something - that instead, it is the contribution of some people in epistemological dialogue. Others "sense," "feel," "emote," etc., and I would argue that these are equally valid ways of "knowing" - that is, that the "rational" part of the "rational/emotional" dichotomy need not be privileged.
3) This is one of a few times in your post I see you assuming the value of characteristics traditionally socially associated with men and masculinity over those traditionally socially associated with women and femininity, and assuming that hierarchy of characteristics is valid. This tendency, both in scholarship and in politics, is what inspired me initially to write the post reacting to the debate over Sonia Sotomayor's nomination.
C) "it is a preface to the special pleading arguments that these scholars are advocating so they can feel morally righteous about fully embracing their own political biases"
1) I appreciate that you may well know me better than I know myself despite never having met me, but, if you'd humor me for a second, this is certainly not why I make that argument. I make the argument because I fundamentally believe that my perspective is no more valuable than that of the person I would oppose most wholeheartedly on any particular issue, and I wish that I could convince them of that (and perhaps only that) point, such that real dialogue could happen instead of polemical lecturing where we conclude that the appropriate standards for judgment should remain narrow and uninclusive.
2) In fact, feminist epistemology is not about "fully embracing their own political biases" - one of the tenets of feminist theory that is most compelling to me is the idea of conflict deescalation by empathy. This is the idea that one would find one's most ardent opponent and try to see the conflict as they see it - not to feel/sympathize for them, but to feel what they feel and see what they see, and see how that changes how you see your side of the conflict.
3) It is interesting that you assume that my intellectual approach is about me ("embracing" my politics and "psychologically innoculating" myself), but you don't assume that your intellectual approach is about you? Why, because yours is accepted orthodoxy and mine is not? Only deviant perspectives are fundamentally personal?
4) You say that the alternative that I should be taking is "attempting to overcome [my biases'] influence." You are assuming that there's a "there" "underneath" those "biases" which can be uncovered and discovered. I am arguing that there is not - that, fundamentally, what we have is perspective. We can either combine a bunch of them to get something more rigorous - or only listen to the ones that sound like ours - something I would argue is intellectually less rigorous.
... that seems like way too much for a "comment," but so much remains to be said. I'll just leave this for now though.
Hi Dr. Laura
Wow, generally when I come over here and yank somebody's chain, I seldom get a post in rebuttal! Since you gave me the courtesy of an extended response, I'll try to address your substantive objections:
First, you appear to have inferred that my comment was a personal attack, which it was not. I accepted your premise of what "feminist scholars(collective) argue" as an accurate epistemological generalization and critiqued that generalization. I did not state nor did I imply "Prof. Laura Sjoberg argues". As this was your second post, I do not know the extent to which you identify or diverge from feminist theory. My quarrel is with the intellectual position you had articulated, not with you the individual.
Re: Point 3 of A.
Academics are "privileged" relative to the mean, but that is because while some academics are damn fools, most recognizably have a verifiable degree of expertise, certified by a PhD and/or years of experience in a field. "Privilege" (for most) flows from achievement rather than unearned deference. There are reasons why we don't, for example, ask the hot dog vendor about abstruse points of international law.
That said, this "privilege" does not equate to "influence" or being "heard". That only 18% of IR specialists are women is less significant than the field of IR largely being ignored by policymakers (for good reasons). Arguably, high-powered and ambitious women are far better off becoming lawyers or politicians than becoming IR profs, if they wish to acquire power or influence.
Re: B in toto
I think you are flatly wrong in your explicit premise and mistaken in your imlicit assumption that a collaborative intellectual inquiry toward a synthesis or emerging paradigm is something separate or opposed to critical, analytical, argument. Analysis and synthesis are complementary cognitive functions. If you want to argue that higher ed.(or IR or Security Studies) does not emphasize or value synthesis enough, I'd agree with that with some enthusiasm.
Intuitive, emotive, cognitive processes have value and from MRI study evidence, are correlative to the generation of insight. They operate in tandem with conscious rationality, most likely because the human brain may have a structural tendency toward modularity and neural plasticity. While important and real, they are not reliable or easily verifiable qualities however. "Your honor, my gut intuition says he is guilty of capital murder!" is not an adequate or valid argument.
" This is one of a few times in your post I see you assuming the value of characteristics traditionally socially associated with men and masculinity over those traditionally socially associated with women and femininity"
I strive toward objectivity. 
On a serious note, some traits are "valued" more because they are functionally useful in important contexts. Masculinity or Femininity could be merely coincidental to useful as an easy descriptor of the behavior, rather than a driver of the behavior.
Re: C Points 2,3,4.
Empathy is a laudable trait. De-escalation can be a very useful interpersonal tactic. The second is not always an appropriate situational response while the first does not per se exclude conflict or confrontation. We might empathize with our friend the drug addict yet participate in a intervention that creates angry feelings in order to help them.
Trying to look at matters through another's perspective is praiseworthy. The frame you have presented though in your post re: privilege vs. unhead voices, is very strong and would appear to me, to make that task harder, not easier.
Regarding biases, which we all have, including myself, synthesis of varied perspectives is not the only answer (though there's nothing wrong with synthesis). Metacognitive reflection is a useful practice for stepping back and analyzing what factors might be influencing our assessment of empirical evidence because that's generally where our lacuna or hidden biases are rooted.
Finally, I'll reiterate, since my impression of your response is that I've caused you some degree of aggravation tonight with my comment,is that I may have come across more harshly than I intended and I meant nothing personal by it. The vigor of your reply shows that you are a great addition to this blog.
I'm cross-linking this piece to a little controversy over my way..., just to let sister Laura know that the tedium of washing out this old epistemological blanket of Objectivity in public discourse is not hers alone to bear.
The objections (pun intended) to calling Objectivity a myth, or an ideology, are so predictable I could write a play-book for them by now.
Hang in there, Laura. Some things, it seems, we have to wash again and again and again before we see the colors return.
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