*Revised*
I've seen various iterations of Boucoyannis' article, although always through third parties. A really nice piece, but not entirely convincing.
For example, Guicciardini gets labeled a "humanist" and Machiavelli a proponent of "realpolitik," but the reason for this distinction remains unclear.
It is also not true that Machiavelli lacks any notion of the international balance of power; he notes, on at least one occasion, that bandwagoning produced the subjugation of Italy (this is the diagnoses of Guicciardini's History of Italy). While he does "opt" for imperialism, moreover, he also argues that republics *can* opt for a strategy of being armed to the teeth.
In general, I think there's some important slippage between the valence of terms like "liberal" and "realist" in various philosophical traditions and the valence of those terms in contemporary IR theory. By much the same token, I am unconvinced by the dismissal of republican theory as an alternative root to the balance-of-power notion; but once republican theory can produce the balance-of-power notion, it follows that one need not be liberal to affirm it.
I should also note contemporary realism does share similar ethical concerns to those non-liberals who advocated the balance-of-power notion, whether anti-Habsburg and anti-Bourbon propagandists or the copious non-liberal writers on the subject in the 18th century (see her discussion on p. 713).
In sum, the argument for "the balance of power" being consistent with major strains of liberal thought is persuasive; she's made a very important contribution, at a minimum, in arguing that the balance of power" is too big to restrict to realism, and ought to be treated as an object of analysis in its own right. This is also a point made by proponents of the English School, and one I hope to amplify if I ever finish a review essay on the balance of power. She's also dead on about how Mearsheimer's focus on war and peace has created serious problems for "offensive realism" and prevented it, as I would argue, from resuscitating realpolitik.
Yet her attempt to redefine realism as, in essence, hegemonic-order theory strikes me as strained. What she's picking up on, in my view, is how certain features of contemporary realism--partially explicable through elements of liberalism within contemporary realism, but also having to do with the sociology of the field--have led it to pay inadequate attention to patterns of coercion and domination.
But she gives away a lot to rather weak arguments about the "degenerative" character of realism, and winds up treating a framework as a predictive theory (715). Realism is consistent with a range of distributions of power as outcomes, although particular predictive theories within the realist approach may not be. This is frustrating, because her discussion of contemporary liberalism immediately prior is quite good. I guess one way of putting this is that "liberalism" and "realism" are simultaneously ideal-typical constructs and things that people call themselves. So it doesn't strike me as overly radical to point out that actual liberal and realist theorists share a lot of assumptions, both because we shouldn't expect them to be philosophically pure and because the source material for the traditions overlap and borrow from one another. Yes, both realists and liberals have argued that the creation of a balance of power checks domination and allows for the management of coercion. And some "realists" (e.g., Morganthau) argued that this would allow for the creation of robust, power-transcendent international orders. But other "realists" disagree, which has to do with how they break from contemporary "liberals."
Anyway, if this article is any indication of her depth of thought, I can't wait to read her multi-award winning dissertation.
I was going to add something about the significance of Dan Deudney's work on the republican legacy in IR theory, but I forgot. Consider this the relevant postscript.
I wish I had something really intelligent to say about Boucoyannis's article, but I haven't had a chance to read it closely yet. And by the time I have done so I'm sure this thread will be old. :-( On a cursory reading, I was a tad bothered by her suggestion that reclaiming the BOP for Liberal IR theory will make it more "robust". (I.e., you are a "weakling" if you don't predict or prescribe power balancing?)
BTW, has anyone taken a look at the new (or fairly new) book by Harrison Wagner, 'War and the State: The Theory of Int'l Politics' (U Mich Press)? In the opening pages, he argues that Waltz's and Mearsheimer's versions of Realism both fail the test of 'logical validity,' which seems to be one rather thinly veiled way of saying they are B.S. There's a bit of snark (if that's the right word?) about how something's being published doesn't necessarily mean it's right (well, gee, you don't say). He doesn't like Wendt much either (needless to say).
To D.Nexon: Are you reviewing Richard Little's new book on BOP? Either give us a sneak preview or say where the review essay will appear? 
LC: Dick's book appears, but it isn't in the list of books reviewed in any of the current drafts.
I'll post something when I have a chance. It isn't an earth shattering piece. Don't know if, or when, it will appear. Must get book to publisher first.
LC, I haven't seen the new Wagner, but it sounds familiar to me, based on the responses to Steve Walt's 1999 "Rigor or Rigor Mortis" piece in IS. In that, the formal modelers tended to get out their thrashing sticks and aim at the "mooseheads" in security studies, saying that while Walt praised them for their originality, there were so many logical flaws in their arguments, and that's why formal modeling was so important. I think it was BDM who said that logical validity, as defined by the use of proofs to rigorously demonstrate the causal flow of an argument, has pride of place over empirical validity or originality. Of course, that whole symposium was a pissing contest in the first place, so there's that.
will: thanks for the context. in fairness to wagner, i should say that there's more to his book than the opening critique i mentioned, including a chapter on the history of the notions of 'realpolitik' and 'reason of state' and what seemed to be an exposition of the (or a) bargaining model of war but without all the mathematical proofs that often go along w it. But i was looking at the book in a library and didn't take it out, so can't say any more about it now.
Seems like there's some reinventing of the wheel here in the comments, folks. Scholars for quite some time have stressed commonalities between (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici...%3E2.0.CO%3B2-
I
But let me hold off on a more detailed commentary until after I read the Boucoyannis piece. I'm impressed, though, with all the up-to-date discussion on the "texts". Harrison Wagner, eh? Boy, I can't wait for that sabbatical!
"Scholars for quite some time have stressed commonalities between (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism"
Sure. And the relevant question is whether the article in question moves beyond a significant portion of this debate. I think it does.
I did, however, find few of its arguments surprising... but I suspect that stems from my minor in political theory and the fact that I study similar historical periods as Boucoyannis does. She's put together a nice, provocative, and very thoughtful package. It does has its flaws, as I suggest above, but so do all non-trivial arguments.
Having not read the article in question, let me make a few foolish comments:
1. In IR, both liberalism and realism possess similarities such as the axiomatic rationalistic nature of agents, the logic and structure assumed a priori upon agents, the general nature of language (its representational over its constitutive and constructive), the primacy of states -- to name a few things.
2. In IR, both theories depart significantly on the role of reciprocity, the logic of anarchy, the different types of states, and the act of transforming properties of the system or agents -- to name a few things.
3. These are significant differences that are not easily bridged or confused, thus the different names categorizing groups of theories within each camp.
4. These formulations are made based on reading IR theory, not relating IR theory with its classical predecessors in their prospective camps.
5. That said, not being a political philosopher but having read superficially some of the more popular European philosophers, relating IR theories like realism back to their classical predecessors, it seems like the ontologies between the classic and present are all wrong. Even when comparing classical realism with IR realism (specifically Waltz), there is very little role, if any, for agents, rather structural tendencies that lead towards specific knee jerk reactions in normal agents. Classical realism possesses an account of people and their inherent nature, not structural tendencies. The same goes for liberalism -- it suggests something about the way that people behave. Both leave some room for people acting outside of these typical behaviors and logics. In this sense, the agents themselves are not so similar between classical and modern theory.
6. Balancing exists quite apparently in liberal theory -- and manifests itself prominently in places like the Federalist Papers -- but to my knwoledge never transfers from the individual acting institutions to the groups (states) acting in social organization (anarchy). Why does the theory never travel from one context to another for liberals? Why do we see balancing on the inter-state, not intra-state, level from self avowed realists (like Kissinger, Bismark, Metternick, to name a few)?
7. The difference in context is signficant, suggesting different sources perhaps for where balancing comes into realist political theory. Its entrance suggests survival, not success, triumph, transcendence. It only suggests restraint in the smallest of ways. It suggests a certain pessimism and self help, an existence that might be nasty, brutish, and short.
8. This inability to improve on the natural world (transforming it into property) suggests something quite illiberal. Additionally, the potential for stasis and the potential violence, near violence, and outright violence needed to maintain the state within Waltz's forumlation makes his theory not liberal, but realist.
I briefly looked at the article and although I think many of her conclusions regarding the balance of power are essentially valid, I feel that she misunderstands the difference between classical realism, liberalism and contemporary neo-realism.
While it is true that the balance of power can be said the be conceptually distinct from realism as Boucoyannis defines it and she does a good job of demonstrating why it is not incompatible with liberalism, her description of realism is specifically of Waltzian realism. Because of Waltz's systemic determinism, Realism after Waltz became entirely obsessed with a reified idea of "balancing" and most scholars since 1991 have been exhaustively beating away at the twin dead horses of "when do states balance" and "why are they not balancing now."
Classical Realists like Carr and Morgenthau were not similarly concerned with the balance of power. Instead, while balance of power certainly played a role, classical realism can be said to be an almost Foucaldian study of power relations in the international system (JS Barkin writes about this in International Studies Review 5(3)). This is not always evident on the surface, but it is what I find to be at the core of the realist project. Furthermore, the conception of power in classical realism is fundamentally distinct from that in liberalism, although this is also not often explicit. Regretfully, realism today has seemingly forgotten its roots in favor of a focus on the balance of power, which is not an exclusively "realist" concept, as Boucoyannis shows. Boucoyannis' article demonstrates to me the importance of rescuing realism from the balance of power and returning to the study of power and power relations. If realism is to reassert its own distinct identity contra liberalism, it requires serious re-engagement with political philosophy, constructivism and continental thought.
Z: These are good points, but Waltz is not a systemic determinist. See my piece with Stacie Goddard.
I wouldn't go quite so far as to say that classical realism was Foucaultian (see the forum PTJ put together on the Sammy Barkin piece you reference), but it did focus on a much larger variety of instruments of power, including what we would now call constitutive forms of power, then most contemporary realists do.
And it is true that the balance of power played a much less central role in classical realism than in post-Waltzian realism. Indeed, one could argue (as Boucoyannis stops just short of, but Waever doesn't in his discussion of US realism) that Waltz presents a liberal-cum-Hobbes theory; i.e., that most US realists are really liberal. I think it might follow, as you suggest, that we need to look elsewhere to find the "heirs" of key aspects of the classical realist tradition.
That being said, I thought Matt's points were dead on about some of the problems with the article.
Re Z's comment: I was going to disagree a bit that realism should re-engage with continental thought, but then it occurred to me
that: 1)Nietzsche apparently influenced Morgenthau (I believe Christoph Frei makes this case, though I've not read his book on Morgenthau); 2)Foucault read Nietzsche closely. So what? Possibly nothing, but I doubt that will stop someone from writing a dissertation on "Nietzsche, Morgenthau, Foucault, and the Transmutations of Power." Maybe it's already been done. (Disclaimer: Not a political theorist, no expertise on Nietzsche.)
Re LC: If you are interested, there is a growing body of work exploring the links between continental thought and realism. Nietzsche, Weber, and Schmitt, are the key figures here, though not the only ones. See, for example, Michael Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations (CUP) and Vibeke Tjalve, Realist Strategies of Republican Peace (Palgrave). See also the latest edition of the critical theory journal "Constellations", which has a special section on realism. For what it is worth, i am editing a book, due out later in the year and entitled "Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme", which contains some essays on continental thought and realism.
Duncan,
Could you email me about the project? I'd love to see/assign some essays from it. It sounds terrific, and long overdue.
To Duncan Bell:
Thank you for the references, and I look forward to reading your book.
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