I agree that Rumsfeld and his friends in the Pentagon (i.e., Wolfowitz, Feith, et. al.), heavily endorsed and supported by GEN Downing's SOCOM community and GEN Myers' USAF community (this bloc, BTW, includes the current CSA, GEN Schoomaker, although he has been much less prolific in his support since he became chief of staff), believe that technological advances can reduce the number of troops on the ground. And it's true for high-intensity maneuever warfare-- the Thunder Run demonstrated just what the Army can do fighting that kind of war. OTOH, the strategy breaks down in a counter-insurgency (which this bloc was very slow to recognize it was facing).
Having said that, more troops on the ground is not necessarily a panacea. Ambassador Khalilzad and LTG Barno demonstrated that with a force *one-ninth* that of OIF, in a country the *same* size and population as Iraq, they could nonetheless accomplish strategic effects that Paul Bremer and LTG Sanchez would have only dreamed about.
I guess what I'm saying is that you can have all the soldiers on the ground that you want, if you're not executing the right strategy you will not be successful. That-- far more than the shortage of troops-- is what has really caused OIF to lag behind OEF.
I realize you're a huge fan of General Zinni, so at the risk of upsetting the pedestal you have him on, you should be aware that just as Rumsfeld and Friends made false assumptions that have hampered operations, Zinni (like Shinseki) also made some assumptions that were frankly obsolete and untrue-- a product of their *own* biases. When the Thunder Run demonstrated that their "emperor had no clothes," they lost a lot of credibility at the very moment when their assumptions were going to start becoming valid. It's the irony of this conflict, but we're all prisoners of our biases and ideology, and none of us inside or outside the community got it totally right.
Good post - I like the idea that having "humans in the loop" remains an important, if not greater, value in a future netcentric culture/military. As you say, it's not that technology reduces the need for people, it just makes them more efficient and quicker to respond. That's an important point.
Bobby - I see your theme here that OEF and OIF were fought differently and there are lessons that need to be learned there, I just haven't really heard that line elsewhere, but I am intrigued. All I follow is the CB defense stuff, and I can tell you that the WMD exploitation tactics were developed in Afghanistan and repeated in Iraq. I am curious though what you mean by Thunder Run and Zinni's being debunked there. I assume you mean the Thunder Runs into Baghdad. Did Zinni not agree with those? Or are you saying the success of the Thunder Runs goes counter to Zinni saying more troops were needed?
Yeah, debunked is a little strong, but essentially the success of the Thunder Run (which was *not* supposed to be possible with such limited combat power according to conventional belief) made it *look* like the Powell crowd had (once again) exaggerated the threat and that their assumptions (that OIF would require 200,000+ troops) were false. In fact, their assumptions were still *very* applicable, but for Phase III-type operations (SASO and COIN).
But I'm not surprised that you don't hear about any differences between what Kabul strategy versus Baghdad strategy. Seriously, if not for me, would you have even *heard* of Regional Development Zones (RDZ), Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), the Afghan Stabilization Program (ASP), et. al.? Would you know about the Afghan National Priorities Program (ANPP) or the national reconciliation initiative? All of these are OEF-only initiatives that (to my knowledge) the OIF team hasn't yet tried.
I think part of the reason that OIF is treated as "US strategy" that (falsely) encompasses OEF is because there's relatively far fewer people who have OEF versus OIF experience. It's just a much quieter theater-- especially in terms of non-military people there (the int'l media is almost altogether absent in Afghanistan). But also, from a non-military perspective, let's face it, OIF is going poorly and if you want to embarass the President (as I believe many do) then you focus your energy on OIF and let Americans (falsely) infer that both theaters are going the same. The President's "amen corner," OTOH, has no choice but to talk up Iraq since that's where the attention is.
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