I want to make it clear that I am not against THE doctrine of divine simplicity, only a certain formulation/definition of it. If we approach the doctrine of divine simplicity Triadologically, then it's obvious that multiplicity and plurality in God are to be accepted and that divine simplicity should not or cannot be defined in such a way as to exclude them.
Divine Simplicity for me refers namely to these two points:
1) Whatever is uncreated is God.
2) God's essence is shared but not divided amongst the Persons of the Trinty.
Again, it does not mean that all plurality in God is to be excluded.
What is the problem motivating the Scholastic doctrine of Divine Simplicity?
"For, whatever is composed of parts is not altogether one, but is: in some sort plural, and diverse from itself; and either in fact or in concept is capable of dissolution. But these things are alien to you, than whom nothing better can be conceived of." [Proslogium, XVIII]
Since the Father freely wills to be the hypostatic source of the Father and the Son, on what basis can we assert that their existence is "necessary"?
It would be very helpful to explain how contradictory properties can be true of one and the same essence.
WB:
Before I reply to the substance of your your first comment, I note from your overall contributions that you seem to put a lot of weight on Anselm, as though he had the ipsissima verba of scholastic and Catholic doctrine on this complex of questions. Aquinas, however, is usually a more reliable guide to the mind of the Church on said complex, where that mind is expressed in dogmatic formulae. Not that I don't think highly of Anselm, of course; but he is not the most representative figure you could pick, and I disagree with him more than I do with Aquinas.
On the specific question of DDS as professed by Aquinas and by Catholicism generally, DDS does not entail lack of plurality in God. For one thing, Aquinas and all Catholics eschew modalism and affirm the genuine hypostatic distinctness of the three divine persons; that is a kind of plurality, though not of course strictly numerical. What DDS does entail is that the distinction between God's doing of what he does, i.e., the divine energies, and what God is, i.e., the divine essence, is not a distinction of parts. For if it were—so the argument goes—then divine plurality would either be numeric, which is incompatible with monotheism, or something other than the divine essence would be needed to explain how the essence and energies are interrelated. Instead, God's doing of what he does is seen as the same God as what God is. Such relative identity does not rule out all plurality, only one kind of plurality.
As to your second comment, it must be said that the Father necessarily generates the Son and breathes forth the Holy Spirit. He does not do so contingently; that is, it's not as though things might have been otherwise. Is of the divine essence that he do so, and therefore that the Son and the Holy Spirit each exist, are each the same God as he, and are co-eternal with him.
Best,
Mike
Perry:
It is absolutely not conditionally necessary that God do, and thus be, something-or-other freely; for freedom is of the divine essence. But whatever God does freely, it is only conditionally not absolutely necessary that he do that thing in particular; else his doing of it would not be free.
I posit "a kind of contingency" in God because, given that he must do something-or-other, if only ad intra, then whatever he does will be something in particular.
Best,
Mike
As to your second comment, it must be said that the Father necessarily generates the Son and breathes forth the Holy Spirit.
One notable point to mention here is that heretics frequently construed this as meaning that God is forced to generate the Son and spirate the Holy Spirit, because they believed that what was by nature could not be free. But as Dr. Liccione observes, "freedom is of the divine essence." The difficulty was that Nestorians were conceiving these concepts (what is done by necessity, what is done freely) as definite and particular concepts opposed to one another, effectively dividing up the indivisible divine essence. I would note by contrast the notion of "something-or-other," which conveys the right impression that there is absolutely no comprehensively known particular that can be said to be necessary, only that which utterly defies conception (i.e., the divine essence, the Trinity). I am reminded of Albertus Magnus's statement that we can know of God "something is" but absolutely nothing about what that something is. It's a very basic error in construing medieval theology that the uses of "something" or "in some mode" refer to some particular, definite thing or mode. In fact, the use of this sort of language is intended to convey exactly the opposite; it is a lexicon for speaking about what can be understood in some sense but not conceptually defined. And incidentally, Anselm appears to be right in line with the way he treats "that than which nothing greater can be conceived."
Dr. Liccione can speak for himself, of course, but I see nothing in his statement that God necessarily does "something in particular" to suggest that the particular thing done is comprehensible or analyzable. This seems to be the prevailing understanding among medievalists about the sort of negative theology practiced universally among the scholastics (as opposed to the more radical view that literally nothing could be affirmed, not even the sort of conditioned statements I was describing above).
ML,
I have finished Book One of the Summa, but I would prefer to keep my mouth shut on Aquinas until I have read more of Summa Contra Gentiles. I do have an opinion on what I have read so far, but I will hold my peace until I have read more. It doesn't seem right to bash a (distinguished) theologian on second-hand information.
On the Trinity, I have three points:
1) The Father is the hypostatic source of the Son and the Spirit.
2) The fact that the Father in love freely begets the Son does not compromise his divinity in any way; I have no way of knowing whether or not the Son might not have existed.
3) A WHO and not a WHAT determine the nature of the Godhead. The Son and the Spirit exist because the Father in love wills it to be so.
If ingeneracy and simplicity are defining attributes/properties of the divine essence itself, then the divinity of Son and the Spirit is ruled out since both lack these properties.
The Divine Essence is ontologicaly imparticiple and rationally incomprehensible, outside being and time. The generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit from the Father are likewise rationally incomprehensible/inaccessible; both are free but they are neither necessary nor contingent because they transcend those categories.
Dr. Liccione,
For the sake of all the poor Orthodox on the web who have an inadequate understanding of western theology (and scholasticism in particular), could you or Jonathan or Michael Sullivan please publish a piece that explains just what western theology and/or scholasticism actually is?? Charges are leveled at Orthodox every day here and elsewhere that we do not understand the west, but no one really gives us any positive leading as to what western theology is all about. If you or any of your respected colleagues could do this, I for one would benefit greatly. Thanks in advance for any help you may offer.
Joseph
William,
I don't know who you've been reading, but you got the right idea.
One correction:
"If ingeneracy and simplicity are defining attributes/properties of the divine essence itself, then the divinity of Son and the Spirit is ruled out since both lack these properties."
The Son and Spirit lack the property of ingeneracy only, but both have the property of simplicity. If we can say simplicity about Father, Son, Holy Spirit, we conclude this is a property of their nature. We can only predicate the property of Ingeneracy about the Father. So we conclude that their is a real distinction between the property of ingeneracy and simplicity. Properties are either in common or absolutely unique. That's the patristic ordo. Do you have my paper on Gregory of Nyssa? I can send it to you. Notice what happens when we predicate about an essence first: we either come up with false doctrine (Arianism or Eunomianism) or we have to do a lot of verbal gymnastics to explain to patristically minded folks (Orthodox and Anglicans) that the hypostases aren't subsumed or confused with some natural property of the divine essence. It's all quite simple, it just takes some humbleness to throw off the "Augustinian" engrained thinking.
Photios
"Do you have my paper on Gregory of Nyssa?"
I've only read it about five times. I'm not to quick on the Triadological draw....
I need your help here, if we go Essence->Attribute->Person, then I thought a distinction of Persons would compromise the simplicity of the essence because of the relation or subordination of person to essence.
This conversation can gain traction if we just get rid of the TERM "energies". Yes, I know it is as faithful a translation one can get from Greek to English - but it does not COMMUNICATE faithfully. "Energy" is a term loaded up with all sorts of meanings and images.
Contra Eunomium confirmed my pre-philosophical intuition concerning the validity of the cosmological argument. If the divine essence is defined by ingeneracy or unbegotteness, then what about the Son and the Spirit? The Son is generated by and the Spirit proceeds from the Father; neither of them are ingenerate "Uncaused Causes."
Photios Jones wrote:
"Properties are either in common or absolutely unique. "
A question concerning this principle. Both the Son and the Holy Spirit share the property of coming from the Father. If the principle is true, would it not imply that the Father must also share this property? Hence, the Father would have to also come from the Father --- a notion which is both absurd and utterly heretical.
I grant, of course, that the modes of origin for the Son and the Holy Spirit are diverse, the one by generation and the other by procession. Nevertheless, if eternal unoriginateness is truly a property of the Father in relation to the Son and the Holy Spirit, then it would seem that eternal originateness must be a shared property of the latter two Persons.
Am I incorrect here?
Edward,
Very good quesion, and I'm surprised that someone else hasn't asked me that before on here. Fr. David Balas asked me that exact question and asked how I might answer that question given the Cappadocian framework and thesis, and basically, I responded that the Holy Spirit and the Son do not share a property of both coming from the Father, as this would imply that they share a COMMON some property of being caused-IN-GENERAL. If they both shared a property of being caused, then, yes my argument would fall through and by logical necessity (I would need to posit an infinite amount of hypostases going back the other way like Iamblichus stating that there is a One above the One). So there are two things here that underlie the assumptions of the question: a) a commitment to God-In-General theology at least unknowingly, and b) that there is only one way that the Father brings forth as Monarchia the other two hypostases (this is also Aquinas' mistake in Summa Contra Gentiles as he sees procession as a general category of causation). So, I would answer, 1)that the question is wrong-headed from the get-go and it is has underlying assumptions that I deny, and 2) That the Son and the Holy Spirit are not caused-in-general, but that one shares an absolutely unique property of generate and the other an absolutely unique property of proceeding.
Otherwise, great question, that does need clarifying as the Cappadocians do at times say that the two Hypostases are caused, but do go on to clarify the unique properties.
Photios
"I need your help here, if we go Essence->Attribute->Person, then I thought a distinction of Persons would compromise the simplicity of the essence because of the relation or subordination of person to essence."
Yes that's right. Eunomius posited a "more or less" absolutely simple hypostasis (which he equated the term with being). Since the First Being was Ingenerate and identical to its very Being, and that the next hypostasis was in dialectical opposition to this first by the category of generate because the method being used what to distinguish them by their mutual opposition (Ingenerate Generate). By logical necessity since the property was identical to their repsective essence, they could not be--not only of a similar--essence but of absolutely different essence.
I think Mike and the others would try to get around Eunomius by the use of 'relative' identity, where Eunomius posited an absolute identity. I'm not convinced that that is going to work very well, as it seems every property, whether natural or personal is just relative to any other, and it would be difficult to see the difference between a natural property and a hypostatic property on that basis. But it would be very interesting to see this worked out nontheless.
Photios
Correction:
Yes that's right. Eunomius posited a "more or less" absolutely simple hypostasis (which he equated the term with being). Since the First Being was Ingenerate and identical to its very Being, and that the next hypostasis was in dialectical opposition to this first by the category of generate because the method being used was to distinguish them by their mutual opposition (Ingenerate Generate). By logical necessity since the property was identical to their repsective essence, not only could these hypostases not be of the same essence, they could not be of a similar essence (Arianism), but were absolutely different essences. And the 3rd hypostasis? Well you can figure that one out on your own. But I don't think it is any coincidence at all that Eunomianism and filioquism have the same logical "STRUCTURE" (please note that I'm only saying Structure here) since they have many underlying assumptions together, specifically between the relationship between philosophy and theology. Eunomius is a "natural theologian" totally unbridled. His next step should be Gnosticism. Why stop with 3 hypostases? Hell let's have an infinite number!
Photios
Michael,
Again, if there is contingency in God, is that identical with the non-contingency in God, that actually is God or something else?
Joseph:
For the sake of all the poor Orthodox on the web who have an inadequate understanding of western theology (and scholasticism in particular), could you or Jonathan or Michael Sullivan please publish a piece that explains just what western theology and/or scholasticism actually is??
I think the lack of detail is going to be fatal to the attempt, because to some extent, there is no such thing as "western theology" or "scholasticism" viewed as some homogeneous mass. One has to deal with some specific concept or question in detail. With respect to as specific concept, and particularly how the Eastern view of God's unknowability doesn't really work against Thomism, Michael had earlier posted a good article on the point:
http://mliccione.blogspot.com/
20...bsconditus.html
Fr. Hugh Barbour here gives a good summary as to why the underlying difficulties between East and West are fundamentally theological and dogmatic, not due to any necessary consequence of an overarching "scholastic" or "rationalist" methodology, which doesn't really distinguish as between the positions:
http://www.balkanstudies.org/199...1998/
barber.htm
Those two articles ought to give some guidance as to what the real problem is: the ill-informed attempts to beat medieval theology into a Hellenistic box that won't hold it. There are elements in medieval theology not to be found in any Hellenistic source, period, full stop.
Jonathan,
Thank you. I'll give them both a read.
Perry:
Although we've been over the construal of "identical with..." many times before, perhaps a little progress can be made here.
It would of course be absurd to say that what's necessary in God is absolutely identical with what's contingent in God. But that's not what I'm saying. I'm using relative identity, as we must, e.g., in triadology.
There is only one God, but three hypostases are God. Therefore, each of the three is the same God as the others. Similarly, God as his free, yet eternal and unalterable activity is the same God as the divine essence, else there would be more than one God. So God is necessary in one respect and contingent in another. But 'contingent' does not mean "merely possible" or "contingent on" anything other than God himself. It signifies conditional necessity.
Best,
Mike
William: "Contra Eunomium confirmed my pre-philosophical intuition concerning the validity of the cosmological argument. If the divine essence is defined by ingeneracy or unbegotteness, then what about the Son and the Spirit? The Son is generated by and the Spirit proceeds from the Father; neither of them are ingenerate "Uncaused Causes.""
I've been waiting the better part of a day for one of the Cathlics here to refute the idea that cosmological arguments attempt to "define the essence" of God in any way (and thus fall into this Arian/Eunomian trap). For me, such an accusation just doesn't wash. Perhaps I'm missing something here. Thanks.
Anon:
I'm not sure what you mean by 'cosmological arguments', but I think you would be interested in my paper "Prove to Me that God Exists," which you can access by clicking the link in the left sidebar of this blog.
Best,
Mike
Dr. L: I've read your article before, I think it's very good. As for what "cosmological arguments" mean, I think that's up to Mr. Ballow to clarify what he means. When I say "arguments" I mean any argument for God's existence that is generally classed as "cosmological," that's all.
To repeat my earlier point: I think it's a mistake to think that natural theology attempts to "define God's essence."
Maybe I should expand on what I said: I think any successful argument for God's existence proves that he exists, e.g. that he created the universe. It makes an inferential claim. It does not attempt to reduce him to a definition, e.g. as the "ungenerate" as opposed to the "generate" universe. The mistake, I think, is to assume that natural theology tries to do the latter instead of the former. Is this completely off-base?
Anon,
It *does* appear that you believe that if my understanding of what natural theology is and implies were correct then the conclusion would follow. I do (or so it seems) have a valid argument; the question is whether or not its premises are true, and I believe there is good reason to believe that they are. The Cosmological argument defines God as "Uncaused Cause" or "ungenerate" as opposed to the caused or generated universe. The Ontological argument argues for a "necessary being" as opposed to the "contingent" universe.
Liccione had a problem with my assertion that the Father freely wills to beget the Son because in his framework that would imply that the Son's existence was contingent rather than necessary, and since he defines God as a "necessary being" my Triadology struck him as implicitly Arian.
If ingeneracy or "unbegottenness" is a defining attribute/property of the divine essence or "God-in-general", then the divinity of Son and the Spirit is ruled out since both lack the property of ingeneracy.
The Divine Essence is ontologicaly imparticiple and rationally incomprehensible, outside being and time. The generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit from the Father are likewise rationally incomprehensible/inaccessible; both are free but they are neither necessary nor contingent because they transcend those categories.
Your idea seems to be that necessity and contingency are related to the essence, but not related to each other. Is that right?
It seems to me better to say that what God is, is absolutely necessary and what God is, is contingent, rather than speaking of what is necessary in God, because that just is God given ADS. It is not as if there is some thing that is necessary and something that is contingent in God other than God. I don’t think Thomas speaks of anything like relative identity qua essence because for him, that would amount to a distinction in God or another hypostases in the Trinity. Here then it seems your account is weaker than Thomas’. If so, then you haven’t shown that the problem doesn’t stick for Thomas.
Furthermore, I don’t see the room for relative identity given ADS, because it is not as if necessity and contingency are relations or something related to the essence-they just ARE the essence. That is the whole point of positing the hypostases as relations because relations are something else other than the essence. There I admit there might be some wiggle room for relative identity, but not for the essence. But for God, he simply is his own mode of existence.
William Ballow wrote:
"If ingeneracy or "unbegottenness" is a defining attribute/property of the divine essence or "God-in-general", then the divinity of Son and the Spirit is ruled out since both lack the property of ingeneracy."
Dear William,
If I have understood you correctly, I don't think this argument works as a criticism of the cosmological argument. When the latter refers to God as "Uncaused Cause" it does so in relation to the creation. Ingeneracy, on the other hand, refers not to God's causality ad extra but rather to the relations of origin within the Holy Trinity. As far as causality vis-a-vis the creation goes, all three Persons are equally causes. St. John Chrysostom, in Homily 5 on the Gospel of John, comments on the phrase "all things were created through Him(i.e., the Word" as follows:
He says of the Son what is said of the Father in His character of Creator; which he would not have said, unless he had deemed of Him as of a Creator, and yet not subservient to any. And if the expression "by Him" is here used, it is put for no other reason but to prevent any one from supposing the Son to be Unbegotten. For that in respect of the title of Creator He is nothing inferior to the Father; hear from Himself, where He saith, "As the Father raiseth up the dead and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom He will." (c. v. 21.)
So, in respect to creation, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit share equally the title Creator. Moreover, the notion of "cause" in the cosmological argument has "temporal effect" as its correlative. In this respect, any cause which is also a temporal effect is a caused cause. God is an Uncaused Cause precisely because He is not a temporal effect. Causation within the Blessed Trinity, on the other hand, does not have temporal effect as its correlative and is of an entirely different order.
Ed
"The Divine Essence is ontologicaly imparticiple and rationally incomprehensible, outside being and time. The generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit from the Father are likewise rationally incomprehensible/inaccessible; both are free but they are neither necessary nor contingent because they transcend those categories."
Two questions(with some sub-questions) arise:
1) If the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit are rationally incomprehensible/inaccessible, how do you know that they are free?
2) If they are free, are you then arguing that the Father had some sort of choice as to whether to generate the Son or process the Spirit? Might He have done otherwise? If you do not intend this meaning, what precisely do you intend?
Ed
Ed,
Necessary existence and Ingeneracy are predicated of the Divine Essence itself (or "God-in-General"), the hypostatic property of the Father (ingeneracy) is now *the* defining attribute/property of the Divine Essence. Since the Son and the Spirit lack that property, then neither of them can be Divine.
The generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit are personal acts of the Father, and therefore free.
The mistake, I think, is to assume that natural theology tries to do the latter instead of the former. Is this completely off-base?
Off-base? Far from it. Lawrence Moonan makes an unassailable argument for exactly that position in his book Divine Power. The problem is that if Moonan's argument is valid and sound (and I consider it entirely reasonable to think so), all of these charges re: "God-in-general" and divine simplicity as creating an equal sign between definite properties predicated of the divine essence are just gone, including the whole necessity/contingency problem as well as the necessity of creation. They would simply be based on a bad misreading of St. Thomas. What is particularly entertaining is that it would be based on the same methodology that was applied to St. Augustine and St. Clement of Alexandria in viewing them as cookie-cutter late Platonists/Neoplatonists. Not that I wish to needlessly trash good scholars like Etienne Gilson, Eugene Portalie, Jean Danielou, and Salvatore Lilla for following such an approach, but I think it is a display of respect to point out where they went wrong, even while respecting what they accomplished. The conceptual debt of Western theology to Greek philosophy has been exaggerated to a large extent, and it is nice to see it being suitably revised downward. Absent that debt, virtually no charges along the lines of Westerners being crypto-Eunomians or crypto-Origenists can stick.
Of course, our esteemed host, a student of the forward-thinking James Ross, has been aware of this for a couple of decades.
William,
I think Athanasius makes a similar argument against the Arians re generate/ungenerate, and goes on to make the same distinction between two meanings of "generate" that Ed did earlier in order to show that the Logos was generate in one sense and ungenerate in another. This may deflate the argument you're trying to make -- not making this distinction can cause problems. It seems to me that Western theology may not have the problem you're trying to foist on it.
--
Jonathan,
Thank you for your response. Actually, your recommendation (to someone else) of B. Miller's _Most Unlikey God_ has helped clear up some things for me on this very topic. As far as I can tell, the Eastern Fathers all the way to John Damascene did do natural theology (i.e., they gave proofs for God's existence directed at the pantheists and atheists of the time), and this realization has caused me to rethink the whole subject.
"Necessary existence and Ingeneracy are predicated of the Divine Essence itself (or "God-in-General"), the hypostatic property of the Father (ingeneracy) is now *the* defining attribute/property of the Divine Essence. Since the Son and the Spirit lack that property, then neither of them can be Divine."
Alright. What if, instead of "uncaused cause", we use the term "unmade maker." Would you say then that only the Father can be called such? Or can we say that this is an attribute of the Divine Essence?
"The generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit are personal acts of the Father, and therefore free."
I can see how you would say that personal acts are free. But might it not be better to use the word "voluntary." Freedom denotes the ability to choose between two or more options. A voluntary act, on the other hand, does not cease to be so merely because there is only one possibility.
Ed
Ed,
From our point-of-view, there is no divine essence abstracted from and prior to considering persons. This is so for us because the Person of Christ is our starting point as a paradigm to solve any theological problem of understanding God or man: scripture and our liturgical life is my starting point. We predicate properties to PERSONS, and if these are properties that THESE PERSONS have in common, THEN we conclude that that is a property of their NATURE. What we mean by a "God-in-general" theology is ANY theology that predicates properties about a divine essence independent and prior to considering of Persons. Here is a good example of a theological handbook that has a touch of the "God-in-General" theology "Orthodox" style: http://www.intratext.com/IXT/ENG...ENG0824/
_PF.HTM
To sum up my point, any theological manual that doesn't start with Christ and His Recapitulatory Economy in salvation history to understand not only the fulfillment of the promises as well as undoing the curse of death, but also the rational principles of nature is not one that is doing dogmatic theology. For us, there really is no such thing as speculative theology in understanding theological questions of a dogmatic and spiritual kind.
"Alright. What if, instead of "uncaused cause", we use the term "unmade maker." Would you say then that only the Father can be called such? Or can we say that this is an attribute of the Divine Essence?"
Given that one is starting from the premises that construe Natural theology and reason, what are you predicating "unmade maker" about? How about just Infinite Being? Why Father at all for that matter? I see no reason to posit such.
Photios
Ed,
If you believe that Triadological compatibilism will solve the problems I've presented, then feel free to use it. You must; however, take that compatibilistic freedom down into Christology and soteriology to remain consistent.
Jonathan,
If the hypostatic property of the Father (ingeneracy/unbegotteness) is the defining feature of Divine Essence or the definition of divinity, how can the Son and the Spirit be God if both lack that property?
The following is a re-statement of my argument for clarity and convenience:
The property of unbegotteness or ingeneracy predicated or attributed to the Divine Essence (by the cosmological argument in particular and natural theology in general) is the hypostatic property of the Father and in order for the Son and the Spirit to be God or Divine they must possess that property, but they do not.
William:
In natural theology, the correct thing to say is that "God" is in no sense caused by what is not God. In dogmatic theology, it is correct to say that the Son and the Spirit are, in different senses, "caused" by the Father, who is in no sense caused. But it does not follow that the Son and the Spirit are not God, or that being a cause is a hypostatic property only of the Father. All that follows is the Son and the Spirit are not causes of the Father, and that the senses in which God is a cause ad extra are not the same as, but only analogous to, the senses in which the Father is cause of the other Persons ad intra.
You seem to be assimilating all instances of 'caused' to 'generated'. That's unjustified. There are many different senses of 'cause'. The sense of 'cause' in which God as triune is an uncaused cause, which I've just specified, is not the same as the senses of 'cause' in which the Father generates the Son and breathes forth the Holy Spirit.
As to what you call "triadological compatibilism," I think you're also conflating things. The Father is not free to refrain from generating the Son and breathing forth the Spirit; if he were, then God would not be necessarily triune but only contingently so, which would involve conflating generation and procession with creation. Nor are any of the Persons free not to love the others. They are each free with respect to how they love the others, and they are necessarily free in that way. That's why, as I've argued, there is a kind of contingency in God.
Best,
Mike
*WHAT* is "God", from the standpoint of natural theology alone, before revelatory truths are taken into account? A Prime Mover, Uncaused Cause, Actus Purus, Necessary Being etc.? None of these either in isolation or combined have to actually be a person let alone "God." These various arguments imply respective definitions or defining attributes/properties of the divinity or the Divine Essence which I believe create Triadological problems down the road.
Every person of the Trinity is uncreated, but *only* the Father is unbegotten or uncaused. My argument is that if unbegotteness or ingeneracy is the defining feature of the divine essene or divinity AND since that is the hypostatic property of the Father, then the Son and the Spirit cannot be God.
As Daniel Jones said, "From our point-of-view, there is no divine essence abstracted from and prior to considering persons. "
If essence is prior to person methodologically, then person will be subsumed under and subordinate to essence theologically. An essence is an *it* or a *what*; I don't see how the *thing* (necessary being, actus purus, etc.) that was being philosophically dissected in this post even qualifies as or constitutes a person in the first place.
If the hypostatic property of the Father (ingeneracy/unbegotteness) is the defining feature of Divine Essence or the definition of divinity, how can the Son and the Spirit be God if both lack that property?
It's not a "defining feature" of the divine essence. It's not even a "property" in the sense of a proper predicate. Albert the Great quotes Athanasius on this point: when you say "God is good," "God is wise," etc., then regarding the divine essence in itself, nothing is connoted.
Note Dr. Liccione's language on this point: "All that follows is the Son and the Spirit are not causes of the Father, and that the senses in which God is a cause ad extra are not the same as, but only analogous to, the senses in which the Father is cause of the other Persons ad intra."
Thus, there is a right answer to this question:
*WHAT* is "God", from the standpoint of natural theology alone, before revelatory truths are taken into account?
The answer is "I can't say," because natural theology properly speaking says nothing about the "what is" of God. I can say *that* God is, I can say what God is NOT by reference to limitations on powers (e.g., God is not evil), but when it comes to the question of what He is, that's where I have to stop and let revelation do its work. That's why I've always found it a bit odd to speak of divine simplicity as if it equated properties, being that the whole point of the doctrine is that nothing can be properly predicated of God in Himself. That doctrine says, "Here I am, and I can go no further."
Even as revelation is concerned, we are still not able to go much farther. Since it is revealed that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, we affirm that this is true. We still have no idea what they are, but we know that whatever "God" is, they are, so we know *that* the Father is, the Son is, and the Holy Spirit is, although I equally cannot say *what* they are. We don't view the statements as meaningless, but neither do we view them as definitive (unlike Eunomius, for example). The use of the dialectical method is drastically different in the medieval context; it applies to our speech about God, but not what that speech conveys about God.
I'm working from memory here, but I recall that an Orthodox commentator on Clement of Alexandria said something to the effect of "From the outside, the Triad is a monad." That's what the doctrine of divine simplicity says. It sets a hard limit on what we can conclude from what we know about God (specifically, that we can know God is, although nothing at all about what God is), and it leaves the rest to revelation.
Note that the persons simply aren't deducible by natural theology. St. Thomas couldn't even be more clear regarding philosophical knowledge of the Trinity: "So also we do not assert that the Father and the Son differ in substance, which was the error of Origen and Arius,
"So also we do not assert that the Father and the Son differ in substance, which was the error of Origen and Arius, who in this followed the Platonists."
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1032.htm
St. Thomas just isn't following the God-in-general or Neoplatonic One or whatever else it is called. Saying that "God is" just doesn't imply anything about what God is, and saying that in God all things are one is just stating the reason that such statements connote nothing about what God is. You've got to get out of this mindset that medievals were predicating things of God like Platonists did, because it just wasn't the case, and they patently said that it wasn't.
If essence is prior to person methodologically, then person will be subsumed under and subordinate to essence theologically. An essence is an *it* or a *what*; I don't see how the *thing* (necessary being, actus purus, etc.) that was being philosophically dissected in this post even qualifies as or constitutes a person in the first place.
That's actually a good way to put it. In medieval theology, there is no way to start from "person" in natural theology, because there's no way to know persons before they are revealed, and there's no way to start from "essence" in the way you'd describe, because there is no "it" or "what" that can be "philosophically dissected" (nice term for dialectic, BTW). Natural theology is not about saying "we know this about God." It is about saying "There exists Something that is thoroughly beyond our grasp." It is more or less an apologetic against the notion that whatever we cannot understand doesn't exist.
Jonathan,
Again, everyone here seems to grant that my argument is *valid*; it is just that most do not grant that its premises are true.
1) Natural theology *does* predicate various things of the Divine Essence. It *does* make definitive cataphatic statements concerning the Divine Essence nature apart from and prior to the revelation of the Persons (Necessarily Being, Absolutely Simple, Pure Actuality, Ingenerate, etc.)
2) Do you believe that when I say that God is good, God is omnipotent, and God is omniscient I am making three statements that are only formally/conceptually/mentally distinct but ultimately identical in meaning? That's what Divine Simplicity amounts to in RC theology, independent of what it was "meant to do." It *does* equate properties and opposed real distinctions in God.
I have seen nothing so far that would lead me to believe that (1) is false.
3)I agree that "there is no way to start from the "person" in natural theology, *because* there's no way to know persons before they are revealed." However, although it is not proper to "start from essence" prior to person the fact is (or I am under the impression that) that that is what was done by medieval theologians. The question is then whether God is a being that we can apprehend or dissect via philosophical speculation? An affirmative answer lays the foundation for natural theology and a negative answer for apophatic theology (proper).
"For He does not belong to the class of existing things: not that He has no existence, but that He is above all existing things, nay even above existence itself. For if all forms of knowledge have to do with what exists, assuredly that which is above knowledge must certainly be also above essence: and, conversely, that which is above essence will also be above knowledge." [John of Damascus, Exposition, Ch. IV]
It is necessary to "believe that He is," not 'what He is.' If "that He is" needs Faith, and not reasonings; it is impossible to comprehend by reasoning 'what He is.' If that "He is a rewarder" needs Faith and not reasonings, how is it possible by Reasoning to compass His essence? For what Reasoning can reach this? For some persons say that the things that exist are self-caused. Seest thou that unless we have Faith in regard to all things, not only in regard to retribution, but also in regard to the very being of God, all is lost to us?
[Chrysostom, Homilies on Hebrews #22]
Photios Jones wrote:
"Given that one is starting from the premises that construe Natural theology and reason, what are you predicating "unmade maker" about? How about just Infinite Being? Why Father at all for that matter? I see no reason to posit such."
"The wrath of God is being revealed from heaven against the irreligious and perverse spirit of men who, in this perversity of theirs, hinder the truth. In fact, whatever can be known about God is clear to them; he himself made it so. Since the creation of the world, invisibile realities, God's eternal power and divinity, have become visible, recognized through the things he has made. There these men are inexcusable. They certainly had knowledge of God......"
(St. Paul's Letter to the Romans, Ch. 1, vs. 18-21)
What is St. Paul predicating eternal power and divinity about? In what sense did people know God from looking at the visible things that he has made?
Ed
Again, everyone here seems to grant that my argument is *valid*; it is just that most do not grant that its premises are true.
You've probably committed the equivocation fallacy as well, and rephrasing the argument might illuminate the problem. I take your reasoning to proceed as follows:
1. Ingeneracy is a property of the divine essence (alternatively, of being God).
2. By DDS, all properties of the divine essence are identical with (and therefore essential properties of) the divine essence (alternatively, of being God).
3. No individual lacking an essential property of any essence can be "of" that essence (perhaps "have" or "possess" that essence; alternatively, to be that sort of thing).
4. The Son and the Spirit lack the property of ingeneracy.
5. Therefore, the Son and the Spirit are not of the divine essence (alternatively, are not God).
(Note: I've omitted a few intermediate steps linking the premises explicitly, but I think it is straightforward to fill them in.)
Several people have pointed out that "ingeneracy" does not mean the same thing in the context of the divine essence that it does in the context of the Son and Spirit, so the argument would be invalid for equivocation. If you rephrased in the way Dr. Liccione suggested, then (1) would read "Not being a dependent being is a property of being God," while (4) would read "The Son and the Spirit lack the property of being the Father." "Not being the Father" is not the same thing as "being a dependent being," and parties are ordinarily entitled to define terms ipse dixit, so the argument is not valid.
That's not to say that there aren't any disputed premises; the truth of (2) would certainly be debated as well. That's why I've found all forms of this argument notoriously unhelpful although they are quite popular, even to the point that some Thomists actually attempt to resolve them AS IF this structure were ostensibly valid, e.g., Stump and Kretzmann. The threshold question is what the medievals actually meant by these comments, and based on my own survey of Thomist opinion on the subejct, I have found the arguments that St. Thomas meant the same sort of thing in (1) and (4) or that he would have accepted (2) unconvincing, mostly because the methodology is anachronistic, and in particular, that it imputes the opinion of Hellenistic philosophers to Western authors without adequate demonstration of derivation (a problem common to both Catholic and Orthodox scholars regarding both Western AND Eastern Fathers, including Augustine). And I think there has been ample demonstration that the position that I take to have been held by St. Thomas and many other medievals (and dogmatically endorsed by Catholicism in some respects) is not incoherent. I would cite William Vallicella, Barry Miller, and Xavier Zubiri as each having plausible arguments consistent with historical Western theology for the coherence of the Western view, dependin
I would cite William Vallicella, Barry Miller, and Xavier Zubiri as each having plausible arguments consistent with historical Western theology for the coherence of the Western view, depending on what metaphysical assumptions one finds persuasive.
That's why I find the philosophical arguments that there is some fundamental methodological difference between East and West unconvincing. I have never actually seen an argument directed against what I consider the West's historical methodology that convincingly showed some sort of logical incoherence or false implications. The real argument is the dispute over the normativity of the methods, and that's why this always keeps coming back to the question of authority. Given that the real dispute IS one of authority, that's also why Drs. Liccione and Tighe, along with myself, find Todd Kaster's position so offensive. It is impossible to accept the authority of Rome based on Rome's own standards while rejecting the normativity of the scholastic method, so the rejection of the normativity of scholasticism is quite reasonably taken as a rejection of the authority.
So there are no substantive theological issues and arguments to sift through, because "the real dispute is one of authority?" The question of first priority are ecclesiological, whose authority do I accept and/or are the papal claims true? The other questions though important are secondary, is that your position?
The original post that sparked this whole thing was Pontificator's post "Bad Reason #1 Not To become Catholic." It seemed that he was saying only due to obstinate denial and intellectual handicap (perhaps this is an exaggeration, but still my initial impression) could one not see and confess the truth of a certain ecclesiology, but the "Palamite distinction" "with meager patristic evidence" dogmatized by the Orthodox Church could only be found if one was already quite predisposed to finding it. I felt like I just been called an idiot for leaning one way as opposed to another; so I felt obliged to throw in my two cents before everything was said and done.
Mr. Prejean,
Let me begin by saying that I enjoyed reading your defense of St. Thomas, because you have done a commendable job in trying to show that he was not "following the God-in-general or Neoplatonic One" framework in his theology. Sadly, I am not sure that all Westerners agree with your view on Thomistic theology, but clearly those who are posting in this thread are supportive of your position. I thank you for your excellent defense of St. Thomas. Nevertheless, I do not agree with what you have said in your concluding paragraph, i.e., the one where you said that, "It is impossible to accept the authority of Rome based on Rome's own standards while rejecting the normativity of the scholastic method, so the rejection of the normativity of scholasticism is quite reasonably taken as a rejection of the authority," because Eastern Catholics do not have to accept the normativity of Scholastic methods in theology. In fact, Eastern Catholics have our own spiritual, theological, and liturgical traditions, and we have been called upon by the Magisterium to live by those traditions, and this at times may even require that we go through a process of de-Latinization, which may not be popular with some Western Catholics, in order to return to our ancestral traditions. The authority of the Catholic Church does not stand or fall based upon the truth or error found within the Scholastic approach to theology.
God bless,
Todd
Prejean,
How do you account for the theological differences between Orthodoxy and Catholicism or Eastern and Western Christendom? I seriously would like to hear your explanation. If there is "no fundamental difference" in methodology, then how do we explain the different and divergent theologies? What is the source of the rapid and unprecedented succession of doctrinal development in the West after the Schism?
If there are no methodological differences and if people with the same methodology and starting-points just happen to end up with different conclusions for no apparent or discoverable reason whatsoever, what hope is there of ever finding the truth?
I always assume that if there is long-lasting debate or unresolved dispute between intelligent persons that the source of the error is methodological; that assumption has proven true again and again.
So there are no substantive theological issues and arguments to sift through, because "the real dispute is one of authority?"
I didn't say that (although I think it is probably the case). What I said is that the difference is not methodological. There may be substantive differences, but they don't stem from a difference in methodology.
The question of first priority are ecclesiological, whose authority do I accept and/or are the papal claims true? The other questions though important are secondary, is that your position?
Some people might consider ecclesiology to be of "first priority," but my point is more modest. All I am saying is that the question of authority and philosophy can't be resolved to (or conflated in) methodology. If it relates to the normativity of a particular methodology, then one might to need to resolve a question of authority before the subsequent discussion even becomes meaningful.
It seemed that he was saying only due to obstinate denial and intellectual handicap (perhaps this is an exaggeration, but still my initial impression) could one not see and confess the truth of a certain ecclesiology, but the "Palamite distinction" "with meager patristic evidence" dogmatized by the Orthodox Church could only be found if one was already quite predisposed to finding it.
No, Fr. Kimel's argument was that the notion that this decision was necessitated by history was a bad argument. Yes, there was certainly a charge that if that was your reason for being Orthodox, it would be an unintellgent reason to do so. That the issue of authority and normativity must necessarily be considered is irrespective of whether you agree with Fr. Kimel's argument that "This [Catholic] magisterium authoritatively judges doctrinal developments and, when needed, imposes Spirit-inspired dogma which does not mislead the faithful. No other ecclesial body, including Orthodoxy, makes an analogous claim; no other ecclesial body, including Orthodoxy, can make this claim."
Makes sense, I'll leave you, Tighe and Kaster alone now.
The authority of the Catholic Church does not stand or fall based upon the truth or error found within the Scholastic approach to theology.
I concur; it does not stand or fall on ANY approach the theology. That is why I think it is anti-Catholic to REJECT the normativity of scholasticism even if you yourself do not accept it. If the scholastic methodology can meet the Roman standards for doctrine, then you have no basis to reject it. Conversely, if the Eastern methodology cannot meet the doctrinal requirements of Catholicism, then it must be rejected, although I don't believe this to be the case. The point is that the farther we get away from what those specific doctrinal requirements are and the more we get into vague generalities, the more this problem is obfuscated.
Fair enough, Mr. Ballow. I can see a bit of difference in our approaches, as it has been my experience that almost all long-lasting disputes originate from entirely mundane and circumstantial matters producing a collection of particular disputes that are later *explained* by asserted methodological reasons and that the disputes are prolonged exactly by trying to find some overarching methodological reason for them. Consequently, my approach has always been to find the particular points at which the specific issues arose, trying to find the needles that get lost into the hay that is made over methodology and presuppositions.
Perry,
It might be a better strategy to grant the point about relative identity and insist that, nonetheless, accepting contingency implies there is a distinction in God on the side of God rather than, say, merely the intellect.
That is, leave aside all talk of identity, which would be merely a rational relation, and instead talk in terms of unity/ plurality.
To avoid introducing a real distinction in the divine nature--which would be disaster--ML will have to introduce something like a formal distinction in the divine nature.
But then, the game is over: Aquinas is wrong, and something like what Scotus said is right. But that might be good news for you, if you see formalities as prima facie compatible with energies.
Mr. Prejean,
The Scholastic system is not normative for the Eastern Churches. It is an 11th/12th century Western system, and even Dr. Dragani, who is not a "radical" Eastern Catholic, has said as much.
God bless,
Todd
Ed,
Romans 1:20 is talking about Christ and His economy. The things that are known from the foundations of the world (referring to creation), for St. Ambrose of Milan is Christ and *His works:* His working with a specific people to accomplish redemption (i.e. Salvation History). For the pre-Augustinian Latin tradition, there is no evidence at all of programs of natural theology. St. Ambrose' understanding of Romans 1:20 is at odds with the post-Augustinian tradition. I don't have the reference in front of me now, but if you are interested, I can provide it to you.
The closest thing I've seen to any type of program to natural theology is in some of the Apologists, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen.
Photios
For the pre-Augustinian Latin tradition, there is no evidence at all of programs of natural theology.
What was Justin Martyr about, chopped liver?
Look, Photios, I know that, like Barth, you're so allergic to natural theology that you can't see any evidence for it pre-Augustine. But the fact is that many of the prior Fathers saw certain philosophical ideas as useful preambula fidei and thus as truths, though quite limited in scope. On some accounts, such as my own, that just is natural theology. On your account, of course, natural theology is a whole ordo theologiae that is misconceived and misleading from that start. But as I so often find in these East-West set-tos, you're begging the question.
The question is whether anything at all can be known about God without divine revelation. If the answer is yes, as many theologians throughout the ages have said, then divine revelation does not set aside the truths thereby attained but rather sets them in proper context, thus purifying the insights they contain of such admixtures of error as are common in philosophy. One cannot credibly argue a priori that the answer is no on the ground that what we know of God comes first and foremost through a Person, Jesus Christ. While dogmatic theology must begin with our encounter with that Person in Scripture, Tradition, the experience of the Church, and our own experience, nothing follows about whether there are any relevant and knowable truths attainable without that encounter. All that follows is that said encounter, if properly responded to, will gradually correct whatever errors we may have made without it.
Best,
Mike
Perry and AS:
Perry writes: It seems to me better to say that what God is, is absolutely necessary and what God is, is contingent, rather than speaking of what is necessary in God, because that just is God given ADS. It is not as if there is some thing that is necessary and something that is contingent in God other than God.
I think that's right, but I don't think it's contrary to what I've said. I think it helps to make my main point clearer.
Contrary to what AS says, I think Aquinas does grants a "real" distinction within the Godhead: that among the divine Persons. Thus he admits a kind of plurality in the Godhead, but one that is consistent with monotheism in virtue of relative identity. Similarly, the modalities of necessity and contingency in God do not imply more than one God. That's why Perry is incorrect to write: I don’t see the room for relative identity given ADS, because it is not as if necessity and contingency are relations or something related to the essence-they just ARE the essence. That is the whole point of positing the hypostases as relations because relations are something else other than the essence.. While I don't find Aquinas denying that the divine essence is "really" as distinct from "notionally" distinct from the divine Persons, I myself would deny as much and believe that that is consistent with Aquinas. Given the Father's ingeneracy and necessary generation of the other Persons, I think we have to say that the divine Persons constitute the essence rather than being really distinct from it. Hence God is essentially plural with compromising divine simplicity.
Best,
Mike
"Romans 1:20 is talking about Christ and His economy."
Dear Photios,
I'm afraid I cannot buy this interpretation of the passage. According to St. John Chrysostom's understanding below, the "'works" do not refer to Salvation History, as you assert, but to the works and beauty of creation itself. Moreover, through these works, St. John affirms, the pagans (Scythians, barbarians, Greeks) came to know God's power and divinity.
Needless to say, St. John's interpretation is consistent with the vast majority of modern exegesis and with the plain meaning of the text itself.
So, the question remains. What God do we come to know by studying His created works?
Ed
'"And whence is it plain that He placed in them this knowledge, O Paul? "Because," saith he, "that which may be known of Him is manifest in them." This, however, is an assertion, not a proof. But do thou make it good, and show me that the knowledge of God was plain to them, and that they willingly turned aside. Whence was it plain then? did He send them a voice from above? By no means. But what was able to draw them to Him more than a voice, that He did, by putting before them the Creation, so that both wise, and unlearned, and Scythian, and barbarian, having through sight learned the beauty of the things which were seen, might mount up to God.[1] Wherefore he says,
Ver. 20. "For the invisible things of Him. from the Creation of the world are clearly. seen, being understood by the things which are made."
Which also the prophet said, "The heavens declare the glory of God." (Ps. 19:1.) For what will the Greeks (i.e. Heathen) say in that day? That "we were ignorant of Thee?" Did ye then not hear the heaven sending forth a voice by the sight, while the well-ordered harmony of all things spake out more clearly than a trumpet? Did ye not see the hours of night and day abiding unmoved continually, the goodly order of winter, spring, and the other seasons remaining both sure and unmoved, the tractableness (eugnwmosunhn) of the sea amid all its turbulence and waves? All things abiding in order and by their beauty and their grandeur, preaching aloud of the Creator? For all these things and more than these doth Paul sum up in saying, "The invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made, even His eternal Power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse.'
(St. John Chrysostom: Homily on Romans)
"What was Justin Martyr about, chopped liver?"
Well, first he's not a Latin, but a Greek Father, and second his program of "natural theology" is nothing even close to the Scholastic enterprise. If anything, he sets the stage more so for development of doctrine in the way he views pagan philosophy as *anticipating* elements of Christianity, in much the same way that Alcuin combs the Fathers for *anticipations* of the filioque doctrine. It doesn't mean he's "chopped liver," it just means he's wrong on that point, and somewhat sets the stage towards Origenism, Arianism, and Nicea. When the problem of predicating the property of *Creator* and *Father* about the Person of the Father, and how to properly distinguish the two, his commitment to looking at pagan philosophy for some safe haven was telling him one thing, and his faith was telling him another. Like Augustine, he's not consistent at looking at theological questions from this stand-point. Other places, he's right in line with Irenaeus.
"One cannot credibly argue a priori that the answer is no on the ground that what we know of God comes first and foremost through a Person, Jesus Christ."
Why not? What makes you think you can have dogmatic truth outside of Christ? And how are you going to come up with the Christian view of hypostasis from natural theology? Is a relation of opposition what Chalcedonian Christology has in mind? A relation of opposition came in Incarnate? Does Christ have another relation [of opposition] to his human nature? How is that not another person from the perspective of natural theology? The fact of the matter is Mike is not one heresy was destroyed based on working out natural theology, but on the other hand, "natural theology" or rather the more readily used pagan ordo theologiae was the basis of producing the heresies: whether Eunomianism, Arianism, Nestorianism, or Monophysitism. cont...
You can say begging the question all you want, but none of us will ever be persuaded by the "Rome says so, so it must be true" line.
BTW-how is one a "theologian" if Christ is not your presupposition and starting point?
I believe only after we have established the dogmatic facts could we possibly entertain what pieces of greek philosophy are useful. The essence-energies distinction is one, but it is God-in-General theology if it is our starting point or overemphasized. I have no basis for understanding or making a claim of what that distinction even amounts to, unless I understand Who Christ is (and other dogmatic points touching Nicea and Chalcedon). But when natural theology is telling me that a divine person is a relation and Chalcedon is telling me something else, then there is something wrong with the method employed. And if left in the same unreconstructed paradigm and ordo of analyzing abstract categories and what they mean, this is where we fall into heresy. The homoousion is not a philosophical claim (which is why it was originally objected to by some Orthodox at the council and after) nor have the Nicene's left the term with its pagan philosophical content. The same goes for the Christian view of hypostasis. The fact that the Fathers used handy terms from pagan philosophy doesn't mean we analyze the philosophers for the meaning of those terms (unless we want to know what Plotinus or any other pagan meant by them) and read that into the Fathers, otherwise we are left with an insurmountable problem of understanding Christ and Chalcedon.
Florence says that all is one in God except for the existence of a dialectical opposition, and that being two of them. That is a dogmatic claim based on natural theology and not revelation.
Photios
Dear Photios,
I have a question about something you said earlier concerning the Son and the Spirit not being caused in general. You wrote the following:
"I responded that the Holy Spirit and the Son do not share a property of both coming from the Father, as this would imply that they share a COMMON some property of being caused-IN-GENERAL. If they both shared a property of being caused, then, yes my argument would fall through and by logical necessity"
Pardon me if my question is silly. But for the sake of understanding your position better, I must ask it. If the Son and the Holy Spirit do not share a common property of being caused then is it not incorrect or, at the very least, dangerous to speak of the Father as the One Cause of both the Son and the Holy Spirit? For to assert this of the Father in relation to the Son and the Spirit seems to imply that the Son and the Spirit share this property of being caused. But if we cannot say that the Father is the One Cause of both the Son and the Spirit then is not the teaching on His Monarchia jeopardized?
Perhaps this reasoning is based on some false assumption on my part. But I am only thinking of the meaning of language. Generally speaking, if we say that A is a cause of both B and C then it follows that B and C share the property of being caused by A. If B and C do not share that property, then it would seem that A is not the one cause of both. A might have a relation to both B and C but it would not be causality. Am I making any sense at all?
I have the feeling of course, that I'm still not getting it. So any clarification would be of help.
God bless,
Ed
Photios:
When the problem of predicating the property of *Creator* and *Father* about the Person of the Father, and how to properly distinguish the two, his commitment to looking at pagan philosophy for some safe haven was telling him one thing, and his faith was telling him another. Like Augustine, he's not consistent at looking at theological questions from this stand-point.
That is purely a matter of opinion about which, in the case of Augustine, we have disagreed before. But more importantly, it fails to address my point, which is that natural theology was being done among Christians before Augustine. That you dislike how it was done does not alter the fact that it was done.
What makes you think you can have dogmatic truth outside of Christ?
Nothing, given that I think no such thing. What I think is that some truth about God can be known by reason apart from revelation. Such truth belongs precisely to natural not dogmatic theology. And insofar as they can be known by natural theology, they are philosophical not just dogmatic truths.
You can say begging the question all you want, but none of us will ever be persuaded by the "Rome says so, so it must be true" line.
Once again, completely missing the point. As a high-school and college student well before I knew that the Catholic Magisterium taught that some truths about God can be known by human reason, I had already concluded that they could be so known. You're begging the question not because you disagree with Rome, but because you assume, without arguing for, a negative answer to the question I said is the question in this context, which is whether natural theology can yield any truth about God. To support a negative answer, you're going to have to show that no natural theologian as such ever said anything true about God. Good luck.
Best,
Mike
The Scholastic system is not normative for the Eastern Churches.
I don't think that you understand what I am saying. "Systems" are not normative in the same way dogmas are. Realistically, no "system" is "normative" in the sense of being binding apart from its results; systems are only normative as options. My point is that you can't reject the normativity of the scholastic system so as to say that it is wrong to use the method in and of itself. I recognize that there are numerous Eastern thinkers who do not consider the Scholastic method as "normative" in the sense of being a dogmatically mandated methodology, and I never said otherwise. But I also have never seen an Eastern Catholic say that it was WRONG to use the Scholastic methodology. In the sense that methodologies are generally considered "normative" (viz., they do not in and of themselves produce defective or erroneous results), it is clear that scholasticism is ONE "normative approach" to theological inquiry, although it is probably not the ONLY normative approach. The point is that you start from doctrinal conclusions to judge this matter, and it is abundantly clear that every single doctrinal pronouncement of any of the 21 binding Western councils must be met by any methdology in order to be Catholic.
"That is purely a matter of opinion about which, in the case of Augustine, we have disagreed before. But more importantly, it fails to address my point, which is that natural theology was being done among Christians before Augustine. That you dislike how it was done does not alter the fact that it was done."
I never said it wasn't done in nascent form, and I've admitted that some did, but it wasn't being done by the Latins, unless they were gnostics. That's because the first movement away from Hellenization was in the West. The East had as many Hellenizers as you could swing a dead cat at.
Photios
According to St. John Chrysostom's understanding below, the "'works" do not refer to Salvation History, as you assert, but to the works and beauty of creation itself.
Creation is part of the economy. What is questionable is whether Rom. 1:20 refers to the portions of the economy in themselves (more or less, God's power as manifested) or to the abstraction of some concept of "God" FROM these manifestations. Chrysostom's statements could conceivably be consistent with either. I personally suspect that Paul was speaking in terms of the particulars, so that the people in question are denying God as they know him in the context of the manifestations of His power. For example, they see manifest evidence that animals are finite in power, but they make idols of them anyway.
Generally speaking, if we say that A is a cause of both B and C then it follows that B and C share the property of being caused by A.
One might inquire whether that is actually a "property" of the effects, viz., whether there is something particular about them that is adequately defined by being "not-X" or whether this is simply relative. It might help also to examine the "from-not from" approach used by Anselm:
http://examinelife.blogspot.com/...f-
faith_07.html
Angels cap tip to the Pontificator.
"I personally suspect that Paul was speaking in terms of the particulars, so that the people in question are denying God as they know him in the context of the manifestations of His power. For example, they see manifest evidence that animals are finite in power, but they make idols of them anyway."
Dear Jonathan,
I don't disagree with what you say here. It fits very well with St. Thomas' assertion that what we can know about God apart from revelation we know by the way of remotion. Hence, the pagans should have been able to say, "though we do not know God as He is, we do know what He is not and He is not finite." Since God alone is to be worshipped, even the pagans are without excuse in worshipping a finite creature.
If this is what St. Paul and St. John interpreting St. Paul mean, then it seems to me that we have found a rudimentary natural theology in Scripture.
Ed
Photios,
"If we can say simplicity about Father, Son, Holy Spirit, we conclude this is a property of their nature. We can only predicate the property of Ingeneracy about the Father. So we conclude that their is a real distinction between the property of ingeneracy and simplicity."
If you intended this as a syllogism it is a non sequitur. If you have omitted some steps please complete the argument, and also state what is, in your opinion, the significance of the conclusion.
Robert,
I wrote a whole paper on the topic in regard to Gregory of Nyssa, the ordo theologiae, and the Basilian principle of what is in common to persons is of the nature, and what is particular and absolutely unique is of one hypostasis and only one. It's probably best you proceed there and become familiar with the argument. It would also be helpful as background material to read Basil's letter #38 (which is probably written by Gregory of Nyssa).
Daniel
Ed,
You've probably outlined the single best objection against the doctrine of the Trinity in my opinion. As I indicated before if we say the Father is cause of the other two persons, we need to realize that we are speaking rather loosely here with the term Cause and those that are Caused (quite general). If that is as unique and as particular as I could frame it, then yes I think your argument would go through. Fortunately, the Fathers do not see the Father as being a Cause in some general sense of the Son and Spirit. Each has their own unique relation of origin. The Father as the Single Source and Principle, the Son by Generation, and the Holy Spirit proceeding. Does Generation and Procession have, at least, in common some general property of being caused? Well I think if we substitute the term "cause" with the term "relation of origin" we would have to say yes. But the Fathers recognized and labeled God the Father's relation of origin, as Ingenerate and Source. I think as long as the relation of origin is absolutely unique, then Personhood is not collapsed into being a property of the nature.
Thanks for the quote from Chrysosotom, I shall respond to that one when I get some time. Thanks for the good dialogue too.
Daniel
Photios,
Simply to supply references is not an argument. Please state the syllogism for the conclusion here and the significance of the latter.
Mr. Prejean,
Yes, I reject the Scholastic system as normative for me, because I am an Eastern Catholic and so I follow the theological tradition of the Eastern Church. What the Scholastics think does not, nor has it ever, had a role in the formulation of doctrine in the Byzantine Church. Take for example, the doctrine of "original sin," in the Eastern tradition the ancestral sin of Adam introduces death and corruption into the created order, and this return to non-being is reversed by the incarnation and paschal mystery of Christ. Clearly, the Western notion that there is some kind of hereditary guilt passed on from Adam to his descendants plays no part in the doctrinal tradition of the East. The fact that the West has a different way of looking at "original sin" is fine with me, but the Western idea has no place in my own spiritual life.
On another note, I read with interest Dr. Carson's comments on the "filioque"; nevertheless, I remain unconvinced by his argument, especially when he said the following:
"Since the Son is evidently 'not from' the Holy Spirit, we can infer that the Holy Spirit is 'from' the Son, and not merely through the Son as by an instrument, per Filium, as the Greeks insisted . . ."
How is it evident that the Son is not "from" the Spirit? Clearly, scripture speaks of the Son "sending" the Spirit, but it also speaks of the Spirit "sending" the Son (cf., Luke 4:1
. So, how is it evident that the Spirit is "from" the Son, and not merely "through" Him as the Fathers of the East taught. Also, how do you reconcile the Western philosophical speculation on the origin of the Spirit with the doctrine of St. John Damascene? Because, as I am sure you are already aware, St. John Damascene explicitly denied that the Spirit is "from" the Son, for as he explained, ". . . we do not speak of the Son as Cause or Father, but we speak of Him both as from the Father, and as the Son of the Father. And we speak likewise of the Holy Spirit as from the Father, and call Him the Spirit of the Father. And we do not speak of the Spirit as from the Son, but yet we call Him the Spirit of the Son" [St. John Damascene, "De Fide Orthodoxa," Book I, Chapter VIII]. Also, in another treatise Damascene went on to say that, ". . . the Holy Spirit of God the Father, as proceeding from Him, who is also said to be of the Son, as through Him [i.e., the Son] manifest and bestowed on the creation, but not as taking His existence from Him" [St. John Damascene, "Sabbat." 4:21-23]; clearly, St. John makes a distinction between the hypostatic origin of the Spirit, which he holds comes only from the Father, and the Spirit's manifestation within the created order, which comes from the Father through the Son.
God bless,
Todd
I see that the number eight should never be used with closing parenthesis. Although, as an Eastern Catholic, I suppose that I should be pleased that a happy face ICON appears in my post.
God bless,
Todd
Robert,
I feel little urgency to reproduce an argument here if I have done a sufficient job somewhere else, especially if it in the form of a theological paper that allows for full elaboration that cannot practically be done in a comment box. Mike and others are much accustomed to referencing their own material often, and I appreciate that as it allows for better understanding than a few lines, and it forces the engager to get *up to speed* before they engage the issue. So, in this case as well, yes my reference does suffice for an argument, because the argument is contained there. I guess if you aren't happy with that you can choose not to engage me.
Photios
Photios,
References serve the same purpose as footnotes in a paper. If I am not mistaken, the others here do not (or should not) use references as a substitute for an argument, but as a further elaboration of it. On the given point, you have offered what purports to be an argument ("and so we conclude") but is not one, as the preceding premises contain no reference to real distinction (nor, for that matter, does your reference to Basil's Letter 38 ). Surely it would cost you no great labor to supply two premises (I only ask for two) from which your conclusion follows. If you are unwilling to do so, then it is not I but you who have chosen not to engage. As for not being "up to speed," I can reassure you that I am already familiar with the distinction between essential and personal properties.
I follow the theological tradition of the Eastern Church.
The theological tradition of the Eastern Church in communion with Rome says that the ex cathedra pronouncements of the Pope are infallible.
Take for example, the doctrine of "original sin," in the Eastern tradition the ancestral sin of Adam introduces death and corruption into the created order, and this return to non-being is reversed by the incarnation and paschal mystery of Christ. Clearly, the Western notion that there is some kind of hereditary guilt passed on from Adam to his descendants plays no part in the doctrinal tradition of the East.
I think it's hard to get around the Fifth Session of Trent on that point: "If any one asserts, that the prevarication of Adam injured himself alone, and not his posterity; and that the holiness and justice, received of God, which he lost, he lost for himself alone, and not for us also; or that he, being defiled by the sin of disobedience, has only transfused death, and pains of the body, into the whole human race, but not sin also, which is the death of the soul; let him be anathema:--whereas he contradicts the apostle who says; By one man sin entered into the world, and by sin death, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned." It may play no part in the Eastern tradition, but it surely must not contradict it, else the Eastern Catholics could not be in communion with Rome.
Also, how do you reconcile the Western philosophical speculation on the origin of the Spirit with the doctrine of St. John Damascene?
I don't think the concepts are doing the same work. Anselm's understanding is relative; note that he only speaks of pairs. St. John is dealing in absolute properties, as St. Basil did. One might say that it's the difference between relative opposition and absolute (dialectic) opposition. The West has more or less opted for the former since Augustine first introduced the concept of "subsistent relations," meaning that we can only speak about the Trinity relatively. That's certainly a creative gloss on Gregory Theologian's idea of "relations," but not an incoherent one, as Aquinas's subsequent work made clear.
By the way, I would also like to make clear that I don't actually believe that the idea of inherited guilt played no part in Eastern theology. IMHO there is plenty of penal atonement in the Eastern Fathers that can't be subsumed under the category of Christus Victor. But I am saying that even if you believed that there is no penal atonement in Eastern theology, Catholicism still requires it.
Jonathan,
Dialectic is dealing with pairs and their mutual opposition to understand their difference. What Anselm is doing their just IS dialectic understood within the principle of non-contradiction. The Cappadocians do not know a step of *twoness* in their understanding of the Trinity.
Photios
Jonathan:
I am constrained to point out that the CCC, and therefore the Magisterium, denies that original sin is personal fault. See §405. Given that interpretation of Trent, it's hard to state how original sin is held by the Catholic Church to be "guilt," at least not in any sense that would be objectionable in terms of the Eastern tradition.
Best,
Mike
Mr. Prejean,
Dr. Carson said, ". . . the Son is evidently 'not from' the Holy Spirit." But my question remains, how is this evident? Scripture clearly teaches that the Spirit "sends" the Son, just as it clearly says that the Son "sends" the Spirit; so, I do not see how it is 'evident' that the Spirit receives His hypostatic origin from the Son.
Now, prescinding from the scriptural texts, I suppose that if a man holds the idea that the hypostaseis of the Trinity are merely "relations of opposition," then he would need to have some kind of "relation of opposition" between the Son and Spirit in order to differentiate them as persons. But if a man instead sees the hypostasis of the Son as distinct from the hypostasis of the Spirit because the Son is generated by the Father alone, while the Spirit is distinct from the Son because He takes His origin from the Father alone by procession, then it follows that he does not need to posit the idea that the Spirit receives His personal existence "from" the Son. In other words, it appears that the filioque is predicated upon the acceptance of the Augustinian notion that the persons of the Trinity are merely distinct as "relations of opposition" within the divine essence, but the filioque becomes unnecessary if that theory of the Trinity is not used.
God bless,
Todd
Mr. Prejean,
Dr. Liccione's comment about the teaching contained in the CCC on "original sin" is helpful, because I do not believe that guilt or sin are inherited by Adam's descendants; instead, I believe that death and corruption are inherited. Sin and guilt are personal realities, not natural ones, and that is why I accept the teaching of the Greek Fathers on Romans 5:12. Thus, in Adam's descendants it is death that is inherited (i.e., the movement toward non-being), and death brings about sin.
God bless,
Todd
Dialectic is dealing with pairs and their mutual opposition to understand their difference. What Anselm is doing their just IS dialectic understood within the principle of non-contradiction.
As I understand it, dialectic in the classical sense is also built on the ontological assumption of opposing powers acting as limits on one another (e.g., hot/cold, being/non-being). For medievals at least (and arguably Augustine himself), God is not subject to analysis in this manner because His power is not the sort that is subject to limits by outside powers. So I find it difficult to accept that Anselm is reasoning dialectically in an area in which he would explicitly say that dialectic analysis is inapplicable.
I think this illustrates the notion that one can speak meaningfully according to the law of non-contradiction even when the ontological conditions of dialectic do not apply by speaking solely in terms of relative opposition and identity (distinguishing places in relations). Moreover, it maintains that you can speak meaningfully about cases without limits even when using the language of limits. In terms of the history of science, that would actually have been a quantum leap in the understanding of mathematical description of physical phenomena, although the implications weren't realized until well out into the future. For my purposes, it calls out the fundamental break in intellectual history between East and West: the idea that you could speak meaningfully about real relations without any sort of comprehensive knowledge about the entities that occupy the places in the relations.
The Cappadocians do not know a step of *twoness* in their understanding of the Trinity.
One interesting aspect of what I just said is that you are confined to speaking relatively, meaning that there is no concept of the entities out-of-relation that can be properly extrapolated from speaking of the entities in-relation. The Semitic (and Celtic) languages use a "construct state" as distinct from the absolute, notably in phrases such as "house of Israel" and "Word of God," to indicate that the relationship between the things is somehow constitutive of what the thing itself is.
http://
www.hebrew4christians.com...t_relation.html
My contention would be that it is unwarranted to reason from speaking in the construct state to the absolute. St. John is speaking of "Spirit of the Son" as if it can be deconstructed (which fits with a dialectical understanding of philosophy), and St. Anselm isn't. His formulation always involves pairings, while St. John is viewing the relations as saying something about the individual properties of the persons (although obviously nothing comprehensible in the absolute sense). This is why I believe that the metaphysical assumptions have them talking about different subjects.
Given that interpretation of Trent, it's hard to state how original sin is held by the Catholic Church to be "guilt," at least not in any sense that would be objectionable in terms of the Eastern tradition.
It appears my clarification wasn't clear. 
In the sense that the West speaks about "original sin" (and I would go even farther and say the sense in which Augustine himself did), it means nothing other than what any Eastern or Western Father says regarding penal atonement (viz., strictly speaking, it isn't true that original sin properly construed plays "no part" in Eastern theology). What I was getting at is that an Eastern Catholic can't simply use the observation that it is "Western" to talk about "original sin" as an excuse for not articulating a parallel explanation of what the West is speaking of when it speaks of "original sin." The Tridentine doctrine clearly requires that "original sin" be considered in terms of not only death and pains of the body but also death of the soul. There is a real sense in which the soul under original sin is born "dead" and must be resurrected, although you've certainly demolished the idea such a soul must be punished. So even an Eastern Catholic wishing to be explicitly consistent must articulate some idea of "death of the soul" consistent with Trent, regardless of whether that idea plays a part in Eastern theology.
italics off.
Scripture clearly teaches that the Spirit "sends" the Son, just as it clearly says that the Son "sends" the Spirit; so, I do not see how it is 'evident' that the Spirit receives His hypostatic origin from the Son.
Offhand, I can't recall any passages regarding the Spirit sending the Son, so it might help to know what you have in mind. Certainly, the Holy Spirit was responsible for overshadowing Mary in the Incarnation, but that obviously wouldn't be the same thing. The passages I can think of are all one-way.
Now, prescinding from the scriptural texts, I suppose that if a man holds the idea that the hypostaseis of the Trinity are merely "relations of opposition," then he would need to have some kind of "relation of opposition" between the Son and Spirit in order to differentiate them as persons.
That's a little backward. The entire idea about "relations of opposition" is that the relations themselves are the way of speaking about the endpoints (places in the relation). They aren't made "in order to differentiate" the persons. Rather, the revelation of the relation allows us to infer the existence of the endpoints. We know from the fact of the relation that something fills the places, even if we don't know what that something is.
But if a man instead sees the hypostasis of the Son as distinct from the hypostasis of the Spirit because the Son is generated by the Father alone, while the Spirit is distinct from the Son because He takes His origin from the Father alone by procession, then it follows that he does not need to posit the idea that the Spirit receives His personal existence "from" the Son.
I think that this is a perfectly adequate explanation that affirms the same conclusion that the West affirms by the filioque (viz., the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit all exist as hypostaseis, and we cannot know anything about what sorts of entities they are apart from their existence). The point is that the West is not asserting to know any MORE about God in its formulation; it is simply a different formulation of the same idea.
In other words, it appears that the filioque is predicated upon the acceptance of the Augustinian notion that the persons of the Trinity are merely distinct as "relations of opposition" within the divine essence, but the filioque becomes unnecessary if that theory of the Trinity is not used.
That is probably also fair, but the pejorative "merely distinct" doesn't appear to grasp the difference in approach between Augustine (at least as later interpreted, although I would argue that he held the same belief) and the East. It isn't some lesser form of the hypostatic distinction; rather, it is a different way of speaking about the hypostatic distinction. And I would argue that it didn't start with Augustine. Marcellus of Ancyra, for example, shows a primitive, inchoate intuition that is similar, and I think it is notable that Athanasi
Marcellus of Ancyra, for example, shows a primitive, inchoate intuition that is similar, and I think it is notable that Athanasius wasn't willing to go along with Basil's polemical accusation that Marcellus "despise[d] the hypostaseis." For that matter, Marius Victorinus had a distinctive take, and he was relatively well received in the West. It doesn't look to me like either Rome or Alexandria was ever as inflexible in terms of the metaphysical/philosophical formulation of the Trinitarian dogma as later generations might have us think.
Photios,
I came across this passage in Aquinas that I think provides the link I was seeking. It appears to correspond to what you were saying above. The quotation is taken from his Contra Errores Graecorum (the addition in square brackets at the end is my own):
"[Peter Lombard] shows in the fifth distinction in the first book of the Sentences, which he wrote, that a common essence neither generates, nor is begotten, nor proceeds. This is true because in the divine [Persons] there is something that is common and indistinct, and something that is distinct and not common [to the three divine Persons]. So that which is distinct in the divine [Persons] cannot be attributed to what is common and indistinct, but solely to what is distinct. But there is no distinction between the divine [Persons] other than the fact that one generates and another is begotten and another proceeds. So to generate or to be begotten or to proceed cannot be attributed to the divine essence, which is common to and wholly indistinct in the three Persons."[and if it cannot be attributed, it must be really distinct, for if it were only logically distinct it could be attributed].
I forgot to add my name, which is not "Anonymous" but
Robert,
That's not the quote I was thinking of and without my notes here at work I'm at a loss to be of any help at the moment. But that is a good quote nonetheless and I would largely agree. Thanks for sharing.
Daniel
"Offhand, I can't recall any passages regarding the Spirit sending the Son, so it might help to know what you have in mind."
Luke 4:18
Mr. Prejean,
As an Eastern Christian I can accept a reciprocal connection between the Son and Spirit in the divine energy, because the Son manifests the Spirit, while the Spirit glorifies the Son. But as far as hypostatic origin of the Son and Spirit is concerned, I hold that the Father alone causes the other two hypostaseis in the Trinity; so, He alone causes the Son by generation, and He alone causes the hypostasis of the Spirit by procession.
God bless, and thanks for the interesting discussion,
Todd
I am glad that we could have a discussion as well.
Speaking of Luke 4:18, "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to preach good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty those who are oppressed," it seems that the Lord is speaking according to His human nature. For parallel concepts, see the Lord's Baptism in the Jordan (Luke 3:22 and parallel passages) and John 17:19 ("And for their sake I consecrate myself, that they also may be consecrated in truth."). St. Cyril is a good expositor on this point.
"Speaking of Luke 4:18, "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to preach good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty those who are oppressed," it seems that the Lord is speaking according to His human nature. For parallel concepts, see the Lord's Baptism in the Jordan (Luke 3:22 and parallel passages) and John 17:19 ("And for their sake I consecrate myself, that they also may be consecrated in truth."). St. Cyril is a good expositor on this point."
That is a good point, but it is still of the economy because what is said is said about a Person. So, Todd's point still goes through because the structure appears to be reverse filioque style regardless if the term "sent" is used or not. The fact that you recognize that this passage is talking about the Person of Christ in regard to his human nature and him being the annointed One I find fascinating. What *I* (and possibly some other that have studied the Mystagogy) would like to know is what your recognition here does to the Augustinian and Frankish argument for the filioque based on an "of" equals "from" assumption with respect to the Spirit in phrases like "Sprit of the Son" and "Spirit of Christ" (which is also modern day justifications as well for the filioque doctrine). So, as a reductio ad absurdum, if we assume the "of" equals "from" argument of the Carolingians, the Spirit proceeds from the Person of Christ with respect to his human nature, because Christ is the annointed one in this passage. For the Spirit to be eternal, so must Christ's human nature. If Christ human nature is created, so is the Spirit. Thus, the filioque has reproduced (not surprisingly) an old friend 'the Origenist Problematic.'
For those who do know, the Origenist Problematic is summed up very nicely by Georges Florovsky: "Either affirm the eternality of the Son and the eternality of the kosmos or to deny the eternity of the Son and the kosmos." Aspects of Church History, p. 46
Photios
Todd,
But if a man instead sees the hypostasis of the Son as distinct from the hypostasis of the Spirit because the Son is generated by the Father alone, while the Spirit is distinct from the Son because He takes His origin from the Father alone by procession, then it follows that he does not need to posit the idea that the Spirit receives His personal existence "from" the Son.
That is an old objection. It assumes that the Son and Spirit are sufficiently distinguished by the fact that they are related to the Father in different ways. The problem with this is that the relations of paternity and active spiration coexist in the same subject, the Father, and therefore are not really distinct. But if two relations are not really distinct then neither are their correlatives. E.g., if A is both teacher of B and father of C, there is no reason why B and C could not be the same person, both the student and the son of A. The same applies, mutis mutandi, to the case of the Trinity. But that would imply that the Son and the Spirit could be the same Person, unless there were some additional property whereby they could be distinguished. In fact there is, and it is supplied by the joint spiration of the Spirit by the Father and the Son as from a single principle, the active power of spiration. After all, the Son has from the Father everything that the Father is and has except for what distinguishes them, including the spiration of the Spirit, which does not distinguish them because it is the common property of both, yet not the common property of the essence because active spiration is not possessed by the Spirit.
As for the selection of the relation of opposition (more specifically the relation of origin) as the distinctive feature for the Persons of the Trinity, this is not arbitrary but is the product of a rigorous examination of the possible alternatives and a process of elimination. This is based on a thorough logical and metaphysical analysis of the nature and modes of distinction, opposition, and relation, including the possible foundations of relation. Does all this also rigorously demonstrate the Trinity? Of course not, for ultimately this can only be a matter of faith. It is merely the best that reason can come up with in explaining the nature of the Trinity in the project of "faith seeking understanding."
That is a good point, but it is still of the economy because what is said is said about a Person. So, Todd's point still goes through because the structure appears to be reverse filioque style regardless if the term "sent" is used or not.
The point is that the passage is speaking according to the human nature, so it simply doesn't say anything about the divine operation, economic or otherwise. One might infer some things about the divine operation according to the parallel passages, even concluding that all divine economic operations are common to all three persons, but the sense in which Christ "was sent" in this context has nothing to do with that. Even granting your premise about the filioque reasoning from economy to theology, "reverse filioque" wouldn't entail reasoning from statements according to the human nature to statements according to the divine nature. The reductio similarly fails because it doesn't follow from affirming something in the divine context that it holds in the human context. The reason "of" equals "from" in the Augustinian reasoning is that the description is purely relational anyway, meaning that it doesn't even particular matter what order you pick. The Spirit is spoken of in relation to the Son and the Father; the Son is spoken of in relation to the Father. Hence, subsistent relations: they are only spoken of in relation to one another. The Mystagogy brings a whole bunch of assumptions to the table about what sort of knowledge is entailed in speaking about entities relationally, most of which the West rejected on the authority of Augustine (and that turned out to have been not an unreasonable thing to so, once scholasticism worked out the kinks).
The Franks were more or less holders of the antiquated homoian creed from the synod of Constantinople in 360 delivered by Ulfila, and I find it a little odd for the West to be simultaneously accused of Eunomianism/Origenism AND homoianism, since the positions were polar opposites regarding the knowability of God. The relative unsophistication of the Frankish view is fairly obvious from the Libri Carolini. Given the military realities of the time, it's unsurprising that the Pope was willing to deal with them, but to say that the Frankish position on this subject had substantial theological influence over Rome is to strain credibility. Romanides's history is palpably weak on this point; the West Romans cheerfully allied themselves with various barbarian groups (frequently playing them against each other in the process) to secure their autonomy, which even Romanides admits. They seem to have been entirely cognizant that the Frankish version of the filioque was different from their own, but that the similarity might be exploited for the sake of manipulating the Franks or the difference exploited to manipulate the Easterners. Photius was pretty well played by Pope John, for example, while the West was conniving for control
Photius was pretty well played by Pope John, for example, while the West was conniving for control of Bulgaria, even though that didn't actually get pulled off until Rome had the Normans as pawns. I see no reason to think that situation ever changed, that Augustine's formulation of the filioque was heterodox, or that the Frankish version thereof ever replaced Augustine's.
All that is ugly history, no question. It would be nice to live in the sort of world where Christians didn't do this to each other, where West Romans and East Romans formed one big happy family against the nasty barbarians, but, to quote Jules in Pulp Fiction, "that s&!t ain't the truth." The truth is that Rome had cut Byzantium loose way before any of this had ever happened; the signs were there all the way back to Justinian in the resentment many Westerners had toward his high-handedness. Pretending there was some sort of mutual regard and understanding, that West Romans and East Romans were "one country" in any meaningful sense, would just be a happy fantasy. Chalcedon was the last time that there was any *real* unity between East and West, although there was clearly some common theological turf still around in the Sixth and Seventh Ecumenical Councils. But I'm not going to engage in some kind of massive revisionism about this monolithic patristic theology covering all sorts of authors East and West through the first eight centuries of Christendom. There is no "thin line between Nicaea and Chalcedon;" it was a massive web of interconnections, not all of which even crossed one another.
Jonathan,
St. Photios agrees that the passage of Christ being the anointed one is speaking about Christ (divine person) with respect to his human nature, which is exactly why he says you can't use or assume the "of" equals "from" argument without falling into Origenism in this case. Smart guy that Photios. And yes, this IS a divine operation, because Christ is being anointed by another Divine Person (the Holy Spirit). Is this an act of will or an origination of the Logos? Act of will? Yes an act of will. Is the will proper to all Persons of the Trinity? Yes it is proper to all Persons. Hence, Rahner's rule that the Economic exhausts or is the same as the theological Trinity is fallacious on its head. The “of” equals “from” argument again fails, since the order here is the EXACT opposite in this context of what is assumed by the Carolingians. The Economic Trinity reveals the Theological Trinity and scripture says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from THE FATHER. My FILIOQUE and Pope St. Martin I's FILIOQUE, understood by St. Maximus the Confessor, is not the same FILIOQUE of the Franks, Augustinism, or Florence. And you are incorrect that Rome had broken itself from the Roman-Byzantine oikonomia prior to 9th Century (Nicholas I). That does not make sense of the stance of Pope Leo III's (a real bishop of Rome) speech to the Frankish envoy or his crowning Charlemagne emperor of the IMPERIUM ROMANUM. Yet we are told that this is what Charlemagne wanted, and he was extremely displeased even angry at Pope Leo III for such a move (since he wanted to obtain such a goal through marriage to the Empress Irene). The joke was on Charlegmagne as Pope Leo III knew the Romans in the East would never recognize a foreign ruler. Hence, Leo III played the spoil to Charlemagne’s crafty plan making an idiot out of him.
“The Franks were more or less holders of the antiquated homoian creed from the synod of Constantinople in 360 delivered by Ulfila, and I find it a little odd for the West to be simultaneously accused of Eunomianism/Origenism AND homoianism, since the positions were polar opposites regarding the knowability of God.”
Not really since it is all dialectical to begin with. The filioque reproduces Polytheism and Sebellianism depending on which route one goes to develop (Uncaused-Cause and Caused-Cause vs. Father-Son as a single principle) which are polar opposites. And the Franks were not “more or less” holders of the homoian creed. There is nothing different about Alcuin and Paulinus’ conception then Augustine’s or Anselm’s.
Photios
Robert,
Thank you for responding to my post. Interestingly enough your post highlights the different Triadological views of East and West, because as an Eastern Catholic I do not use the Augustinian or Scholastic model of "relations of opposition" in distinguishing the three divine hypostaseis of the Holy Trinity. Instead, I hold that the hypostaseis are distinct by their different modes of origin, which then gives rise to their mutual relations. In other words, the hypostaseis are not mere "relations of opposition" within the divine essence, nor are they merely distinct in our way of thinking about them (cf. Summa, Prima Pars, Q. 39, A. 1); rather, they are real and eternal subsistences, i.e., the Father is Cause, the Son is begotten, and the Spirit is processed. In other words, the Scholastic framework, which sees the hypostaseis as four relations of opposition, Paternity, Filiation, and active and passive Spiration, has quite simply never been a part of the Triadological doctrine of the East; and as a consequence, I -- as an Eastern Catholic -- hold that the Father alone is the cause of the hypostasis of the Son by generation, and that He alone is the cause of the hypostasis of the Spirit by procession. Nevertheless, there is a reciprocal -- but not oppositional -- connection between the Son and Spirit in the divine energy; and so, the energetic manifestation of the Spirit through the Son, and the energetic glorification of the Son by the Spirit, reveals their consubstantial communion within the Tri-hypostatic Godhead, but without making either of them a hypostatic "cause" within the immanent life of the Trinity.
Blessings to you,
Todd
St. Photios agrees that the passage of Christ being the anointed one is speaking about Christ (divine person) with respect to his human nature, which is exactly why he says you can't use or assume the "of" equals "from" argument without falling into Origenism in this case. Smart guy that Photios.
Too smart for his own good, I think. Origenism only follows if "from" in any sense is equated to "of" in any sense. Origen may have done that, but if he did, it was because of an unwarranted equation of the sorts of causality, effectively equivocating between causation in the divine context (known only analogously and improperly) and causation in the mundane context (known properly), just like Eunomius. What distinguishes his view from the Western view is the context in which the West draws a distinction between the two modes of action, identifying when the "of" = "from" can be correctly applied. You can certainly resolve the problem without distinguishing the two, as St. Maximus did, but it's equally legitimate simply to say that, as far as causation goes, "between creator and creature there can be noted no similarity so great that a greater dissimilarity cannot be seen between them" (Fourth Lateran) and "there can be no ratio, no means of comparison, no middle term, between the finite and the infinite" (Nicholas of Cusa, De Docta Ignorantia). Origen and Eunomius both believed in a finite, graspable divine essence, while the Homoians incoherently asserted the unknowability of God as itself being a property of the divine essence (effectively asserting a sheer antinomy, exactly what the Western theology distinguishing the visibility of God by modes of action rather than intrinsic properties was geared to reject). Photius's "of" = "from" argument would therefore be inapposite; it doesn't account for the context in which it is being made nor the distinction being made that Origen did not make.
And yes, this IS a divine operation, because Christ is being anointed by another Divine Person (the Holy Spirit).
My point was that He is being anointed by all three Persons of the Trinity, including Himself, which is exactly why this passage doesn't say anything exclusive or unique about the eternal relations between the Son and the Spirit. It is a temporal operation according to Christ's humanity, not an eternal relation according to His divinity. The one Person relates to other Persons in different modes.
Hence, Rahner's rule that the Economic exhausts or is the same as the theological Trinity is fallacious on its head.
I don't even think Rahner was so auadacious as to claim that the economic Trinity exhausts the immanent Trinity, but I would say the argument was fallacious for the same reason you did; it fails to distinguish contingent activity (acts of will) from acts of nature.
My FILIOQUE and Pope St. Martin I's FILIOQUE, understood by St. Maximus the Conf
My FILIOQUE and Pope St. Martin I's FILIOQUE, understood by St. Maximus the Confessor, is not the same FILIOQUE of the Franks, Augustinism, or Florence.
Even St. Maximus admitted that he was speculating as to what Pope St. Martin and the rest of the West meant by the filioque, and based on my research, what St. Maximus thought the Westerners meant wasn't actually what the Westerners meant. It certainly doesn't match St. Leo, who followed St. Augustine directly on the subject even in his Tomus, and it doesn't appear to match St. Ambrose or St. Hilary either as far as I can tell. Nothing wrong with that; Maximus grew up Byzantine, and even in his time in the West, there's little evidence that he became all that familiar with the Latin way of thinking.
More on Franks to follow...
Todd,
Instead, I hold that the hypostaseis are distinct by their different modes of origin, which then gives rise to their mutual relations.
"Instead" implies an alternative view. But Aquinas agrees that they are distinct according to their mode of origin; after all, he insists that the relations are relations of origin. But what accounts for the difference of origin? Aquinas answers, "This very difference of origin is due to the Son being from the Father alone, whereas the Holy Spirit if from the Father and the Son" (De Potentia, 10, 5, ad 1). He cites Richard of St. Victor on this point: "Observe that this difference of properties consists merely in the number of persons producing, in that the first has being from no other, the second from one only, the third from two" (De Trin., V, 20). Thus, if both the Son and the Spirit are from one only, they are distinguished according to their mode of origin. But you have just stated that mode of origin is the basis of distinction. Therefore it would follow that they are not distinguished at all, but are the same person. Nor can you fall back on the mode of procession, for as I showed earlier that leads to the same untenable conclusion (I note in passing that you did not even attempt to refute that argument).
In other words, the hypostaseis (sic) are not mere "relations of opposition" within the divine essence, nor are they merely distinct in our way of thinking about them (cf. Summa, Prima Pars, Q. 39, A. 1):rather, they are real and eternal subsistences....
Here you misread the clear assertion of Aquinas: "But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons." This is the direct opposite of what you represent him as saying. And once more, the "rather" is inapposite, for Aquinas also holds that the hypostases or persons are real subsisting and eternal relations, subsisting in the same essence and therefore one God and not three.
Next you refer to "the Scholastic framework, which sees the hypostaseis (sic) as four relations of opposition...." The Scholastics do not see the hypostases as four relations, but three; otherwise there would be four persons. In the Scholastic view, active spiration is not a property constitutive of a person, since it is not a unique property but one held in common by the Father and the Son. With regard to the reciprocal relation held to exist between Son and Spirit, you yourself grant that is not oppositional, but if it is not oppositional then it cannot ground the distinction, which is the point at issue.
Indeed, the whole basis of your position seems to be the rejection of relational opposition as the ground of distinction. The real question here is not theological but philosophical.
The basis of distinction must be either absolute or relative. Not absolute, for then it would apply to the essence and not to the persons taken individually, for essential properties are common to all three persons, and things cannot be distinguished by that which is attributed to them in common, for by that they are identical and not distinct. Therefore it is relative.
Now, distinction is the opposite of identity and is either material or formal. Material distinction is according to quantity, but since God does not exist in matter nor is there any corporeal quantity in him, there can be no material distinction in God. Therefore it must be formal. All formal distinction is only by opposition. E.g., the distinction of numbers between even and odd is that the former is divisible by two and the latter is not, in this case the opposition of contradictories. In general, opposites are those which cannot exist simultaneously in the same subject. Thus the same number cannot be both even and odd. Now, there are only four kinds of opposition: contradictory (affirmation and negation, A and not A), privative (possession and privation, e.g. having sight vs. blind), contrary (e.g. white and black), and correlative (e.g. . Contradictory opposition does not distinguish of itself but is a consequence of a distinction already made: A is not B because they are distinct by one of the remaining kinds of opposition. But neither private nor contrary opposition will do in the case of God, for both include imperfection in one of the relata, and each of the persons is perfect. Therefore we are left with correlatives (opposite relations), such as father and son. The possible foundations of relations are quantity, action and passion (passivity). Corporeal quantity we have already rule out. The other relations based on quantity are all equivalence relations and therefore are the opposite of distinction. Passion or passivity implies potentiality but since God is Pure Act there is no passivity in God, except in the quasi-passive sense of reception, which of itself does not imply potency. We thus arrive at quasi-acts such as the immanent acts of generation (giving rise to the relations of Father and Son) and active spiration (also called by the generic name of procession, and giving rise to the relations of Father and Spirit). More generally, these are relations of origin only, such that one is a principle or source and another is from that principle. Thus only these will serve to distinguish the persons. On this basis, three things can only be distinguished only according to following scheme: one either is or is not from another. That which is from another either has another which proceeds from it or not. Thus we arrive at one which is not from another (the Father), one which is both from another and which has another from it (the Son), and one which is from two others and which has no other from it (the Spirit). The last must be from two because if it were only from
The last must be from two because if it were only from one it would not be distinguished from the second, for each would be from another without another from it, and they would have that in common. You will immediately recognize this as the scheme of Richard of St. Victor in the earlier post. You will note that this is perfectly general and does not in itself entail the psychological model, though that is a convenient analogy for it.
Finally, if we examine your post, we do not find a single argument there for your position. Every sentence is a mere assertion ("I do not use...," "I hold...," "I -- as an Eastern Catholic hold -- ," etc.) You can assume that we know what you hold and what you reject. What is pertinent here has to do with why you hold or reject it. My argumentation above is based on reason, but only to show that the Filioque is reasonable in the sense that it fits the Trinitarian faith which I assume we do hold in common: that the three Persons are really one God, that they are really distinct from each other, and that the Son and the Spirit are from the Father. The Filioque is simply an inference from these. I accept it, however, not on the basis of the reasoning, but on authority. Unfortunately, we are not agreed on that.
"Thus, if both the Son and the Spirit are from one only, they are distinguished according to their mode of origin."
That should have read, "they are not distinguished...."
Robert,
In Eastern theology person and essence are really distinct, but without being separate; so, yes, I reject the idea that "relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking." In Eastern theology essence, energy, and hypostasis are really distinct (see St. Gregory Palamas, "Capita Physica," no. 75).
And finally, as far as the four real relations are concerned (cf. Summa, Prima Pars, Q. 28, A 4), I do not subscribe to the philosophical Trinity of Aquinas and the Scholastics; and so, I do not need the 'filioque' in order to distinguish the Spirit from the Son. The Spirit is distinguished from the Son by His procession of origin from the Father, while the Son is distinct from the Spirit by His generation from the Father. As St. John Damascene said, "the Son is derived from the Father after the manner of generation, and the Holy Spirit likewise is derived from the Father, yet not after the manner of generation, but after that of procession. And we have learned that there is a difference between generation and procession, but the nature of that difference we in no wise understand. Further, the generation of the Son from the Father and the procession of the Holy Spirit are simultaneous." (St. John Damascene, "De Fide Orthodoxa," Book I, Chapter VIII).
God bless,
Todd
"'Thus, if both the Son and the Spirit are from one only, they are distinguished according to their mode of origin.'
That should have read, 'they are not distinguished....'"
Robert,
This would be a problem if I subscribed to the Scholastic system, but I don't. In fact, I think that the Scholastics have gotten the revealed doctrine of the Trinity wrong.
God bless,
Todd
Robert,
As far as "of" and "from" are concerned in reference to the Son and Spirit, I agree with St. John Damascene who said that ". . . we do not speak of the Son as Cause or Father, but we speak of Him both as from the Father, and as the Son of the Father. And we speak likewise of the Holy Spirit as from the Father, and call Him the Spirit of the Father. And we do not speak of the Spirit as from the Son, but yet we call Him the Spirit of the Son." ("De Fide Orthodoxa," Book I, Chapter VIII)
God bless,
Todd
Todd,
I have some other affairs to attend to but will give my response tomorrow night or Sunday, if Mike will be so kind as to hold this thread open for another day or so.
Robert said: "In the Scholastic view, active spiration is not a property constitutive of a person, since it is not a unique property but one held in common by the Father and the Son."
Just for the sake of clarity, in Eastern Triadology any property common to two hypostaseis of the Trinity, is common to all three hypostaseis.
God bless,
Todd
Todd,
In Eastern theology essence, energy, and hypostasis are really distinct, but without being separate.
I am already familiar with the Palamite so-called real distinction between essence and energy, which has insurmountable problems of its own, but since that is not relevant here to the Trinitarian dispute I will not pursue it. But this is the first I have heard of a real distinction between essence and hypostasis. Please provide a few quotations (not references) from the Greek Fathers, prior to the 14th century Palamite "development," which state this distinction. I have seen passages in which they speak of a distinction, as does Aquinas {for whom it is virtual), but not of a real distinction. However, this is a question of fact about which I could well be mistaken. Even if it is true, it is not without rather obvious difficulties. If essence and hypostasis are not separate, they must be in some sense one. One way in which things can be really distinct from each other "without being separate" is if they are modes or principles of the same thing, e.g. as matter and form, substance and accident, or essence and existence. But all of these are related as potentiality to act, and God is Pure Act, else he is not perfect. If the three hypostases are really distinct from the essence of God, moreover, in what sense can they be God, and in what way can they really be one, if not one in essence, for in themselves they are really distinct from each other? You have described them as "real and eternal subsistences." In what do they subsist, if not in the essence? If they subsist in the essence they cannot be really distinct from it. On the other hand, if they subsist in themselves, they will each have their own act of existence and thus will be three beings, and if so they will be three Gods. The creed tells us that Father and Son are "of one substance," which is to say essence or nature, since these are really the same and differ only logically in reference to God. Cf. John Damascene: "The Word of God, in so far as He subsists in Himself, is distinct from Him from whom He has His subsistence [the Father]. But, since He exhibits in Himself those same things which are discerned in God, then in His nature He is identical with God" (On the Orthodox Faith, I, 6).
...any property common to two hypostaseis of the Trinity, is common to all three hypostaseis."
The property of being "from another" is common to both the Son and the Spirit, therefore it is common to all three, and therefore the Father is from another? Apparently you are unfamiliar with the concept of a relative property.
The Spirit is distinguished from the Son by His procession of origin from the Father, while the Son is distinct from the Spirit by His generation from the Father.
I have already refuted this as the ultimate ground of the distinction in my earlier post. The quotation from John Damascene merely states the fact of the distinction, on which all are agreed, without addressing its ground. In fact, John explicitly prescinds from stating it: "[T]he nature of that difference we in no wise understand."
More generally, once again we have no argument from you, but only "I reject," "I do not subscribe," "I do not use," "I hold," etc. I repeat what I said earlier, "What is pertinent here has to do with why you hold, reject, etc....." Suppose I were to say that "Western theology" does not "subscribe" to the Palamite hesychiast system. Would that sort of global rejection persuade you? It cannot because it is a mere statement of fact, not an argument. Let us take but a final example of this mode of discussion:
This would be a problem if I subscribed to the Scholastic system, but I don't.
It is a common misconception among those unfamiliar with medieval history that there is some common "Scholastic system" when in fact there are many such systems, as any knowledgeable student of the Middle Ages is well aware. What they do share in commom is not a system but a method, one which incorporates precise definition of terms and a dialectical process of investigation, issuing finally in a demonstrated resolution of the question.
That method is already found in ancient Greek philosophy. It is the method of what has been termed "the perennial philosophy," and all philosophers practice it in one form or another. They do so because it is a product of human reason, and rooted in the very nature of man, which like truth does not change when one crosses the geographical boundary between "East" and "West," wherever that is. In rejecting the "Scholastic system," therefore, in reality you are rejecting your own nature, whether you are aware of it or not. Is there an "Eastern" version of the principle of contradiction that contradicts (one already sees the absurdity) the "Western" one? I do not deny that there are cultural differences, but I "do not hold" that they are absolute, and accordingly I "reject" the stance of cultural relativism and the artificial erection of barriers to Catholic unity that it entails. I "do not subscribe" to National Geographic.
More on Franks to follow...
On reflection, I didn't think I could do the issue justice on a combox, so I put it on my blog:
http://crimsoncatholic.blogspot....ories-
part.html
Wow, I'm like 3 years late to this dicussion!
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