But, professor, what are to think about the change in hermeneutics, the change from the partim-partim theory to Newman's development theory. Upon what basis does the Papacy change the way that it interprets the deposit of Faith?
When I was little, I used to do addition by putting lines down the numbers so it can make a row. Now, I don't do that. Now, I may just use a calculator. Or something else. The way I did addition, looking back, look silly. Yet, I learned it that way. Same with the Church. When you were little, didn't you look at reality differently, even wrongly (i.e. where babies came from, etc) but when you grew in maturity through them in some way? Same with the Church.
Plus, I don't the "change in hermeneutics" is such a big deal.
kepha, to answer your question, here are some passages from Origen
"There is a certain gate which remains shut and through which no one enters (Ez. 44:1-2). For there are certain things which are hidden from the created world and known only to one; for the Son has not opened all he knows to the world." (Homily on Ezekiel 14, 2)
"When I consider the difficulties of investigating the meaning...of the words of scripture, something similar seems to be happening to me as happens to a hunter who goes out after his prey with the help of a dog's keen sense of smell. It sometimes happens that the hunter, intently following the trail, thinks he is close to the hidden lair, but suddenly lose track of the trail. He goes back and makes the dog sniff more carefully over the same tracks until he finds the place where the prey made a sharp turn onto another hidden trail which, where he has found it, he pursues more eagerly, more certain in his hope of gaining his prey and made more sure by the strength of the track. That is what hapens to us when the traces of the explanation we have began somehow disappear; we go back a bit and hope that the Lord our God will grant us our prey." (Com. on Song of Song 3)
The idea of development was joyfully embraced by Vatican II, in the spirit of the Fathers. The real "hermeneutics of discontinuity" is that of those who want to step back from the fuller vision of Vatican II to the status quo ante.
kepha:
Partim-partim and Newman's story about development are, both of them, incomplete and provisional theories about just how the deposit of faith gets handed down, elaborated, and understood. With the contemporary Church, I believe the latter to be more comprehensive and illuminating than the former. But this is a more a matter of the mechanism of interpretation than of content of what is interpreted. Therefore it is not a matter belonging to the deposit of faith. Given as much, a change in theory on this matter does not affect the Catholic Church's claim to teach the deposit of faith authoritatively and, indeed, infallibly.
All the same, Vatican II improved on Trent's simple distinction between the written Word of God (Sc'ripture) and oral Tradition. Dei Verbum says that Scripture and Tradition "form one sacred deposit of the word of God, committed to the Church," and points out that said sources, "flowing from the same divine wellspring, in a certain way merge into a unity and tend toward the same end." That is not as developed a teaching as I'd like to see; I prefer saying that Scripture is the earliest and most authoritative written record of Tradition, because I think that best accords with how the scriptural canon, especially that of the NT, actually formed. But this remains a matter of opinion which does not affect the Magisterium's claim to authority in teaching the content of the faith-once-delivered.
Best,
Mike
Fr. O'Leary:
The real "hermeneutics of discontinuity" is that of those who want to step back from the fuller vision of Vatican II to the status quo ante.
I agree that many trads do that. Yet, from where I stand on the spectrum, I see progs peddling their own hermeneutic of discontinuity. They want "development" to include negation of certain doctrines long taught infallibly by the ordinary and universal magisterium. That would be inauthentic development, and rests on its own hermeneutic of discontinuity.
Look more closely in the mirror.
Best,
Mike
Absolutely no question about it. Liberal Catholics are far more often guilty of employing a "hermeneutic of discontinuity" than Traditionalists are. Even the SSPX are more in line with sacred tradition than most liberal Catholics.
Exactly what is "sacred tradition" and who determines it?
The sacred tradition which is determined by a human 'who' or explained exactly is not the true sacred tradition, grasshopper.
philli,
here's my notes on it last year
http://apolonio.blogspot.com/200...nedited-
in.html
Apolonio,
In keeping with your analogy, the Apostles saw the Faith immaturely, but we maturely? The Apostle Peter wrote, "we have the prophetic word made more sure, to which you do well to pay attention as a lampshining in a dark place, until the day dawns and the morning star arises in your hearts." (2 Pt 1:19)
Professor,
It seems to me that the existence of two theories about what Tradition is, the Two-Source Theory and the venerable cardinal's, indicate a trial-by-error understanding of what Tradition extactly is. How can we have one understanding of what the reality of what 2 Thess 2: 15 is, and then decide that that understanding was wrong or insufficient? This is important to me, because we're not talking about a biblical interpretation here, but rather an understanding of what the Apostles verbally handed on. To repeat, but by way of example, how can we have at one time believed that the Apostles verbally handed down the Immaculate Conception, but then decide that this is wrong?
On another note, is it wrong for me to think that the Apostles and early Christians needed to have held to the distinction between material and formal sufficiency in order for it be valid?
kepha,
it's not about immaturity or maturity. it's that even the apostles did not exhaust the mystery of Christ. Even the apostles did not understand everything they said (i.e. Paul speaking about Christ and the Church). I don't understand why it's wrong to say we understand the mystery of faith more than they did. We're talking about the same Spirit here. The same Spirit who guided the Apostles guided Vatican 2 and guides the whole Church.
And yes, as the Petrine epistle says, we do have the prophetic word and it's good that the Church be attentive to it. She has been, because of the Spirit, and that's why she understands her Groom better.
Apolonio,
Saying that the Apostles didn't "exhaust the mystery of Christ" and that later generations of Christians grow in their understanding of Christ is one thing, but to say that the Apostle didn't exhaust, say, the mystery of Mary and that later generations of Christians grew to understand that she was immaculately conceived, is enturely different. The former seems to be a case formal development; the latter, material development.
As for the Apostles, they were unique not only their historical position, but in their knowledge. Hence, the Apostles's admonition that we would do well to heed their, that is, the Apostles', knowledge, experience, example and teaching.
Kepha,
Newman affirms that we can never know more than the apostles knew. But there are some questions that the Church cannot answer until they are asked. When a new question is asked, an opportunity for development is at hand. As new philosophies, languages and cultures develop, Christian doctrine comes to meet it with the apostolic teaching.
thebyronicman,
When the time came for someone to ask about Mary's conception, shouldn't the leadership have said something like, "We don't know, because the Apostles never taught anything about it. However, you are free to hold private opinions"? Not saying this seems to have resulted in material development.
kepha,
The mystery of Mary is the rooted in the mystery of Christ. And since revelation is Christ, a Person, an event, and not some kind of list of propositions, and Christ is not separated from creation, then when the apostles received the deposit of faith, they received Christ and everything that is subjected to him.
The Apostles are unique only in that they handed on what they have witnessed. You rely too much on the knowledge of the Apostles, which is important of course. But, again, what is more important is *Who* sent them, *Who* guided them.
Plus, I do not know a good argument against the notion that the Church understands more than what she has known in the past. The apostles are important in that they *verify* my experience of the Risen Christ. And by that, I mean it in the concrete sense: the bishops being the link of reference to the experience of the apostles.
kepha:
How, exactly, do you not know that what has been taught about Mary by The Church isn't, in fact, what the Apostles themselves taught?
Indeed, it is due to Tradition passed down from generation to generation that such came into being in the first place!
In this instance, what had been accepted so naturally in the past as part and parcel of the Faith had to become formally declared due to it having become ultimately challanged in an age that has suffered a certain amnesia of what had come before it!
"When the time came for someone to ask about Mary's conception, shouldn't the leadership have said something like, "We don't know, because the Apostles never taught anything about it. However, you are free to hold private opinions"? Not saying this seems to have resulted in material development."
But I think your question is framed improperly. The thing to ask is this: how did the question of Mary's conception arise in the Church? How did the Church come to focus it's attention on Christ's mother in such a way that her conception was even an important object of consideration at all? To look at any dogma of the Church as the answer to a question is to be immediately drawn into the history of the question. To begin, we see that the Church's marian teachings arise from her christology, which resulted in the first marian dogma, which is a christological dogma. I'll leave you to search that out for yourself. Suffice to say that the answer "we don't know" would have been entirely false. The Church discovered that it did know.
"The sacred tradition which is determined by a human 'who' or explained exactly is not the true sacred tradition, grasshopper."
Kinda like a meteorite that fell from the sky then.
That's very helpful.
kepha:
I want to get the matter of specific dogmas out of the way first. Then I shall talk about different "theories" of Tradition.
It took the Church several centuries after the Apostles to say that the Son is homoousios with the Father. Among the Apostles, the author of the Gospel of John and perhaps St. Paul too might have understood what Athanasius and Hosius meant by that. But I very much doubt that any of them had had just that thought. Rather, the Nicene formula is an authentic, formal development of that deposit of faith which the Apostles believed and taught. But it was only formulated as an answer to the challenge of Arius. Until that challenge was issued, the Church had simply not thought the matter through.
The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception (DIC), which is the favorite target of anti-DD Protestants even as the filioque is the favorite target of anti-DD Orthodox. The question whether Mary was conceived free of original sin or not could not even have been raised until Augustine had refined the concept of, and formulated the term, 'original sin'. Once the question could be raised, it was; and the consensus fidelium of the Catholic Church answered the question in the affirmative, based on devotional, mystical, and theological developments which were already very much in evidence by the fifth century. Thus DIC is another authentic development drawn from the deposit of faith given once-for-all to the Apostles.
I still think you're not quite getting the material-formal distinction as it applies in a context such as this. To say that what the Catholic Church professes today is materially equivalent to what the Apostles believed and taught does not necessarily imply that every dogma the Church has defined down through the centuries was explicitly believed or taught by the Apostles. What it implies is that they believed more than they knew and knew more than they could say. The same holds for any and all true believers. The formal development of what the Apostles into explicit dogmas does not, therefore, contradict or add to what they believed and taught. It merely brings it to fuller consciousness and expression.
(continued below)
2. You write: It seems to me that the existence of two theories about what Tradition is, the Two-Source Theory and the venerable cardinal's, indicate a trial-by-error understanding of what Tradition exactly is. How can we have one understanding of what the reality of what 2 Thess 2: 15 is, and then decide that that understanding was wrong or insufficient?
... is it wrong for me to think that the Apostles and early Christians needed to have held to the distinction between material and formal sufficiency in order for it be valid?
The first thing that occurs to me on reading that is that you're being anachronistic. The question how Scripture and oral Tradition are interrelated in the handing on of the deposit of faith could not have been raised until the Church had reached clear agreement on what was inspired Scripture and what was not, which did not take place until a couple of generations after the Apostles had gone to their reward. When the Church did reach such agreement, it was because she had affirmed certain "Christian" writings as expressing authentic apostolic teaching and therefore as faithful to the Tradition which the bishops had received from the Apostles. Thus the question how Scripture and Tradition are interrelated received a partial answer which remains very much the belief of the Church today.
Of course one can then raise further questions, such as in what sense and to what extent Scripture "contains" what is handed on by the larger and earlier Tradition. The Church's answer has been, and remains, that Scripture is a materially sufficient expression of the deposit of faith. I take that to mean the whole divine revelation is recorded in it. But it does not follow that Scripture is formally sufficient for transmitting and understanding the deposit of faith, to the extent it can be understood. In the ordinary course, one cannot reliably understand Scripture without being immersed in the Tradition, and guided by the Magisterium, of the Church. That does not contradict 2 Thess 2:15; it presupposes it.
Of course one can then go on to raise the further question to what extent Scripture and Tradition differ as sources, assuming they contain and express the same deposit of faith. The simple and obvious answer is that Scripture is, by definition, written while Tradition is wider than what is written. Part of the difficulty you seem to be having is that the term 'Tradition' can be used in more than one way. When we say "Scripture," we can know what we mean by pointing to a book. When we say "Tradition," we can mean any number of things, including books. Trent used 'Tradition' to mean what was orally transmitted as distinct from Scripture. That's quite a narrow use of the term, even though what Trent said was true as far as it goes. Newman did not contradict Trent; he merely went beyond it.
Best,
Mike
Thanks, Dr. Liccione, for this discussion. In a comment to Kepha you wrote that J.B. Mozley failed "to observe the distinction between the material content and the formal elaboration of the deposit of faith." I believe this is mistaken. Mozley, who was one of the brightest lights of 19th century Anglicanism as well as a close relation by marriage to Newman, does in fact appear to draw the distinction. This was noted previously at Conscious Faith (in the fourth comment to The Other Pope). If you have a chance, could you please clarify how your view stands relative to Mozley's? God bless.
Mozley, who was one of the brightest lights of 19th century Anglicanism as well as a close relation by marriage to Newman, does in fact appear to draw the distinction.
The problem is that Mozley's view of early dogmatic developments as "purely formal" is clearly wrong, although he likely did not know it. Newman was the greatest patristic scholar of his generation, and even he oversimplified the process, Mozley far more so. It simply isn't true that Nicaea, and far less the transition from Nicaea to Constantinople, was a "purely formal" restatement in Mozley's sense.
In particular, after reading and re-reading Lewis Ayres' Nicaea and Its Legacy, I am firmly convinced that this is the best English-language study on the process of dogmatic development through Nicaea, and it thoroughly contradicts the position that both Mozley and kepha take, at least with respect to the dogmatic development of "pro-Nicene" theology. It surpasses both Michel Barnes's The Power of God and Vaggione's Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Nicene Revolution, and at least from my perspective, that is really saying something. And as an interesting aside, Ayres also takes on Fr. O'Leary's position regarding dogmatic development, quite successfully IMHO (and evidently in the opinion of those responsible for Ayres' hiring over Fr. O'Leary for a chair in Catholic theology!).
Completely off topic, my sister got married on Saturday, and I have a little note on my blog if anyone would be inclined to offer prayers for a prosperous union.
Congratz, Jonathan Prejean!
Prayers definitely said for a prosperous union!
Professor,
So would you say that, like in post-apostolic centuries, there were various understandings of Jesus at time of the Apostles, at least some of which are captured in the New Testament?
Robert Kysar, for instance, writes that, "It could be agrued that there are three fundamental concepts of Christ in the New Testament. We will label them 'adoptionistic,' 'agency,' and 'incarnational.'
"The adoptionistic suggests that Jesus was a man who because of his obedience to God was adopted as God's Messiah. . .
"Agency Christology is more common in the New Testament. In some form it declares that God took the initiative to send a personal agent to perform a revelatory and saving function. . .
"The boldest of the claims for Christ is embodied in incarnational Christology. In this way of conceiving of Christ, some form of his prior existence is asserted." (John, The Maverick Gospel, Revised Edition, pp. 33-34)
Kepha, Is the "adoptionism" Dr. Kysar proposes consistent with the orthodox reading of Phil. 2, so that the different "fundamental concepts of Christ" are all complementary rather than pitted against each other?
Mr. Prejean, Thanks for your response. It is not obvious to me that Mozley was wrong. His view of development looks very similar to that of Fr. Behr, who surely is acquainted with modern scholarship on Nicaea. Anyway, I don't believe I know you, but congratulations to your sister and her husband.
Kepha:
Each "understanding" can indeed be found in the New Testament. But I would say that, as a result of DD, the incarnational one eventually subsumed what was true in the other two and thus went beyond them.
Best,
Mike
Each "understanding" can indeed be found in the New Testament.
Even heretical ones at that!
I don't believe that absent the existence of The Church (i.e., its council of bishops in concert with the Pope), such doctrines could ever be formed; instead, you would find the chaos of differing (heretical) opinions, rather than doctrine.
It's amazing that folks continue to insist that The Church is but an unnecessary man-made invention when, clearly, not only did Christ institute this (vs. writing a 'book') because it would be the New Jerusalem, but knew how it would prove a necessity unto the future. Thus:
Mt 18:17: And if he will not hear them: tell the church. And if he will not hear the church, let him be to thee as the heathen and publican.
Ioannes:
Mozley certainly drew the distinction, but he did not understand it as Newman did, and thus did not observe it in the sense I do.
The material-formal distinction de dicto is as follows. To say that two propositions, call them P and Q, are materially equivalent is to say that their truth-values are the same. To say that P and Q are formally equivalent is to say that they consist of the same forms of words, even if one is written and the other merely oral (their 'type' is the same even if their 'tokens' are not). Thus, P and Q can be materially equivalent without having the same meaning, whereas P and Q must have the same meaning if they are formally equivalent. So much for mere logic; applying the distinction to the deposit of faith (the "material" part) and its verbal expression by the Church (the "formal" part) is a bit more complex.
When we say that the Church's body of irreformable teaching is materially equivalent to the DF given once-for-all to the Apostles, we cannot mean merely that each is true just in case the other is. (That would be trivial; after all, unicorns roam the forests just in case the moon is made of green cheese, but who cares?) We must also mean that each is about the same realities as the other—which need not be the case for mere logical material equivalence between propositions. With that understood, however, it is not hard to go on to say that the doctrines the Church has authentically developed over the centuries are materially equivalent to what the Apostles believed and taught but not formally equivalent.
Mozely fails to apply this distinction with full understanding. He thinks of the difference between the DF and later, developed doctrines as "merely" formal, which means that the developed teachings differ only in forms of words from the what the Apostles taught. I have never been able to believe that; I see Newman as holding something more realistic. He held that, while the objective content of the DF given once-for-all has not been diluted or augmented one whit by later DD, the meaning of what they actually said in teaching it and handing it on has definitely been augmented by DD. That is possible because they were not fully conscious of the depth and ramifications of they rightly believed and taught. So it's not that the object of our knowledge is any greater than that of the Apostles' knowledge; after all, they experienced directly what we only have heard about from them and their successors. Rather, our awareness of what is implicit in what they received has grown greater as the necessary questions and challenges are confronted down through the ages. Newman got that; Mozely didn't.
BTW, last month I did a post on Fr. Behr's take on DD.
Best,
Mike
"Ayres also takes on Fr. O'Leary's position regarding dogmatic development, quite successfully IMHO (and evidently in the opinion of those responsible for Ayres' hiring over Fr. O'Leary for a chair in Catholic theology!"
Sorry, but this is pure fantasy! Ayres has a stellar academic career which more than more than justified his Durham success. The idea that he and I differ on the nature of doctrinal development in any sharp fashion is one that is unfamiliar to me. In his Nicea book, he actually refers to my ideas as expressed in Questioning Back (1985) in a positive way. For the latter see http://josephsoleary.typepad.com...e-
historic.html. For my part, I find nothing much to disagree with in Ayres's work, which I will be looking at again soon for help in preparing a paper on Gregory of Nyssa for the Tubingen conference in September.
Dr. Liccione, Thanks for answering. Before replying at any length, I need to ask whether you read what I wrote about Mozley on development? The question is not at all meant as a slight--I am confused because the discussion (see here and here, as well as here) was already explicitly framed in the context of your post on Fr. Behr, which you have linked just now as though it were unknown to me.
Iohannes:
His view of development looks very similar to that of Fr. Behr, who surely is acquainted with modern scholarship on Nicaea.
Suffice it to say that I think Fr. Behr is wrong as well, and that Ayres just flat out gets the better of him. But Fr. Behr is coming at the issue from a drastically different perspective that Mozley in any case. Mozley's "purely formal" understanding is a great deal more simple-minded than Fr. Behr's.
Fr. O'Leary:
The idea that he and I differ on the nature of doctrinal development in any sharp fashion is one that is unfamiliar to me. In his Nicea book, he actually refers to my ideas as expressed in Questioning Back (1985) in a positive way.
I never said anything to the contrary, although the footnote you mention more or less said that you did the best that you could with the position. That is certainly a compliment, but not an endorsement. I agree with the assessment; I think the lesson is a useful one, but ultimately a contradiction of pro-Nicene theology.
Mr. Prejean, In all honesty, how much did you know about Mozley before today? Have you read his work on development? Have you read his biography? If you are going to call his thought simple-minded, I hope you can substantiate the assertion.
Regarding the Immaculate Conception;
The way I've had it explained is this; Mary is called 'full of grace'. In the Roman Catholic tradition, the primary result of the fall was that God in his indignation withdrew supernatural grace, and this continues to be witheld due to the guilt of original sin. Since Mary was 'full of grace', therefore she did not have the guilt of original sin.
The assumption follows logically from this.
Neither of these is found in sacred tradition, which not only does not teach that Mary had a fallen nature, but also that she died! The Apostles went to her funeral!
I'm pretty sure from the tone of the other comments that I'm way out of my league here, but I am really curious to know what tradition the Immaculate Conception is said to have developed out of, exactly.
Thanks and Peace,
Alex
Dr. Liccione,
Thanks again for the discussion. After a little more thought I will ignore my earlier post and try to reply now. My purpose is to save time, and to avoid the confusion bound to arise from a smattering of older comments not very well organized.
I believe much of the difficulty Kepha and I have in approaching your position is captured in the word implicit. All agree that "our awareness of what is implicit in what they [the Apostles] received has grown greater as the necessary questions and challenges are confronted down through the ages." The challenge lies in identifying the mode whereby legitimate developments are implicit in the Apostolic teaching. If we follow Dr. Toon, there are at least two possibilities:
It can be said of the Old Testament saints that they were not fully "conscious of the depth and ramifications of [what] they rightly believed and taught." The coming of the Incarnate Savior was in this sense implicit in all anticipations of the Gospel, starting with the Protevangelion. For today, when we look back at the Old Testament, we perceive that Christ is the fulfillment. The Incarnation is by no means necessarily entailed by what Moses and the Prophets taught. It is, however, fully consistent with the preceding revelation, and, in light of our experience, it is impossible for us not to accept it as the fulfillment. If we may speak so dryly about so glorious a truth, we recognize the Incarnation as a legitimate development, and it becomes for us the key to discovering the meaning of the earlier revelation.
On the other hand, there is a narrower sense in which men may be less than fully aware of what is implicit in their beliefs. Owen Chadwick gives two examples. The first is translation of a statement from one language to another. The truth conveyed is the same, although expressed with different words, words perhaps not known before. This, if it is rightly termed development, is very limited indeed, and Chadwick's other example goes further: "a little child which knows that 2 plus 2 equals 4 may not yet know that 4 plus 4 equals 8." Here the conclusion results from analysis, or what Chadwick calls "logical explication." What is common to both cases is that the development follows necessarily from the initial belief. In Toon's terminology, the developed teaching is not only consistent with its origin, but is positively entailed by it.
(Part 2)
Of these two possibilities, the latter, both in its weaker (translation) and stronger (analysis) forms, is not controversial. Chadwick held that "If Newman's theory could be fitted into the idea of logical explication, there would be nothing new, or startling, about the theory of unconsciousness." The problem is that Newman, although he speaks of developments as logical, appears to mean more than logical in the sense of analysis. Here it does not do the paraphrase Chadwick. The passage is too long to quote directly in this comment, but I have posted it at Conscious Faith.
Toon has noted that many scholars disagree with Chadwick's specific description of how Newman understood the original revelation. He observes that others have suggested an analogy between Newman's notion of development and the fulfillment of prophecy. He then quotes the Essay: "Thus too we deal with Scripture when we have to interpret the prophetical text and the types of the Old Testament. The event which is the development is also the interpretation of the prediction; it provides a fulfillment by imposing a meaning." If this view is correct, it seems that later developments like the Vatican I definition of papal infallibility give us the interpretation of what was already taught in anticipation (though perhaps unconsciously) by Christ and the Apostles.
This brings us again to the two possibilities of implicitness outlined above. Is the first possibility (that akin to prophecy and fulfillment) the way in which the later Roman Catholic doctrines are believed to be implicit in the Apostles' beliefs and teachings? Or is it some other way?
Sorry about the length. I hope this is helpful, and appreciate your interaction with Kepha's and my concerns.
God bless.
Mr. Prejean, In all honesty, how much did you know about Mozley before today?
Only what you've said. I trust your characterization, and if the contrast with Newman is accurate, then what I have said is true. So either you're wrong about Mozley or wrong about Newman, but the distinction is immaterial from where I sit. As Dr. Liccione pointed out, you either don't understand Newman, or you do, meaning Mozley is simply wrong.
In either case, I'm not sure how you've made the case out that Mozley's opinion is of any moment. Of course, I freely confess my own bias in this regard, since I find 19th century Anglican theologians and 20th century Orthodox theologians to be more useless than not. But perhaps Dr. Liccione has more interest in the matter; I simply wanted to point out a good summary of why a number of like-minded Catholics wouldn't give theories such as the one you outlined the time of day.
Even heretical ones at that!
Are you serious? How dare you state that there are heretical opinions in God's breathed Word. What is wrong with you? You are a papal presuppositionalist to the heart.
Mr. Prejean: It seems there is little reason for us to converse. I have nothing more to say other than that I wish you well.
Alex,
"In the Roman Catholic tradition, the primary result of the fall was that God in his indignation withdrew supernatural grace, and this continues to be witheld due to the guilt of original sin. Since Mary was 'full of grace', therefore she did not have the guilt of original sin."
The "guilt of original sin" is not accurate to Catholic teaching. Indeed, only our first parents bear the guilt of original sin. There is no "original guilt" in the descendants of Adam and Eve. Hence, the Catechism teaches about original sin that, "Although it is proper to each individual, original sin does not have the character of a personal fault in any of Adam's descendants" (CCC 405).
"Neither of these is found in sacred tradition, which not only does not teach that Mary had a fallen nature, but also that she died! The Apostles went to her funeral!"
The Catholic Church does not teach definitively either that Mary did or did not die, and indeed, any faithful Catholic may believe that Mary died. The Church only teaches definitively regarding Mary's Assumption into heaven.
God bless,
Rob
Kepha,
Wow...
Are you serious? How dare you state that there are heretical opinions in God's breathed Word. What is wrong with you? You are a papal presuppositionalist to the heart.
With all due respect, I suggest taking a 'chill pill.' "e" does not seem to have been suggesting that God 'breathed' error into the Holy Writ, but, rather... within the wording of the texts... different understandings... differing lines of thought can be picked up on... followed... that's all...
"breathe*
BC
"Anon.,"
The train of thought is easy to follow.
1.) I asked Dr. Liccione if he believed there were different views of Christ in the New Testament, such as the ones I quoted from the liberal scholar, Robert Kysar.
2.) He said yes.
3.) "e." said, after quoting Dr. Liccione's answer, "Even heretical ones at that!"
BC:
Thank-you for understanding my line of thought on the matter.
kepha seems to lack significant knowledge of ecclesial history for he fails to take into account that many of those who engaged in heresy throughout history from the early church onward had done so by their misinterpretation of the Word of God, be it Oral or Written. (Yet, the latter is never evident to them and would not even entertain the thought of it being such since to them, their interpretation of Scripture is infallible).
Heck, take for example (one of many, unfortuantely) the modern-day non-Trinitarians who constantly cite Scripture to justify their heresy that there is no such thing as the Trinity.
Kepha,
I am pretty sure that 'e' didn't mean that he thought that the God-breathed Scriptures had heretical opinions in them...
That's pretty easy to see based on his comments on the posts...
If he did mean that then your 'how dare you" would fall on deaf ears anyway... that's also pretty easy to deduce, don't you think?
*sigh*
BC
e,
I think Kepha believes that the Scripture clearly teaches that God is really 3 co-substantial persons in one 'Godhead' - he seems to buy hook, line, and sinker that the Scriptures are "clear" - the fact that there were controversies in the early Church about the meanings of certain things biblically... the reason they had councils to discuss these things... the reasons that there are STILL discussion about what certain things mean... even important things... seems to show this idea to be simplistic and wrong-headed...
Kepha makes me *sigh*
BC
I sense being told, "How dare you say that the God-breathed Scriptures aren't clear" or "how dare you say that the God-breathed Scriptures don't clearly teach that God is 3 co-substantial, co-eternal beings in one Godhead!!!"
*continued sighing*
BC
BC:
I think Kepha believes that the Scripture clearly teaches that God is really 3 co-substantial persons in one 'Godhead' - he seems to buy hook, line, and sinker that the Scriptures are "clear" - the fact that there were controversies in the early Church about the meanings of certain things biblically... the reason they had councils to discuss these things... the reasons that there are STILL discussion about what certain things mean... even important things... seems to show this idea to be simplistic and wrong-headed...
AMEN!
This is just utterly ridiculous since if that were true (i.e., Scripture is so "clear"), the adherents of Sola Scriptura (which would serve as proof since they rely on Scripture alone, supposedly) would have all agreed on matters of doctrine and interpretation; yet, they have interpreted Scripture in a multitude of ways to accomodate so many (mis-)interpretations that even Luther himself would be utterly shocked and dismayed.
Mind you, too, that such Protestants do not consist merely of those who rely simply on the dynamic translation of Scripture for their (mis-)interpretations; these consist also of those who look to the actual Greek (for the NT) and Hebrew (for the OT) as well.
Suffice it to say that even if one were to be adept as Protestants of the latter, this does not prevent one from a misinterpretation of Scripture.
That is why I had remarked (as I did then in the original response, which kepha conveniently removed in his comments in order to rob it of the actual context of my reply):
"Even heretical ones at that!
I don't believe that absent the existence of The Church (i.e., its council of bishops in concert with the Pope), such doctrines could ever be formed; instead, you would find the chaos of differing (heretical) opinions, rather than doctrine.
It's amazing that folks continue to insist that The Church is but an unnecessary man-made invention when, clearly, not only did Christ institute this (vs. writing a 'book') because it would be the New Jerusalem, but knew how it would prove a necessity unto the future. Thus:
Mt 18:17: And if he will not hear them: tell the church. And if he will not hear the church, let him be to thee as the heathen and publican."
e.,
Kepha may have reacted too strongly, but your form of expression was injudicious. Moreover, no one on this thread insists "that The Church is but an unnecessary man-made invention." I think we all need to be careful lest we treat our categories like a Procrustean bed and so hold up any possibility of ecumenical progress. And even where the categories are valid, we need to eschew overblown rhetoric about the strength of our own positions, as well as overly emotive language implying that anyone who disagrees is a fool. This discussion is descending rapidly into the pits of online discourse about theology. I apologize if I have offended anyone, and I hope the discussion can be salvaged. It does no honor to God to hurl brickbats at one another. Let us not give the world any more reason for the sarcasm of "see those Christians, how they love one another."
Amen, Iohannes. But I will repeat to you what you once told me about James Swan, "Presuppositionalists are incredibly difficult to dialogue with." I would only say that Papal presuppositionalist are far more difficult to dialogue with.
Let me say to "BC" and "e" that I hold the philosophical position that Truth is self-testifying. I realize that you two, being papal presuppositionalists, cannot hold this position because it would then mean that things like Scripture and Christian dogma don't neccesarily need the Papacy.
Secondly, I absolutely believe that the Apostles of Jesus Christ believed Him to be fully God, as well as the Holy Spirit. I'm sorry that you do not.
Ioannes:
Your latest way of posing the question definitely betokens progress, at least to me: you suggest the two possible explications of "implicitness" are, roughly, "fullfillment of prophecy" and deductive necessity.
With Prof. Scott Carson, I should say that some authentically developed doctrines follow by deductive necessity from statements attributable to the Apostles or, what amounts to the same, to the tradition recorded in their name by the NT. But that doesn't get us very far. For deductive inference to be valid, the terms in the conclusion must be used in precisely the same sense as the formally identical terms in the premises. There must be no ambiguity. Whether that is always the case in what appear to be deductive doctrinal inferences from apostolic statements is far from obvious. To a great extent, the matter is one of opinion. For it is clear that the meaning of certain key forms of words, such as 'Messiah' and 'Son of God', changed for the Apostles themselves in the course of their post-Pentecostal lives. There is development in the NT itself, and it is not clear that you can deduce all later, authentic developments just from the ones evident in the NT. Often, it seems to me, one can only get that neat deductive result by anachronistically reading the sense of the terms used in later DD back into the NT. That is not heretical, but neither is it all that useful; and it's hardly a counterexample to Newman's method.
Rather than present all authentic instances of DD as valid deductive inferences from the earliest source data—which would go beyond even what the neo-scholastics attempted—I prefer to say that a good many such instances are abductive inferences from the data, or rather what I would call "ampliative." I have written several posts on that theme; just do a blog search on the term 'abductive'. With that in mind, I would certainly hold that some instances of authentic DD are more like what the NT got out of the OT than like deductive necessity.
Best,
Mike
kepha,
Let me say to "BC" and "e" that I hold the philosophical position that Truth is self-testifying. I realize that you two, being papal presuppositionalists, cannot hold this position because it would then mean that things like Scripture and Christian dogma don't neccesarily need the Papacy.
Secondly, I absolutely believe that the Apostles of Jesus Christ believed Him to be fully God, as well as the Holy Spirit. I'm sorry that you do not.
You've certainly proven to be an expert at subreption.
It's a pity that instead of even trying to wrestle with your opponent's arguments (which I would prefer and openly welcome), you instead feel the need to engage in outright misrepresentations and sly ad hominem attacks.
I guess if you can't beat him -- misrepresenting him (and his views) is the next best thing.
For my part, I absolutely believe in Christ.
Thus, I believe in The Church He Himself founded.
It logically follows then that I believe in the Apostles and the Teachings of Christ, which they entrusted to it in both Tradition and Scripture.
(It only makes perfect sense that it was that same Church that decided upon the Canon of Scripture as we know it today!)
As to the matter of Faith, mine is so strong that I even believe in the successors (however grossly, humanly imperfect they are) going all the way back to the Apostles themselves in a long line of succession.
I'm sorry that you do not!
Instead, you join the multitudes of over 20,000 denominations of varying 'self-testifying' 'so-called truths.
As for me, there is only "One Lord, One Faith, One Baptism." (Eph 4:5)
In correspondence with Mt 18:17 (i.e., "And if he will not hear the church, let him be to thee as the heathen and publican"); feel free to indulge all manner of heresy.
The ancient Church is the only one that matters since it is The Church Christ had spoken of (not churches) and, in fact, established to the point of ultimate sacrifice.
kepha:
...I hold the philosophical position that Truth is self-testifying.
Before I can respond usefully to that, I need you to be clearer. By 'Truth' do you mean truths in general? Or do you think, on strictly philosophical grounds, that there is a Truth-capital-T which is something of another order than the mere conjunction of all truths? If so, what is it?
Of course you might mean either or both of the following: that saving truth which is contained in Scripture is self-testifying; or that Person who, as the primordial Word of God, just is the Truth, is self-testifying. But those are theological not philosophical claims.
...papal presuppositionalists, cannot hold this position because it would then mean that things like Scripture and Christian dogma don't neccesarily need the Papacy.
Vatican II taught that "Scripture, Tradition, and the Magisteriuim of the Church are so interrelated that one cannot stand without the others." I have never had any trouble believing that, because the evidence of both the NT's compositional history and that of the post-apostolic process of canon formation seem to accord with it.
Best,
Mike
Mr Prejean misreads my stuff on overcoming metaphysics in Christian tradition as a contradiction of Nicea. Rather, what I call for is a realization of the limits of he hellenistic inculturation of the Gospel. The truth of Nicea will look after itself or shine all the more brightly in a thinking that steps back to the biblical roots of dogma. Again, I shall look at that footnote, but I am sure that Lewis Ayres does not consider me anti-Nicene! We seem to be at crosspurposes here (I and Mr Prejean) about hermeneutics and the subtle problems of articulating Christian truth under the conditions of human history.
"Kepha"
I thought that since you liked putting quotes on nick's, I would join in the fun with your's... 
You wrote:
"Let me say to "BC" and "e" that I hold the philosophical position that Truth is self-testifying..."
An interesting presupposition... I mean 'position,' of course...
You wrote:
"I realize that you two, being papal presuppositionalists, cannot hold this position because it would then mean that things like Scripture and Christian dogma don't neccesarily need the Papacy."
I guess it depends on how you mean "necessarily," in the end... but you seem to have some presuppositions of your own, my friend.
You wrote:
"Secondly, I absolutely believe that the Apostles of Jesus Christ believed Him to be fully God, as well as the Holy Spirit. I'm sorry that you do not."
Yeah... where are you getting this...? Please quote me on this or stop making the claim please. It would be much appreciated.
I await your proof.
Blessings,
"BC"
"Kepha"
By the by...
I would just like to know if you hold to the 'position' that the apostles believed that there were three co-substantial and co-eternal persons in the Godhead... if so... what are you reasons for holding to this 'position'?
I am just curious about what other 'positions' you have to hold first in order to answer that first question... the answer to the second question ought to shed some light on that for me, no?
Blessings,
BC
Rob,
I appreciate the response. I will have to disagree with you about what the Catholic Church teaches regarding original 'guilt' (the term used in Trent). While it is true that the Catholic Church does not teach that original sin has the same characteristic as a personal fault, it is clear (especially in the writings of Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine) that it is percieved as a guilt which demands payment.
That the Apostles went to Mary's funeral has been celebrated in the (Orthodox) Church for over a thousand years and is considered sacred tradition.
However, my original question remains unanswered - which tradition did the IC and assumption develop out of?
Blessings,
Alex
Alex:
Dr. Liccione had already covered this topic many, many threads ago.
Please go here:
Development and Negation VII: Original Sin as Inherited "Guilt"
Here's a preview:
"It is essential here to focus on the dogmatic term being translated as 'guilt': the Latin reatum. Its meaning in what is now a long-dead language is primarily legal, and is weaker than that of the English term 'guilt'. As the classicist and philosopher Scott Carson has pointed out:
In Roman law to be reatus means to be liable to or actually under an indictment or a sentence; culpa refers to actual guilt for wrongdoing. (In some contexts, culpa refers to the actual act of wrongdoing, while reatus refers to the state of the wrongdoer that accrues as a consequence of the culpa.) The CIC [Codex Iuris Canonici, the Church's codification of canon law—ML] adopted these same standards straight out of Justinian. The two words are sometimes used together in theological contexts in such a way as to suggest that reatus is used to mean guilt in the sense of having incurred a guilt-debt as a consequence of wrongdoing. Two significant usages are: reatus poena and reatus culpa. The former refers to our guilt-debt of punishment for sin, the latter our guilt-debt of moral culpability or fault for sin. It is our reatus culpa that is removed by absolution; our reatus poenaremains, hence we perform some penance...
Now when the dogmatic texts speak of the reatum of original sin, they are speaking of a kind of reatus poena, which means "liability to punishment" without presupposing personal fault (i.e., culpa) on the part of the one thus liable. So, the descendants of our first parents are made liable to punishment, i.e. reatus, for what was really only the culpa of our first parents, i.e. the Fall."
Hey btw, Mark,
Is there a working link to the site where I can get my own 'peculiar aristocratic title?'? lol.
oops... i meant mike... not mark
e:
Thanks for a very enlightening response. Having read his earlier post I can appreciate the complexity of the issue. That being said, I still am not convinced in light of other studying that I have done on this issue.
That being said, this isn't the thread for that debate and I don't want to detract from the subject of this post.
I'm really more interested in my original question, which is still, which tradition did the IC develop out of?
While it is true that Mary's conception was celebrated in the Early Church (and continues to be celebrated, I believe, in the Orthodox Chuch), it is because her conception was miraculous, in the sense that her parents were unable to conceive.
Thanks and blessings to all !
Alex:
The link to peculiar aristocratic titles is at the bottom of the blog page. Yours will be peculiar indeed. 
As for the DIC, I suggest you first read the papal bull explaining and defining the DIC. If you do, I expect the issue to be usefully narrowed.
Finally, re original sin, if you've read the post of mine to which "e" so graciously linked, I'd be curious to hear your objections. I consider the dogma of original sin, as I explained it in that post, to be one of the few that has direct empirical support!
Best,
Mike
"I consider the dogma of original sin, as I explained it in that post, to be one of the few that has direct empirical support!"
That makes you, me, Chesterton, and anyone else who is paying attention to anything at all remotely human!
Unless I missed it, not one of you spoke of DD as being a personal journey. Lotsa hubris in interpreting the mind of the Church, which I think misses the point of much of St. Vincent, St. Gregory N, and others who are used so frequently - if not carelessly? - to score points. What if the thrust of their musings was less how the Church corporately understands the faith once delivered, and more how each generation, and each one of us, is called to humbly submit to what we have received and grow individually from glory to glory in understanding and faith? This is an arduous journey, and so I can well understand how my own conception and reception of doctrine can develop (or regress of course too). But for the Church to not know Herself, in all that Jesus revealed (not all of which was written btw, as the Evangelists clearly point out), from the getgo, just seems fantastic. I can understand if you say, the 10th generation from the apostles - N10 - understood this, and had the benefit of peaceable articulating this because of Constantine's edict, but to say that what N1, N2...N9 understood IN COMMON was different from N10 seems to lead one to think that every generation can create new doctrine.
Stephen:
Unless I missed it, not one of you spoke of DD as being a personal journey.
...called to humbly submit to what we have received and grow individually from glory to glory in understanding and faith?
And just which understanding would that be? That is, if we are to rely simply on our own personal journeys, then which of these many personal journeys would happen to coincide with the correct understanding of what is and what is not doctrine?
There are several (mis-)interpretations of Scripture and of what exactly the Apostles themselves taught by not only Christians in the age of the early church (resulting in heresy) but also by those who happen to consider themselves Christians today, such as Non-Trinitarians.
In short, there would be more chance for error when each individual acting as their own 'Pope', if you will, arbitrarily determining for themselves what exactly is doctrine and what isn't, justifying what they innovatively conceive to be doctrine from select passages in Scripture itself.
That is why there is The Church so that we may be anchored to The Truth, which is Christ Himself!
So "that henceforth we be no more children tossed to and fro and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the wickedness of men, by cunning craftiness by which they lie in wait to deceive." Eph 4:14
How apt that The Church in Scripture is alluded to as the Bride of Christ (See Ephesians & Revelation) and declared by Paul as being the Pillar & Foundation of Truth! (1Tm3:15)
Mike,
Thanks for the link. As often as I wish that these issues were cut and dry to appease my ever spiralling ego, I need people like you to say "hey, why don't you go and actually read this", so thanks.
Regarding the topic of original sin; I didn't see a comment link on that post, so I'll just post here and if you like we can move the discussion.
One of the key differences I thought of in our respective theologies (Orthodox and Catholic) that is important here is what hell is, and relatedly, what the sacrafice means. The dominating theory (not dogma, as far as I know) in the west since the time of Anselm has been the penal substitution theory, which basically says: the smallest offence against God requires infinite satisfaction; no one can actually fulfill this satisfaction; Christ paid this debt on the cross.
This understanding of the sacrifice is actually not the Eastern Orthodox understanding at all (and actually, certain fathers, ie. St. Athanasius, actually write against this notion before it became popular in the Medieval era). God, being the source of existence for everything else, doesn't need anything.
However, this has been the western understanding up to our present day.
Now - what does this have to do with original sin?
According to the Catholic Encyclopedia, 1911 edition, "original sin is the privation of sanctifying grace"
In Catholic theology, grace is a created phenomenon. Again from the Catholic Encyclopedia "it is not a substance that exists by itself, or apart from the soul... Sanctifying grace may be philosophically termed a 'permanent, supernatural quality of the soul'". This is contrasted with the Orthodox definition of grace as the 'Uncreated Energies of God'.
Thus when original sin is talked about in Catholic dogmatic teachings, such as at Trent and Florence, they are still talking about a punishment - the deprivation, on the part of God, of original justice.
The ultimate consequence of this formula is that our fallen natures are the consequence of a deprivation of grace, as opposed to the reverse (Orthodox) teaching which states that we cannot fully partake in the Divine Life because of our fallen natures.
Back to the different understandings of redemption - it does not seem consistent to me if Christ's redemtpive work on the cross is meant to be a forensic satisfaction to then say that infants who are not brought into the Church, either visibly or invisibly, would go to hell - since hell is seen as the punishment for those who do not partake in that satisfaction.
A good deal of this has to do with a difference in language between the vulgate and the Greek; this is a quote taken from the Eastern Catholic website http://www.east2west.org, the site of Dr. Anthony Dragani.:
The Greek biblical text of Romans 5:12 does contain the phrase "eph'ho pantes hemarton." The Western Church has traditionally translated this as "in whom all have sinned.
In cont
whoops - looks like something got cut off there... i'll just sit back and wait for a response.
Blessings !
Alex,
Thanks for your kind response to my last post.
"The dominating theory (not dogma, as far as I know) in the west since the time of Anselm has been the penal substitution theory, which basically says: the smallest offence against God requires infinite satisfaction; no one can actually fulfill this satisfaction; Christ paid this debt on the cross."
Anselm's theory is not penal substitution. Anselm's theory is a satisfaction theory, which states that offenses against God require a satisfaction on the part of the offender. Luther and Calvin corrupt satisfaction theory into penal substitution theory. Anselm actually denies the chief components of penal substitution theory in Cur Deus Homo (that God had to condemn a just man in order to save sinners).
"This understanding of the sacrifice is actually not the Eastern Orthodox understanding at all (and actually, certain fathers, ie. St. Athanasius, actually write against this notion before it became popular in the Medieval era). God, being the source of existence for everything else, doesn't need anything."
Indeed, as Ps. 50 states, God does not need the blood or meat of our sacrifices. But I can't help but think that your presentation here is a grave oversimplification, at best, of the alleged Western position which you are critiquing. No one would assert such a thing. (No one would assert, namely, that God *needed* sacrifice.)
"However, this has been the western understanding up to our present day."
Perhaps you could clarify for me, based on my comments, more precisely what you are alleging. I feel that I'm not catching the full import of what you are alleging against the Western view, for it seems to me that if I take your position as simply as I am, that it really isn't accurate to Western theology.
Perhaps there is also someone here who could address better than I could the issue of so-called 'created grace.'
God bless,
Rob
You are right that there is ultimately a difference between satisfaction theory and penal substitution - sorry for the slip up.
However, Anselm's theory as put forth in cur deus homo still places as the central theme an incorrect view of the Justice (tzedek) of God which is not consistent with the Hebrew or Greek understanding of the word, and which sets forth the notion that people must be punished who violated God's "dignity".
Taken from Ch. 6 of Book 2 of Cur Deus Homo:
CHAPTER SIX: Only a God-man can make the satisfaction by means of which man is saved.
ANSELM. But this work can only be accomplished if there is someone who pays to God, for man's sin, something greater than every existing thing besides God.
BOSO. This has been proven.
ANSELM. Moreover, whoever can give to God something of his own which surpasses everything that is less than God must be greater than everything that is not God.
BOSO. I cannot deny it.
ANSELM. Now, nothing except God surpasses everything that is not God.
BOSO. This is true.
ANSELM. Therefore, only God can make this satisfaction.
BOSO. This follows.
ANSELM. But only a man ought to make this satisfaction. For in any other case it would not be man who makes it.
BOSO. Nothing seems more just.
ANSELM. Therefore, if (as has been established) it is necessary that the Heavenly City be completed from among men, and if this completion can occur only if the aforementioned satisfaction is made, and if only God can make this satisfaction and only a man ought to make it: it is necessary that a God-man make it.
We see throughout the entire paper that Anselm's view of salvation is that something must be paid to God, which we cannot pay, to satisfy God in face of our sins, and that this payment is Christ's death, which "outweighs the number and magnitude of all sins"
By the way, Anselm actually rejects a proof similar to the psalm you cited, regarding the fact that God doesn't need sacrifice, saying that that applied only to people before Christ existed.
Nevertheless, the main point that is to be drawn out of all of this is that hell, that is, our spiritual death, is something given by God! This is why limbo has been such a hot topic - people can't understand why God would send babies to hell. Although I certainly am not a master theologian, I do know enough to know that this, at least, has been the dominating western position - that hell is a punishment from God, and not merely a consequence of our fallen natures.
If I am wrong, though (which I hope I am), please educate me!
btw here is the last part of my earlier post regarding the different latin vs. greek translations of Romans 5:12
he Greek biblical text of Romans 5:12 does contain the phrase "eph'ho pantes hemarton." The Western Church has traditionally translated this as "in whom all have sinned.
In contrast, the Eastern Fathers understood the word "eph'ho" to modify the preceding word "thanatos," which means "death." Therefore the Eastern Church translates the phrase in question as "because of which (death) all have sinned."
Dr. Liccione,
I am grateful for your response and apologize for delayed answer on my end. The dialog has made appreciable progress; and hopefully the progress will continue.
'Abductive' reasoning is a helpful clarification of your position. So too is the statement that some instances of authentic development correspond more to "fulfillment of prophecy" than to "deductive necessity." With regard to the latter mode, I am ambivalent about the term 'deduction', since, technical usage notwithstanding, the connotations are narrower than what is appropriate to theological reasoning. Yet this is a minor issue with little bearing on the substantive question.
That question remains the relation of allowable modes of implicitness to the affirmation that the deposit materially "may not and indeed cannot be augmented by any process whatsoever."
From my perspective the difficulty continues to reside in how to square Newman's vision of development with the material sufficiency of the deposit. It is beyond question that Roman Catholics believe nothing can be added to the material content of the deposit. As Vatican I taught, the Holy Spirit was not promised to the successors of Peter that by His revelation they might disclose new doctrine, but that by His help they might guard sacredly the revelation transmitted through the apostles and the deposit of faith, and might faithfully set it forth. (DS 1836) Yet there is an apparent problem (whether real or not) when this belief is juxtaposed with the belief that the distinctively Roman dogmas are divinely revealed.
Following the past discussion of abductive reasoning in connection with development I will take Isaiah 7:14 as an example. As Christians we of course believe this verse speaks to the virgin birth of the Messiah. At the same time we acknowledge that, as was said before, the virgin birth of the Messiah "is not warranted as a strict deduction from the original Hebrew text." To redeploy Jesuit historian Klaus Schatz's language about the emergence of the Papacy, we maintain that the prophecy's inspired teaching did in fact "encompass the possibility" which we now recognize as its most important fulfillment.
On this much I believe we are agreed. The divergence of opinion seems to arise naturally enough when we turn to the implications for doctrinal development.
(continued below)
(part 2)
What is crucial from my perspective is that there was no way to know before the fact that the Messiah would be born from a virgin. The Messiah's virgin birth was implicit as a possible fulfillment, but that it would be the ultimate fulfillment was not a truth accessible to the Old Testament saints based on the revelation theretofore given. The evidence from Jewish antiquities confirms that there was no expectation of the virgin birth of the Messiah. J. G. Machen appealed to this fact in defense of traditional Christian belief: if the figure of Jesus were artificially constructed from a checklist of messianic requirements, there would have been no reason to concoct the virgin birth; as no one was looking for it to happen, the reality that it happened is the best explanation for why the earliest Christians read Isaiah as speaking to the nativity of Christ.
If this view of the prophecy is correct, it is hard to see how the Old Testament revelation was sufficient in itself to warrant the conclusion that the virgin birth of the Messiah was a doctrine divinely revealed. It is a doctrine we now recognize as anticipated or adumbrated in the Old Testament, but properly speaking it was not revealed until the actual advent of Christ. And so if we impose the categories of the development debate, it seems that new revealed data had to be added to the Old Testament tradition before the doctrine of the virgin birth of the Messiah could become an article of faith as opposed to a subject of pious opinion and speculation.
This, in a nutshell, looks to be the main weakness with Newman's model of development. If we relax the requirement that later doctrinal developments be somehow conclusions drawn by good and necessary consequence from the Apostolic deposit, then we quickly run up against the problem of ongoing public revelation and material addition to the deposit. I believe this apparent impasse is what Fr. Behr had in mind when he said "A tradition with a potential for growth ultimately undermines the Gospel itself--it leaves open the possibility for further revelation, and therefore the Gospel would no longer be sure and certain."
(continued below)
(part 3)
If Owen Chadwick is correct, it seems that certain Roman Catholic theologians recognize the difficulty at this point and have tried to propose a solution:
In recent times a somewhat different description of the place of logic has won some favor... The development is asserted to be strictly logical, strictly an inference. But the Church, or the theologian, cannot perceive, or cannot always perceive, the logical connection until afterwards. Though the definition occurs without conscious inference, we look back subsequently and we see that it was a strictly logical explication... But can we always perceive it afterwards? Or is the perception itself also a kind of act of faith? For Mgr Charles Journet, the perception is itself an act of faith: the explication must be asserted to be 'rigorously logical', but the inference is discerned itself in 'the night of faith'... Alternatively, it is suggested by Clement Dillenschneider... that though the logic of the development is not perceivable by the human mind we ascribe it to 'a higher logic', a kind of logic in God's sight but not man's.
Chadwick goes on to say The difficulty of these assertions is that they appear to remove the utility from the logical explication. The development must be asserted by faith to be logical though we cannot always see how. This is not using the words 'logical explication' in a meaningful sense; except to assert 'definitions do not (in spite of appearances) change the unchanging revelation: how this is we cannot see, but logical explication makes a good illustrative analogy how such a thing may be without being self-contradictory'. In the case of Dillenschneider the language expresses a recognition of the traditional importance, but nevertheless the inadequacy, of the logical language, while his real case rests upon 'la sens de la foi', in effect Newman's intimus sensus. (From Bossuet to Newman, p. 211)
It may be good to add that I do respect and even admire Newman as a thinker and as a Christian. If I thought he was correct, I would not hesitate to follow him to Rome. So far I am not convinced, though I am open to the possibility of being persuaded.
Thanks again, and God bless.
Alex,
"By the way, Anselm actually rejects a proof similar to the psalm you cited, regarding the fact that God doesn't need sacrifice, saying that that applied only to people before Christ existed."
I think we may be talking past one another. Are we saying that Anselm asserts that God, who is ontologically self-sufficient, needs sacrifice? I must conclude that I'm misinterpreting you here because this is precisely the pagan notion of sacrifice which Judaism and Christianity reject, namely, that man gives something to God which God needs by making sacrifice. And I doubt that Latin theologians could contradict that. They can be dense, but not that dense.
On the other hand, perhaps I ought to interpret you this way. When you say that Anselm asserts that God needs sacrifice, what you are saying is that God needs a sacrifice in order to forgive sinners. Perhaps that is what you mean.
Have you ever read St. Thomas Aquinas on satisfaction and atonement? I think you might find him a bit more palatable. Anselm addresses many important issues, but Thomas rejects some of his errors and clarifies difficult parts. For instance, Thomas denies the absolute necessity of the Incarnation, passion and death, arguing instead that it was only "necessary" in the sense that it was the most fitting way for God to forgive us of our sins (and that God, in his omnipotence, could have done otherwise). Likewise, Thomas stresses that what makes Christ's suffering and death meritorious is, above all, the love with which he underwent them for us, for charity is the source of merit.
"Nevertheless, the main point that is to be drawn out of all of this is that hell, that is, our spiritual death, is something given by God!"
I'm not quite sure how you're getting from Anselm's position on this. Please bear with me, and explain for me. And also, please clarify the sense in which you think Anselm says that God gives us spiritual death. (By the way, it seems rather obvious to me that spiritual death is the result of a privation of sanctifying grace, and hence is not something positively given by God because it is essentially constituted by a lack.)
Thank you and God bless.
-Rob
Rob,
I have read a bit of Aquinas' writing on satisfaction and atonement - I don't find it more palatable for the reason that both theologians define the work of the sacrifice as a 'satisfaction'. It is this basic fundamentally western Medieval invention which I am taking issue with. Anselm is not saying that God is not self-sufficient; but he does say that there are laws of justice, as part of our created universe, which must be obeyed and which dictate that a satisfaction must be made, yes, for forgiveness to take place. This is not the understanding of the early Church and is on the face inconsistent with, for example, the parable of the prodigal son.
Regardless of whether or not this theory is correct - it implies that God is the author of our spiritual death. Why? Because hell is our spiritual death, AND hell is the punishment of a vengeful God who refuses to forgive sin without a satisfaction.
I disagree with you about what the Catholic Church teaches about sanctifying grace, apparently. The traditional latin teaching on the subject teaches that we are deprived of sanctifying grace from God - keep in mind also that in the Latin tradition, grace is a created substance (as opposed to the Encreated Energies of God, ineffably distinct from His Essence), which is given to us from God. The point here is that if spiritual death is the result of a privation of sanctifying grace, and the God deprives us of this grace, then clearly God is the cause of spiritual death.
Man this is getting way off topic, lol.
Blessings to all, please don't be offended, this is simply what I have concluded based on a lot of time studying this.
I think the best source for the teaching on grace in the Catholic Church is the official Catechism.
Especially the following:
1129 The Church affirms that for believers the sacraments of the New Covenant are necessary for salvation.51 "Sacramental grace" is the grace of the Holy Spirit, given by Christ and proper to each sacrament. The Spirit heals and transforms those who receive him by conforming them to the Son of God. The fruit of the sacramental life is that the Spirit of adoption makes the faithful partakers in the divine nature52 by uniting them in a living union with the only Son, the Savior.
1131 The sacraments are efficacious signs of grace, instituted by Christ and entrusted to the Church, by which divine life is dispensed to us. The visible rites by which the sacraments are celebrated signify and make present the graces proper to each sacrament. They bear fruit in those who receive them with the required dispositions.
And from a talk of Scott Hahn on grace:
Sacraments Enable us to Fulfill our Supernatural Family Life
I'll tell you one thing that I want you to take home. The highest good in all creation, the greatest goal for all our lives can be reduced down to one thing,
outside of God himself, of course, and that is the grace of divine sonship, Sanctifying Grace. The grace of divine sonship is the most precious thing in
the whole universe, outside of God himself.
What is that grace? It's the life of Christ, the Eternal Son, within us. So it's no longer I who lives, but Christ who lives in me, as Saint Paul says.
Jesus says in John 15, verse 5, "Apart from me, you can do nothing." But St. Paul says in Phillipians 4:13, "I can do all things in Christ who strengthens me."
We need to understand that. The highest good in all creation is the grace of divine sonship. He wants to bring that sonship to maturity.
He wants to bring that grace to perfection. He wants us to become like Christ. Romans 8:29, "Those whom he foreloved, he predestined to be conformed
to the image of the firstborn among many brethren." Christ is the new Adam because he is the founding father of a new family in his own glorious and divine
and human flesh and blood and he calls us to bring that sonship to maturity and he gives to us all that we need to do so. That's the bottom line. The supernatural
life of His children is His biggest concern for History and for the world.
Here is the link, from that talk above:
http://zuserver2.star.ucl.ac.uk/.../m5/
scmnt2.html
From the CCC again on how we lost the grace of original holiness in which our first parents were constituted:
Freedom put to the test
396 God created man in his image and established him in his friendship. A spiritual creature, man can live this friendship only in free submission to God. The prohibition against eating "of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil" spells this out: "for in the day that you eat of it, you shall die."276 The "tree of the knowledge of good and evil"277 symbolically evokes the insurmountable limits that man, being a creature, must freely recognize and respect with trust. Man is dependent on his Creator, and subject to the laws of creation and to the moral norms that govern the use of freedom.
Man's first sin
397 Man, tempted by the devil, let his trust in his Creator die in his heart and, abusing his freedom, disobeyed God's command. This is what man's first sin consisted of.278 All subsequent sin would be disobedience toward God and lack of trust in his goodness.
398 In that sin man preferred himself to God and by that very act scorned him. He chose himself over and against God, against the requirements of his creaturely status and therefore against his own good. Constituted in a state of holiness, man was destined to be fully "divinized" by God in glory. Seduced by the devil, he wanted to "be like God", but "without God, before God, and not in accordance with God".279
399 Scripture portrays the tragic consequences of this first disobedience. Adam and Eve immediately lose the grace of original holiness.280 They become afraid of the God of whom they have conceived a distorted image - that of a God jealous of his prerogatives.281
It was in man's rebellion against God that love for God died in man's soul. God cannot indwell a soul in active rebellion. The Father of the Prodigal had to wait for the son to repent/change, before He could embrace him again. Thus, Christ's first command in Mark's gospel is to "repent and believe in the gospel."
Also, I believe "created grace" refers to the effect of God's indwelling in our soul, which is the cause. The Holy Spirit vivifies a spiritually dead soul, uniting it to the life of the Trinity in Christ, by which the soul is transformed (has new powers to live as God's adopted child) as it is divinized.
I've been rereading Lewis Ayres and note with some complacency that in the chapter "In Spite of Hegel, fire and sword" I get off much more lightly than Karl Rahner, Walter Kasper etc. in this Milbankesque universal scolding of modern theologians. I think Lewis recognizes that he and I are both proNicenes and both ardently desirous of a systematic theology grounded in critical engagement with history. He takes less seriously than I the Harnackian dictum that dogma in its origin and development is a produce of the Greek mind on the soil of the Gospel, though he claims to find metaphysics in the Gospels themselves (!). He does not see the necessity of a Heideggerian overcoming of metaphysics in Christian tradition (an overcoming which rejoins the overcoming of metaphysics effected at Nicea and Chalcedon and in the great Christian thinkers like Augustine, even if from another point of view they remain within a metaphysical inculturation of the Gospel). Like Heidegger, I hold that metaphysics is true, but limited as a mode of apprehension of the phenomena, and that the same can be said of Christian thought and doctrine shaped in engagement with metaphysics. Lewis believes that fourth century discourse is so adequate that we can and indeed must carry it over verbatim in our own discourse, whereas I stress hermeneutics, translation, rearticulation, critical retrieval.
Rob,
I suggest you read some Catholic sources other than the CCC to gain a fair understanding of what the Catholic Church has taught over the years. The CCC often explains things very differently and with different emphasis than, for example, the Catholic Encyclopedia.
I used to make the same arguments as you until I actually went to investigate whether or not past teachings are the same as the current (more eastern) teachings contained in the current Catechism (I say current to differentiate between, say, the baltimore Catechism, which is decidedly different). If you can cite some reason to explain why the CCC is more authoritative than these sources or the Catholic Councils, then please explain.
Blessings
Also Rob,
regarding Mary's death, I am aware that the Catholic Church does not teach definitively that Mary died. However, the apostolic tradition does - that was one my points regarding the IC.
Alex, I hope you understand that the Catholic Encyclopedia is not a Magisterial document. It was a multi-volume work prepared by a board of editors, and individual writers -- not by the Church. It has a nihil obstat and imprimatur, but that does not give it any Magisterial authority -- it just certifies is as being free from doctrinal error. It's a useful guide to the state of theology in 1917, and a handy reference book, but that's about it.
The CCC, on the other hand, was issued by the Holy Father, after having been called for by a Synod of Bishops, and was prepared by a commission of bishops under the guidance of the head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.
In issuing the CCC, His Holiness wrote that it " is a statement of the Church's faith and of catholic doctrine, attested to or illumined by Sacred Scripture, the Apostolic Tradition, and the Church's Magisterium. I declare it to be a sure norm for teaching the faith and thus a valid and legitimate instrument for ecclesial communion."
The CCC thus has a very high level of Magisterial authority, and a very high claim on the submission of faith by Catholics. The CCC has not abrogated or repudiated past teaching (to hold that would be to fall into the "hermeneutic of discontinuity" that Pope Benedict speaks of). To get a sense of this, you should review the Index of Citations, and see the depth of past sources relied upon.
May I suggest that you pick up a copy of Dei Verbum, the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation from the Second Vatican Council, and the CDF's Doctrinal Commentary on the Professio Fidei (you can find this at EWTN's website, http://www.ewtn.com/library/CURI...IA/CDFADTU.HTM)
? That might clarify matters better than I could explain.
God bless.
"The CCC, on the other hand, was issued by the Holy Father, after having been called for by a Synod of Bishops, and was prepared by a commission of bishops under the guidance of the head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith."
That is, it represents the theology of the CDF at a time when it was unreformed (having rejected Paul VI's prescriptions for its reform) and busy undercutting the vision of Vatican II. Theologians have faulted the Catechism for the very severe theological defect of fundamentalism.
"In issuing the CCC, His Holiness wrote that it " is a statement of the Church's faith and of catholic doctrine, attested to or illumined by Sacred Scripture, the Apostolic Tradition, and the Church's Magisterium. I declare it to be a sure norm for teaching the faith and thus a valid and legitimate instrument for ecclesial communion.""
Has anyone asked if it has any pedagogic virtues in practice? It is used chiefly as a reference work by the vocal conservative faction in the Church. I am not aware that it has any wider reception or use.
"The CCC thus has a very high level of Magisterial authority, and a very high claim on the submission of faith by Catholics. The CCC has not abrogated or repudiated past teaching (to hold that would be to fall into the "hermeneutic of discontinuity" that Pope Benedict speaks of)."
The Church has often changed its teaching. That is called development not discontinuity. The real discontinuity arises when you reject healthy development and attempt to put the clock back.
" To get a sense of this, you should review the Index of Citations, and see the depth of past sources relied upon."
Past sources are a wax nose; and you might ask how well the CCC uses the texts of Vatican II or Paul VI's progressive utterances.
I think Lewis recognizes that he and I are both proNicenes and both ardently desirous of a systematic theology grounded in critical engagement with history.
I was away for several days, so I probably could have answered this idea earlier. I was using "pro-Nicene" in the same technical sense that Ayres was, not to suggest that you are explicitly denying the Nicene dogma. But I think it is fair to say that your view of dogma implicitly rejects the Nicene view.
He takes less seriously than I the Harnackian dictum that dogma in its origin and development is a produce of the Greek mind on the soil of the Gospel, though he claims to find metaphysics in the Gospels themselves (!).
I don't take the Harnackian dictum seriously at all, so that is probably why I like Ayres. It is a long-held piece of idiocy that has (unfortunately) been held too long on account of the brilliance of its author. To me, this is no different than the numerous discredited physical theories that have been held too long on account of the scientist's eminence.
He does not see the necessity of a Heideggerian overcoming of metaphysics in Christian tradition (an overcoming which rejoins the overcoming of metaphysics effected at Nicea and Chalcedon and in the great Christian thinkers like Augustine, even if from another point of view they remain within a metaphysical inculturation of the Gospel).
It's that sort of revisionism that troubles me. There's no overcoming of metaphysics at Nicaea or Chalcedon; there is a rigorous metaphysical articulation of the limits of metaphysics, which is a different thing entirely. Zubiri was Heidegger's student, and he knew this. The equivocation between articulation of limits and overcoming is fatal in this instance.
Suffice it to say that I concur with Ayres that the entire project is antithetical to the pro-Nicene project as a matter of historical fact.
Like Heidegger, I hold that metaphysics is true, but limited as a mode of apprehension of the phenomena, and that the same can be said of Christian thought and doctrine shaped in engagement with metaphysics.
It's the latter non sequitur that strikes me as patently opposed to the entire pro-Nicene product, and indeed, the entire concept of Christian dogma. The denigration of Christian dogma does not follow from the limits of metaphysics, nor was Heidegger's articulation of those limits the last word (or even a correct word) on the subject. Philip Blosser was right about you having followed the Heidegger path and being unable to see your way out of it.
Lewis believes that fourth century discourse is so adequate that we can and indeed must carry it over verbatim in our own discourse, whereas I stress hermeneutics, translation, rearticulation, critical retrieval.
The notion that "pro-Nicene" theology is "so adequate" or that it must be carried "verbatim" into modern discourse is in such sharp contrast with
(cont.)
The notion that "pro-Nicene" theology is "so adequate" or that it must be carried "verbatim" into modern discourse is in such sharp contrast with Ayers's thesis that I don't even know how you could have gotten that out of his work. His thesis is that the four fundamental theses of pro-Nicene theology must be held no matter the mode of articulation and that whatever contradicts these theses necessarily contradicts pro-Nicene theology, no matter what the particular metaphysical articulation. That's simply the law of non-contradiction, and whether Heidegger or Hegel argues that he can escape it, all attempts to do so are ultimately nonsense. You can wave the Heideggerian banner all you like, but that won't change the fact that it is alien to the Cross.
Ed,
Have you actually compared and contrasted the teachings on, for example, purgatory and original, as they are explained in the councils of Trent and Florence with the explanations in the CCC?
Another source you should consider looking into is the writings of Thomas Acquinas. You will be surprised.
Blessings,
Alex
P.S.
I am not solely concerned with what the magisterium of the Catholic Church has taught in an infallible sense, but in the overall teaching instruction of the Church throughout the ages.
It would indeed be odd for the CCC to differ materially from Trent's Decree on Original Sin , given that the CCC repeatedly cites to that document as its source (See CCC 402 et seq.). Likewise, CCC on the necessity for Baptism cites Trent and Florence (see CCC1257 et seq.). As for the significance (if any) of any change in the manner of expression of the dogmas, you should consult Dr. Liccione's article on Development and Negation (link in the sidebar).
Alex,
I am busy, and will be away for a week, but I'd love to take up this discussion once again at that point.
A few quick points which I'd like to bring up. First, it was actually another person, "john" who responded to you with the CCC quotes, not me.
In regards to Anselm-- I'd like to discuss Anselm and Athanasius, especially with a short excerpt from Dr. David Hart's "the Beauty of the Infinite," for a way in which an Orthodox Christian can see Anselm as continuous with Athanasius's thought.
On Aquinas, atonement and the early Church understanding-- Thomas says, "it was not necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. For God with His omnipotent power could have restored human nature in many other ways." (ST. Tertia Pars, Q. 1 art. 2).
On sanctifying grace-- I do believe that john is correct in his explanation of the Catholic term "created grace." The Catholic terminology tends to focus on the effects of grace in man (which are indeed 'created': they have a beginning), but does not indeed deny that the uncreated God dwells in our souls. I think the supposed problem here is more with terminology than with reality.
"If you can cite some reason to explain why the CCC is more authoritative than these sources or the Catholic Councils, then please explain."
This creates an imagined opposition between the two. Rather, I think Ed and john see the Catechism as an authentic interpretation of the Councils.
By the way, while I ought not to speak for Ed and john, I have read writings of Thomas Aquinas, as well as the Council of Trent, and it's not always apparent to me that the Orthodox polemic is an accurate assessment of the western view vis-a-vis the eastern view. Sometimes it just finds opposition where it doesn't exist.
And don't worry, I'm not offended by your responses.
God bless,
Rob
I don’t think Gregory has in mind what Newman has in mind. Gregory is writing in the heat of the Pneumatamochoi controversy, a species of later Semi-Arianism. The charge was that the divinity of the Spirit was unknown and therefore foreign to the apostolic deposit. Gregory’s claim is one of disclosure and revelation, rather than conceptual development. Gregory in his writings against the Pneumatamochoi asserts in other places that the doctrine was revealed in the Scriptures but the church is being now moved to openly proclaim it. Consequently Basil and Gregory on the same page here in explaining the matter in terms of an open proclamation and an internal tradition to the church.
Further, just using the word “development” doesn’t prove that Vincent had in mind what Newman had in mind. That needs to be demonstrated. Much of the above seems like a word-concept fallacy.
"This, in a nutshell, looks to be the main weakness with Newman's model of development. If we relax the requirement that later doctrinal developments be somehow conclusions drawn by good and necessary consequence from the Apostolic deposit, then we quickly run up against the problem of ongoing public revelation and material addition to the deposit. "
Iohannes,
You make a very interesting point here which I think needs to be addressed. At the same time, I have a question. Consider the doctrine of the perpetual virginity of Mary. If one looks to the New Testament, it would appear that there is very little if any warrant for this doctrine. We don't find the Fathers actually arguing the matter until about the 4th century and, in main, their argument is taken from obscure passages of the Old Testament. Does this doctrine, held firmly by all of the apostolic churches, constitute a new revelation in accordance with Chadwick's criticism of Newman?
Ed
Mike,
I look forward to continuing the dialogue. FYI, I agree with you 100% that some Orthodox (especially them) love to find opposition where it doesn't exist. I'm going off of my own investigation into the original documents.
Enjoy your week!
Alex
Mr. Robinson,
You are right to highlight the difference between Newman and Gregory. When I provided the quotation originally I had no intention of casting Gregory as a prototype of Newman (as comments here and at Conscious Faith show, I am not persuaded of Newman's theory). The reason for citing the passage was the response of one of my professors, a distinguished patristics scholar, when asked about whether the ancients had any notion of doctrinal development. He said that the modern notion of development stems from the time of Newman (maybe a little earlier if we look at Germans like Moehler). But then he added off the top of his head that Gregory's words might have some bearing on the general theme of development in connection with the presentation of doctrine.
Mr. De Vita,
Thanks for the question. From my perspective there is a difference between doctrines or dogmas formally taught by the Church, and pious opinions or practices and speculations allowed and perhaps in some ways approved, but not mandated, by the Church. The only Marian dogma is the Theotokos of Ephesus, which is primarily a Christological dogma. That doesn't mean we should reject outright other beliefs about Mary and the saints. For my part I have no trouble believing the perpetual virginity of Mary; and even if I didn't believe it, I wouldn't go around challenging those who do, because that would cause needless controversy. It is interesting to recall that Newman, when he was very much worried about what was happening at Vatican I, wrote a letter to his bishop in which he asked, "When has definition of doctrine de fide been a luxury of devotion and not a stern painful necessity?" One of Newman's more critical biographers noted that making "luxury of devotion" into an article of faith seems to be exactly what happened with the definition of the Immaculate Conception. In any case, I would like to avoid saying anything more right now, in order allow Dr. Liccione to give his thoughts before the discussion gets carried on much further.
Haha,
whoops - i meant Rob
Iohannes,
My comment was not directed at your use of Gregory, but Michael's. About 12 years or so ago, I spent a year studying Gregory's Orations and the Pneumatamochoi controversy in serious depth and I don't think a fair reading of his work can yield the kind of support Mike wants for a Newmanesque theoryof development. A far better source would be historically much closer to Newman's historical period, namely in German Idealism.
Ed,
Is the Catholic Encylopedia an accurate expression of the Church or not?
Iohannes,
You seem to believe that the doctrine of the perpetual virginity of Mary is merely a pious opinion of the church. This is not clear. Simply because a dogma has not been formally proclaimed does not make it any less a dogma. Otherwise, we'd have to say that the doctrine of the virgin birth or the Resurrection, which have never been formally proclaimed as dogmas, are merely matters of pious opinion.
In the case of the Perpetual Virginity, it is mentioned twice at Constantinople II in its anathemas against the three chapters. St. Leo the Great sets it forth in his dogmatic letter to Flavian, which was accepted by the Council of Chalcedon. The Second Council of Nicaea also confesses Mary as the God-bearer, ever-virgin.
It sounds to me like there's more going on here than merely a pious opinion.
Ed
Iohannes,
Ed is right on this one - it's no accident that the liturgies of the Church speak of Mary as "ever-virgin", and the Fathers (and some of the more famous reformers, now that I think about it) fiercely repudiated those who sought to challenge the dogma.
Ioannes,
I think a better example of a pious devotion would be the assumption (I am speaking from an Orthodox point of view here)
Perry:
I don’t think Gregory has in mind what Newman has in mind. Gregory is writing in the heat of the Pneumatamochoi controversy, a species of later Semi-Arianism. The charge was that the divinity of the Spirit was unknown and therefore foreign to the apostolic deposit. Gregory’s claim is one of disclosure and revelation, rather than conceptual development.
Given what I know of your general position on DD, I very much doubt you want to say that. We both agree that authentic DD, on the hypothesis that there is such a thing, is not progressive revelation. I hold that it is a bringing forth of what is materially but only implicitly contained in the deposit of faith. So, assuming you want to deny that there is progressive revelation, it is by no means clear how Gregory's claim "of disclosure and revelation" differs from progressive revelation on the one hand and the kind of thing I advocate on the other.
Best,
Mike
Michael,
Even if what you say is true, it wouldn't follow that Gregory has in mind what Newman did. He didn't. Plenty of work has alrady been done on the Cappadocian appeal to an unproclaimed tradition vs. the kerygma and that is the distinction I had in mind. The advance that Gregory has in mind is one of proclomation, not one development. Basil makes a similar appeal in his defense of the Spirit. So I am not claiming that for Gregory he thinks of new revelation being had. I'd recommend looking at some of the work already in the literature on the proposed distinction. Many scholars reject that Gregory is right here, but that is a different question from what he has in mind. I happen to think he not only has something else in mind from Newman but he is also right.
Perry:
It would indeed be anachronistic to claim that Gregory had in mind just what Newman did in speaking of DD. But it seems to me nonetheless that what Gregory did say is much more palatable on Newman's view than on any view which denies the possibility of authentic DD.
Best,
Mike
Michael,
But Gregory isn't talking about DD or appealing to anything like it. So it isn't a question of it being palatable or not. Further, the way you placed the texts was to give the reader the impression that Gregory did have DD in mind, perhaps not as developed (pun!) as Newman had in mind, but essentially the same idea. But my point is that claim is false.
Ioannes:
At this point, it seems to me that the discussion is less about whether there is development of doctrine than about which developments should be dogmatized. My own view is that there is no a priori answer to that question, aside from a stipulation that the proposed dogma pertain directly to the deposit of faith. It would be most unwise to try to shackle the Holy Spirit in this regard, treating as mere opinion truths that can be important aids to some people's salvation.
Last year I wrote a post about the importance of the Marian doctrines for salvation. I expect it contains a perspective you have not encountered before.
Best,
Mike
Perry:
There are more ways to see DD than Newman's metaphor of organic growth. By claiming that the co-equal divinity of the Holy Spirit was not openly proclaimed until the Church was ready to hear it, Gregory was, in my view, showing one such way. Obviously that does not show that Gregory had an explicit theory of DD or that, if he had had one, it would have been Newman's. But that only goes to show that the idea of DD has itself developed—not that the idea is a purely modern innovation.
Best,
Mike
Mike,
I didn't appeal to Newman's metaphor. I appeal to Newman's idea. Do you think Gregory taught Newmans idea or not? If not, why place it in the context of doctrinal development if it isn't to support the idea?
I didn't claim that Gregory's theory of DD was not explicit. I claimed that quote can't be used to support the idea that he taught or believed any theory of DD. The context and use in the controversy among the Cappadocians, as well as other authors in the Pneumatamochoi controversy was an appeal to an unproclaimed tradition, not to development.
Alex & Mr. De Vita,
Not everything spoken of by a Council is dogma. Is your position that the perpetual virginity of Mary has the status of dogma just as the belief that Mary is Theotokos has that status? My position is that some beliefs, however decorous and well attested by the fathers, are not dogmas but pious opinions. Just because something is strictly speaking a pious belief doesn't mean we should necessarily feel free to reject it. The Church has afforded varying degrees of approval to certain pious beliefs, while stopping short of mandating them as dogmas necessary to be affirmed.
Dr. Liccione,
Thanks for the link. I would still appreciate an answer to my comments from a couple days ago (the ones on how Newman-style development is compatible with the material sufficiency of scripture). But if the discussion has moved on and others aren't interested, I would be fine with letting the matter drop.
Mr. Robinson,
I've been waiting for you to post some stuff on your blog about development. I'm very much interested in how the other ancient Church has been led to understand the Deposit of Faith. I realize that you're probably very busy, but are you still going to post some stuff?
Iohannes,
Thanks for the response - my understanding is that the ever-virginity of the mother of God comes from the sacred tradition; the difference with the assumption is that in contrast, the source for that belief is not found in it - therefore it is not held as a dogma.
A person may hold a belief that is consistent with, but is not given in, holy tradition. This is (I think?) what is generally considered to be a pious tradition.
I think we may just be thinking different meanings of the same words - I am confused about why the resurrection is dogma but the ever-virginity of the Theotokos is not?
Best,
Alex,
Thanks for the reply. I think you are right to ask whether we disagree in anything more than the words we are using.
The difference I see between affirmation of Mary as Theotokos and of Mary as perpetually virgin is that the former is a necessary consequence of the deposit as bearing on the Gospel and recorded in Scripture, while the latter (though we may agree that no one should challenge it) is not absolutely essential to the Gospel, nor is it recorded in Scripture (though Scripture might hint at it). As for the resurrection and the virgin birth, both, besides being taught in Scripture, are part of the Nicene Creed.
It might be good to compare Fr. Behr's remarks here:
http://energeticprocession.wordp...tion-scripture/
Comment 3 at the thread (by "Death Bredon") says pretty much what I have been trying to say.
God bless.
Iohannes
Is the canon of Scripture a logically necessary consequnce of the deposit?
In other words, it is true that whatever is scriptiure is inspired but how does it necessarily follow that..say...the book of Revelation is inspired? We're not talking epistemic necessity here, as you said, but logical necessity.
In fact, some books were not considered to be Scripture til centuries later. That seems to be an example of a development that was not simply a logical consequence.
Apolono,
I think Iohannes is talking about doctrines and dogmas. The Canon is neither, but that whichy we derive our doctrines and dogmas.
Iohannes,
Thanks for the reference.
Iohannes,
I wouldn't be too quick to assume that a particular doctrine is not essential to the gospel. That is a matter for the church to decide, not individuals. As an instance of this, consider the fact that evangelical Protestants generally believe in the deity of Christ but would not call Mary the Mother of God. Obviously, they do not see the essential connection between the two.
But the church does.
In the case of the perpetual virginity of our Lady, the argument used by the Fathers had to do with the fact that her womb was made so holy for having contained God Himself that nothing less than God could enter it. On this account, a denial of her perpetual virginity would entail a denial of the divinity of Christ.
Ed
Kepha,
It is a doctrine of the Church that the Gospel of Matthew is Scripture. In fact, Trent places an anathema on those who reject the books which the Council declared as sacred.
Apolonio,
For a good discussion of the canon's relation to the Apostles and subsequent generations of the Church, see Herman Ridderbos's Redemptive History and the New Testament Scriptures. If you would like to discuss the formation of the canon, and how it relates to ecclesial authority, I would be happy to do so somewhere else.
Mr. De Vita,
I agree that it is for the Church to decide. But I don't see where the Church has decided that the perpetual virginity of Mary is dogma. Giving sanction to a belief, even quite strong sanction, is not the same thing as mandating it as dogma. For another explanation, this time from an orthodox Anglican perspective, see:
http://philorthodox.blogspot.com...ver-
virgin.html
You are right that too many Protestants deny that Mary is the Mother of God. In my experience they mostly do so in reaction against the excesses of Roman Catholic Marian devotion. When the doctrine is explained to them, they normally don't have trouble understanding why it is true, and so they revise their beliefs. The more traditional Protestant churches receive the doctrinal deliverances of the Ecumenical Councils, at least the first four, and so the confusion you point to seems to be mostly a matter of deficient instruction of the faithful.
Mr. Robinson,
Like Kepha, I would be interested to learn your thoughts on development of doctrine.
Iohannes,
I'm not talking about the canon and ecclesiastical authority, but the relationship between your claim that development is only limited to logical necessity. You cannot go from:
Every Scripture is inspired
to
Philemon is Scripture
by simple logical necessity. So the development of the doctrine that Philemon is scripture is not just a logical consequence.
Apolonio makes an excellent point here.
Protestants take for granted that the Canon of Scripture which they so revere and acknowledge as such (i.e., the 27 Books of the New Testament) was the result of The Church having declared thus in the Council of Rome in 382 AD and later affirmed in subsequent councils, Hippo (393 AD) and Carthage (397).
Due to 20/20 hindsight, they often take that for granted.
I would very much be interested in learning from these individuals how (apart from the Authority of The Church having thus declared in the 4th Century) do they actually know that such books deemed part of the New Testament are, in fact, Scripture per se.
After all, many in the early church rejected Revelations, Jude, 2nd and 3rd John, and Hebrews as being Scripture and declared they were not inspired; while, on the other hand, the Epistle of Clement was actually regarded as inspired Scripture. In fact, it was read in Corinth for over a hundred years as Sacred Scripture after Clement died.
Moreover, Apolonio is keen to point out that such determination of the New Testament Canon by The Church is actually a Development itself.
Apolonio,
I share Kepha's perspective; doctrine and dogma aren't the best categories for thinking about the canon of scripture. If Trent says otherwise, that may settle the matter for you, but it doesn't for Christians who don't receive Trent as a binding council. For an example of the troubles that ensue when the categories of doctrine or dogma are misapplied, see the controversy among the Spanish scholastics of the early 17th century on whether it is properly de fide that a particular pope is in fact pope.
what do you think scripture is?
Iohannes,
So the proposition,
"Gospel of Matthew is Scripture."
is just a true proposition but not doctrine? It seems to me that the proposition is actually about God's plan of salvation, that God has made Himself known by inspiring the author of Matthew.
Define doctrine.
For those interested in my thoughts on DD, it is no great secret. Second, this is not the place to discuss it as it would probably constitute a hi-jacking of the thread. While I have significant disagreements with Mike, it wouldn't be fair to do so. I suppose at some time in the future I will post something else with some new "developments" with respect tomy thinking on the matter.
But as for now I am unable as I am suffering from a great evil and injustice done to me and am facing the loss of my home. Finding work takes precedence.
Perry Robinson:
But as for now I am unable as I am suffering from a great evil and injustice done to me and am facing the loss of my home. Finding work takes precedence.
You'll be in my prayers, Mr. Robinson.
I can't imagine the horror of losing a home; although, I imagine I may suffer a similar fate anytime soon given the current economic climate.
Mr. Robinson,
You'll be in my family's prayers.
Ioannes:
Sorry for overlooking the following comments of yours:
From my perspective the difficulty continues to reside in how to square Newman's vision of development with the material sufficiency of the deposit. It is beyond question that Roman Catholics believe nothing can be added to the material content of the deposit... Yet there is an apparent problem (whether real or not) when this belief is juxtaposed with the belief that the distinctively Roman dogmas are divinely revealed.
Following the past discussion of abductive reasoning in connection with development I will take Isaiah 7:14 as an example. As Christians we of course believe this verse speaks to the virgin birth of the Messiah. At the same time we acknowledge that, as was said before, the virgin birth of the Messiah "is not warranted as a strict deduction from the original Hebrew text." To redeploy Jesuit historian Klaus Schatz's language about the emergence of the Papacy, we maintain that the prophecy's inspired teaching did in fact "encompass the possibility" which we now recognize as its most important fulfillment.
On this much I believe we are agreed. The divergence of opinion seems to arise naturally enough when we turn to the implications for doctrinal development.
First, for how I see the significance of such examples as Isaiah 7:14, see my post Ratzinger, Scripture, and the development of doctrine. The point can be generalized for the entire NT's Christological hermeneutic of the OT.
Second, and given as much, I should say that the entire body of developed Catholic dogma does not detract from the "material sufficiency" of Scripture, if by 'material sufficiency' we mean that Scripture contains, in varying degrees of explicitness and implicitness, the entire deposit of faith. But it does not thereby follow that Scripture alone is sufficient for getting across the entire DF to the world or even to the faithful. Indeed, I believe that those dogmas taught by the Catholic Church which cannot be formally deduced from Scripture stand in a relation to Scripture that is similar to, even if not entirely the same as, how the NT stands to the OT. Thus all authentic instances of DD—e.g., the co-equal divinity of the Holy Spirit, the filioque as defined at Lyons and Florence, St. Gregory Palamas' essence/energies distinction, and the Immaculate Conception—are contained implicitly but not explicitly in Scripture. In general, the wider Tradition out of which Scripture grew, and the Magisterium of the Church, are also and equally necessary for getting across the entire DF.
Best,
Mike
Mr. Robinson,
I will be praying for you and your family.
Apolonio,
If you really wish to discuss these matters, then as I said above, I will be happy to do so elsewhere. What you are asking is a tangent to the discussion of Newman and development. Also, please don't issue bald imperatives.
e.,
If you wish to have a serious discussion of the canon's formation, then as with Apolonio, I will be glad to do so at another time. For now, I will say what HJ Schroeder said in his edition of Trent: "The Tridentine list or decree was the first infallible and effectually promulgated declaration on the Canon of the Holy Scriptures." That is why as devoted a Roman Catholic as Cajetan, for example, was allowed to raise questions about the status of certain books.
Dr. Liccione,
Thanks for the reply. I think we may be talking past each other. I had your post on Ratzinger in mind when writing my comments. Those comments (which come in 3 parts) were concerned with whether Newman-style development can be squared with belief in the material sufficiency of scripture. Specifically, the argument was that the Old Testament was not sufficient in itself to warrant the conclusion that the virgin birth of the Messiah is a doctrine divinely revealed. The Old Testament revelation included the possibility that the Messiah would be born of a virgin. Further revelation was necessary, however, to get from the virgin birth of Christ being a possibility to it being, properly speaking, a revealed doctrine.
Mr. Robinson, you and your family are in my prayers.
The Canon -- Athanasius's list in one of his Festal Letters gives the 22 OT books recognized by Jews and the 27 NT books recognized by Christians. This is a consensus the Church reached over centuries.
"Protestants take for granted that the Canon of Scripture which they so revere and acknowledge as such (i.e., the 27 Books of the New Testament) was the result of The Church having declared thus in the Council of Rome in 382 AD and later affirmed in subsequent councils, Hippo (393 AD) and Carthage (397)."
Not so sure they take anything for granted. Karl Barth thought the Church had the authority to revise the Canon, though he did not recommend it in practice. Luther notoriously called James an epistle of straw and sought to identify a canon within the canon.
"I would very much be interested in learning from these individuals how (apart from the Authority of The Church having thus declared in the 4th Century) do they actually know that such books deemed part of the New Testament are, in fact, Scripture per se."
But we do not even know if the texts have come to us in reliable form -- there are thousands upon thousands of variants. This clutching at certitude is misguided.
Then there is the question of the Apocrypha -- why are they recognized as Scripture at all? I think the Lord leaves it largely up to the churches what books they will accept or reject as Sacred Scripture.
"After all, many in the early church rejected Revelation, Jude, 2nd and 3rd John, and Hebrews as being Scripture and declared they were not inspired; while, on the other hand, the Epistle of Clement was actually regarded as inspired Scripture. In fact, it was read in Corinth for over a hundred years as Sacred Scripture after Clement died."
Which further illustrates the point.
"Moreover, Apolonio is keen to point out that such determination of the New Testament Canon by The Church is actually a Development itself."
Of course it is.
""The Tridentine list or decree was the first infallible and effectually promulgated declaration on the Canon of the Holy Scriptures." That is why as devoted a Roman Catholic as Cajetan, for example, was allowed to raise questions about the status of certain books."
Sorry, but the effort to create certitude by raising Trent's list to the status of a unique, infallible determination is question-begging.
"I believe that those dogmas taught by the Catholic Church which cannot be formally deduced from Scripture stand in a relation to Scripture that is similar to, even if not entirely the same as, how the NT stands to the OT. Thus all authentic instances of DD—e.g., the co-equal divinity of the Holy Spirit, the filioque as defined at Lyons and Florence, St. Gregory Palamas' essence/energies distinction, and the Immaculate Conception—are contained implicitly but not explicitly in Scripture."
In reverse, any dogma not contained implicitly in Scripture would be false. Since when has the essence/energies distinction been a Catholic dogma?
The inspiration of Scripture is a dogma, of sorts, but the identification of particular books as inspired (and canonical) is not exactly a dogma. If we accept a communal theory of inspiration, the faith of Israel as expressed in its sacred writings gives a general inspired status to them and the selection of the ones that are most clearly inspired is then a matter of taste and judgment. There is not objectively a huge gulf -- a qualitative difference -- between the less inspired parts of Scripture and the most inspired parts of extra-biblical literature. The people of the covenant has a certain indefectible fullness of the Spirit that gives certain of their books inestimable value as testimonies. That is all that needs to be said. Efforts to copperfasten inerrancy and inspiritation, as in Leo XIII's Providentissimus Deus (which unwisely rejected the more seasoned and realistic suggestions of Newman) are self-defeating.
"Since when has the essence/energies distinction been a Catholic dogma?"
Exactly.
Fr. O'Leary and Perry:
I do not limit "all authentic instances of DD" to the class of dogmas defined by the Catholic Church. I believe St. Gregory's E/E distinction to be a true doctrine and thus an authentic instance of DD. That the Catholic Church has not dogmatized it is neither here nor there. Not all sound development of doctrine issues in defined dogmas.
Best,
Mike
Ioannes:
Specifically, the argument was that the Old Testament was not sufficient in itself to warrant the conclusion that the virgin birth of the Messiah is a doctrine divinely revealed. The Old Testament revelation included the possibility that the Messiah would be born of a virgin. Further revelation was necessary, however, to get from the virgin birth of Christ being a possibility to it being, properly speaking, a revealed doctrine.
We might indeed be talking past one another. Everything depends on what is meant by "warrant," and I don't think you're paying enough heed to that.
For example, Isaiah 7:14 does not "warrant" the conclusion that the Messiah would be born of a literal virgin, if by "warrant" we mean deductively valid inference from what the author wrote and how his Jewish audience understood it. But Matthew's interpretation is "warranted" all the same because the definitive stage of divine revelation tells us what the Holy Spirit had in mind in inspiring Isaiah's prophecy. Hindsight thus enables us to warrant Matthew's inference as an abduction rather than as a deduction. The "suffering servant" passages in that same book may and should be similarly treated.
From this point of view, the fullness of divine revelation brings out what is present, but only implicitly, in an earlier stage. Such is what Jesus brought out for the disciples on the road to Emmaus. And that's the sort of thing I have in mind when comparing DD to the development of revelation itself as recorded in the Scriptures. Later reflection based on various factors, both theological and historical, enables us to make warranted abductive inferences from earlier expressions of Tradition to reach new formulations that bring out what was present but only implicit therein.
Best,
Mike
The historical reality of the virgin birth is undermined by Matthew's use of Isaiah, since the idea that the story is simply based on the Isaiah text arises. Philo of Alexandria, also 1st century, has a story of the virgin birth of Isaac that suggests such ideas were in the air at the time.
Mike,
I have to wonder if we mean the same thing by the e/e distinction since this seems like a significant change in perspective for you.
Second, I don't take the e/e distinction to be an instance of development since I think there is plenty of biblical and early patristic witness to it.
The essence and energies distinction is amply expounded in Philo of Alexandria -- though perhaps Gregory Palamas represents a more refined development of it (I speak in ignorance). I've never been able to understand how it can be compatible with divine simplicity or with the post-Nicene trinitarian doctrine.
Fr. O'Leary,
I believe the e/e distinction is in Athanasius and plays a big part of the refutation to Eunomianism in the Cappadocian fathers. In fact, I don't see how you have a refutation of their view without it. I argued as much in a paper I wrote on Gregory of Nyssa. I also think it's in Ambrose, Hlary of Poiters, Augustine partially (God's seminal reasons),Irenaeus, and Clement of Rome, though in different terminology.
The Cappadocians take a highly antinomical view of divine simplicity compared to the definitional kind we see in the Augustinian tradition (to be is the same to be wise the same to be great the same to be a person). The Cappadocian doctrine juxtaposes seemingly opposite assertions, holding both together so as to inforce each other. The upshot in the affirmation of both opposite properties is to emphasize that God is equally one and many and as a transcendental pointer for your mind that God is beyond all categories. This is the purpose of Cappadocian dialectical statements like:
"Lives and life, lights and light, goods and good, glories and glory, true and truth and Spirit of truth, holy ones and holines itself; each one as God if contemplated alone, with the intellect **dividing undivided** entities; the three as one God when apprehended with each other through their identity of movement and of nature." --Oration 23:11
That phrase "dividing undivided" is the true antinomical phrase that limits any kind of positive philosophical content that could be poured into the meaning of simplicity for the Cappadocians.
Photios
Iohannes,
While I am familiar with the difference between 'almah' (young woman with an implication of virginity) and 'parthenos' (virgin), rather than saying that the virgin birth of the Messiah was not expected, it is more proper to say that there is a reason that the seventy translated that verse to explicitly say, 'virgin', and that the hebrew writer of Isaiah used 'young woman'. There is a very good article on this at the website of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese:
http://www.goarch.org/en/
ourfait...article9612.asp
Regarding the perpetual virginity; dogma is not created - it is simply defended against heresy (I am of course speaking from an Orthodox perspective). If the perpetual virginity is contained in the deposit of faith (it is, as far as I know) then it is doctrine.
I'm not sure what your denominational background is fully, but at least for the Orthodox, the Church is not an institution but the one united Body of Christ, which has believed and continues to believe the faith which was given once and for all to the apostles. That Jesus is God, for example, is not a dogma by virtue of the fact that the Church in council expressed that Truth, but by virtue of the fact it is part of the apostolic faith.
Blessings
For those interested, I just posted Part Two of my three part series on de Lubac and the development of doctrine.
Alex,
Thanks for the link. I have no knowledge of Hebrew and so must rely on what scholars and religious authorities have said. Apart from the implications perceived for doctrinal development, there is little (if any) discrepancy between the view I hold of Isaiah's prophecy and the view Dr. Liccione has put forward. That is, the Christological reading of this text, as with many texts in the Old Testament, is not strictly required by the original words. Nonetheless the Christological reading becomes irresistable on the basis of the actual fulfilment we have seen in the coming of the Savior. The tricky issue is not just how to translate the Hebrew word rendered 'parthenos' in the LXX. The still larger matter is whether the passage is Messianic. I am aware of no evidence that the Jews thought it was. But that doesn't mean the text did not speak of the Messiah; it means only that it did not speak so definitely as to preclude other potential readings. Some prophecies are more explicit than others, but they are prophecies all the same.
Just to avoid confusion, it may be good to mention that for me the discussion of the perpetual virginity of Mary is subsidiary to the broader dialogue on development (see how it first appeared here here). I do not belong to the Orthodox Church and will not presume to speak for her. Since it came up, my background is as a traditional Protestant sympathetic to the wider heritage of historic Christianity. With that said, I think Photios Jones gave an excellent account of how belief in the perpetual virginity of Mary (a belief I share) compares to the dogma that Mary is Theotokos. Hopefully his words, coming from a fellow Orthodox, will be helpful for you.
God bless.
Dr. Liccione,
Thanks for the answer. I appreciate the time you have taken in responding to my thoughts, as well as your patience.
I believe we are on the same page on how to read Isaiah 7:14. My contention has not been that the Christian reading follows by deduction from the text. On the contrary, I was already in agreement with the thrust of your second paragraph. It is indeed only by looking back after the fulfillment that we can rightly understand the import of the prophecy.
The difficulty I have suggested is not with this view of the prophecy. It is with the application to development. Here is what I said before:
...it is hard to see how the Old Testament revelation was sufficient in itself to warrant the conclusion that the virgin birth of the Messiah was a doctrine divinely revealed. It is a doctrine we now recognize as anticipated or adumbrated in the Old Testament, but properly speaking it was not revealed until the actual advent of Christ. And so if we impose the categories of the development debate, it seems that new revealed data had to be added to the Old Testament tradition before the doctrine of the virgin birth of the Messiah could become an article of faith as opposed to a [fit] subject of pious opinion and speculation.
This, in a nutshell, looks to be the main weakness with Newman's model of development. If we relax the requirement that later doctrinal developments be somehow conclusions drawn by good and necessary consequence from the Apostolic deposit, then we quickly run up against the problem of ongoing public revelation and material addition to the deposit.
The difficulty is that the application of the prophecy and fulfillment model to development appears to undermine the culmination and completion of public revelation with the Apostles (cf. Lamentabili Sane as Chadwick suggests). Our Christological reading of Isaiah 7:14 depends on data not revealed until the advent of Christ. If the analogy holds, and so, for example, papal infallibility is implicit in the New Testament in the way the virgin birth of the Messiah was implicit in the Old Testament, then for the former to become a divinitus revelatum dogma it seems that new revealed data must likewise supplement the earlier revelation.
Owen Chadwick, writing as an historian rather than a theological polemicist, chose to end his study From Bossuet to Newman with this sentence: "The question then for those who think Newman's theology is Catholic, is this: these new doctrines, of which the Church had a feeling or inkling but of which she was not conscious--in what meaningful sense may it be asserted that these new doctrines are not 'new revelation'?" His question is the same as Fr Boyer's (see Kepha's latest post at Conscious Faith): "How could we say that revelation was closed at the death of the last of the apostles if a subsequent belief were not connected to it by a truly rational and logical bond
The Cappadocians take a highly antinomical view of divine simplicity compared to the definitional kind we see in the Augustinian tradition (to be is the same to be wise the same to be great the same to be a person). The Cappadocian doctrine juxtaposes seemingly opposite assertions, holding both together so as to inforce each other. The upshot in the affirmation of both opposite properties is to emphasize that God is equally one and many and as a transcendental pointer for your mind that God is beyond all categories.
Have you read Ayres's Nicaea and Its Legacy? There's a chapter in there that speaks directly to both the Cappadocian and Augustinian use of divine simplicity, commenting specifically on the passage you quoted. He argues that Augustine is doing exactly what you are saying, using "definitional" language as what you call a "transcedental pointer."
And when it comes down to it, I think he's right. Both he and Giulio Maspero effectively did their work on Gregory of Nyssa in parallel and arrived at the same conclusions for nearly the same reasons. It's almost creepy to see on paper what has been in my head for the last couple of years; the overlap between the bibliography and my library was shocking.
The only drawbacks in these works, if any, is that they don't explicitly address Behr or Bradshaw (and obviously not Farrell, but I have already outlined the reasons why it's doubtful that anyone will). But if you follow the reasoning, then it becomes clear where Bradshaw makes a misstep in conceiving God's decision or create this way or that as an unactualized potency, a category that simply isn't applicable to God in this way. I think Mike L. has said what there is to be said on Fr. Behr anyway,
N.B., If it wasn't clear from the comment above, it would be my position that divine simplicity in the context of the Augustinian/Thomist theory of faith and cognition actually serves the same purpose as the e/e doctrine, even though it uses opposite language. In a way, the Eastern and Western views on this subjective together serve as an the antinomy pointing to transcendence. In a way, we see God (hesychasm); in a way, we do not see God (Augustine). In that antinomy is the mystery; both are true, but inexpressibly so.
"I believe the e/e distinction is in Athanasius and plays a big part of the refutation to Eunomianism in the Cappadocian fathers."
Not a very big part. GNyssa says our speech of God is "about" God while the infinity and simple divine essence is unknowable. I don't think recollect a strong text on divine energies. A single divine life-giving power, common to Father, Son, Spirit, would seem to leave little room over for these energies, which in Philo are much lower beings than God self.
" it's in Ambrose, Hlary of Poiters, Augustine partially (God's seminal reasons),Irenaeus, and Clement of Rome, though in different terminology."
Again, how could it be in Augustine with his very firm doctrine of divine simplicity?
"Lives and life, lights and light, goods and good, glories and glory, true and truth and Spirit of truth, holy ones and holiness itself; each one as God if contemplated alone, with the intellect **dividing undivided** entities; the three as one God when apprehended with each other through their identity of movement and of nature." --Oration 23:11
Is not this about the Trinity rather than energies?
"That phrase "dividing undivided" is the true antinomical phrase that limits any kind of positive philosophical content that could be poured into the meaning of simplicity for the Cappadocians."
In GNyssa the topos of divine simplicity comes up in contesting Eunomius's alleged claim to grasp the essence of God in the word Agennesia (for an alternative view of what Eunomius was up to see Maurice Wiles). He does not draw on trinitarian paradox of the kind you cite to establish simplicity or incomprehensibility of God, any more than his predecessors such as Clement of Alexandria do. And this has nothing to do with essence vs energies.
"Not a very big part. GNyssa says our speech of God is "about" God while the infinity and simple divine essence is unknowable. "
I'd say it played one of the biggest parts. Because Eunomius could not distinguish between the creation of the World and the generation of the Son. And this is because of divine simplicity.
And for Gregory of Nyssa, our language is not something "about" the divine essence, but rather something "around" the divine essence. This is the radical spatial imagery that nothing can grasp God. So, the phrase "ta peri ten theian physin" as referring to "predicates of identity" is a complete misreading and mistranslation of the text by western authors.
"A single divine life-giving power, common to Father, Son, Spirit, would seem to leave little room over for these energies, which in Philo are much lower beings than God self."
Sure it does because the life giving power is "unconfused and undivied" and "indivisibly divided." It is equally both One and Many. That's the whole point of the Oration text I quoted.
"Again, how could it be in Augustine with his very firm doctrine of divine simplicity?"
My point is that he is inconsistent, that's what I meant by partly. In portions of De Trinitate he has the type of simplicity you have in mind. In portions of his exegesis of Genesis he has more of what I have in mind. Again, if God's "seminal reasons" for creating were absolutely one to the view you describe it leaves little reason for the multiplicity that is in creation. You aren't going to get multiplicity from absolute unity.
"Is not this about the Trinity rather than energies?"
Both of course, he thinks that it is applicable both ways. Life, light, and glory aren't Persons ya know.
"He does not draw on trinitarian paradox of the kind you cite to establish simplicity or incomprehensibility of God, any more than his predecessors such as Clement of Alexandria do. And this has nothing to do with essence vs energies."
Really. I'm afraid that you just haven't spent enough time with the text and thinking clearly on their meaning, but instead make sweeping assertions.
I'll let Gregory speak:
"God is not an expression, neither hath He His essence in voice or utterance. But God is of Himself what also He is believed to be, but He is named, by those who call upon Him, not what He is essentially (for the nature of Him Who alone is is unspeakable), but He receives His appellations from what are believed to be His operations [energein] in regard to our life. To take an instance ready to our hand; when we speak of Him as God, we so call Him from regarding Him as overlooking and surveying all things, and seeing through the things that are hidden."
and,
"We are clearly taught by Holy Scripture, by the mouth of great David, when, as by certain peculiar and appropriate names, derived from his contemplation of the works of God, he thus speaks of the Divine nature: “The Lord is
"We are clearly taught by Holy Scripture, by the mouth of great David, when, as by certain peculiar and appropriate names, derived from his contemplation of the works of God, he thus speaks of the Divine nature: “The Lord is full of compassion and mercy, long-suffering, and of great goodness.” Now what do these words tell us? Do they indicate His operations [energeiai], or His nature? No one will say that they indicate aught but His operations [energeiai]."
--CE II, NPNF II, 5, p. 265
The antinomy of the Trinity:
"For while there are many other names by which Deity is indicated in the Historical Books, in the Prophets and in the Law, our Master Christ passes by all these and commits to us these titles as better able to bring us to the faith about the Self-Existent, declaring that it suffices us to cling to the title, “Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,” in order to attain apprehension of Him Who is absolutely Existent, Who is one and yet not one."
and,
“He is divided without separation, and united without confusion.”
-Ref Conf, NPNF II, 5, p. 102
I give a very formal argument in my paper of what is going on in Eunomius and Gregory and their views of simplicity. If you think I am wrong, perhaps you can prime my pump where you think this is.
"Have you read Ayres's Nicaea and Its Legacy? There's a chapter in there that speaks directly to both the Cappadocian and Augustinian use of divine simplicity, commenting specifically on the passage you quoted."
I've read Ayres before but not this one. He's a pretty good patristic scholar. I'll have to read it and see what he has to offer, but I'll note this. If Augustine was being antinomical he would not make such a blunder in saying that these attributes are the *same thing.* Nor would have the subsequent tradition in thinking that God's essence and his attributes are identical and that God in and of Himself is subsistent Being known to the intellect. I'll have to see Ayres' exegesis and see that it doesn't amount to a massive new interpretation of the text.
Photios
It is true that in De Trinitate XV somewhere Augustine says that the attributes are identical not only with the divine substance but with one another. This goes beyond the call of logic!
There is a good article challenging Ayres in the last issue of Modern Theology.
"He is named, by those who call upon Him, not what He is essentially (for the nature of Him Who alone is is unspeakable), but He receives His appellations from what are believed to be His operations [energein] in regard to our life. To take an instance ready to our hand; when we speak of Him as God, we so call Him from regarding Him as overlooking and surveying all things, and seeing through the things that are hidden."
Of course the creative activity of God is the source of our knowledge and naming of him. But if that is all that is meant by divine energeiai I see nothing to argue about.
" Do they indicate His operations [energeiai], or His nature? No one will say that they indicate aught but His operations [energeiai]."
They denote God acting in creation. GNyssa may not have thought through the logic fully. But there are notions of God that concern his relation to creation (such as Creator) and others that concern his essence (such as Good, Wise, Just). If that is all that is meant by the essence/energies distinction I see little to argue about.
Again in Contra Eunomium II, which I studied intensively, I do not recall that arguments for divine incomprehensibility were drawn from the riddles of the Trinity. Rather the limits of the human mind, the incomprehensibility of creation itself, and the faith of Abraham were the sort of things he appealed to.
" our Master Christ passes by all these and commits to us these titles as better able to bring us to the faith about the Self-Existent, declaring that it suffices us to cling to the title, “Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,” in order to attain apprehension of Him Who is absolutely Existent, Who is one and yet not one."
and,
“He is divided without separation, and united without confusion.”
What is new about that? Are you saying that the Trinity teaches us a new conception of the divine essence? I am not sure that your quotes show that.
However, I have not read the Refutatio Conf., and it may be that GNyssa does advance there to a new idea, that the divine essence or our faith in it is given a new focusing by the Trinitarian doctrine.
Perry:
I'm surprised that you say: "I have to wonder if we mean the same thing by the e/e distinction since this seems like a significant change in perspective for you."
I have not changed perspective. Brandon Watson and I have posted before on GPalamas on E/E and expressed agreement with him. We interpret his E/E distinction as compatible with the dogma of divine simplicity formally defined by the Catholic Church. Since you hold the two to be logically incompatible with each other, there is obviously a difference of interpretation. That is not surprising.
I don't take the e/e distinction to be an instance of development since I think there is plenty of biblical and early patristic witness to it.
I would rather say that there is plenty of biblical and patristic warrant for it. But GPalamas' version does not, in my view, deductively follow from the sources either individually or collectively; rather, I believe it to be the best way to synthesize and explain them. It is a warranted abductive inference. If you think it follows in a stronger sense than that, then that is probably due to the same difference of interpretation I've already cited.
I'm puzzled by what appears to be your assumption that a doctrine for which there is good "biblical and patristic witness" cannot be an instance of development. I would say that a doctrine backed by such witness is an authentic development, provided it has not already been formally stated in the sources. But once again, it is not always obvious, at least before hindsight, which doctrines thus count as authentic. Development in any interesting sense is not deductive but abductive inference, and the latter is a far subtler matter than the former.
Best,
Mike
Ioannes:
The difficulty is that the application of the prophecy and fulfillment model to development appears to undermine the culmination and completion of public revelation with the Apostles (cf. Lamentabili Sane...
Owen Chadwick, writing as an historian rather than a theological polemicist, chose to end his study From Bossuet to Newman with this sentence: "The question then for those who think Newman's theology is Catholic, is this: these new doctrines, of which the Church had a feeling or inkling but of which she was not conscious--in what meaningful sense may it be asserted that these new doctrines are not 'new revelation'?" His question is the same as Fr Boyer's (see Kepha's latest post at Conscious Faith): "How could we say that revelation was closed at the death of the last of the apostles if a subsequent belief were not connected to it by a truly rational and logical bond?"
Ioannes:
Once again, everything here depends on what is meant by "a truly rational and logical bond." If the NT's Christological hermeneutic on the OT is sound--and we both agree it is--then what the NT saw in the OT was there to be seen, thus linking the latter to the former by a rational bond. True, it could not readily be seen until the unfolding of divine revelation was complete; but that doesn't make the bond any less rational.
To apply the analogy to DD: what cannot readily be seen at an earlier stage of the Church's understanding of divine revelation can come to be readily seen at a later stage when more has already been assimilated. In no sense does such a process constitute "progressive revelation," if by that phrase is meant a process which materially augments the DF. Rather it constitutes progressive assimilation and thus formal development of what was there all along.
Obviously some of the later authentic developments are not apparent, and do not even seem authentic, to many of those who subscribe to the earlier ones. But that is only to be expected. Every religion has its fundamentalists, who differ with one another only over the size and age of the fundamentum. Christianity is no exception.
Best,
Mike
Michael,
What I recall of agreement was that you both agree that there is no potentiality in God in terms of 1st potentiality. But that is uncontroversial. The question is whether you think there is any 2nd potentiality in God or not. I do and I doubt you do. That is controversial. So the "agreement" so far as I understand it doesn't move the ball down the field.
And if we interpret it differently, then it is exactly as I said, we do not mean the same thing. If you follow Williams or Gleason, then you view it as an epistemic distinction, which Gregory explicitly denies. That isn't the e/e distinction but something else.
As for deduction, the Apostles reading of the OT didn't deductive follow either. And it isn't clear that abductive reasoning helps much either.
If there is good biblical and patristic witness, why do I need development? Why not see them as a record?
SpiritofV2,
Do you mean the article by Jacobs or some other article?
The question is whether you think there is any 2nd potentiality in God or not. I do and I doubt you do. That is controversial.
I suppose it depends on what you mean by 'second potentiality'; usually it would be taken to mean a habitus, an accident added to a substance so as to perfect or actualize its first potentiality and in such a way that it can be further perfected by something else. This clearly can't be the meaning here, since there is no first potentiality to be perfected, and (I would think) we all agree that divine energies can't be accidents superadded to the divine substance. So what meaning do you have in mind?
I have in mind Aristotle's discussion of the soul as the highest form of life and his example of knowledge in a teacher.
I'm afraid I don't find that particularly clarificatory, given that the 'second potentiality' in the case of God will not be second (there being no first potentiality for it to be the incomplete perfection of). The divine energies are clearly not second potentialities in any of the usual senses in which it is applied to human beings for precisely this reason; so the question is what is meant when 'second potentiality' is affirmed of God. It is as if you asked what I meant by the phrase 'divine simplicity' and I replied, "I am alluding to St. Bernard's comments on the Trinity."
Dr. Liccione,
It is true of Isaiah's prophecy that "what the NT saw in the OT was there to be seen," but in the sense that the OT gave a shadow and the NT gives the thing. The thing was not revealed until the NT; before that it could only be guessed at from the shadow. As you said, "You can't get from there to here by being merely literal." In fact, you can't get from there to here without more revelation. Without the new revelation given at Christ's coming, the Christian reading of the prophecy was in OT times a speculative possibility, not a divinitus revelatum dogma. If the development analogy holds, it is the same way with a teaching like papal infallibility. Some may see shadows of it in the NT, but apart from further revelation it is impossible to get beyond the plane of speculation. The thing itself has not been revealed. Surely the path that leads from a shadow to speculation about the corresponding object differs from the path we take when, with the object at last revealed, we look back and, now knowing the object more fully, are enabled better to understand shape of the shadow.
Context is important with Fr Boyer's question. Compare a few lines earlier: I do not see that one can deny the logical connection, which not only exists in itself but which can be traced by our means of investigation, between the progressive precision of dogma and the greatest indefiniteness of origins. The development of a truth can only follow a logic, and this path, at least this point of arrival, must be perceptible. Appealing to life, and, in a way, to the irrational-quoad nos-seems to us to be a concession to certain contemporary philosophies.
Boyer is not saying that we can rationally comprehend the reality to which developed doctrines (like any profound teaching) point us. Rather, he insists only that we can rationally apprehend the course of logic leading from the deposit to a legitimate doctrinal development. What he challenges is what de Lubac asserts, viz. "the Church has no more need, for example, in favor of the Immaculate Conception, to receive a true 'proof' by means of a theological conclusion than she has need to receive from scholars an irrefutable historical attestation of the belief of the faithful in this truth since the beginning."
To distinguish progressive revelation from assimilation looks helpful. Nonetheless, if applied thus to development, it seems a distinction in practice that is only in words. The development from OT to NT is not simply assimilation; it is also a material increase in revelation. No one requires that development from OT to NT follow logical necessity, since that development was characterized by a positive increase in revelation. What those like Fr Boyer resist is the notion that such extra-logical development can be normative for doctrinal development in the NT Church: for public revelation was completed with the Apostles.
Thanks & God bless.
If Augustine was being antinomical he would not make such a blunder in saying that these attributes are the *same thing.* Nor would have the subsequent tradition in thinking that God's essence and his attributes are identical and that God in and of Himself is subsistent Being known to the intellect. I'll have to see Ayres' exegesis and see that it doesn't amount to a massive new interpretation of the text.
His view (and mine for some time) is that Augustine says that "to be is to be wise" etc. is said to make exactly the opposite point from the one you believe him to be asserting. In other words, he says this not to suggest anything definitional, but rather to emphasize exactly how incomprehensible the divine essence is. He is saying something that explicitly defies human comprehension, so that it is not a positive statement about God but rather a statement about our lack of knowledge about what God is. It's not remotely a blunder; it was a deliberate attempt to make exactly the same point that an unfortunate number of scholars have tried to recast as the Neoplatonic use of the same terms.
Certainly, Ayres takes issue with those who attribute to Augustine the Neoplatonic usage of Neoplatonic terms, but those conclusions have been hastily made on insufficient historical dependence anyway, mostly dependent on the word-concept fallacy. Certainly, the overarching theses of Gilson and Armstrong, and even Brown and Rist, are overstated to some extent. Ayres is simply following the observations of, e.g., Sweeney, Burrell, and Rocca regarding the relative inaccuracy of this characterization. Ayres simply does the historical analysis of dependence that ought to have been done by those who hastily read the Neoplatonic framework into Augustine.
Absent that Neoplatonic lens superimposed on Augustine, it becomes clear that his theory of cognition does not suggest anything like Being graspable by the intellect in the sense that you are suggesting. Various Thomist scholars have known that of St. Thomas (notably Wilhelmsen and Maritain), and had the wedge between Augustine and Thomas by Gilson et al., it probably would have been realized with Augustine as well. Indeed, it's somewhat unusual that we have to have a revision to show the compatibility between Augustine and Thomas, but the ressourcement theologians were keen to refute the Harnackian thesis (itself a product of hastily-drawn conclusions), so they erred the other way. The point is that we need to concern ourselves with what is accurate, rather than embracing hastily-drawn (and unreliable) conclusions of the past simply because they have been around. Ayres, to my mind, has it right, and he's brought together several authors who have been beating this drum for some time.
I'm afraid I don't find that particularly clarificatory, given that the 'second potentiality' in the case of God will not be second (there being no first potentiality for it to be the incomplete perfection of).
And shouldn't the question really be not one of first and second potentiality, but one of active and passive potency? It seems to me that the eleventh century discussions of God's omnipotence and the Scholastic investigation of active and passive potency very clearly refutes the notion that God's lack of passive potency suggests that He is somehow identical with the effects He produces, which are only finite and constrained imitations of infinite power.
Brandon,
I didn't imply that 2nd potentiality was in reference to the divine energies. I meant the divine essence. And the problem you pose depends on how we understand the nature of the soul in Aristotle as the highest form of life. Since the intellect is eternal, there is no pure potentiality in it either.
Perry,
Sorry about the misinterpretation; since your comment had been about the distinction between essence and energies, I took it that, when you said to Mike that the agreement [with Palamas on the divine energies] had been that there is no 1st potentiality but that the "question is whether you think there is any 2nd potentiality in God or not" that you were talking about the energies (particularly since you didn't correct me after my first comment). A hasty assumption on my part, I suppose. But since you still haven't said anything about the meaning of 'second potentiality' here, just pointing to one of the most obscure and controversial parts of Aristotle's view of the soul, namely, the intellect, and since I now no longer have any clear idea how this is supposed to relate to the distinction between essence and energies, I am more at loss to understand your comment than I was to begin with.
Ioannes:
You've been emphasizing the disanalogy between the unfolding of divine revelation on the one hand and the progressive assimilation by the Church of its definitive form on the other. I grant that disanalogy. But that does not detract from the analogy I have drawn between how revelation itself unfolds and how the Church assimilates it progressively. Each is continuous with its own past, and the continuity is manifest to God's faithful people through reflection guided by "the analogy of faith" itself. That is a "logic" of sorts, if one wishes to use that term; but the logic or "rational bond" is typically abductive rather than deductive.
I don't think I would disagree with what I understand Fr. Bouyer's position to be. He was opposing the essentially Modernist idea that the development of doctrine proceeeds vitalistically as opposed to rationally. However, my position is not the one he rejects. What I've said in the previous paragraph should suffice to show why.
Best,
Mike
Dr. Liccione,
Thanks for the answer. Do you mean that you agree with Fr Boyer over against Cardinal de Lubac? Are you thinking possibly of L. Bouyer rather than C. Boyer?
God bless.
Ioannes:
Sorry, my misspelling. I meant Boyer.
I agree with both Boyer and de Lubac. I am able to do so because I don't believe that what de Lubac meant to affirm is what Boyer meant to deny. De Lubac wanted to insist that authentic DD cannot be a matter of inferring the truth of a given doctrine by means of scholarly "proofs," even if such efforts are meant to prove that the doctrine in question satisfies the VC. Just as no article of faith can be proven by reason alone,neither can the interesting instances of authentic DD be "proven" from premises drawn from the DF. If they could be, then they would have been affirmed throughout the Church sooner than many have been, or at least not as widely denied as many have been.
This does not mean, however, that authentic DD is irrational. It means that the abductive inference which is typical of it is propelled by more than mere data. The Holy Spirit is at work in it, shaping minds and hearts accordingly. We can see the "reasonability" of such a process retrospectively, in terms of Newman's "seven marks". The process of justification here is not the same as the process of discovery; but the former satisfies the latter.
Best,
Mike
"He is saying something that explicitly defies human comprehension, so that it is not a positive statement about God but rather a statement about our lack of knowledge about what God is. It's not remotely a blunder; it was a deliberate attempt to make exactly the same point that an unfortunate number of scholars have tried to recast as the Neoplatonic use of the same terms."
If saying that the attributes are the same thing and are the same thing as being a person, and that this is to represent our lack of knowledge about God, then that seems completely counter-intuitive. Absence of knowledge or apophaticism is supposed to prevent you from saying such a thing. That's the point of the doctrine of apophaticism. Secondly, the spin you give on it doesn't seem any different than Plotinus from what I've read of him. The type of human comprehension that Augustine has in mind is the kind of incomprehensibility that has always been taught by the Augustinian tradition: that the feable human mind can't understand how 'to be' is the same thing as 'to be great' and is the same thing 'to be wise' and is the same thing 'to be a person.' This is isn't the kind of incomprehensibility that I have in mind at all.
Photios
If saying that the attributes are the same thing and are the same thing as being a person, and that this is to represent our lack of knowledge about God, then that seems completely counter-intuitive.
But he never says that attributes are the same thing as being a person in the sense that you are asserting it. He never says that "to be the Father is to be the Son is to be the Holy Spirit," which is what would be required on your reading. What he is saying is that the essence, the actuality of being, by which each divine person is a person is common. This is nothing other than an assertion of a common and simple essence, the persistent eisegesis of the Neoplatonic view into Augustine notwithstanding.
Plotinus does not, in fact, make this distinction. He views the infinity and transcedence of the One solely in terms of effects, which requires the One, the Nous, and the World-Soul to have different essences. While Augustine is never explicit about the infinity of the essence in itself, one can certainly infer it, and regardless, there is nothing in his statement here that would contradict that sense.
Different languages and culture; different theological grammar; same concepts. That's all that's happening here.
"He never says that "to be the Father is to be the Son is to be the Holy Spirit," which is what would be required on your reading."
I don't need to make the argument that hard and fast. It's illustrative enough just to show Augustine's belief in the Trinity and then his philosophical commitments on the side, and then, to illustrate the incompatibility which they are.
"What he is saying is that the essence, the actuality of being, by which each divine person is a person is common."
Essence qua person is never in common among persons. You're somewhat proving the premise of my argument and my reading of the text. What makes me a 'person' is not in common with Mike, Perry, or you.
And no. What Augustine says is that it is not one thing to be wise and then another thing to be great. They are in fact the same thing, whereas in creatues: greatness and wisdom are in fact distinct. And then he goes on to say that this same "something" is not other than being a person. All you have to do is just *read* the text.
"Plotinus does not, in fact, make this distinction."
And what distinction is this? What distinction did you make above?
"He views the infinity and transcedence of the One solely in terms of effects, which requires the One, the Nous, and the World-Soul to have different essences."
He views the transcedence of the One over everything else in terms of CAUSE.
Photios
Professor,
If you agree with both de Lubac and Boyer, then this must mean that you disagree with de Lubac's heavy criticism of Boyer's understanding of development?
In his chapter on the development of dogma, de Lubac links both Fr. Tuyaerts and Fr. Boyer together as representatives of an outdated, erroneous understanding of development. He begins the chapter by criticizing Fr. Tuyaerts, while using other scholars in the process to show that Fr. Tuyaerts is outside of the consensus of Catholic theologians on this issue. After he demonstrates this he ends the first section of the chapter by saying that, unfortunately, Fr. Tuyaerts's thought has been revived by a Fr. Boyer.
The second section of the chapter is dedicated to disproving Fr. Boyer's understanding of development, which de Lubac says is a "danger" (Theology in History, p.256). De Lubac begins the section by saying that Fr. Boyer's "position of the problem and way of approaching it" is flawed (Ibid.). Next, de Lubac takes him to task for attempting to utilize St. Thomas for his view of development. He then moves into his critique of Fr. Boyer's claim that all development must be logical or else it is new revelation.
If you want a bit more detailed of de Lubac's critique of Fr. Boyer, I have posted it on my blog. The third and final part of de Lubac's critique of both Fathers Tuyaerts and Boyer will posted this evening. At any rate, how can you agree with both de Lubac and Boyer since the former completely repudiates the latter's view?
Dr. Liccione,
Thanks again. Kepha's comment brings out what is confusing me in your most recent statements. Would you mind giving your thoughts on Kepha's series on de Lubac? If you don't have time, I would certainly understand. An additional post at Conscious Faith that may be relevant is the one on Newman's Logic (here). I am having trouble seeing how Newman's notion of 'logical sequence' (as opposed to 'logical explication') doesn't amount to progressive revelation in all but name. That was Chadwick's concern, too (see the comments beneath the post).
God bless.
Ioannes and Kepha:
It ought to be obvious that I believe de Lubac "overinterpreted" Boyer. De Lubac rightly rejected what he thought Boyer was doing, but I believe Boyer was doing something less ambitious than what de Lubac thought him to be doing. I think you and kepha tend to overinterpret Newman as well.
Overinterpretation is a very common problem in theology because, when somebody produces arguments for a given position of great importance for assimilating the deposit of faith, the reaction of many is that the author is trying to prove something that cannot be proven, or more generally to substitute reason for faith. The cure for that is to always keep in mind that illumination is often not the same thing as demonstration.
Meanwhile, I suppose the discussion will have to shift this discussion to your blog and kepha's.
Best,
Mike
Dr. Liccione,
It is possible that de Lubac "overinterpreted" Boyer. Owen Chadwick, however, who presumably was working independently of de Lubac, read Boyer in the same way:
The development is asserted to be strictly logical, strictly an inference. But the Church, or the theologian, cannot perceive, or cannot always perceive, the logical connection until afterwards. Though the definition occurs without conscious inference, we look back subsequently and we see that it was a strictly logical explication. For this view, see, e.g. C. Boyer in Gregorianum, vol. XXI (1940), p. 265. [From Bossuet to Newman, 211]
If you would like to switch the discussion over to the Conscious Faith blog, that is fine with me. Feel free to comment on any of the threads, regardless of whether they are currently under discussion or not.
Best,
Iohannes
I agree with Iohannes, and I apologize for extending the blog topic to such lengths.
I don't need to make the argument that hard and fast. It's illustrative enough just to show Augustine's belief in the Trinity and then his philosophical commitments on the side, and then, to illustrate the incompatibility which they are.
I just don't know what it means not to make an argument hard and fast. If it isn't hard and fast, then it's at best debatably true. And reading Augustine's philosophical commitments "on the side," in a manner inconsistent with his other writing, is precisely the problem, so ISTM that this is just a wrong approach. It's well established, to be sure, but not correct.
Essence qua person is never in common among persons. You're somewhat proving the premise of my argument and my reading of the text. What makes me a 'person' is not in common with Mike, Perry, or you.
But that's not what Augustine is saying; he never says that essence qua person is common (the phrase doesn't even make sense for Augustine, since the divine essence necessarily subsists as the Trinity). What he is saying is that the sine qua non of personhood, i.e., having a rational nature, is common. In other words, there is no separation between God's rationality and God's other qualities. He isn't remotely saying that the individual personal existence is common; he is simply saying that the quality of rational existence is common. St. Severinus Boethius takes it the same way.
And no. What Augustine says is that it is not one thing to be wise and then another thing to be great. They are in fact the same thing, whereas in creatues: greatness and wisdom are in fact distinct.
I don't dispute that. That is an assertion of the divine incomprehensibility.
And then he goes on to say that this same "something" is not other than being a person. All you have to do is just *read* the text.
I would think that exegesis would have something to do with harmonizing separate statements and reading them in light of a close study of historical context, but maybe that is the problem. If you read it in the same way both Boethius and Aquinas did (which reading I believe has ample warrant), then the "something" in question is simply the rational faculties of powers, which are attributes of nature and not person.
And what distinction is this? What distinction did you make above?
The distinction between essence and person, between the mode of personal existence and the nature of that existence. Most simply, the distinction between "that is" and "what is."
He views the transcedence of the One over everything else in terms of CAUSE.
Precisely. Augustine and Aquinas do not, at least not without stripping this concept of "cause" from all of the connotations that corrupt Plotinus's understanding. They use the WORD "cause," but the concept is practically the opposite of Plotinus's. It's the same thing that Gregory of Nyssa does. But Ayres covers thi
(cont.)
But Ayres covers this explicitly, although he is hardly the first. I'm not sure why people seem to think that there is some magic in using the word "cause" that makes you an Origenist, but the evidence doesn't support that hypothesis. "Cause" in Western theology is stripped of its temporal connotations with respect to intra-Trinitarian relations.
"I just don't know what it means not to make an argument hard and fast. If it isn't hard and fast, then it's at best debatably true."
It means I don't have to be that explicit in stating that Augustine "thinks the Person of the Father is the Person of the Son is the Person of the Holy Spirit." If asked simply, I have no doubt he would deny it. To state that Augustine simply thinks this, is just an ad hominem to him. The problem is far more complex and his confusion far deeper than he realized. It has to do with the order in which those questions are asked, and not necessarily the questions he did in fact ask. In other words: ordo theologiae. All heretics when confronted with the bald face conclusion of their teachings would more than likely deny them. Take Pelagius' acquital by the Eastern Bishops for example.
What I mean is that it's possible to draw that as a *conclusion* implicit in Augustine's own thinking based on his assumptions from NeoPlatonism, which Augustine entertains why there isn't just one Person in the Trinity. Obviously, he's investigating what his philosophy is telling him. This is part and parcel of doing speculative thinking.
"What he is saying is that the sine qua non of personhood, i.e., having a rational nature, is common."
Again, you are proving my point of how I read the text. Simply having a rational nature is not the sine qua non of personhood. Why? Cuz you and I have that rational nature in common. It doesn't individuate you and me. Something else is needed to constitute personhood. Augustine is just simply wrong.
"then the "something" in question is simply the rational faculties of powers, which are attributes of nature and not person."
But is this in fact what Augustine says in the text? He says that to be great and to be wise is the same as to be a person. So where are you getting this from that person is excluded from attribution when Augustine says that just IS what it means to be a Person.
""Cause" in Western theology is stripped of its temporal connotations with respect to intra-Trinitarian relations."
Western Theology traditionally doesn't use causa as a term to describe intra-Trinitarian relations. This has nothing to do with the discussion or problem at hand. You're straining to describe how philosophically Augustine differs from Plotinus on simplicity. In some ways, Augustine's just more consistent then Plotinus is on simplicity. Per Plotinus' aphophaticism, it would really be improper to say that the One is even "simple" in terms of defintion of identity or that it's activity is the same as its being, which he acknowledges in some places and denies in others.
"The distinction between essence and person, between the mode of personal existence and the nature of that existence. Most simply, the distinction between "that is" and "what is.""
I don't see the distinction adequately expressed enough to be the Person and Nature distinction that the
I don't see the distinction adequately expressed enough to be the Person and Nature distinction that the Trinity requires. I'm failing to grasp where you think a person amounts to something 'that is' simply. I can get all the mileage out of that thought simply with Plotinus. What do I need the Trinity for?
The second problem is if that distinction is even justified at all if "He is called in respect to Himself both God, and great, and good, and just, and anything else of the kind; and just as to Him to be is the same as to be God, or as to be great, or as to be good, so it is the same thing to Him to be as to be a person."(St. Augustine, De Trinitate, 7:6:11)
The problem is far more complex and his confusion far deeper than he realized.
Is it genuinely his confusion or yours?
It has to do with the order in which those questions are asked, and not necessarily the questions he did in fact ask. In other words: ordo theologiae. All heretics when confronted with the bald face conclusion of their teachings would more than likely deny them.
Augustine is a heretic?
The thought never crossed my mind that a certain number of Orthodox, or even the Orthodox in general, actually considered St. Augustine a heretic.
e,
I don't think Augustine is a heretic because I don't think anybody can be condemned for speculating for its own sake. Nothing wrong with that. I do think Augustine speculated in a heretical direction though (haven't we all), heretical meaning a false opinion incompatible with the faith, and I'm comfortable expressing that. Expressing heretical ideas is different than personally being a heretic. If I'm pointed towards Augustine, its because his views and his legacy have been common to western christianity in general and with Roman Catholicism in particular. Where the West differs from the East, it is precisely because of its "Augustinism." If that didn't happen, we wouldn't even be discussing Augustine and his errors would hardly be worth commenting on. We would do precisely what St. Photios prescribed: seek to cover up his nakedness.
As far as my comment, I wasn't trying to say that Augustine has the same status as the heretics, I was trying to use them as an example. If I was unclear, I hope this comment makes it clear what I think.
Photios
It has to do with the order in which those questions are asked, and not necessarily the questions he did in fact ask. In other words: ordo theologiae.
But that seems to be what I am saying with the what is/that is distinction. I am suggestin that Augustine starts from the existence of the persons (that is) as a theoloical datum, not the kind of entity (what is) to derive the existence of the persons. That is in contrast with, e.g., Plotinus.
What I mean is that it's possible to draw that as a *conclusion* implicit in Augustine's own thinking based on his assumptions from NeoPlatonism, which Augustine entertains why there isn't just one Person in the Trinity.
I don't believe the Neoplatonic assumptions have actually been shown. I think they have been supposed based on the use of certain terms, but I do not believe that they have been demonstrated. At least, they have not to my satisfaction, FWIW.
Simply having a rational nature is not the sine qua non of personhood. Why?,/i.
Surely personhood includes both natural and existential aspects, right? The distinction is not so absolute that one can contemplate individual existence completely in isolation from the natural properties within which that personhood is exercised. My point is that Augustine is speakig exclusively of those natural powers relevant to personhood. I see no attempt at reductionism here.
So where are you getting this from that person is excluded from attribution when Augustine says that just IS what it means to be a Person.
I don't think that he is remotely suggesting that being a person is JUST these things. I think in context it is clear that "to be a person" in this context clearly means "to be the sort of entity that exists as an individual, rational substance." That is how I myself meant the same statement when i made it to Eric Svendsen. It would seem that if I am capable of making that semantic distinction, then an Augustine or a Boethius could do so far more clearly and insightfully.
The reductionist interpretation results from *assuming* that Augustine takes the One in the same way Plotiinus does, starting from some concept of transcendence by nature and working from there. But there is little evidence for this bein the case, at least to the extent I have been able to survey the scholarship. The recent trend seems to be away from it.
italics off.
repost with proper italics and one bit that I left out:
Simply having a rational nature is not the sine qua non of personhood. Why?
Surely personhood includes both natural and existential aspects, right? The distinction is not so absolute that one can contemplate individual existence completely in isolation from the natural properties within which that personhood is exercised. My point is that Augustine is speakig exclusively of those natural powers relevant to personhood. I see no attempt at reductionism here.
So where are you getting this from that person is excluded from attribution when Augustine says that just IS what it means to be a Person.
I don't think that he is remotely suggesting that being a person is JUST these things. I think in context it is clear that "to be a person" in this context clearly means "to be the sort of entity that exists as an individual, rational substance." That is how I myself meant the same statement when i made it to Eric Svendsen. It would seem that if I am capable of making that semantic distinction, then an Augustine or a Boethius could do so far more clearly and insightfully.
The reductionist interpretation results from *assuming* that Augustine takes the One in the same way Plotiinus does, starting from some concept of transcendence by nature and working from there. But there is little evidence for this bein the case, at least to the extent I have been able to survey the scholarship. The recent trend seems to be away from it.
Western Theology traditionally doesn't use causa as a term to describe intra-Trinitarian relations. This has nothing to do with the discussion or problem at hand.
On the contrary, it's the same way in which Augustine explains the intra-Trinitarian relationships. It is through the use of analogies (e.g., the "psychological" analogy) that *could* be interpreted causally but should not be. Unfortunately, Plotinus's foreign causal concept is read into what Augustine says, so it is assumed that he is doing the same thing. Actually, he is starting from the theological datum and offering a created analogy while simultaneously affirming the inadequacy of the analogy, in like manner to other pro-Nicene theologians." To be ... is to be a person" is likewise a mysterious, not a definitional, statement.
Western Theology traditionally doesn't use causa as a term to describe intra-Trinitarian relations. This has nothing to do with the discussion or problem at hand.
On the contray, I don't need to strain because I never assumed it was there in the first place. Perhaps I simply have the advantage because I never knew as much about Augustine before, so I never got caught up in the older scholarly prejudices in the first place. I've read people like Portalie and Gilson with a much more skeptical eye, because I read the current studies first. In my view, Augustine's alleged Neoplatonism was just standard "scholars as lemmin
"Surely personhood includes both natural and existential aspects, right?"
Yes but let's go back to what you stated, you said this was the sine qua non of personhood. That is quite a bit different.
"My point is that Augustine is speakig exclusively of those natural powers relevant to personhood. I see no attempt at reductionism here."
Where does the text say this? I see nothing in the context that says "these here, I'm referring to the natural powers, and they are, somehow, the same 'thing' and as the same thing as being 'Father,' but the irreducible property of the Father is not the same thing as to be wise or to be great." Show it from the text that this is in reference to natural powers vis-a-vis personal properties. The text says that the natural attributes, their being, are the same thing as to be a person. They aren't some'thing' different. This is the poing of the text.
'I think in context it is clear that "to be a person" in this context clearly means "to be the sort of entity that exists as an individual, rational substance." '
In the context of simplicity, where does he say that 'to be a person' is "an entity that exists...as an individual rational substance." I'm not finding that in my copy of De Trinitate in the discussions on simplicity.
As being your own gloss of a person, you'll have to comment to me how this doesn't result in Nestorianism since Christ has an "individual rational substance" for his human nature. Definitional accounts of personhood in light of general categories do not give you a theological understanding of personhood. The Augustinism "misses the mark" because it doesn't take hold of Christology first.
"The reductionist interpretation results from *assuming* that Augustine takes the One in the same way Plotiinus does, starting from some concept of transcendence by nature and working from there."
Rather Augustine takes the peculiar insights of the One and the Nous and collapses them together so that the Nous has the One's property of simplicity, and the One has the Nous' property of intelligibility.
"It is through the use of analogies (e.g., the "psychological" analogy) that *could* be interpreted causally but should not be."
A highly inadequate analogy at that since the psychological analogies have one person as their aim (Modalistic). Social analogies by the Cappadocians are far superior since they have multiple persons in their sights. Multiple persons are in the Trinity and psychological analogies can only grasp one person or what is in *common* to many persons (i.e. just more general categories).
"Unfortunately, Plotinus's foreign causal concept is read into what Augustine says, so it is assumed that he is doing the same thing."
This is where the logic of Plotinus is far superior to Augustine even though he talks out of both sides of his mouth with regard to the transcedence of the One. Since each entity is "more" or "less" simpl
This is where the logic of Plotinus is far superior to Augustine even though he talks out of both sides of his mouth with regard to the transcedence of the One. Since each entity is "more" or "less" simple, i.e. being and hypostasis are the same thing, i.e. to be is to be an hypostasis, to be 'other' from another hypostasis amounts to having a different being. Structure of both is similar, presupposition of simplicity is similar, outcome is different. From the judgment of logic, Plotinus is view is far superior and a more consistent view of double procession than Augustine's.
Photios
Yes but let's go back to what you stated, you said this was the sine qua non of personhood. That is quite a bit different.
Can there be a person lacking the natural power of rationality? It does seem to me that a rational nature is required to be a person, which was all that I said.
Show it from the text that this is in reference to natural powers vis-a-vis personal properties.
It is a reasonable reading of the text because Augustine uses a generic term (person). If he meant "to be Father," then he would have said so. Presumably, the fact that he uses a generic term leaves open the interpretation, and I would argue that there is considerably surrounding evidence, particularly the inclusion of the phrase in a series of adjectives, that suggests this is what Augustine had in mind. Have you not considered this?
The text says that the natural attributes, their being, are the same thing as to be a person. They aren't some'thing' different. This is the point of the text.
If that were the point, this would be a bizarre construction. Normally, one would separate the latter point in some way, such as "and all of these mean the same thing as 'person.'" It would be awkward at least to use a parallel structure when one item of a different kind is likened to other unlike things.
I'm not finding that in my copy of De Trinitate in the discussions on simplicity.
Neither do I find Augustine saying "to be Father" is the same as "to be Son" is the same as "to be Holy Spirit," which is what one would expect if this is what he was trying to do. Even the most wildly inconsistent author wouldn't say something that is basically a paraphrase for something he rejects, even though people seem willing to attribute that sort of stupidity to Augustine rather casually.
As being your own gloss of a person, you'll have to comment to me how this doesn't result in Nestorianism since Christ has an "individual rational substance" for his human nature.
No, he has an individual rational substance (the Word of God) for both natures. You're using "substance" as referring to nature rather than hypostasis, but in this context, it is the same as hypostasis.
The Augustinism "misses the mark" because it doesn't take hold of Christology first.
Augustine uses the same two form Christology that Leo does, and the latter was accepted at Chalcedon. Your assertion simply isn't consistent with the facts.
Rather Augustine takes the peculiar insights of the One and the Nous and collapses them together so that the Nous has the One's property of simplicity, and the One has the Nous' property of intelligibility.
Certainly, if one assumes that Augustine is using terms in the same way as Plotinus, this is what one would assume. But that is what I deny, so this will require more proof.
A highly inadequate analogy at that since the psychological analogies have one person as t
A highly inadequate analogy at that since the psychological analogies have one person as their aim (Modalistic). Social analogies by the Cappadocians are far superior since they have multiple persons in their sights. Multiple persons are in the Trinity and psychological analogies can only grasp one person or what is in *common* to many persons (i.e. just more general categories).
Ayres and Maspero both cover in detail how Gregory Nyssen's AdAbl rejects social analogies as inaccurate. Moreover, the psychological analogy is not being used in the manner you suppose; Ayres covers that as well. Again, your assertions don't match with the facts as best I know them.
This is where the logic of Plotinus is far superior to Augustine even though he talks out of both sides of his mouth with regard to the transcedence of the One.
... or Augustine doesn't mean the same thing as Plotinus regarding the transcendence of the One. That's the other possibility, the one I consider more plausible.
Anyway, rather than going over the same ground, it would probably be helpful to see some sort of interaction with Augustine without at least the assumption that he is Neoplatonist. What I found helpful was to assume that Augustine was saying the identical thing with the Cappadocians and Cyril, and then to understand how he could be read consistently. When I did that, it seemed obvious that what he was saying could be taken as Neoplatonic only through a stretch, and it was at that point I realized that no one had ever shown remotely the kind of evidence that could sustain that stretch, even though many people had made it. But given ordinary assumptions of intellectual charity regarding Augustine's influences and surroundings, this wouldn't happen. This has been the approach of several works, including Keating's work on Cyril, Maspero's on Gregory of Nyssa, and Ayres's on pro-Nicene theology. What I have not seen is serious criticism of the approach or evidence to answer the conclusions. Simply repeating what has been refuted doesn't answer the criticism, and I at least would like to know why no better efforts have been made to harmonize Augustine in this manner.
Jonathan,
I'm going to bow out of this discussion, since you're method of staving off my argument is to footnote scholars. If you're going to make an argument based on someone else you can at least, to the best of your ability, summarize that argument and then footnote the scholar.
I will conclude with a couple of things here on what you said:
"It is a reasonable reading of the text because Augustine uses a generic term (person). If he meant "to be Father," then he would have said so."
He did, "For as He is great, only with
that greatness which He begat, so also He is, only with that essence which He begat; because it is not one thing to Him to be, and another to be great. Is He therefore the Father of His own essence, in the same way as He is the Father of His own greatness, as He is the Father of His own power and wisdom? since His greatness is the same as His power, and His essence the same as His greatness."
Augustine doesn't think that this functions the same way for just the Father but for every person.
"Even the most wildly inconsistent author wouldn't say something that is basically a paraphrase for something he rejects, even though people seem willing to attribute that sort of stupidity to Augustine rather casually."
This answer leaves inexplicable why Augustine entertains why there just isn't one person in the Trinity. Are you not aware of this text? Are not aware that he speculates in this direction and investigates? It's obvious that his presupposition on the divine essence being identified with all its attributes and then being identified with "person" leads Augustine to ask this question. That he comes to finality in rejecting that conclusion should have triggered in him to go back and reinvestigate what brought him there to begin with. Maybe you should ask why Augustine entertained that thesis?
“No, he has an individual rational substance (the Word of God) for both natures. You're using "substance" as referring to nature rather than hypostasis, but in this context, it is the same as hypostasis.”
Let’s go back to your original statement and see if it is compatible with what you have stated here or if you are just simply redefining terms.
You sated, “I think in context it is clear that "to be a person" in this context clearly means "to be the sort of entity that exists as an individual, rational substance."
But to take substance in the way you’re stating in this answer and to combine it with your first answer amounts to: “to be a person in this context in this context clearly means to be the sort of entity that exists as an individual, rational person (substance).” Or in other words, to be a person is to be an individual rational person for short. Either a nice tautology or you are back pedaling since you saw what your first answer implied that an individual rational nature is a person. And Christ having two natures would be two persons.
“Augustine uses the same two form Christology that Leo does, and the latter was accepted at Chalcedon. Your assertion simply isn't consistent with the facts.”
Well of course he does. I’m talking about within the context of simplicity. I don’t see it there, do you? Augustine made lots of Orthodox statements, and he made a lot of Heterodox statements. Like thinking the soul, since it was immaterial, as being the mediating principle between the divinity and the humanity. And here you have the soul= person confusion in Augustine, either Christ doesn’t have a human soul, and the Soul he has in mind is the Person of the Logos (Apollinariansim), or the Hypostasis is not the dint of the union (Nestorian). Leo was accepted at Chalcedon based on his harmonization with Cyril, and in fact, he went band modified many of his assertions from the Tomb after seeing the accusation of Nestorianism against him and how the Nestorian party used his text. The strong patristic ordo theologiae is very evident in these later texts of Leo.
“Certainly, if one assumes that Augustine is using terms in the same way as Plotinus, this is what one would assume. But that is what I deny, so this will require more proof.”
That is accomplished by way of comparison and letting each author simply speak for themselves. Augustine defines his terms and clearly defines on what it means to be simple. The attribution with Plotinus is to show simply (no pun intended) for continuity’s sake and the developmental trace of ideas. Beyond that, Plotinus is really irrelevant.
“Ayres and Maspero both cover in detail how Gregory Nyssen's AdAbl rejects social analogies as inaccurate. Moreover, the psychological analogy is not being used in the manner you suppose.”
The social analogy of Peter, James, and John as being one man and not three men is about as easily demonstrated from the text and multiple texts in Gregory of Nyssa as about any I’ve ever seen. Either they goof big time (I doubt it) or they are reading it in a way different to confront modern social trinitarian models. The psychological analogy has one mind, one act of intellection, and one act of love. This is because Augustine looks inward to discover the Trinity and the processes of the intellect. Where you are meaningfully interacting with me or how you show that I am wrong (I learned this in Balas’ class) is beyond me.
“[O]r Augustine doesn't mean the same thing as Plotinus regarding the transcendence of the One. That's the other possibility, the one I consider more plausible.”
I meant that Plotinus was talking out of both sides of his mouth with regard to transcendence. Plotinus is inconsistent in thinking that the One is beyond intellection and treating it as simple, because to say that it is simple it has to be intelligible. Much easier to do what Augustine did and just say that the One and Nous are the same as the divine essence and keep both properties. Where Plotinus is more consistent is with the view of simplicity itself that hypostasis and Being are the same thing: each hypostasis requires a different essence if they are not the other.
“Anyway, rather than going over the same ground, it would probably be helpful to see some sort of interaction with Augustine without at least the assumption that he is Neoplatonist.”
My sympathy with Augustine is taking him to mean what he says he means and then take that data and see if he’s compatible or not with the Councils and with representative Fathers. Augustine is not a Father of an Ecumenical Council, so I judge him as a Christian writer on that basis. To challenge Augustine, from an Orthodox Christian perspective, does not amount to a challenge of the consensus patrum as it was for medieval Catholicism.
Photios
Photios
I'm going to bow out of this discussion, since you're method of staving off my argument is to footnote scholars. If you're going to make an argument based on someone else you can at least, to the best of your ability, summarize that argument and then footnote the scholar.
I thought I had. If nothing else, I pointed out what was disputed, and your repetition of the disputed assertion doesn't really help anything. For example...
Augustine doesn't think that this functions the same way for just the Father but for every person.
... when I have no idea why you believe that passage equates Fatherhood with the divine essence.
It's obvious that his presupposition on the divine essence being identified with all its attributes and then being identified with "person" leads Augustine to ask this question.
... when that is by no means obvious; rather, he appears to be responding to objections raised against the Trinity without endorsing the arguments himself.
Either a nice tautology or you are back pedaling since you saw what your first answer implied that an individual rational nature is a person.
... which simply assumes what you are trying to prove after I specifically distinguished the generic aspects of personhood (rationality) from individual existence (individual substance).
I’m talking about within the context of simplicity. I don’t see it there, do you?
...begging the question on your dichotomy between Augustine on simplicity and Augustine on theology, since I don't see the two as separate or incompatible.
However, to be fair, I think you honestly just don't grasp the argument. You said:
Either they goof big time (I doubt it) or they are reading it in a way different to confront modern social trinitarian models. The psychological analogy has one mind, one act of intellection, and one act of love. This is because Augustine looks inward to discover the Trinity and the processes of the intellect. Where you are meaningfully interacting with me or how you show that I am wrong (I learned this in Balas’ class) is beyond me.
Yes, and my point is exactly that the distinction you draw between modern social theories and Gregory of Nyssa's view is precisely the distinction you should draw between Neoplatonic models and Augustine's psychological model. Just as Gregory of Nyssa rejects the social model as one of common action, so Augustine rejects the psychological model as one of mere operations of internal faculties. He doesn't take the analogy literally, but transcendentally. I suspect that Fr. Balas agrees with that, but if you missed it here, you probably missed it there as well. Besides, Fr. Maspero covers Fr. Balas, so to the extent they disagree, it will have been covered there as well.
@Do you mean the article by Jacobs or some other article?@
Yes, Jacobs -- I just reread it. He does not say much about Ayres but he strongly argues for Aristotle primary-secondary ousia as the common philosophical model for all three Cappadocians on the Trinity.
Commenting by HaloScan
