Modelos de democracia
Víctor Hugo D’Paola
TalCual
12 Julio 2005
Los embajadores del chavismo ante la OEA y los Estados Unidos, Jorge Valero y Bernardo Alvarez respectivamente, han venido hablando de las distintas maneras de ejercer la democracia. Según ellos, Venezuela tendría un régimen democrático distinto al de los Estados Unidos, que no lo sería tanto.
Condoleezza Rice, la gran dama de la política exterior estadounidense, ha dicho en el Oriente Medio que su país ha fracasado intentando durante 60 años darle más importancia a la estabilidad de los gobiernos que a la democracia.
Esta valerosa autocrítica la reafirma con un rotundo: “Esto cambia ahora”. Cierto, la secretaria de Estado le pide al despótico régimen egipcio –aliado suyo– “limpieza electoral” en los próximos comicios. Ala monarquía de Arabia Saudita le exige no reprimir a la oposición, respetar sus derechos. Así también los de la mujer.
Irán no faltó al llamado democratizador de la Sra. Rice.
Las respuestas no faltaron de parte de los aludidos. El alcalde de Teherán, Ahmadineyad –hoy presidente de la República Islámica– afirmó:
“Irán no hizo una revolución para tener una democracia”. El ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Kamal Jarrazi, dijo que Irán tiene su propio modelo, ideal para los países islámicos y ellos buscan exportarlo. En realidad, el régimen de los ayatolas tiene muy poco que ver con una democracia.
(...)
(...)
Ellos creen que “los seres humanos no tienen derechos, sólo obligaciones”. En Irán ha fracasado la “revolución islámica”. Las desigualdades sociales son enormes y casi 15 millones de personas viven por debajo de la línea de pobreza. En los años de la revolución la pobreza se disparó de 8 millones a los 15 mencionados.
Los gobernantes de China y Rusia en declaración conjunta de Hu Jintao y Vladimir Putin, rechazaron los intentos de “imponerles desde fuera modelos de regímenes políticos y sociales”. Al margen del crecimiento económico de China, nadie ignora en el mundo que el gigante asiático no tiene un régimen democrático.
El antiguo jefe de la KGB, Putin, ha endurecido su gobierno y cada vez son más restringidos los derechos democráticos. En América, Castro tiene 46 años dirigiendo el Estado cubano. Nunca ha habido elecciones libres, ni se ha permitido la organización de la oposición. Mientras viva nadie podrá postularse contra Castro, él es vitalicio, como un emperador. Sin embargo, con todo el cinismo que lo caracteriza, nunca en cuatro décadas y media ha dejado de hablar de “democracia cubana”.
Total, de acuerdo al razonamiento del gobierno venezolano habría distintas democracias:
Cuba, Irán, Rusia, China, Corea del Norte y por supuesto Venezuela. Serían modelos, dignos de tomar en cuenta. Se dice en París que la Directiva de Le Monde Diplomatique propondrá el modelo venezolano para la Europa que hoy vive una crisis por los resultados de la consulta sobre la Constitución. La democracia es igualdad de derechos, libertad, respeto al otro, sobre todo a quienes son opositores. La democracia también es un humanismo y este no significa la persecución de los otros. Siempre:
el derecho de los otros. Seguramente EEUU no pueda, ni tiene el derecho de exportar su democracia, pero no son muy democráticos los modelos que se le contraponen. Chávez quiere ofrecer el suyo. Lo entrega acompañado de unos cuantos barriles de petróleo. También Orwell hablaba de democracia en la granja de los animales.
(Víctor Hugo D’Paola, TalCual, 12 Julio 2005)
Gillermo, this is getting old. Don't you think that it is about time that you engage the topic in your own words, and not the oligarch media columnists?
Just asking.
OW, my thoughts are with these brave farmers. These wealthy elites that hire death squads are vile cretins.
A pattern is clear across the Americas--any country that cannot control thier elites is doomed to mass immiseration.
It would be interesting to see how the oligarch media featured this event. My guess is that they covered it but did thier best to minimize this march.
wow. murdering scum.
I don't know about the Venezuelan media but I know this has never been brought up here in the U.S.
From tenants to owners
A number of reforms aimed to transfer property from absentee and rentier property owners to the tillers, and to promote small, family farms. Among the reforms generally considered most successful under this approach were those in Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan Province of China. Tenants received full ownership rights for the holdings they had cultivated previously while landowners received compensation in cash and bonds. These so-called "land to the tiller" reforms were undertaken to foster modernization and a better sharing of the benefits of economic progress. They were part of a general development strategy that gave agriculture a major role, and they resulted from the strong political will of mostly authoritarian governments.
(snip)
Ending feudalism in the countryside
…Radical shifts in government in some countries, particularly in Latin America, resulted in abrupt changes in the paths of reform. For example, in the 1960s, Chile embarked on a reform to allow workers to become the owners of land they cultivated. The beneficiaries of former latifundia were organized into settlement groups, which elected management committees. The original plan was to divide the land after three to five years and transfer ownership to those who had proved themselves during this transition period, or else retain a cooperative form, depending on the free will of the members. However, in 1970, the incoming government kept cooperative farms under peasant committees beyond the transition period and created several state farms on newly expropriated lands. Following the violent change in government in 1973, the cooperatives were dissolved in favour of private ownership, and state assistance was discontinued or restricted severely.
(snip)
The pace of agrarian reform in former socialist countries quickened following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. …Coupled with the realization in several southern African countries of the likely political and social effects of highly skewed tenure structures remaining from colonial times, and the continuation and revitalization of reform issues in some countries (notably in the Philippines and Brazil), these developments have returned the subject of land reform to the public arena in recent years. This is reflected in the Vatican document Towards a better distribution of land. The challenge of agrarian reform (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 1997). However, this renewed interest in land reform has generally led to interventions that have transcended traditional redistributive land reforms. These new interventions have focused on ensuring access via gradual measures rather than one-off massive redistributions. They have placed greater emphasis on new forms of access such as community titling, intrafamily and intracommunity land transfers, and regulated land markets. They have also explicitly sought greater complementarity between land interventions and supportive measures in t
An example of this new type of intervention is that proposed by the World Bank. In line with the increasing emphasis on the role of markets, the World Bank has launched "market-assisted land reform" approaches. Under these, beneficiaries obtain credit and/or grants for the purchase of suitable land, and negotiate directly with the sellers. Market-assisted land reforms have been criticized because of their speculative effect on land markets in some areas where they have been implemented. While controversy surrounds the appropriateness of the different mechanisms for transferring land from large landowners to the landless and land poor, there is broad consensus that agrarian reform plays an important role in rural development where land concentration is high.
(snip)
LESSONS LEARNED ON AGRARIAN REFORM
How successful has the process been?
It is difficult to define success or failure of an agrarian reform. Agrarian reform is a multiobjective process involving ethical, political, social, economic and productive objectives among others. Such a complex process necessitates complex evaluation. A balance of objectives is necessary in order to be able to achieve at least some of the required major results. Latin America provides a fertile field for drawing lessons from agrarian reforms. While the coverage and scope have varied considerably from country to country, the extent of the reforms has been impressive. Reforms in Bolivia and Cuba expropriated about 80 percent of the agricultural land; Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru expropriated about half the agricultural land; and in Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Panama the area expropriated ranged from one-quarter to one-sixth. As for beneficiaries, the Bolivian and Cuban reforms benefited about three-quarters of the agricultural households, while about half such households were beneficiaries in Mexico. In El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela, about one-third of the agricultural households benefited. As part of agrarian reforms, governments have often promoted the organization of the peasantry into trade unions and cooperatives of various kinds (e.g. producer, marketing and credit associations). This has brought about a considerable degree of integration of the peasantry into the national economy, society and polity. In other cases, the reforms have led to a reduction in the size of holdings, which in turn has contributed to the emergence of an overall agrarian structure that is more dynamic and responsive to market conditions (e.g. Chile, China, the Philippines and Viet Nam).
Lesson 1: Good governance and the rule of law correlate closely with the successful implementation of the process.
The rule of law needs to prevail throughout the process. Measures to reduce the inherent instability and uncertainty that accompany profound social change should be enacted decisively. Social mobilization, which is necessary to maintain the momentum and political support of such changes, should be kept within rational limits. This was achieved in the 1964 - 70 Chilean experience (Annex 1), as well as in Mexico and the Philippines. Moreover, good governance and effective state apparatus are required for successful implementation. To a large extent, the reforms in Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan Province of China were successful because of the conjunction of several positive factors (Annex 1). Among the most important of these were political will and good governance (limited corruption and rent-seeking behaviour in the implementation of the reforms).
Similarly, it is essential to establish suitable institutions to resolve land conflicts both during the reform period and afterwards as the established judiciary often lacks the capacity to deal effectively with these issues.
(Lots more here)
http://www.fao.org/documents/sho...5T/
j0415t04.htm
Sorry for the Non introduction of this substantial post. The title of the report is:
FAO in agrarian reform[1] - M. Cox, P. Munro-Faure, P. Mathieu, A. Herrera, D. Palmer and P. Groppo
The reason for the long post is to inform on the necessity of land reform in Latin America, particularly in Venezuela. The Venezuelan opposition has cried foul over the redistribution of Lands, and have fought it tooth and nail since its inception. Those who are the most vociferous in combating against land reform, are usually the Creme de la Creme of Society who see any intrusion by the government as an affront to society in general. What they dont recognize, or perhaps they do and dont care, is the condition of the rural poor who by way of loss of land have been forced to peasantry and or forced to move to urban areas where they will find wage labor only if they are lucky. The concentration of so many in such small areas is bound to cause social conflict in the way of crime.
So to the reasonable person Land reform would seem like a good idea, no? No is right they still fight against it. That is why when one reads:
Lesson 1: Good governance and the rule of law correlate closely with the successful implementation of the process.
It should be noted that the current Venezuelan government meets all the criteria Set forth byt the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization to make this plan work NOW!
For those who want information on the Governments plan named "Plan Zamora" You can get some basic info here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan_Zamora
Good info Pulpo, thanks.
All this mess points up to the extremism of the US style of ownership--a system that allows a few of the most ruthless oligarchs to gobble up huge swaths of the modes of production and land.
When this model is embraced as the 'only way' in Latin America, the situation becomes explosive.
The Chavez policy of encouraging domestic production, micro-loans, and breaking up huge estates where the land is deemed idle is moderate and far-sighted.
The hew and cry against this modest reform merely point up to the level of extremism that is inherent in the twisted ideology of the Venezuelan and US elites.
Poverty has a deep structural character--and changing that deep structure in a significant way is what 'revolution' is all about.
But for the rulers of the universe (the US) and its effete, spoiled minions, even modest reform is intolerable--becasue they fear that once the core logic of reform is understood as 'commonsense' and just, then their entire oppressive edifice of property relations and slave-wage oppression is going to come tumbling down.
The Continuing Need for Land Reform: making the case for civil society
http://www.landcoalition.org/
doc...odfaomon2c2.htm
2. Improving access to land
2.1 The Failure of State Directed Land Reform
Redistributive land reform has failed to attain its prescribed goals throughout Latin America. The historic achievements of European land reforms (Denmark, Prussia, post-War Italy) and the more recent successes of land reform in Southeast Asia (Korea, Thailand, Japan) and even in parts of Africa (Kenya) have not been reproduced in Latin America. Land distribution patterns remain the most unequal of all the world's regions, rural and overall poverty levels remain largely unchanged, and small producers continue to struggle for market entry. Despite these failings, and the immense financial, administrative, political and social costs associated with these failures, the call for land reform remains strong within the region. The almost daily land invasions of Brazil's Movimento Sem Terra, recent mass peasant protests against recent INRA reforms in Bolivia and the repeated call for land distribution in Guatemala attest to the enduring appeal of redistributive land reform.
Attempting to explain the causes of land reform is a sisyphean task. There are almost as many attempts to explain the failures of land reform as there are abandoned assentamientos in the region. Interpretations however, focus on:
• the inefficiency of state bureaucracies, reflected in slowness, costliness and weak enforcement capacities
• the impossibility of avoiding opportunism and destructive rent-seeking behaviour amongst beneficiaries
• the lack of control exercised by beneficiaries in terms of site selection
• the stringency of overly strict tenure controls that can encourage informality
• the lack of supportive technical assistance (henceforth "TA")
• the weak managerial capacities of many beneficiaries
• the continuing dysfunction of vital factor and output markets, especially credit and marketing
• the strategic guile (and bullying) of large landowners to outwit reform initiatives
• the weakness of government commitment to break up the holdings of the (politically and) economically strong in favour of the (politically and) economically weak.
These conditions reflect 4 types of constraints:
1. political
2. institutional;
3. market-related
4. beneficiary-related.
2.1.1. Political Constraints
Many of the region's land reform programmes emerged in direct response to social unrest or the perceived risk of conflict, or were intended to deflect critical public attention away from other troublesome issues. Their design was driven by the demands of political expedience rather than the rigours of technical precision. Inevitable weaknesses resulted. They were often ad hoc in design, lacking the necessary institutional and financial resources to implement the initiatives. Similarly, reforms were often targetted at politically significant groups rather than those with authentic socio-economic needs and capacities. The frequent absence of robust beneficiary selection criteria meant that there were few checks against opportunists and free-riders - the large grant component of almost all these reforms presented ample rent-seeking opportunities to both the rural poor and non-poor groups. Finally, politically-driven policy interventions are susceptible to the caprice of all political discourse - enthusiasm and support can wane dramatically once sufficient support is garnered or the perceived political risk is removed.
The Chavez Administration has its central focus the social condition of the country. Previous land reform in Latin America were attempts by governments to placate a particular population to prevent unrest. The Venezuelan itself is the spearhead of the movement incorporating the landless rural population. The Plan has been thoroughly planned out with Technical assistance provided by the government, Access to Credit for Machinery, and Financial support driven by its ample natural resources. The recipient population will be the beneficiaries as well as urban sectors which will see a decline in wage laborers, and the government which will be securing its constituent base.
2.1.2. Institutional Constraints
Land reform is not just a process. It is also a complex institutional arrangement requiring extensive support. It requires an appropriate legal environment and demands effective executing agencies and organisations. Expropriation procedures for example, have been extraordinarily long and complex, seeking to both respect and protect the principles of private property rights whilst simultaneously subjugating them to a perceived greater public interest. In these cases, the expropriation process, where necessary, is often resource heavy in terms of both time and money.
Plan Zamora has written into it means for compensation for expropriated lands. The greater public interest is where objectors to the plan see no benefit for themselves. This has been the issue for a long time, and is evident by the disparity of distribution of income as well as the notorious disparity of land distribution. In its efforts to move forward with the land redistribution the Venezuelan Government has support of other branches of government that will facilitate the expropriation process and ea
... ease any constraints that become evident. The Government has had to fend off attacks that it is becoming a communist state. Nothing is further from the truth, and to date not one private institution has been expropriated that wasn’t bankrupt already. Under Chavez, despite claims to the contrary, Private enterprise is growing with a short dip in growth due to the actions of the opposition during the time period of the strikes and the coup attempt.
2.1.3 Market Constraints
In many cases, market constraints are either too great or are ignored to permit the attainment of land reform goals. The costs of land reform for example, are often increased by continuing distortions driving land prices above the capitalised value of agricultural profits. These distortions increase the costs of land reforms, create additional obstacles to beneficiary repayment, make the reform sector susceptible to rent-seeking from the non-reform sector, thereby fostering greater rather than less land concentration and challenge the overall sustainability of land reform.
As mentioned earlier Credit will be made available to the farmers, combined with other subsidized government programs i.e low cost food, can put off any market constraints until the program gets over its initial hurdles. Soon after, and once established, these farmers will be self sufficient. Formed into cooperatives with other farmers the government will provide a market for their produce, either for local consumption or export.
2.1.4. Beneficiary Constraints
It has been reported that over 60% of land reform beneficiaries in Brazil have sold or abandoned their reform parcels. These levels of abandonment are typical rather than atypical for the region. The causes of abandonment are diverse. For some, it is the short-term rent seeking opportunities offered by the usually unauthorised sale of reform plots, for others, abandonment is an expression of their inability to establish either sustainable income streams from the land reform process or to match the income-generating potential of other household strategies.
It is for this reason that land ownership will reside with the state. The individual will be given access to use and this access can be passed along and inherited. Having title to the land and using it as collateral only leads to the examples given above where the recipients sell their land to wealthy land owners thus perpetuating the problem. Thus abandonment will only lead to a recovery of the land by the government for redistribution to someone else. Families are given three years with a plethora of government support to become successful.
And so what is the result of this innovative program:
Poor farmers who for once see some benefits coming their way, who only now can expect for even a small bit of justice are being summarily executed by opposition members. Thats right - those who have everything are killing those who have nothing yet again. Its a tragedy that in this day and age that we still see this hordeing of resources when the need is so great to so many.
Thanks for all the information Pulpo. Its very informative. And that Wilkapedia site is amazing. I wonder how they get so much info on so many subjects.
BTW, notice the conspicious absence of any opposition posters on this. I guess its not easy to make a case for the murder of 130 people.
"It would be interesting to see how the oligarch media featured this event. My guess is that they covered it but did thier best to minimize this march."
Jim, are you kidding. Amost none of them touched this at all. Remember, its Chavez they're after, not the opposition. All news is filtered with that in mind.
Jim:
Here is more on your question. I just finished reading the opposition paper Tal Cual. In its lead editorial which is supposedly about how the masses are turning against Chavez because 50 people turned up at Miraflores to protest lack of replacement housing for flood victims he mentioned the farm worker demonstration. The only thing is all he said was that 6,000 farm workers demonstrated in front of Miraflores - as if they were protesting against the government and against Chavez. No mention that what they were protesting was that 130 of them have been killed by the opposition scumbags and they want Chavez to take action against the opposition to stop the murders!!!!!!
So there you go, some good old opposition spin.
That Teodoro P. is a total fake--he is supposed to have street-cred because he was involved in leftwing activities three and a half decades ago. Amazing.
Now that he sees a vested interest in going soft on the oppressive economic structure, he poses as an "in the know" type of reformer. What a fake.
I would be interested in reading any critique from him about the US imperial invasion and occupation of Iraq; Uribe and the Colombian oligarch's ties to the paramilitaries (which do most of the killings), etc.
The world is totally interrelated and the oligarch medias way of downplaying certain issues indicates their vested interests---thouroughly rooted in the comparador exploitative relationships that configure more than half the population are cheap labor or expendable.
Jim,
I agree about Petkoff. But on Iraq he is actually pretty good. He wrote an editorial after the London bombings that was highly critical of the invasion of Iraq and layed the blame for the bombings on what was happening in Iraq. One of the things he pointed out was that if the U.S. and Britian think they can go around invading who ever they want then why should they expect others to respect their soveirgnty and not bomb them in their own countries.
I actually meant to translate and post it but haven't had the time. If you want I could e-mail it to you.
Well good for Teodoro P.--than he must not have sold all of his personal integrity and intellectual credibility.
But it is interesting about how the hard right Venezuelans don't trust Teodoro very much. I remember Quico signing T.P.'s praises and being met with silence and/or hostility by the pro-US true believers that frequent these wacko opposition sites.
What Chavez' governance is showing us is that even modest reforms aimed at curbing the power of the corrupt oligarchs will make a credible difference in the lives of everyday people. The hardright Venezuelan oligarchy are such extremists that any check on their power automatically has them calling for a US invasion, coups, paramilitary deathsquads, ect.
I can only pray that others in Latin America strive to follow Chavez' example. Cripple kids begging money from tourists in the streets while the elites are shopping vociferously in Miami just doesn't pass the 'democracy' smell-test.
OW, Jim:
Did you know that Octopus meat was addictive? Apparently so it would seem, or so one would have it, must be the ink or somthin. Some people cant live without it I guess. They jump at substitutes like a Miami Exile shopping at Walmart. Or a Hound Dog in heat settling for a Chihuahua. I dont understand the dynamics of it all, but it sure is amusing qua Sad to see.
You know what I always say: "if you want Octopus, jump in the sea, but whatch for the Sharks" (especially of the FLA. waters). Its the only way really, anything less is like getting sherbert when you wanted ice cream, its never the same.
Ill bring the olive oil. M'fers!
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