To my mind, the problem here is the term 'obscure.' The average analytic paper is as obscure as the average continental paper. Plus, of course, is the reliance on weasel words like "our instinct" and etc.

Rather, the difference is in styles of obscurity. The continental tends towards the flamboyantly obscure, in which some chain of signifiers, each of which is progresively more reference heavy and vague, leads us to some sweeping conclusion that really has to be shored up with a lot of particular, empirical research to be judged true or not. The analytic tends more towards that mealy mouthed obscurity favored by accountants who are siphoning money out of the cash drawer -- it is full of coughing, and statements made with a bluff heartiness, as if we are all in agreement on this, surely?

Here, to use a random example, is an analytic philosopher, Dorit Bar-On, writing on externalism and self-knowledge in Nous:

"A strong version of content-externalism says, roughly:
EXT: The contents of our thoughts (and other mental states) depend
for their individuation on the nature of our physical or social environment.
Whether an individual is in a mental state with one content rather than another depends in part on relationships between that
individual and her extra-mental environment.

Thus, an individual cannot, e.g., harbor any water-thoughts if she has never been in any causal contact, direct or indirect, with the substance water. If, for example, she has only ever been in contact with a substance that looks, tastes, feels like water, but is not water—call this counterfeit substance
‘‘twater’’—then she could not have water-thoughts, though she could have
twater-thoughts."

The NYT will never make fun of this the way they make fun of, say, some deconstructivist because they will never come across it. Its sloppy language -- individuation, for instance, refers now to the contents, now to the individuals -- and its absurd distinctions -- based on causal contact, whatever that is -- and its fussiness about what is not in dispute, to obscure the course of nonsense that has animated the argument -- for instance, the care taken to distinguish water from twater, whatever that means - will die or continue in the same dusty journals.

This has little to do with its being more human. It is simply that philosophy in the analytic mode is generally left alone by other social sciences, and science itself. Granted, there have been and are good analytic philosophers of science, but mostly analytic philosophy is as unlikely to influence any other aspect of knowledge as palmistry. The only way it travels into the humanities, and perhaps from there into, say, management science, that fake crown prince of Business schools now taking the lion's share of students, is if it is carried on the back of some continentalists reputation -- the way Davidson was carried into the humanities via Derrida.

So, of course, twater will go happily twaddling on, into that universal indifference to which it is accustomed, and which it has conspired to create.
roger | Homepage | 06.28.06 - 7:46 pm | #

yes, i think Dorit is maybe having twomb-thoughts.
Matt | Homepage | 06.28.06 - 8:57 pm | #

hi Matt,
I get the sense this is a hot-button issue for you. I'm sympathetic but ambivalent, not least I think because I see in your (more sophisticated) views my own previously held (dumber) views. I'm just curious, are there anglo-amaerican/(post)analytics you do like? If so, who and why? I've just recently started to read a bit of the work of Manfred Frank, who I encountered via Andrew Bowie's work (which I also have a lot of time for), and it's really interesting. He's a scholar of early German romanticism, started out as a student of the Fichte guy Dieter Henrich, and reads both contemporary analytic/anglo-american stuff and continental in a way that doesn't really respect the divide. Like some of Habermas's stuff, though not as dull as that.
Best wishes,
Nate
Nate | Homepage | 07.02.06 - 1:16 pm | #

Nate,

I am not familiar with either of those people, no.

And the book link is a recommendation if anything, btw.
Matt | Homepage | 07.03.06 - 1:09 pm | #

hi Matt,
I hadn't followed the link, sorry. I hope the question didn't seem aggressive, it was an honest "who do you like?" I may have read that book or parts of it a long time ago when I was once on a big Rorty and MacIntyre kick.
cheers,
Nate
Nate | Homepage | 07.10.06 - 3:47 am | #

No worries, Nate. And really, that comment I made before, though I think it was in another context - and which I can only assume you mean to reference - was admittedly a pretty dumb thing to say.

As for bridging the divide generally, sure, why not? In truth I am all for it.
Matt | 07.11.06 - 5:14 pm | #

Roger,

"Its sloppy language -- individuation, for instance, refers now to the contents, now to the individuals"

The word 'individual' is a rough synonym of 'person'. The word 'individuate' is a rough synonym of 'differentiate'. These words happen to sound alike, which often happens in English.

" -- and its absurd distinctions -- based on causal contact, whatever that is --"

'Causal contact' refers to a relationship of cause and effect. I am in causal contact with my computer, because I cause (or influence) changes in my computer and it causes (or influences) changes in me. In contrast, there are, say, distant galaxies with which I am not in causal contact. The concept is certainly somewhat vague, but vague concepts can still be meaningful.

"for instance, the care taken to distinguish water from twater, whatever that means"

Twater is a fictional chemical which is chemically distinct from ordinary water, but which has many of water's superficial properties. (For example, it is transparent, liquid at room temprerature, etc.) You may wonder what the interest of such a finctional chemical might be, but the idea is hardly unintelligible.

I hope this helps you understand the passage you were criticizing.
david | 07.12.06 - 12:37 am | #

oh, and in (partial, but forthright) answer to your question, Nate: I am sorely ignorant of more than a few important figures in the so-called "analytic" tradition, including especially Carnap, Quine, Davidson and Kuhn.

Maybe predictably, I'd say for the sake of conversation that I'm more interested in what came a bit before (Emerson and Thoreau) and to a lesser degree somewhat in what came after (say Rorty, Cavell, Danto) (that is, to accept roughly Borradori's genealogy - though without earning the right to do so, of course).

Such figures as Whitehead, Russell and Nozick, on the other hand, I have found - at least in my limited exposure (and in addition to short interviews I have only ever read Science and the Modern World and The Examined Life, for example) often rather hard to subscribe to.
Matt | Homepage | 07.12.06 - 6:36 am | #

I have to say, Matt: citing the case of a Wittgensteinian teaching Foucault as an example of the BAD thing we have got, as opposed to the good thing Heifetz wants - namely, Wittgenstein meeting Foucault in the classroom - is shaving things a bit fine. And please drop the whole 'will someone please think of the children' handwringing pose. It's silly under the circumstances. "A teacher with largely analytic sympathies taking on the role of authority (who knows, perhaps the sole exposure certain students will ever have) with respect to "continental" philosophy." As to this 'role of authority': isn't it enough that I know the material and am competent to expound it? How would you react if an analytic philosopher balked at letting someone teach analytic philosophy, even if this person were perfectly knowledgeable and competent to do so, just because maybe they have 'known Heideggerian sympathies'? How is your attitude different? Is this sort of nose-wrinkling orthodoxy-sniffing really supposed to help bridge the gap? (I don't really believe in the gap, but let it be so, for purposes of argument.)

I'm teaching the module because the guy who usually teaches it wanted a break. He's also the guy I co-teach "Philosophy and Film" with. I'm going to make sure to wait until he has a mouthful of coffee and then tell him there's a nervous person on the internet who is worried Holbo is corrupting the youth by introducing foreign analytic gods into the city of continental philosophy. Honestly. In a philosophy department, being a Heidegger sympathizer and hearing that the Nietzsche/Kierkegaard guy down the hall is taking over your continental philosophy module, is not regarded as cause for concern. Really. It's not. And the fact that I did my dissertation on Schopenhauer's influence on Wittgenstein doesn't change that equation. I am not disqualified, by this educational background, from teaching continental philosophy.
jholbo | Homepage | 07.13.06 - 9:39 pm | #

Hm. Sure you're not shaving things a little thick?

In all fairness, John, I don't believe anyone said you were personally disqualified, so it's interesting that much like Leiter you leap to this defense, to the exclusion of much else.

As you can perfectly well read for yourself, the main issue is the fact that such teaching is rarely if ever done in philosophy departments by those most well-versed in such philosophy, simply because they are sequestered in English (or Religion, or other) departments. This, I think, is lamentable. Of course there are exceptions. The dominant trend is in little dispute.

A fine teacher is of course entirely capable of putting his well-known disposition toward recent continental thought entirely to the side in the service of a basic introduction.

Btw, why not team-teach it with someone from comp-lit, or even mathematics? (Are you really qualified on Badiou? Not to be rude, and mainly out of basic curiosity, what do you most admire about Foucault?) Of course team-teaching is more expensive for the university, and so rarely done...
NWC | 07.14.06 - 12:20 am | #

How would you react if an analytic philosopher balked at letting someone teach analytic philosophy, even if this person were perfectly knowledgeable and competent to do so, just because maybe they have 'known Heideggerian sympathies'?

I'm flattered you ask. I would say it was an understandable but ultimately utterly indefensible balk.

I posted the excerpt without offering much comment, but since you ask I happen to agree with the author that the real issue is systemic, not personal imbalance.
Matt | Homepage | 07.14.06 - 12:32 am | #

Why do you assume that people in English departments, who study continental philosophy, are 'better-versed' than people in philosophy departments, who study continental philosophy? This seems like a completely bizarre assumption. Why do you make it?

I was going to say that Leiter was wrong to call you 'random' (I kid, I kid). But this assumption about 'well-versedness' seems totally random and out of the blue to me. I've never even heard it suggested before that, holding constant for degree of focus on continental philosophy, people in English departments read more of the stuff. And therefore should be more trusted.
jholbo | Homepage | 07.14.06 - 1:21 am | #

Why do you assume that people in English departments, who study continental philosophy, are 'better-versed' than people in philosophy departments, who study continental philosophy?

I don't.

You rather happily misconstrue my meaning. I merely second the assertion of a basic fact: that people who wish to study and teach so-called continental philosophy after Heidegger continue to be largely, er, encouraged, by institutional conditions, to do so in other departments.

As you know.

Which is perfectly fine, in some respects, and lamentable in others.

It would be interesting to perform a study of dissertations and books published on Heidegger, Derrida, Agamben, Lacoue-Labarthe, Bataille, Levinas, Blanchot etc. and find out in which department such people are teaching. Is there such a study; does anybody know of such a reference? The continental PGR?
NWC | 07.14.06 - 1:54 am | #

Matt,

I don't think I was so much misconstruing your meaning as pointing out that what you were literally saying is quite absurd.

Let me be a bit more straightforward. You write: "since you ask I happen to agree with the author that the real issue is systemic, not personal imbalance." The problem with this is that the piece is absurd on its face. It is a wildly inaccurate portrayal of the Anglo-American philosophy scene. The fact that you are holding up a palpable tissue of absurdities and saying, with a straight face, 'I have here a roadmap of systemic problems' is ... well, a systemic problem with your approach. In general, it just isn't possible to have a credible opinion about the Anglo-American split without knowing at least a little about both sides - I mean: beyond bogeyman stories for kids. Tales of Terror From the Carnapian Crypt. This is a problem for those - like yourself - who complain about Anglo-American dominance. You need to study both sides of the issue before coming to a determination. It seems to me that you haven't done so. This is the same as the Theory's Empire problem, incidentally. It seems to me that you've been fighting for months, not arguing against the book, but maintaining your right to dismiss it without argument on the grounds that it MUST be bad. I appreciate that life is short and you end up ignoring and dismissing what you suspect is not important. But then you shouldn't TALK about it. If you talk, you should be prepared to argue, and arguing means having some baseline appreciation for what the other side says. In the present case, it really doesn't make sense to be critical of Anglo-American philosophy without some small acquiantance with what it is. Otherwise it's just passing along negative hearsay about what 'those people' do.

I don't expect you to agree with this comment, but it does suggest a more profitable way forward in our little exchanges. I have studied both analytic philosophy and a wide range of continental philosophy. You have pretty clearly studied no analytic philosophy whatsoever, and a narrower range of continental philosophy; you stay within the post-Heidegger line. I am certanly willing to grant that your much narrower focus makes you perhaps more qualified within that narrow area. And no doubt it is a major line you are inhabiting. But what makes you think that people with this narrow focus - like yourself - are more qualified than people who have undertaken broader study, like myself - to pronounce concerning what the broader study is a study OF. Answer: you think your philosophy is RIGHT. And that's fine. But then you should argue a bit differently. None of this 'who will think about the children?'-style plea for greater tolerance or 'balance', which is the opposite of what you really want. Make clear that you are in fact arguing for a narrowing of philosophical offerings, not a broadening. And the grounds for your position is that the general line you study is so good that the other stuff - which you haven't seen - must be not so good. It's even alright to make that argument. (In our hearts, everyone makes this argument. Because no one reads everyone, but everyone thinks what they think is best.) But you can't expect the other side to accept it. (Why would we?) So, for the sake of convincing us that the stuff you like is valuable, you ought to venture forth and make contact with the stuff you've been indignantly denouncing, to prove that you really were right to denounce it. (Doesn't that seem reasonable?)
jholbo | Homepage | 07.14.06 - 11:18 pm | #

How nice to hear you on the defensive for once, John.

I agree with everything you say.
Matt | Homepage | 07.16.06 - 12:53 pm | #

Well, that's one way to look at it, I suppose.
jholbo | Homepage | 07.16.06 - 8:48 pm | #

John Emerson (to John Holbo):

"Is there any philosophical outside to analytic philosophy? And if so, is it just “continental philosophy”? Because the people I like most (Michel Meyer and Stephen Toulmin, for example, or the process philosophers if any survive) don’t fiit into either box. A lot of the animus against AP comes from people who think that AP has succeeded in getting a hiring stranglehold which has killed off possible competing schools—Toulmin, for example, started out in AP, but he wandered off the reservation and hasn’t worked in philosophy departments for 20 years or so. He’s quite explicit about his exclusion. (AP philosophers sometimes deny that the term AP has any meaning, which I take to mean that since there is no contrastive kind of philosophy, the differences within what used to be called AP are the only significant philosophical differences.


Second, Leiter’s rhetorical style is that of someone whose position is impregnable and who does not need to persuade anyone. To me, this is a function of the institutional domination, and I think that there’s a lot of truth in stupid ignorant Heifetz’s accusation that Leiter has played a big role in the AP grand strategy for institutional domination. (Philosophical-type people not in AP do not get a warm feeling when they read the philosophy-department rankings and hiring reports published by CEO Leiter).


Third, when I do find something which seems to develop the general philosophical significance of some area of study, usually it is not something written by a philosopher. Francisco Varela, Antonio Damasion, Stuart Kaufman, Stephen Jay Gould, Ilya Prigogine, J.H. Hexter, Benoit Mandelbrot, Mary Douglas, Marshall Sahlins—these are primary producers in non-philosophical fields who do a great job in presenting the more general, philosophical significance of what they do."
Anonymous | 07.17.06 - 2:39 pm | #

Make clear that you are in fact arguing for a narrowing of philosophical offerings, not a broadening.

God, what good advice for Leiter's PGR!

...but maintaining your right to dismiss it without argument on the grounds that it MUST be bad

Not to speak for anyone or prolong a predictable debate any more than is necessary, but, well...um, in all fairness to Matt it is probably more accurate to say a tiny dose of that, followed by reading five or six dozen essays - some involving large sections of close reading - on the subject, you might say (as you might say everthing John says) more charitably.
Anonymous | 07.24.06 - 8:32 am | #

But what makes you think that people with this narrow focus - like yourself - are more qualified than people who have undertaken broader study, like myself - to pronounce concerning what the broader study is a study OF.

Sorry, but I'm genuinely confused. By "broader study" do you mean how at least one figure in the triad of Wittgenstein, Trilling and a certain analytic-friendly Nietzsche may be constantly employed in self-indulgent, targetted polemics only marginally concerned, or for that matter expository on such continental-lite figures as Zizek and Badiou? Before being challenged in the blogosphere, John Holbo's framing of the "continental" "line of study" was even more polemical and slip-shod than that in that embarrassment of a book, Theory's Empire, it frankly seem to me. Ah well.
Anonymous | 07.24.06 - 8:43 am | #

(This is a real Can of worms, you know...)


what do you most admire about Foucault?

...not much of anything, apparently.

[Ed: indeed]
Anonymous | 07.25.06 - 3:57 pm | #

The comments to this entry are now closed.
M. | 07.25.06 - 4:00 pm | #