Orthodox Theologian John Zizioulas (hailed by the likes of Jenson and Congar) says that 1) The West has a solid pneumatological foundation-as shown by Congar's I Believe in the Holy Spirit, and 2) that the East, while immersed within a Pneumatological Framework, needs to recover (or at least work out more details) its Christological foundation.
Dr. Blosser,
Thanks for responding. There is so much I could say, but I will make a few passing comments here:
1) I'm glad that you brought up Origen since I think his influence and contribution to the Church has done significant good and significant bad. Origen was probably the first to my knowledge to inherit a strong neo-Platonism of absolute simplicity. Origen sees all the problems with the doctrine and because of it introduces what scholars call the Origenist dialectic of opposition. Origen believed that alternate possibilities were essential to personhood [and rightfully so] even in the eschaton, but because of absolute simplicity he glosses free-will as a dialectic between objects of differing moral worth. In the eschaton, to stave off the created hypostasis becoming absorbed into the divine essence, he gives the possibility of sinning and has a strong predestinarianism of falls and redemptions. Origen, because of absolute simplicity, understood acts of will to be identic
Origen, because of absolute simplicity, understood acts of will to be identical to the divine essence, by transitivity for him, creation was necessary as well. Augustine inherits a strong neo-Platonism as well, but I don't think he "saw" all the problems as Origen did, and in fact I think he breaks up the dialectic of Origen in a few places [fixity in the Good, his famous nature and grace dialectic, and God's seminal reason's for creating]. Cappadocians in some place aren't completely disentangled from Origen's problems, it doesn't get fully broken until Maximus in the monothelite controversey. Compare Maximus' reading of Gethsemane with Aquinas'; big difference.
2) I'm quite confident that you can find Eastern theologians that chalk up instability to Adam being created ex nihilo, and that shouldn't be surprising based on what I wrote above on absolute simplicity being passed on up through the Church until Maximus. But you won't see it in Maximus. For Maximus being composite is not what results in being instable, but instability comes from Adam's potentiality for virtue. (The reason that being composite for Maximus doesn't result in instability can be easily shown by referenced to the redeemed in the eschaton who can never fall away but have an unlimited supply of alternate possibilities-divine energies.) Justice comes through habit, and habit comes when one's faculty of willing is fused with one's personal employment of willing.
When God created Adam, the faculty was not fused with Adam's personal use of it—which is called the gnomic will [which is accidental to his nature and not substantial and Christ doesn't need to assume it unless we wanted a possiblity to fall in the eschaton—an absurd notion]. God gave Adam a simple command to fuse these together, resulting in more commands until he reaches a habitual state resulting in deification. Theosis is open to Adam, but he is not created in theosis. This is also why Maximus would reject the scholastics' notion of 'Original justice.'
By Maximus' lights, if Adam was created with 'Original justice' it would be impossible for him to sin since there would be no deliberation: Adam's faculty of will would be fused with his personal employment. It is very unclear whether or not Augustine would affirm 'original justice'; I think there are texts that could be used that he had Maximus' view in mind, albeit some problems elsewhere, which in turn I think he could be closer in viewing Original Sin in an Orthodox sense and not as an "absence of original justice." Augustine views guilt in three senses and none of them are identical by his lights—one associated with Adam which is proper to him alone, one associated with concupiscence, and another that is associated with bodily death—only one of these does he view as personal. From my understanding he's using guilt in an improper sense in the latter two (since guilt is something personal not natural), which in turn I think he would concur with notion of original sin as in
sin as inherited corruption and the Second Council of Orange's Canon 2.
3) I can go on more, but in short I think Rome's following strictly Aquinas, Molina, or Scotus, etc., ends up denying free-will at key points. This can be easily seen in making will identical to the divine essence in God, and in the redeemed in the eschaton who only have one metaphysical object to will--the divine essence. Any other option, is a dialectic of opposition which is Origen's problem and quite the same as the monothelites in their debates with Maximus. It is here you see the compatibilism and irresistibleness of grace, which results in a kind of monotheletism.
4) The filioque is built on the back of absolute simplicity, since persons are understood as a relations of an essence. Relations are metaphysically thinner than essences so it doesn't compromise absolute simplicity. Moreover, 'relations of opposition,' are the BASIS for the distinctions of the persons. By Orthodox lights, the filioque is a problem, WITHIN the context of hypostatic existence, because it confuses begetting and procession with energy. Acts are either acts of nature or acts of will.
The faculty of willing is proper to the WHOLE trinity. To say that something is common to the Father and the Son, it must be common to the Holy Spirit as well. But to say that the Holy Spirit derives his hypostatic existence from himself is absurd. 'Through the Son' in Orthodox theology is understood not as hypostatic existence but as 'energetic' procession or eternal manifestation. If Rome meant THAT by the filioque, and I think she is getting closer to understanding it that way, there would be no issue at all.
5) We can advance to ecclesiology, but the arguments start here in theology proper and christology.
6) The East and West have different readings of Dionysius.
7) To learn more from where I'm coming from try some of these:
Free Choice in Saint Maximus the Confessor, by Joseph Farrell
Disputations with Pyrrhus of Our Father Among the Saints: Maximus the Confessor, by Joseph Farrell
A Complex Theory about a Simple God, by Christopher Hughes
Kretzmann, Norman. “A General Problem of Creation: Why Would God Create Anything at All?” Being and Goodness: the Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, Ed. by Scott MacDonald, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 1991. 219-220.
Daniel
I am sooo over this "East-good; West-bad" Eastern Orthodox chauvinism. I find it off-putting beyond belief.
If Jesus meant to vounchsafe His Truth only to one side of the planet, why did He bother dying for the entire world? :p
Dr. Blosser, I hope your son will weigh in on this discussion. We need thoughtful, informed comments like yours and his. 
Blessings,
Diane
Diane,
If you have an argument, put one forth. If you don't have one, then why comment?
I never said it was an EAST vs. WEST idea. Where is that indicated in my post. I'm just interested in getting down to the conceptual ideas that are the underlying motivations.
BTW, I'm a Roman Catholic, so perhaps you can explain that to me in light of what you just said.
Daniel
dear pb et al.:
It caused a veritable yellow poop storm the last time I drew it to readers' attention, but I encourage you to have a look at my post about Eastern testimony to Roman primacy/supremacy. (http://veniaminov.blogspot.com/
2004/11/and-you-can-quote-me.html)
The sweetest irony is how St. Maximus' theology of supraontological unity allegedly avoids and even dissolves the papalism he spouted! I'm bracing myself once again for waving hands about how none of it DEMANDS a Vatican I-style papacy and thus can’t support it. Never mind how any of it ALLOWS for contemporary EO autocephalism. Never mind how RCs are the only folks on the planet willing and able to echo these Eastern Fathers. Watch for shifting burdens of proof and semi-heretical M.O.’s. The patristic and ecclesiological rigorism of EOs that deny juridical papal supremacy was explicitly and unexceptionally taught/lived in the pre-schism Church is exactly how JWs and Mormons argue against Nicea from the pre-Nicene Church (and how Reformeds deny the validity of Nicea II). Strange bedfellows all.
BTW, Daniel, it's pretty humorous of you to say you are a Catholic when anyone that has followed your blog life for the past half-year knows you are a Catholic only by the faintest vestiges of a now-annoying canonical tatoo. (Your upcoming chrismation behind "the doors, the doors!" will do nicely to remove that scar, though, I'm sure.) You are champing at the bit to be an Orthodox, and your condescension for "the Latins" is dizzying.
Elliot,
I have responded to you here: http://energies.coffeeconversations.com/
Daniel
Thank you, Elliot. As usual, your comments are spot-on.
Diane
It seems St. Theodore the Studite, widely praised throughout Orthodoxy as the true father of reformed monasticism, through the Studion (which later would be the model for the houses of Athos), was also an ardent proponent of the universal jurisdiction of the See of Rome (and this hundreds of years after the foundation of "New Rome").
Does someone know where his words in support of Petrine jurisdiction may be found?
BTW, these are some of St.Theodore the Studite's words on the subject (I could not verify their original sources):
Writing to Pope Leo III ....
"Since to great Peter Christ our Lord gave the office of Chief Shepherd after entrusting him with the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, to Peter or his successor must of necessity every novelty in the Catholic Church be referred. [Therefore], save us, oh most divine Head of Heads, Chief Shepherd of the Church of Heaven." (Theodore, Bk. I. Ep. 23)
---
Writing to Pope Paschal, ...
"Hear, O Apostolic Head, divinely-appointed Shepherd of Christ's sheep, keybearer of the Kingdom of Heaven, Rock of the Faith upon whom the Catholic Church is built. For Peter art thou, who adornest and governest the Chair of Peter. Hither, then, from the West, imitator of Christ, arise and repel not for ever (Ps. xliii. 23). To thee spake Christ our Lord: 'And thou being one day converted, shalt strengthen thy brethren.' Behold the hour and the place
------
Writing to Emperor Michael, ...
"Order that the declaration from old Rome be received, as was the custom by Tradition of our Fathers from of old and from the beginning. For this, O Emperor, is the highests of the Churches of God, in which first Peter held the Chair, to whom the Lord said: Thou art Peter ...and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." (Theodore, Bk. II. Ep. 86)
"I witness now before God and men, they have torn themselves away from the Body of Christ, from the Supreme See (Rome), in which Christ placed the keys of the Faith, against which the gates of hell (I mean the mouth of heretics) have not prevailed, and never will until the Consummation, according to the promise of Him Who cannot lie. Let the blessed and Apostolic Paschal [Pope St. Paschal I] rejoice therefore, for he has fulfilled the work of Peter." (Theodore Bk. II. Ep. 63).
"In truth we have seen that a manifest successor of the prince of the Apostles presides over the Roman Chu
Hi Daniel, I've left a comment on your blog (and on my own).
Relationships within the context of divine simplicity do not damage simplicity (for they are within essence, and form part of it), so what's the problem?
Robert,
I agree with you that relations of an essence in self-relation do not damage absolute simplicity. I think I said just that in point 4--that relations do not compromise absolute simplicity. In point 4, I was only tying in the relationship between absolute simplicity and the filioque, since the latter is built on the back of the former as a conceptual motivation.
The problem, however, by my lights is that absolute simplicity destroys free-will and personhood, both in the Trinity and created hypostasis. I think alternate possibilities are absolutely essential to have personhood. If absolute simplicity is true, then I don't see how anyone can avoid Origen's dialectic: Absorption into the divine essence or cyclic falls and redemptions. The solution is to reject alternate possibilities as a dialetic of differing moral worth as Maximus did, and to reject absolute simplicity as he did as well.
Daniel
Mr. Jenkins,
How can the relations of the essence to itself be "part" of the essence if the essence has no parts in any sense what so ever?
The complete absence of any "part" metaphysical or otherwise logically precludes thinking of the relations of the essence to itself as something of which the essence consists of.
But what if we viewed the doctrine of divine simplicity in terms of relationship?
My friends, I wish I had the time to respond to you all, but I'm afraid my classes are keeping me too busy for that at the moment. Suffice it for me to rever you to the following post
I'm no theologian, no priest or so, just a lay man.
However, I can't understand why orthodoxy reject papacy the way She does : isn't papacy the best "image" of the Father's Godshead ? They fight so much the filioque, but the the catholic Church, with its episcopal, AND hierarchical frame is perhaps the best structure of the Church that reflect the eaqual divinity of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit ( as all the bishop have an equal dignity), but also showing the the Father is the head of the Trinity (the papacy being an unperfect image of this : eqaul to all bishops, bishop by nature, however, with a special primacy).
Wasn't Peter given in particular all the powers that were given to the other apostles gathered ? And wasn't he given an universal flock ?
A page for you to peruse.
And another.
I'm with you, Bob. How do you get around the pretty darn clear words of Christ Himself giving Peter the keys, telling him to feed His sheep? If this is not meant to be a grant of primal jurisdiction, then what is it?
The arguments against it remind me of the arguments that the true sin of Sodom was "lack of hospitality".
Dan,
Would you kindly explicate, in layman's terms, how the filioque is 'built on the back' of absolute simplicity?
As tangential as this is to your central argument, I don't know if Origen's view of free will is quite as clear-cut as you make it out to be (even Methodius profoundly misunderstood him). In the De Principiis Origen is perfectly happy, at more than one point in the Rufinian text, to speak of the will 'hardening into nature.' He seems to leave open this possibility for those permanently united to the Good. Cyclical recurrence, properly speaking, is a Stoic doctrine he spent his life opposing, since it ran contrary to human freedom. The possibility of recurring 'falls' seems to be a working hypothesis for him, though not a matter of faith. In any case, I'm more interested in hearing about absolute simplicity.
jamie, you can (and shall be able to) get more than your fair share of simplicity discussion at Daniel's new blog, http://energies.coffeeconversations.com/
Robinson asks Jenkins: "How can the relations of the essence to itself be 'part' of the essence if the essence has no parts in any sense what so ever?" Any run at trying to define God's nature philosophically runs afoul, at some point, of the exhilarating fact that His nature is humanly incomprehensible. Any student of Gilson may admire the intricate web of distinctions between what is IN SE and AD NOS, what pertains to the divine ESSE and to the economy of the Three Persons. Of course God's "relatedness" to any of His creatures, no less than the relations of the Three Persons within the Godhead, require far more work than meets the eye here. 'nuf.
Dr. Blosser,
I don't think that demotivates what Perry is saying, because for Origen, Augustine, Thomas, et al., to exist is the same as to will and to act in God. In other words, there is a clear identity relation between all these in God. That is what Perry meant by God not having "parts." Futhermore, the incomprehensibleness of God's essence is construed epistemically, that is, analogical predication is built on simplicity and not vice versa. All the language we predicate of God is true, but the language is under an improper mode. They are judgments in OUR mind about God (but no less true), and not really in God. That is how it is incomprehensible for Thomas.
Daniel
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