The problem here is Russia not Iran. If not for technology and material supplied by the Russians the Iranians would not now be in a position to do deals with the Europeans

The US should simply make it clear to the Russians that any nuclear attack by Iran on the US or its allies will be regarded as an attack by Russia on the US

This is how the US got Soviet nukes out of Cuba. The same policy should be applied here.

If not Russia, Iran could have gotten it from:
China
North Korea
South Africa
Brazil
Indonesia
Malaysia
Vietnam
Algeria
Pakistan
Argentina
Mexico
...and pretty much every European country. Plus, there's a slew of scientists out there who can be hired. You might be right about Russia, but simply cracking down on Russia isn't going to change the whole thing...

As for the tree, that would be pretty neat, but I think you should have a bloc so that we could give our explanations for the choices that we make. The draft comment, for example, I would refute.

If Iran proceeds to build nukes, Israel or the US will bomb it. No nukes, either way, not much to model.

They law of unintended consequences is so vast in this area that I do not believe one can do a good job modeling it.

In The Persian Puzzle Kenneth Pollack walks us through the options after providing a handy history of the country. The options are:

1. Invasion

2. Subverion

3. Clinton goes to North Korea

4. Oriraq Redux

5. Containment.

I have that book on my wish list! :(

I suppose the best-case scenario is an overthrow of the current Islamicist regime, which is said to be rather unpopular with the masses. Failing that, military options seem rather limited, both because of the Iraq commitment and the dispersed, hardened nature of many of the nuclear sites.

I would be curious to see whether anyone seriously wants to explore the Genghis Khan option. That was not one of the choices in James Fallows' treatment of the subject in the Atlantic.

Pollack presents several different policy approaches, and then briefly comments on each--and the comment is generally that it won't work:

1) Invasion a la Iraq: the first point is the obvious one: end the regime and you end all the problems the existence of the regime poses. This is true. The question only is cost. Pollack considers an invasion completely unfeasible, and there's little evidence to suggest that anyone in the administration disagrees. Iran's population is three times Iraq's, its land area is four times Iraq's, and we have huge commitments to Iraq already. There would be no allies, the reconstruction costs would be enormous, and lastly, this is the one thing we could do that would be certain to transform the broad positive view of the US that the majority of non-government Iranians have into its opposite. The Iraq experience suggests that a small resistance can do a lot of damage, but here the resistance would
likely be broad-based, and in the end we would have "proved the mullahs right." They might end up taking over again in the end and re-winning the broad support they have squandered over the past 25 years.

Pollack suggests that invasion isn't worth it even if it were to work. The underlying theme is that he doesn't appear to believe that Iran would ever use nuclear weapons against the United States or Israel anyway. Rather, the possession of nuclear weapons would embolden them in conventional ways, the worst of which is conventional terrorism against US and Israeli targets. Yet Iran knows that there are limits to our tolerance for conventional attack. Attack us overseas and take out a three digit figure, and we do nothing. Attack us at home and take out a four digit figure, and we end your country. So that seems to suggest that an Iran with nukes means more small scale suicide bombing of Israel, more Beirut's, more Khobar Towers. The other inherent limit is that they want us bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, but not so much so that we leave, because we have common (Sunni) enemies there.

2) Coup d'etat: this also eliminates all problems if it works. Pollack doesn't think this can work. Though there is much evidence throughout the book that 70% or more of the population is completely fed up with
the regime, he doesn't think that a coup would trigger broad-based support for whoever the coup puts in place. He also thinks that this will constitute sufficient internal interference to trigger the old Persian xenophobic America-hatred, and thus ultimately strengthen the mullahs. The fact that advocates of this approach have talked of using MEK as tools is worrisome: MEK were Marxist guerillas under the tutelage of Saddam Hussein, and deeply reviled by ordinary Iranians. I also don't see how this would work logistically; Pollack doesn't address that.

3) Clinton goes to North Korea: 'nuff said.

4) Osiraq Redux: two problems Pollack raises here. First he doesn't seem to think that Israel can pull it off on a purely technical level and we would never be sure that the entire program had been destroyed. People learned form Osiraq, don't put all of your eggs in one basket, don't put all of your nuclear program in one location. Second, there would be massive retaliation, and it would be costly: lots and lots of terrorism. Much of this might focus on detabilizing Iraq and, as per usual, the Palestinian peaceprocess, where we have enough problems.

5) Containment: this is basically what Pollack recommends: a carrot and stick approach involving the open offer of a Clinton goes to North Korea if you're good, and sanctions if you're bad. The fatal flaw, as Pollack oddly enough seems to implicitly realize, is that it presupposes the possibility of cooperation between the US and Europe, and this rests on a fundamental delusion: that the Europeans are on our side. They are not. They are on Iran's side. They will do everything in their power to prevent the US from doing anything at all that will impede them from rewarding Iran for its bad behavior. Since the book documents this fact magnificently in the historical chapters, it is simply bizarre of Pollack to suggest that after doing everything in its power to allow Iran to acquire nukes, normalize trade, and continue to engage in terrorism, not only against Israel and the US, but against the Europeans themselves, that suddenly Europe will change its tune just because we ask them to.

Nestor,

Nice summation of Pollack's work. On a related note, are you aware of this blog, ArmsControlWonk. I find them to be a little more detail oriented than the blowhards from the political pundit journals.

Also, we need to consider that it is quite probable that it suits the Iranians to make arrangements with Europe and keep the US as the Great Satan. The US has been prepared for a thawing of relations and it's been the Iranians holding back.

You might be interested in a book from The Rand Corporation (downloadable for free) titled Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era. The authors go into detail about the regular armed forces (the Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); their agendas; and their positions in the decisionmaking system.

They also recount the fervor in the early years of the revolution of Islamic fundamentalism and Persian nationalism and how they were the two primary drivers of Iran's security policy. Then they note how Iranian security policy has changed. The primary drivers today are geopolitics, ethnicity, and economies all with the aim of preserving the state and the political regime rather than exporting and invigorating a worldwide Islamic revolution, of which the latter are used as tools in support of the former. There's a whole lot of substance in the report.

Also, Mark Roberts report for the National Defense University, Khomeini's Incorporation of the Iranian Military. Again more good stuff here too.

My thoughts were that the Revolutionary Guard were really the key to a destabilization effort and we needed to find an incentive for institutional aggrandizement, perhaps seeing if an increased and more robust military presence in the region could entice a military led ouster of the Mullahs, rather than the mainly political-student led rebellion. Could the Iranian military be transformed into a Turkish-like protector of the non-theocratic state? Of course the obvious dilemma is that the RG are the protectors of the Revolution! But if history has taught us anything it's that corruption and bribery can indeed work miracles.

I'm interested in a multi-pronged destabilization effort to isolate the Mullahs and to align the armed forces and populace towards their overthrow (as we know the populace doesn't much support the mullahs) but how to incentivize the generals?

Anyways, I thought it would have been interesting to launch a series of posts where we could break the policy options down using some decision science but now that I'm thinking about it this probably isn't the right problem for that type of blog experiment because it would take a lot of information to make the case for critical branches and if people are coming forward with National Review talking

points we'd get bogged down pretty damn early.

As I stated in my post I think Europe will tolerate Iran possessing nuclear weapons because they're not prepared to go to the mat to stop them. The US, at the end of the day, I think will also swallow the bitter pill. What may come out of this would be a geo-political realignment of sorts with European policies vis a vie US interests becoming even starker for the only way to stop Iran is to be united and prepared, quite publically too, to use muscle.

I would however be interested in reading how people think we're going to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

Here is a source on US sanction on Iran. Here is a source on the prospect of UN sanctions and the likely role fo the Chinese (veto authority) and here is an article that dicusses tension within the European diplomatic community regarding the actions of France, Britain and Germany regarding the Iranian crisis.

Just remember that Washington now runs military bases on not just one but two of the countries that border Iran. The overall pendulum of the Iranian zeitgeist is swinging in the direction of Washington. If (when) Tehran grows an atomic bomb, the nuclear fruit will eventually fall into sympathetic hands. The drawbacks are that the strategy a.) assumes that the America-is-Satan pendulum will swing (a safe bet but is might not happen) and b.) that Tehran sponsored terrorism will continue (which is also a safe bet).

Until then the message should be loud and clear:

"You fuck with us, we delete your country. And I don't mean no pansy-ass invasion neither. I mean vitrified desert a la Hiroshima. Geddit?"

The message should be delivered with the usual diplomatic loving-kindness by emissaries of our resident WarCriminal-and-Chief.

There are a number of things far short of invasion that the US could do militarily to put unbearable pressure on the bloodthirsty mullahs of Iran.

Disrupting the income generation capacity of the mullah power structure is a rather uncomplicated strategy. The power to ride brutal roughshod over the people of Iran is derived from the ongoing oil production and export. If small numbers of terrorists can shut down most of Iraq's oil production and export, imagine what Iranian terrorists aided by USSF troops could do.

Cruise missiles and laser bombs work really well, too.

The world economy would take a hit from higher oil prices, but not nearly as much of a hit as from a vitrified NYC or DC.

If the world is not prepared to pay more for oil in exchange for preventing the mad mullahs from going nuclear, the world will just have to be unprepared--and pay more for oil.

Back in '79, I spent the better part Armor Advanced Course trying to figure out how to invade Iran. The miserable terrain [dominated by mountains, hills, salt marshes and towns - few open areas] and the logistics nightmare [small port facilites on the Gulf] stymied my efforts [not ot speak of the reticence of President Carter to take any decisve action].

With modern SOCOM + GPS bombing tactics AND allies on the ground, we might have a good chance for victory, but it will make Iraq look like a picnic. It wil also demand pateince, which is in short supply.

Drop laughing gas on them!

Well, a fairly obvious solution that should present itself but doesn't seem to have. Increase the size of the U.S. army. Do so publicly, announcing that over the next few years the U.S. military will add three or four new divisions to the active duty strength of the army. That way, you have essentially put Iran on notice that the U.S. is serious about actually invading, which means that the U.S. might not have to invade.

Moreover, such an option will mean an army stretched less thin in the event that the Iraq unpleasantness winds up lasting into the middle of the decade.

Of course, doing so might mean raising taxes, which probably makes it a non-starter.

I think this is great idea, tangoman. gnxp can surely bring a different perspective to the current list of inadequate solutions. I'd like to propose the strategy of "agressive deterrent", that we give teeth to our requests with conventional bombing of pre-designated targets. I think the risk assessment is acceptable until such time as the mullahs have launch capability.
And I think gnxp is the perfect place to do a decision tree-- a fresh perspective, both organic and historical backgrounding, and a lot of high IQ armchair analysts. The talent pool here is pretty exceptional. :)

Two additional Army divisions are ALREADY in the current budget - and they were explicitly there from about May onwards. The end stength of the Army will not be increased by 20% because the 'faces and spaces' will be taken out of redundant corps artillery and air defense units which have been totally supplanted by air power.

All new divisons will have 5 "units of action" [brigades] with 'only' about 50 tanks each - which adds up to about 2000 kills/basic ammo load. Note: most 'armored' or 'mechanized' divisons contain about 750 targets, so this small force can currently destroy just about any corps/army-sized [3 divs] organization on the planet [except those that speak British or Yiddish].

However, the real focus of this Army expansion is in 'boots on the ground' for peace-making operations. The infantry-heavy Styker Brigades have proved to be the best choice for the Brave New World we now inhabit.

The original post asked if anyone was interested in participating in decision-tree analysis/gaming. I'm interested

Sure, what harm is there in a game. I only hope the final conclusion is to leave them alone. Certain pushy elements advocating brainiac assertiveness is what is forcing them to arm nuclear in the first place. My belief is that as long as we have a strong defensive deterrent, no one can touch us. Live and let live.

Frank C. That is surely naive. The Iranians are not leaving us alone now, and they never will, while we're supporting democracies on their doorsteps. See Dan Darling's excellent five-part analysis at Winds of Change, The Elephant in the Room.
Here's the conculsion, but the whole thing is very good!
http://www.windsofchange.net/arc...ives/ 005945.php

Naive, huh? Now let me get this straight, you do the scheming, we do the fighting. Checked out your link and saw it for what it is. A load of (Perle) hooey designed to take out more U.S. youth in pursuit of an interest other than our own. I'm only 16 but you can bet that me and my friends aren't going to die for this type of misguided nightmare. We already know what is up. Good luck finding soldiers to fight your endless wars. It is this kind of senseless blind aggression that leads to terror attacks. With a well established American defense, exactly how can they hurt us? Peace!

Frank, I cetainly don't want you to fight! :0
You're too young, and you're not a volunteer. But I think isolationism is a non-viable policy for the US. I am don't believe terror attacks are caused by agressive behavior on our part-- what was the agressive behavior that caused 911?

Maybe our one sided Mideast policy? I Bin Laden's own words he has said so. Why don't we take a neutral approach and focus on our defense? I have a friend who's big brother died outside Baghdad in April 2003. My friend's father (I never saw a grown man cry before) just died of a heart attack in late October. These are good people. The pain they feel I cannot express. Of course I will never volunteer, but our misadventures over there will probably necessitate a draft. Our grief is turning to anger.

"Frank C.": Of course we don't except English-speaking Muslims such as you to volunteer.

David, I'm not particularly in love with Muslims, but they're people too, who are entitled to determine how they run their countries. I just feel that every time we take action over there, it is like stirring up a hornets nest. Our constant meddling there has made us enemies. If the Iranians were so stupid (and they are not) as to launch a nuke at Israel, Europe or the U.S. (or allow nukes to get into the hands of terrorists) they know we would return the favor 100 fold.

Pollack already wrote a book. A book tells you a lot about the author - and "The Threatening Storm" shows that he's an idiot.