Actually, flickering probably did happen before in the system. There was a near miss a few years ago that sounded a lot like this recent crash.
Right after the crash I was chatting with Track29, and I was amazed that a redundant system was not part of the original design.
Another thing. Unfortunately most rail transit systems are unique, and more so now than they used to be.
If you wanted to move a Baltimore streetcar to the Washington, DC system, changing the gauge of the wheels was all that was needed, and pre WWII NY subway cars were indeed moved to Chicago.
But now each system has it's own standards and equipment from one system can't operate on another system. In some cases, Boston and Chicago come to mind, different series of train cars can't even be combined in the same train.
Hell, NYC's various subway systems can't share rolling stock due to different loading gauges on the IRT lines compared to the BMT lines.
I would challenge the assumption, however, that all railroads should be run the same way. Changing technology makes a huge difference. I get that you're talking more about management than operations, but when I hear about 'running' the railroad, I think of operations first.
The thing about BART and Metrorail is that they aren't that unique. They were designed and built roughly simultaneously and by many of the same contractors, using many of the same sources.
And as the article pointed out, which I found incredibly upsetting wrt to WMATA's failures here, is that the problem isn't even unique to BART, similar flickering has been seen on MUNI (and probably other transit systems) -- which is an entirely separate system running on different tracks with a different gauge. And different rolling stock.
What I found particularly interesting is that as soon as BART noticed a problem -- which they noticed in 1972 when the system opened -- they immediately designed and built redundancy into the system.
In addition to CPUC overseeing BART, BART has, and always has had, an elected board. So their is accountability to voters as well.
In my opinion, there was a huge failure at WMATA over this and someone should resign. Or be fired. There also needs to be a thorough audit on why WMATA isn't getting more information from outside the system. And if there's a safety or technology committee on the WMATA board, that should be entirely reconfigured as well. If I were Fenty, I'd replace my appointees to the Board.
There won't be of course. There will no replacements. Everyone will keep their jobs. And we'll bury our heads in the sand until the next tragedy.
I'm talking about the systems that run a railroad. And it's one of the reasons that I subscribe to publications such as _Progressive Railroading_ and _Mass Transit_ and read _Trains_ (but not every month, the others you can get for free...).
I don't think anyone who runs a railroad system would claim that the way operations, signaling, train control, etc., differs from system to system. In fact, the FRA provides standards, etc. that guide overall operation.
This was my basic point. For WMATA to claim otherwise is an example of parochialism.
WRT Ken's point, _Mass Transit_ magazine has a cover story each month on a different transit system. A few years back I was caught by the article on the San Diego system and the director's point that transit systems are making a mistake by all demanding custom built systems, that developing and sticking to best practices, that building common technology (think like the PCC) would reduce costs, and improve reliability and operations.
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