This article is breathtaking! Thoroughly researched, sensible, and respectful. Keep them coming, please!
Why does the author write "R. Professor Leibowitz" in note 23? Leibowitz was not a rabbi. In fact, he was an apikores according to any definition of the term -- even though he was a shomer mitzvot.
Maybe the "R." is short for 'recalcitrant'? Or just plain 'Reb'? Let's keep the disucssion on the issue at hand - women and Aliyah laTorah/kri'at haTorah.
Can Menachem tell us how soon Prof Sperber plans to rebutt these arguments on this forum? or might he be waiting for the official publication? (where in fact is the Frimers' article "in review"?)
--mivami
(3) There is another very large group of posekim (perhaps the majority) led by the R. Yoel Sirkis (Ba”h; Sources 9 and 10) who maintain that one cannot be mohel on kevod ha-tsibbur – particularly in the case of women’s aliyyot.
Fair enough, but significant authorities (e.g. Beit Yosef O.C. #53) feel that they can.
BTW, and I am sure that Prof Frimer has researched this, are there not instances in which, in practice, the tsibbur - however defined - HAS in fact been mohel on it's kavod?
There is a deeper question that has only been hinted to by this review. It seems to me that Sperber (and Shapiro) are both assuming that the contemporary challenge of feminism has created a communal sha'at ha'dechak. The real question is whether or not that is the case. IF we assume that the questions raised by the feminist critique in fact create a halakhik reality of sha'at ha'dechak then even Frimmer would agree that, like the case of all kohanim, women could receive (at least some) aliyot.
This debate is moving the coversation in the direction of a real encounter with feminism. In order for major poskim to decide on this issue, it will demand a serious grappling with the questions that have been raised.
I am not sure of the answer, but I think that we are asking the wrong questions by focusing on the details of "women and X (aliyot, benching, minyan...). 99% of puiblic tefilah is derabanan (parashat zachor, parah perhaps are exceptions). Kevod habriyot + a real sha'at ha'dechak would allow posking to restructure the entire system of tefilah b'tzibbur.
Jeff
Frimmer makes the assumption that there is an individual hiyyuv in kriat hatora. I am not aware of this hiyyuv - could someone give me pointers?
Both R' Sperber & R' Frimer -- miss an important point (although R' Frimer hints at it). maybe the women's feelings are just simply wrong. Yes, we take women's feeling into consideration. But are all feelings legit? Maybe the Torah is against Feminism & therefore would demand that the women understand that their is nothing objectionable in them not getting Aliyot despite what they might feel.
Just to follow up, I would like to better understand the claim that women would be reciting a bracha levatala. Frankly, the entire institution of having a single reader is based on considerations not unlike kevod habriyot, i.e. so as not to embarass the ignorant.
>Frimmer makes the assumption that there is an individual hiyyuv in kriat hatora
See here - http://www.etzion.org.il/dk/1to8...o899/
054daf.htm
That is the opinion of the Pri Megadim and of R' Moshe Feinstein. I know that there are also Posekim who say that it's a Chovos Tsibbur not a Chovas Yachid (I think R' Shlomo Zalman) but I don't know the sources off hand.
Wolf, R. Bick shlita's paper makes the opposite assumption, and backs it with proofs - that there is a hovat tzibbur, and maybe not even that.
Also, I think a chakira between two 20th century opinions makes more or less anyone entitled to an educated guess. I still have yet to see a real proof from a rishon who says there's a chovat yachid, and that this chova is not incumbent upon women.
I was specifically referring to this line -
הנחת הפמ"ג היא שקטן מוציא את הרבים. כלומר - יש חיוב על כל אחד לקרוא בתורה בציבור. בפועל, אדם אחד קורא ומוציא את הרבים מדין 'שומע כעונה', אבל החיוב על כל אחד ואחד
I'mn not certain about your general point. Where does Frimer say its a Chovas Yachid?
"Can Menachem tell us how soon Prof Sperber plans to rebutt these arguments on this forum? or might he be waiting for the official publication? (where in fact is the Frimers' article "in review"?)"
As noted, Frimers' article is in review. You'll know when/where it appears. As for Prof. Sperber's response, I happened to see him last night and he is planning an eventual response.
Aryeh rocks!
Wolf - bmchila mmori verabbi R. Bick - I think the logic behind the sentence is flawed. How could there be an obligation on every yachid to read betzibur?
A better explanation of the Peri Megadim is that the katan fulfills the obligation of the tzibbur.
I know that there are also Posekim who say that it's a Chovos Tsibbur not a Chovas Yachid (I think R' Shlomo Zalman) but I don't know the sources off hand.
Wolf2191 | Homepage | 06.13.08 - 10:49 am | #
it is well known that whether krias hatorah is a chovas yachid or tzibbur was a machlokes between r. chaim and r. elye pruzhaner--r. elye quoted a milchamos in megillah who lists krias hatorah as one of the things which are chovas tzibbur (unlike megillah). brisker lore maintains that r. chaim had a ready response upon being presented with this proof.
see also rabbenu chananel in the seventh perek of yoma who says that it is a mitzvah to stay for krias hatorah because of b'rov am hadras melech. otherwise, it seems there would be no reason to stay.
It seems I erred by assuming that Prof Yeshayahu Leibowitz had semicha. I turned on this matter to a member of the family, who responded briefly as follows:
"He had an MD degree and a PhD in Chemistry. No smicha. Never studied in a yeshiva. Autodidactic. The Kibbutz Hadati movement in its early years asked him shaylas (his answers are interesting) but he did not 'pasken'"
A non-traditional thinker he definitely was. But, I would advise caution before calling anyone a Kofer and an apikores.
Many issues were raised in the comments which my brother Dov and I have dealt with at length in the full article. These include: the nature of the obligation of keri'at haTorah; On whom falls the obligation of the berakhot; How can those (women and minors) who are not obligated receive aliyyot even theoretically; How does the institution of ba'al korei affect the various considerations at play; can a tsibbur be "Mohel" (forego) it's honor; etc. These are lengthy discussions - and we beg the reader's patience until the article is in print.
For some sources on the question of whether keriat ha-Torah is the obligation of the individual or the community, see R. Ovadiah Yosef's Sefer Halichot Olam, vol. I, pp. 242-244.
Dear Reb Menachem Mendel,
Thanks for the mareh makom. I had scanned the eight volumes of Rav Ovadiah Yosef's Halikhot Olam - but I missed that important reference because it is in a surprising location - in the middle of Hilkhot Tahanun and Yud Gimmel Middot.
Yiyasher Koach - Aryeh
Regarding Ephraim's query why there is a berakha levatala under a bifurcated Ba'al Korei system - see the following:
מבית מדרשו של הרב, הלכות קריאת התורה, עמוד ל"א
…אבל בזמן הזה, דבעינן לאתויי לידי דינא דשומע כעונה מהבעל קורא להעולה,…דדין ג' או ז' קרואים, הוא שיהיו ז' קוראים, או על כל פנים שיהיה הקורא הוא המברך. ואם כן בכדי לומר שומע כעונה בעינן מחוייב בדבר, וקטן ואשה פסולים לקרות בזמן הזה מצד הדין, אם לא שמברכים הם על קריאת עצמם.
Jeff raises a fascinating issue which I heard bandied about at an Edah Conference by several participants - namely that we live in a She'at ha-Dehak generation. I find it hard to believe that this claim is more valid now then it was in the Fifties or Seventies. There may well be she'at ha-dehak situations, but to label a whole generation as she'at ha-dehak - in order to permit [wholesale] heterim reserved for extreme situations - seems totally uncalled for.
The underlying tone and assumptions of this article are revealed at the very beginning, when the author states:
I strongly believe that we have to be sensitive to women’s spiritual needs or as Hazal say: לעשות נחת רוח לנשים (Sifra, Parsheta 2; Hagiga 16b).
"We", as in the men who are in the position of relating to or not relating to, and granting or not granting what will make those pesky feminists feel good. We, as in the male hegemony that pretends that the halacha has, in the past, remained pristine and uninfluenced in the face of cultural norms.
I am pretty sure that at the time that Sarah Schnierer was courageously addressing a crisis in the community by founding the beit yakov schools, many people were claiming that they did not live in a live in a "She'at ha-Dehak generation". How fortunate that she had the vision and intelligence to see the "nolad". And how fortunate that Rabbi Sperber is able to do the same.
There is no doubt in my mind that there is a community of women and men who are entirely shomerim mitzvot and who are Orthodox who experience the challenges of feminism as a sha'at ha'dechak. I think that is a fact of the modern orthodox community that can not be denied. The simplest evidence is the popping up of shira hadasha minyanim around America and Israel and none of them with an actual rabbi at the helm (the upper East and West sides of Manhattan notwithstanding). The reality of these minyanim is that they are anti-clergy but committed to halakha.
The question is if that community chooses to pasken against the rest of the Orthodox establishment will they be received like Sarah Schnier and the Chafetz Chayyim? I think that the answer to the question is, sadly, too obvious.
Perhaps what Professor Sperber should work on next are the minhagim of lashon ha-ra...
Great, we all know the Chafetz Chayyim gave his imprimatur to Sarah Schenirer and the establishment of Bais Yaakov.
Please let me know which gadol ha-dor accepts the practices of the shirah chadashah groups.
Actually, adderabbah - maybe, as Sarah Schenirer first got the acceptance of the Chafetz Chayyim, before instituting any radical innovations in minhagei bet ha-knesset, these groups should wait to have at least one posek of any caliber who sanctions their practices. I have not heard of a one. Please correct me if I am mistaken.
(David Weiss Halivni and R. Daniel Sperber are very knowledgable but not posekim, nor would they claim to be.)
It is both disrespectful and ridiculous to write off those who disagree with these women's groups as not understanding of women and not "brave", whatever that means, as though the true bravery is to ignore halakot you feel are inconsistent with your own values.
People can "experience the challenges of feminism as a sha'at ha'dechak". That doesn't make it any more a halakic sha'at ha-dechak than me being emotionally upset over a dish I treifed up causes the halakot of hefsed merubeh to apply.
Jeff states:
"The simplest evidence is the popping up of shira hadasha minyanim around America and Israel and none of them with an actual rabbi at the helm... The reality of these minyanim is that they are anti-clergy but committed to halakha."
I'm not sure you are correct when you say they are committed to Halakha. I asked acquaintances of mine who daven regularly at Shira Hadasha, what percent of the congregants would leave if it could be proven that women's aliyyot were halakhically improper. They responded that approximately 50% would. I was shocked that only 50% would leave - especially if 100% are committed to Halakha.
I have long thought that the problem is what people mean when they call themselves Halakhic. We have traditionally understood it to mean that this refers to the hakhra'a of the majority of poskim or at least to some of the gedolei ha-poskim. It has now come to mean that there is such a view in the halakhic discussion. It could be a small minority oposition or even a rejected position, as long as it gets you where you want to go. Beit Shammai was also part of the halakhic flow. No, IMHO not everything in halakha is halakhic.
Kindly see: “Feminist Innovations in Orthodoxy Today: Is Everything in Halakha - Halakhic?” JOFA Journal 5:2 (Summer 2004/Tammuz 5764): 3-5, available PDF file available online at: http://www.jofa.org/pdf/
JOFASumm...ummerFinal1.pdf. See also p. 84-85 of my review of Tamar Ross' voume http://www.jofa.org/pdf/uploaded...06-
DQLN0171.pdf
abe writes:
these groups should wait to have at least one posek of any caliber who sanctions their practices. I have not heard of a one. Please correct me if I am mistaken.
(David Weiss Halivni and R. Daniel Sperber are very knowledgable but not posekim, nor would they claim to be.)
you require sanction of a "posek of any caliber" but then dismiss the one posek of some caliber who actually approves of this.
R' Frimer actually takes issue with his methodology, but you simply dismiss him out of hand.
On another list responding to R' Frimer's review, it was noted that most "poskim" to be taken seriously today have some kind of political standing, whether as Rosh Yeshiva or as Rabbanut-certified city rav. R' Sperber is neither, being on the BI faculty and rav of a small shul. Perhaps the community that takes him seriously is his "camp".
Posek-stature should not be politically determined, but determined by how many people listen to you, and how many other poskim take you seriously. R' Frimer and others provide the latter validation, even while disagreeing, and the growing Edah/JOFA/Shira Chadasha subgrouping, plus a lot of others in Israel (or so I've been told), provide the former.
Aryeh, I think your question was misleading: who would prove? How would it be proven? I don't think such "proofs" exist in the world of halakha, especially not in this silly crusade of yours since it's all built around fuzzy concepts nobody ever bothered to define like "kvod hatzibur".
How about a good article on some dinei mamonos or something instead?
Amit writes "...fuzzy concepts nobody ever bothered to define like "kvod hatzibur"."
Not fuzzy at all if you scan the extensive responsa Literature - a short digest of which appears in the review. But that will just have to wait for the full article. My apologies.
Aryeh
I tend to agree with Abe. Not everyone who has semicha and paskens, not every Talmud scholar - no matter how knowlegeable - is a "posek." A Posek, who should be consulted before undoing 2000 years of Halakhic precedent, is someone you would turn to for guidance on whether to put someone on a respirator, aguna or mamzeirut question. Someone with broad shoulders and experience, who has been tested over time. I consider Rav Aharon Lichtenstein and Rav Nahum Rabinovitch in this category. First class well recognized modern Orthodox religious zionist Poskim, who are straight-shooters. Both have Doctorates, both were University Professors before becoming Rashei Yeshiva - so they understand modernity. I haven't heard of anyone in the various "partnership minyanim" who have consulted with either of them. I have turned to them repeatedly on women's issues, as well as other serious issues of the kind I referred to above - and they are accessible and approachable.
It wont work to label the generation as a "shaat he dechak" generation because of feminism and then make a few changes as a result. You wont please anyone. If a shaat he dechak exists, you can only make minimal changes, to deal with that shaat he dechak. The feminist challenge to orthodoxy requires much more than that - it needs recognition that women have been excluded from a halachik process designed by and aimed at men. If you dont accept the basis of this challenge nothing you do, even declaring shaat he dechak, will help. Of course if you do you will place yourself beyond the halachik pale.
At the same time many many educated and otherwise traditionally minded women feel excluded by orthodoxy. Some stay affiliated, some never affiliate and others join shira hadasha places. this trend will not go away, and may even grow. so if we can turn a blind eye for 20 years and see how shira hadasha works out that might be a useful halachik experiment
Aryeh's definition of "halakhik" requires some unpacking:
"what people mean when they call themselves Halakhic. We have traditionally understood it to mean that this refers to the hakhra'a of the majority of poskim or at least to some of the gedolei ha-poskim. It has now come to mean that there is such a view in the halakhic discussion."
I think that there is a difference between that which is halakhikally definsible and that which is communally acceptable.
A good example might be the usage of umbrellas on Shabbat. It would not be very difficult to marshal sources in support of that practice given the 'science' of umbrellas today. However, the hatam sofer paskened on parasols and it is very difficult to find a posek prepared to disagree.
One could certainly come up with other examples of actions that are permissable but not acceptable because the poskim have not decided that way. I typically use the word 'halakhik' to describe an action that is defensible based on the classic sources of Jewish Law, but which contemporary poskim are not comfortbale with.
What you are describing seems like something akin to a classic da'at torah approach. Actions are not made assur or mutar by the psak of a gadol. They are either assur or mutat based on the mekorot. The gadol is what grants commmunal legitimacy to said action.
Ironically, the prohibition of women learning torah (from the gemara to the Ramban to the shulkhan arukh) is much more explicit than the exclusion of women from publi prayer. In fact there may be an issur d'orayta to teach women talmud - certianly no such issur could possibly exist in the realm of public prayer. One might wonder why there is such opposition to allowing women into the beit knesset given that we have allowed then into the beit midrash?
a few brief points:
1.
"Only in cases where kavod is obligatory (e.g., for a King or mourner) is the absence of kavod considered embarrassing, as indicated by R. Isaac Blazer" (Source 1
,
The case at hand neatly fits in to the category of: the "absence of Kavod is Gnai", since in today's day and age a show of respect to an all male group is perceived in this manner.
2. "Nearly all authorities – including, inter alia, R. Naftali Amsterdam (Source 20), ... Rav Yitzchak Nissim (Source 21), R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, R. Elijah Bakshi Doron (Source 22), R. Israel Shepansky - maintain that kevod ha-beriyyot requires an objective standard that affects or is appreciated by all".
quotes 21, and 22 seem to be saying something else, (21 seems to making the point you raise later on in your piece: "However, kevod ha-beroyyot cannot be invoked to nullify a rabbinic commandment, where the shame comes from the very fulfillment of the rabbinic injunction itself", and quote 22 does not seem to speak of an "objective standard that affects or is appreciated by all" but rather of a universal practice.
3. you argue that:
"kevod ha-beroyyot cannot be invoked to nullify a rabbinic commandment, where the shame comes from the very fulfillment of the rabbinic injunction itself".
the issue at hand is that the rabbinic commandment was not intended to cause shame, nor was it enacted in a time and place where its very fulfillment leads to this - your argument here ignores this claim of shinui hateva -change in human nature
R' Frimer:
undoing 2000 years of halachic precedent
when this sort of thing has been argued in other fora, it often devolves into "lo rainu eino raya" vs. "lo rainu raya" - which idea is more meaningful here. Was there a positive minhag NOT to give women aliyot, or was there an absence of a minhag to set up tziburim which define their kavod to include women getting aliyot? The answer to that seems to determine how different people answer the main question.
Yes, Abe is right, that there needs to be validation from a posek, but lechatchilah dismissing the one posek who does approve, because he has little political standing in the Israeli scene - I don't like it.
And as was said in the other group mentioned in my previous post, change does not usually happen top-down, as you seem to assert, it more often happens bottom-up. People start doing things, particularly women, that differ from previous practice, there are condemnations, perhaps one or two poskim stand up and are condemned themselves, a couple of generations later it's normal. Look at wigs - they were roundly condemned in the 17th century or so, when women started to wear them, but today, there are major figures who say it's the ideal hair covering.
Then in the 19th century, the removal of the hair-covering, even if roundly condemned by most poskim, well, a few spoke up for it, and until recently it was the norm. Even today, nobody's going to run a woman with uncovered hair out of the synagogue (well, nobody normal, anyway - there are nuts everywhere).
So too here. WTGs - you yourself have become part of the conversation legitimizing them. You, like RD Sperber, stand outside the politically-connecte posek circles. But the strength of your research and your words speaks for itself.
You disagree with him - which shows you take him seriously, as someone to be disproven, rather than dismissed. That has its own value in legitimizing the other side.
The same process is unfolding again.
* * *
Jeff:
umbrellas on Shabbat
and yet, R' Immanuel Jakobovits paskened positively for umbrellas when he was the rabbi of the Fifth Avenue Synagogue, under the conditions that existed in his neighborhood.
Circumstances alter cases.
acceptable...defensible
the machmir/meikil thing runs the other way too - most of us are far more machmir in our kitchens than the Shulchan Aruch requires. Women are not just going meikil against rabbinic texts, they also go machmir in many ways. It's not a "he who looks for all the kulas is an apikoros" position.
Thanbo - you're missing my point, which I thought R. Frimer made as clearly as well.
Does R. Dr Sperber answer shailah's about gittin?
Does he answer shailah's about respirators and taking people off artifical life support?
Does he really consider HIMSELF a posek?
Has R. Sperber ever poskined on iggun, mamzerut, gittin, ro'ah dam machmat tashmish by niddah, or medical life and death issues?
I understand he is a shul rabbi, but come on! - shul rabbi and posek are two very very different things. I'm sure he answers shailahs about mistakes in kriyat ha-torah. Maybe he answers shailahs about mar'ot and ketamim, or basar be-chalav. I'm not saying he has to be a rosh yeshuva - most roshei yeshiva are not posekim either. But shul rabbi as basis for calling him a posek? - Seriously, come on.
That R. Sperber is not a posek, does not mean that he is not an incredibly intelligent and sensitive scholar. His Minhagei Yisrael is monumental and his scholarly works, like the assembled articles in Magic and Folklore in the Rabbinic Literature and the book The City in Roman Palestine are favorites of mine.
But this does not a posek make, any more than a lawyer writing an article on a topic, be it in the Edah Journal, be it in the Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society, be it in Techumin, becomes a posek.
Collecting sources and looking stuff up and publishing it as an article is nice, and if done well can be impressive, but that does not make one a halachic authority able to poskin shailahs.
(If you know where to look, you know where to look. Psak is not an exercise in bibliography or listing odd shitot expressed by one medieval scholar in the course of thousands of yrs of Jewish history. If so, maybe I should poskin like the medieval Sefer ha-Maskil, be an anthropomorphist and refer to the avir baruch hu u-varuch shemo.)
Maybe this distinction is what is causing problems.
I think it is analogous to another phenomenon I have come across. Laypersons with some background in learning often don't understand why other posekim will disagree with R. Ovadiah Yosef on particular issues when R. Ovadiah is able to assemble so many sources. (Though R. Ovadiah's bekius is truly astounding.) R. Ovadiah's poskining is different from his simple assembly of a mass of sources, and people seem to be dazzled by sources, like so many scholars are impressed by obscure footnoting, that they miss the forest for the trees. (Without trying to be disrespectful, maybe it's because some people don't have as much background in jewish learning as others and are more impressed by quantity than they should be.)
(In this sense R. Yehudah Henkin is also a bit modern, as he cites things like Sefer ha-Batim in his teshuvahs and sometimes tries to show a sort of comprehensiveness in collection of rishonim, which most teshuva authors didn't seem to care about.)
Also, if someone could clarify, I would be interested in finding out: Does R. Sperber poskin for his congregation about things like ketamim?
Otherwise, someone "poskining" just in the area of "womens'halacha" is ridiculous, as I am not the first one to point out.
To Abe ,
In שו"ת תפלה למשה ח"ב from Hagoen Rav Moshe Levi Zt"l. He writes in his Hakdama :וכמה צער נפשי על מה ששמעתי פעמים רבות מאנשים שונים המדברים על גאון עוזינו מרן הגאון יביע אומר ואומרים שדרכו לפסוק עפ"י דעת רוב הפוסקים אשר מקבץ בספריו כעמיר גורנה לרוב בקיאותו בספרי האחרונים וכביכול אינו שם לב מי ומי החולקים וקטון וגדול כאחד נחשבים בעיניו ומוציאם דיבה רעה שלא כך צריך לפסוק רק עפ"י העיון וכו ואני אומר דבריהם מהבל ימעטו והבל יפצה פיהם ומי שם פה לאדם להוציא דיבה רעה אשר מחסורת כל יסוד ותולים בוקי סריקי בגאון הענק הזה וכל מעיין הולך ישר בספריו הבהירים שו"ת יביע אומר ויחוה דעת ישר יחזו פנימו ההיפך הגמור ותמיד יסוד ההלכה בספריו הבהירים מוצק כברזל על דברי רבותינו הפוסקים המובהקים ומרן הש"ע ועל כללי הפןסקים המפורסמים ומה שמרבה להביא דברי האחרונים ואפי אחרוני אחרונים ואחרוני זמנינו זהו כדי לבסס את הפסק לחזקו ולאמצו בסיוע נרחב כמה שאפשר מדברי האחרונים וכמו שהאריך בזה הגאון יביע אומר עצמו בדברי הפתיחה לשו"ת יבי"א חלק א אות י וברור בעיני שהמבקרים הללו לא פתחו מעולם ספר יבי"א ואם פתחו לא למדו אותו בעיון רק ברפרוף עין ודי בזה עכ"ל
In addition it would be like saying the Bies Yosef is JUST a ליקוט . If that is what a person thinks then he is not learning it properly. ולהמפורסם אין צריך ראיה
Anon 7:59 - CHAS VE-CHALILAH! I would never say that the Bet Yosef or R. Ovadiah are just liqqutim.
If you read carefully what I wrote: People get the IMPRESSION from R. Ovadiah's writings that massive source collection is the essence of psak. And that is something incorrect which I was attempting to point out.
In fact, the responsum you cite reflects similar concerns, that people read a teshuvah in Yabia Omer and think if I cite more and more sources, this is equal to poskining.
While my concerns were the mistaken impression which people get about psak generally, the Shu"t Tefilah le-Moshe which you cite is concerned with mistaken impressions about the method of psak of R. Ovadia in particular.
It is my mistake if I was misunderstood on this matter.
Thanbo wrote:
"when this sort of thing has been argued in other fora, it often devolves into "lo rainu eino raya" vs. "lo rainu raya" - which idea is more meaningful here. Was there a positive minhag NOT to give women aliyot, or was there an absence of a minhag to set up tziburim which define their kavod to include women getting aliyot?"
When custom is invoked the questions raised by Thanbo are most definitely appropriate. Indeed we discuss this very issue at length in our Women's Services paper. SEE: “Women's Prayer Services: Theory and Practice. Part 1 - Theory,” Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, Tradition, 32:2, pp. 5-118 (Winter 199. PDF File available online at: http://www.jofa.org/pdf/Batch%20...h%201/0021.pdf;
HTML file available at: http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/engli...mer1.htm#start;
Word file available at: http://www.mail-jewish.org/
Women...yer_Service.doc.
However, as outlined below, as we outline below even if there were grounds to set aside kevod ha-tsibbur [which we dispute], this is precluded by documented custom not to give women aliyyot - custom which is at least 450 years old! The evidence follows.
Despite the Talmudic ruling of Megilla 23a permitting minors to receive an aliyya, there is a longstanding pervasive custom forbidding minors to do so, except for maftir. On O.H., sec. 282, see: Magen Avraham, note 6; Eliyya Rabba, note 6; Shulhan Arukh haRav, note 6; Tehilla leDavid, no. 7; Mishna Berura, note 12; Arukh haShulhan, nos. 9-10; Kaf haHayyim, note 24. On O.H., sec. 135, see: Arukh haShulhan, no. 29; Kaf haHayyim, note 18. While this is the universal Ashkenazi custom, R. Ovadiah Yosef, Resp. Yehave Da’at, IV, sec. 23 argues forcefully that this is not the universal sefardic custom. However, R. Reuben Amar argues that R. Yosef has overlooked the comments of the leading Sefardic codifiers, Hida and Kaf haHayyim, which maintain the custom is indeed in practice by sefaradic Jews as well. Other Sefardic authorities, Rabbis Ovadiah Hadaya and Hayyim David haLevi, concur with R. Amar. There is, however, no such prohibitive custom among Yemenite Jews; see: Mekor Hayyim haShalem, ibid.; R. Isaac Ratsabi, Shulhan Arukh haMekutsar, O.H., part 2, sec. 60, no. 3.
The reason given for this custom is that the rationale behind allowing the non-obligated to receive aliyyot was the fear that there would not be enough literate males to read. Hence, as long as there is someone present who is obligated and who can read - and this includes the ba’al korei - we do not call on the non-obligated for the central reading. See: Kaf haHayyim, O.H., sec. 135, note 18; Me’orei Or, Mekor Hayyim haShalem, and Resp. Tsits Eliezer, all supra, note 218.
If this is true for minors - where there is no kevod haTsibbur considerations - a fortiori for women where kevod haTsibbur is applicable. Indeed, dating as far back as the 16th century, poskim have EXPLICITLY stated that the minhag throughout klal Yisrael is NOT to call women to the Torah at all. See: R. Joshua Falk Katz, Perisha, Tur, O.H. sec 282, no. 3 (b. 1550; d. 1614); R. Elijah Hazan, Resp. Ta’alumot Lev, III, sec. 20, no. 1; Yalkut Yosef, II, sec. 135, no. 41, note 46; R. Gedalia Felder, Peri Yeshurun II, on Tanya Rabati, sec. 6, Inyan Sefer Torah, note 50, p. 139; Resp. Benai Vanim, I, sec. 4.
We conclude, therefore, that even if there were grounds to set aside kevod ha-tsibbur [which we dispute], this is precluded by documented custom which is at least 450 years old!
Some general comments on the various posts:
(1) The consensus of all the major poskim is that the prohibition of women learning Torah she-be-al peh was a public policy issue. It was abrogated when the leading poskim at the turn of the century realized that the public policy had turned 180 degrees. The change was made in consultation with these gedolim - not in rebellion. The same thing is occurring with regard to women saying Kaddish Yatom. In both cases it was never assur me-ikkar hadin. (no time to elaborate - you can hear my shiurim at: “Women and Halakha,” Aryeh A. Frimer, A series of 80 shiurim given from 1997-2000 at Tiferet Moshe Synagogue - Rabbi Jacob Berman Community Center. Audio files, source material and unedited lecture notes available online at http://www.bermanshul.org/frimer.htm
(2) I presented Nine reasons why R. Sperber's Kevod haBeriyyot argument is invalid. Even if I erred in one, two or three - as long as one reason remains standing, Kevod haBeriyyot cannot be used.
Aryeh, I fail to understand your crusade against this institution. Your arguments are useless either way - either since (like I think) they're wrong or (like you think) they'll be ignored.
Torah is not math, there are no "conclusive proofs" and you'd be better off writing articles about migo.
At least migo is interesting.
It certainly is true that (at least many of) the Gedolim at the turn of the last century, l'minyanam, approved of introducing formal women's education. However, the change did not originate among the Gedolim, but among those who saw the effect of the combination of compulsory secular education and no religious education on the young women of the period. Yes, they enlisted the support of the Gedolim, but it was Sara Schneir, not the Chofetz Chaim or Rav Chaim Ozer who initiated the idea.
R. Frimmer,
You have been Motzi La'az on an entire community based on one person's idle speculation that 50% wouldn't care about a p'sak. Since he has not surveyed the community, you have no business repeating this "fact" l'genai.
"Aryeh, I fail to understand your crusade against this institution" I dont think it is fair to call his articles etc a crusade. But they have helped create a situation where none of the shira hadasha communities could ever hire rabbis because no O rabbi could take the post and since they see themselves as O they could not hire any rabbi who was not. The future effects of the existence of a large number of communities who view themselves as O, have many learned members but no rabbi, will be interesting.
De facto, they are left to develop as they wish and institutional orthodoxy, such as it exists, can exercise little control
Mike S.,
I don't want to underestimate Sarah Schnirer's contribution or to take away from her the credit for suggesting the idea. But she did not budge without consulting with the Gedolim of her time. Increased Torah study for women from the time of its inception in 1917 by Sarah Schnirer was done with the consent, blessing and guidance of the generation’s leading scholars: R. Abraham Mordechai Alter, the Gerer Rebbi; R. Joseph Isaac Schneerson, the Lubavitcher Rebbi; R. Issachar Dov Rokeach, the Belzer Rebbi; R. Israel Meir haKohen Kagan, the Hafets Hayyim; and R. Hayyim Ozer Grodzinsky. See: Shoshana Pantel Zolty, And All Your Children Shall Be Learned: Women and the Study of Torah in Jewish Law and History (Northvale, N.J.: Jason Aronson, 1993), pp. 278-279. See also R. Emanuel Feldman, “Communications: …Who has not made me a Woman,” Tradition 32:2 (Winter 1998 ), p. 171-173.
FWIW the shira hadasha minyan on the upper east side of manhattan has an orthodox musmach as its rabbi and on the upper west side Rabbi Sperber is their official posek. These are minyanim and not shuls. To my knowledge there is no O shul that hosts such a minyan.
Aryeh - was this how women's tefilah started or were there differences? I know that Lincoln Square and HIR were among the first shuls. Were there tefillah groups functioning outside of the synagogue contexts at the time? Do you see substantial differences between the contemporary phenomenon of shira hadasha and the original development of women's tefilah? (I am asking this from the perspective of someone who was born in 1976 and I truly do not know the history.)
R. Frimer: I am quite familiar with the history, and I know that the Beis Yaakov school was not started without the approval of the Gedolim of the time. My point, however, was that the initiative did not originate with the Gedolim, but by others, particularly Ms. Schneir, who observed the deleterious effects of continuing the traditional practice in drastically changed circumstances.
jeff (6.18.0:
who is the orthodox musmach that is tge rabbi of the uppee east side's shira chadasha (sic) minyan
R. Frimer,
By the time of Maharam mi-Ruttenberg (source 11), wasn't the institution of baal k'riya already in place?
in his hypothetical and somewhat far-fetched scenario of a city of kohanim, would the women have to lain their own aliyos?
it seems that your article implicitely assumes this to be the case, but, does the t'shuva or subsequent sources directly address the issue?
Barry Best is raising an interesting question. Yes there were ba'alei keri'a in the time of the Maharam of Rothenburg. However, as you yourself noted, the scenario of a city of only kohanim - in which the Maharam permitted women to receive aliyyot - is indeed far-fetched. We believe these discussions to be purely academic in nature – not practical responsa. Maharam is basing his responsum on the original Talmudic statement in Megilla 23a (supra note 13), in which each of the olim read for themselves.
Avraham Grossman thinks that the situation described by R. Meir of Rothenberg was very real, but also very rare. A similar situation existed in Italy, very few Jewish families in a town, and according to Reuben Bonfils, this is the reason why we have evidence of women ritual slaughterers at that time. For Grossman's discussion see his Hasidot ve-Mordot, p. 326.
correction: Hasidot u-Mordot
I would also be interested in someone telling us who the orthodox musmach at the upper east side shirah chadashah minyan is.
(not that this means much. I know many contemporary YU and Chovevei musmachim who are total am aratzim. i want to know who the musmach is out of curiosity - is he someone who knows how to learn, who was in the beis medrish there that I remember.)
I hesitate to write this because I do not want this to lead to lashon ha-ra about whether or not he is a talmid chacham, posek, gadol, katan, orthodox, frum, smart or anything else. He is a friend of mine for whom I have great respect.
The minyan is known as "Yavneh - The Jewish Living Project." The rabbi is Rabbi David Kalb. This information can be found at the S3K website (http://www.synagogue3000.org/escworkgroup.html)
I would like to share with you all a conversation I had with Rav Dovid Feinstein, the son of Rav Moshe Feinstein, the present RY of MTJ, and a leading posek in NY. Over the years I have consulted with him on various Women's issues [e.g., Women's tefilla groups - which he opposed; Women's Megilla readings - which he approved (I asked him twice)] and he was very helpful and forthcoming. I always go with my brother-in-law Noach Dear, and on some occassions with my brother Dov. RDF has always allowed me to quote him publicly.
Two or three years ago, when I asked him about the Shira Chadasha phenomenon, he politely told me that he would not discuss the issue with me. I was taken aback, but he explained that he viewed it as the new Conservative movement and refused to give it legitimacy. He blamed the local rabbinic leadership for lacking the backbone "to simply say no." When I quoted my Father zatsal's line about "האהבה מקלקלת את השורה" he concurred. I asked him whether his view was generally held by poskim and he said that he could only speak for himself - but he believed so.
Hot off the Presses: There is an article in the just released volume of Techumin 28 (575 by R. Shlomo (Steve) Riskin, pp. 258-270. Briefly, he argues (similar to us) that Kevod haTsibbur is based on the absence of obligation for women; hence there is no room for "mehila".
That should be Techumin 28 (5768 )pp. 258-270
The future effects of the existence of a large number of communities who view themselves as O, have many learned members but no rabbi, will be interesting.
Yeah, its called Israel.
For example, the shul in which R. Aryeh Frimmer davens, in Rehovot, has many learned members - but no rabbi.
But seriously - couldn't one tenth of the time spent on yelling at these congregations be spent on migo?
"For example, the shul in which R. Aryeh Frimer davens, in Rehovot, has many learned members - but no rabbi."
Actually, the shul has 8 musmachim. One that is in charge of youth education and activities, another 3 who pasken communal questions, yet others who give shiurim. We do lack an official Rabbi - but hopefully that will change.
James Kugel in his On Being a Jew has some interesting things to say about shuls without rabbis, which I think are on point.
Look, this is the basic issue: some people, like Dr. Frimer, think that "D'rakheha Darkhei Noam" is automatically attributed to halakhic conclusions that are arrived at via "authentic" halakhic processes, (which means that novel or minority interpretations are basically out of bounds). Other's like Prof. Sperber, see it as a dictum for how you go about psak. In other words, the guiding "authentic" principle is that halakha must be responsive to the circumstances of society and the emotional and spiritual needs of the community. This requires creativity and openness to innovative readings.
From speaking with him on several occasions, I think that Prof. Sperber has come to this position precisely because he recognizes that both ethical paradigms and halakhic reasoning can shift over time. The idea is to have the the two align so that we are not left with a halakha that, under the guise of "authenticity," is a tool of domination that systematically traumatizes those who see it as the path to serving God.
For those of us who care more about the people who suffer living within a society where they are guaranteed equality and a halachic system that guarantees inequality, over the misleading appearance of authenticity, what Dr. Frimer does to malign Prof. Sperber (or Ross for that matter) is ultimately of little significance.
And Dr. Frimer, can you get over your ridiculous need to begin every attack article with faint praise! Be mentch enough to open your articles with a closed fist, not an obsequious open hand.
R Frimer's article is excellent,well documented and underscores the difference between being a Talmid Chacham with an area of expertise in the development of Minhagim and being a Posek. R Frimer should be applauded for providing a respectful and objective dissection of R D Sperber's book and perspective.
FWIW, I don't see the relevance of discussing the founding of the BY movement which was founded with the absolutely essential and enthusiastic endorsements of R Chaim Ozer, the Chafetz Chaim and the Gerer Rebbe, Zicronam Tzadikim LVBracha. One cannot state that WTGs ever were founded with a Lchatchilah approval from any Gadol. IMO, it is revisionism to say otherwise.
Now, let's move on to the study of Talmud. IMO, one can argue that despite the presence of Talmud programs and teachers in SCW and many RZ/MO oriented seminaries and high schools, one can look in vein for any great underswelling of interest by young or adult women in studying Talmud. IMO, programs per se are not proof of either a demand or interest in any subject. One can debate without any resolution whether the presence of such programs is beneficial, a nice fund raising gesture or a surrendur to the demands of feminists. I would ask a more fundamental question-how many women of a post high school age, once they have gone to a seminary that provides a Talmud program for women, anywhere in the MO world dedicate themselves in their free time to learn even such a de minimus amount of Talmud as a Daf Yomi or have a chavrusa? The answer to that question IMO is far more important than merely creating and having such a progam as window dressing to please the feminist choir and their rabbinic apologists.
MJ-Let me state this as bluntly as possible. Halacha is a system of law predicated upon the different roles of people within the system. It is presumed that different people have different roles and functions. Halacha is neither the Jewish version of the Bill of Rights nor an Internal Revenue Code or a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure where one pushes the envelope of the text to obtain a litigant's desired result. I think that authenticity is the key and that we should be able to withstand any purported claims or appearance of "inequality" without using rhetoric and thinking that sound like CJ's basic premise, namely that times have changed and that we need
"innovative readings based upon "ethical paradyms" which can shift like sand in the desert , as opposed to genuine "halachic reasoning" .I would suggest that anyone interested in this subject listen to RYBS's shiur on Korach and on Gerus.
How is it that Soloveitchik's shiur on Korach keeps coming up all the time in discussions like these? It came up during the Har Hamor Tanach controversy too.
This is bigger than the nitpicking: some people, observant of Torah, do not think they need "gedolim" at all. They can try their own solutions and pasken their own questions. Their rabbis, to paraphrase a different movement, have a vote but not a veto.
This is the difference. This is also why it doesn't really matter how many "gedolim" (whoever decides who they are) approve of this or that move (I want to see the gedolim who approve of the internet, too) - it matters what people do. In time, communities will develop their own "gedolim" who will say what they have been doing for generations is kosher and holy.
Now, Dr. Frimer, on an aside: please don't try to get an official Rabbi into Bermans'. Official Rabbis just function as religious proxies for the community, being the dossim they never actually wanted to be. Its a waste of money and communal resources, and frankly - the shul just doesn't need it. We're all waiting for your much-needed article on Migo, please write that instead.
Amit-One of the greatest tragedies of many MO Jews is that they deny the need for a rebbe in areas of Halacha, Hashkafa and Minhagim. Like it or not, not all of us are entitled to an opinion on many, if not, any of these issues. Halacha is a legal system dependent foremost on obedience first and foremost.
I must say, I'm a tad confused. It seems to me that many of the criticisms R. Frimer raises were addressed comprehensively in the articles published by R. Shapiro and R. Sperber previously:
Regarding the Rambam's supposedly unequivocal objection: Rambam does qualify his statement - by including "mipnei kavod hatzibbur." R. Shapiro further shows (convincingly) that Rambam only objects to women reading (not receiving aliyyot)and only in a shul (Rambam adds the word "bitzibbur" to the baraita).
Regarding a community's option of being "mochel on its kavod" - R. Shapiro shows that the opposition of the Bach and his camp is the minority position. The Beit Yosef, Pri Hadash, Rav Ovadiah Yosef and a majority of poskim hold that "kavod Hatzibbur" can be waived.
Regarding the contention that Rabbis Sperber and Shapiro did not deal with the fact that the baraita was written when baalei keriya were not used: Even a cursory reading of their writing shows that R.'s Sperber and Shapiro not only account for this fact, but use this information to buttress their claims. It is precisely this change that allows R. Shapiro to assert (based on solid grounding - see his article) that the baraita's objection of "kavod hatzibbur" should only apply when a woman is the reader, rather than the olah. But in a case of a female olah and a male baal keriyya, there never was an objection of "kavod hatzibbur." This appears to be the halacha lemaaseh as recorded by the shulcan aruch and certainly the Rema.
The same preemptive answering by Rabbis Sperber and Shapiro holds true with R. Frimer's other objections.
Rabbis Sperber and Shapiro admit that there are opinions and sources that conflict with those that they raise. They quote them extensively, and they explain, refute, accept and discuss them. Is there anything in the review here that is radically new that should lead to a reconsideration of the issue?
thanks,
Yishai
The halakhic process has always been about the honest search for truth – Divine truth.[22] To adopt one particular approach - simply because it yields the desired result, lacks intellectual honesty and religious integrity. It is equivalent to shooting the arrows and then drawing the bull’s-eye. To paraphrase Prof. Yeshayahu Leibowitz: we must always ask ourselves whether we are in reality serving the Divine will or our own.[23]
This unbelievably offensive ending paragraph is the same approach Dr. Frimer took to Tamar Ross's book: "If you come to a different conclusion than I on these issues you lack halachic and intellectual integrity." It takes the discussion outside of the regular halachic discourse and devolves into name-calling.
Let me add one thing: that paragraph could apply just as much to Dr. Frimer as to Dr. Sperber; Sometimes those who wish to maintain the status quo-causing (possibly)needless suffering and estrangement of observant women despite the changing conditions which should necessitate (mandate) halachic reconsideration often do so "simply because it yields the desired result".
In other words, Dr. Frimer, you shouldn't presume that a man's intentions are guiding him incorrectly as far as halachic decision making-- it is offensive, and could apply to anyone. Someone, for instance might say about someone who agrees with you that re: mysoginy "haahava mekalkeles es hashurah aval a sinah kal vachomer"
Phineas-Like it or not, the halachic system runs on an expresed statement of man and woman being created in the Divine Image with role differentiations assigned not to just men and women, but various other classes. I think that any MO Jew should be able to recognize and stand up for the principal that obligation and obedience are the cornerstones of the Halachic system and pervade every aspect of the Halachic elements of the Talmud, as opposed to chiseling away at the system based on apologetics imported from gender theorists.
I can't believe this post is still up. I fully concur with those who wrote "Women's issues" is incredibly boring, and as others have said, no one cares.
I only add that R. Frimer is too focused on books, texts, and halacha. Most of us have seen the damage feminsim has done to general society, and to Reform/conservative society. Why would orthodox Jews want to import the disaster that has been feminsim into it's own society? You think I care what the halacha says? It's common sense!
Anyway, I shouldnt have said anything, but I'm just so bored of seeing this topic. Let the Nishmat girls spend their time on this. No one else cares. Please, please Dan - can you put up something else?
Phineas -
1) No one, neither the proponents of women's aliyyot nor those who disagree with the practice suggest what you do - all agree that the idea of the proponents of the women's aliyyot are suggesting something NEW. As it is they who are suggesting the innovation, their opponents are not changing anything "simply because it yields the desired result".
2) As for your comment that R. Frimer's paragraph "takes the discussion outside of the regular halachic discourse and devolves into name-calling" just about every comment from you in these postings was an ad hominem attack on R. Frimer and on those who disagree with the new instituting of women's aliyyot, something all agree is something that has not been done in any Jewish community in the last thousand yrs of recorded halakic practice.
Now anyone who disagrees with this new practice is a hater of women?!? ("kal va-homer hasin'ah")
Why don't you take R. Frimer's complement of R. Sperber as genuine? They do know each other as colleagues after all.
3) I would suggest that perhaps you, Phineas, should ask mechilah of R> Frimer for your allegations. And ask mechilah of the readers of this blog, devoted to discussion of torah sources, for soiling it with your hateful speech about a talmid chacham.
Since our forthcoming article will deal with Yisha’s queries at length, I will limit my response.
Regarding the position of the Rambam: Maimonides, Yad, Hilkhot Tefilla, sec. 12, no. 17, writes: “A woman may not read because of the honor of the community.” R. Masud Hai Rokei’ah, Ma’ase Rokei’ah, ad loc., argues that this terse language (in contrast to that of the baraita of Megilla 23a) indicates that Maimonides maintains that women’s aliyyot are totally forbidden in this rabbinic edict, even bi-she’at ha-dehak. Several later scholars have concurred in this understanding of Maimonides; see: R. Isaac haLevi Segal of Lemgo, Toldot Yitshak, Tosefta Megilla 3:5, R. Avraham Shoshana, ed. (Jerusalem: Machon Ofek, 5762), p. 217; R. Ben-Zion Lichtman, Benei Zion, IV, O.H. sec. 282, no. 3, note 6; R. Joseph Messas, Mayyim Hayyim, II, O.H., sec. 140; R. Zalman Nehemiah Goldberg, in Mareh haBazak, V, addendum to sec. 113, pp. 225-228; R. Zalman Nehemiah Goldberg, Resp. Binyan Ariel, E.H., “Birkat Hatanim biSe’udat Sheva Berakhot al yedei Isha,” pp. 135-141; Tehilla leYona – Masekhet Megilla, R. Solomon Shalom haKohen Kahn, ed. (Makhon Be’er haTorah: Lakewood NJ, 5759); Megilla 23a, s.v. “haKol Olin,” p. 218. This point is made by R. Henkin in the original responsum to R. Levinger, 14 Nisan 5754, which appears in slightly revised form as Resp. Bnai Vanim, IV, sec 3.
Regarding a community foregoing its honor: There are essentially 5 cases of kevod haTsibbur in Hazal, and in each case kevod haTsibbur is different. Many poskim hold that a community can set aside it’s honor in some (though certainly not all) of them. Indeed, as the Magen Avraham notes, contrary to what the Beit Yosef says on the Tur, in Shulkhan Arukh he does not permit a community to forego its honor and appoint someone under 20 as a permanent Hazan. Almost no one discusses mehilla by women’s aliyyot – and when they do it is to the negative. As we demonstrate, in the specific case of Keri’at haTorah, kevod haTsibbur is based on a woman’s lack of obligation in keri’at haTorah which expresses itself in terms of Tsniut and zilzul ha-mitsva. It is illogical to say that Hazal were stringent in this regard but we don’t care about zilzul ha-mitsva or possible sexual distraction.
The suggestion that baraita distinguishes between “reading” and “receiving an aliyya,” reveals that one is totally unaware that the Ba’al korei was not instituted until the Geonic period – many hundreds of years after the baraita was written. See Iggerot Moshe, OH II. Sec. 72; Elyya Rabba, OH 282:8
I avoid responding to scoffing and mocking. But if someone thinks I'm a misogynist, I suggest they read my publications printed on Menachem's Michtavim Blog. http://michtavim.blogspot.com/20...l-
sperbers.html
The opening of the following article is somewhat autobiographical: Aryeh A. Frimer, "Feminist Innovations in Orthodoxy Today: Is Everything in Halakha - Halakhic?" JOFA Journal 5:2 (Summer 2004/Tammuz 5764): 4, available online at: http://www.jofa.org/pdf/
JOFASumm...ummerFinal1.pdf
Dr. Frimer, Abe:
Perhaps my point wasn't clear: I am not accusing anyone of misogyny, nor am I implying that the praise offered in the introductory paragraphs wasn't genuine. I was referring to the ending paragraph, which implies strongly that the conclusions reached by Dr. Sperber are based on a callous disregard for the integrity of the halachic system, and stem from (albeit laudable (see comment above re: haahava mecalkeles es hashura) ) non-halachic considerations. I was merely pointing out that this reasoning presupposes in a very haughty way that the conclusions reached by Dr. Frimer are based on pure motivations and a concern for the integrity of the halachic system. But this is not at all clear, and the way to evaluate halacha is not by second-guessing motivations (attributing misogyny, for instance), but by sticking to halachic considerations. I believe, to R. Frimer's detriment, he did not do that in the article but descended into personal attacks (motivation). I also believe he did that in the review of Tamar Ross's book.
Phineas,
As the penultimate paragraph of my review clearly states, my criticism there was not directed at Prof. Sperber's book - but at all those who would act on it "hastily undoing more than two millennia of halakhic precedent" - without consulting ANY recognzied gedolim, or without waiting for the dust to settle. IMHO, an agenda guided approach to halakha is intellectually dishonest. Especially if the the halakhic process is about the honest search for truth – Divine truth - emet le-amitah.
As far as my review of the volume by Prof. Tamar Ross is concerned, if you would have read her book, you'd know that she literally pummels Haza"l. This is not about reinterpretation - but a broadside attack. She challenges - nay, denies - the authenticity and reliability of their mesorah. My apologies, but that is not orthodoxy, by any means.
Over the last 35 years I have prided myself at being an Orthodox Feminist - and I trust that my articles and actions bear clear testimony to that fact. But my commitment to the absolute integrity of Halakha comes first.
regarding the distinction between reading and receiving an aliyya- My intention was not to imply that the baraita acknowledges a difference between the two. Rather to point out that perhaps the issue of "kavod hatzibbur" may only be applicable to the reading. This is how R. Shaprio reads the Shulchan Aruch and Rema.
R. Frimer, Thank you very much for responding, the achronim's interpretations of the Rambam are certainly relevant and interesting. I look forward to reading more when the rest comes out.
kol tuv,
Yishai
Yishai, you present R. Shapiro accurately. Unfortunately, the Shulhan Arukh is merely quoting the Gemara almost verbatum. Peshat in the gemara is pshat in Shulhan Arukh.
Several astute readers have correctly noted that the title of this review should be "Lo Zo haDerekh" (not Zu). This will be corrected shortly. In addition, in response to several requests, a pdf file will of the article will be made available.
After thrashing out the issue, back and forth - one hopefully will be able to discern where the truth lies.[21]
WADR we are dealing here in opinions, not truths.
Surprisingly, I find RDF's perspective, expressed a bit differently, right on the money. These women's battles have been fought and settled in Conservative Judaism. Women have rights there not just to aliyot - but full egalitarianism. And as I look out my window here in Teaneck, yes it was raining today, but the world has not ended.
I applaud Sperber and the Frimers for the fine research and written work that they have done in tackling the big issue of whether women can be called for an aliyah to the Torah in the synagogue. (Should I put a question mark here or not? Undecided. Move on.)
Really, is this the right way to spend intellectual capital? Ya gotta ask first, Is Orthodoxy is ready to grant rights to women, or not? If yes, then what is the project plan for moving forward. If no, then why oh why cast so much dust in our eyes over the women's aliyot issue?
The answer by the way is NO.
So the audience for this work on the topic is not Modern or Right Wing Orthodox Jews. They said NO already and they ain't movin on it.
The Conservative Jews aren't going to read these articles in their rear-view mirrors. They are way down the highway - maybe the wrong road - but they are far down there.
Who is listening to all this? Sperber then is talking to Frimer and Frimer is talking to Sperber. Tamar Ross and David Silber's minions may peek in - but they are not waiting with baited breath to see who goes down for the ten count.
Since the Orthodox answer is unquestionably NO - the work by Sperber is a lengthy and detailed brachah levatalah. And the latest work by the Frimers is a long and unnecessary treatise explaining to Sperber why his work is in vain.
It's a pity that the debate cannot be reframed so vibrant Orthodox scholars can ask why the establishment resounds with such a loud NO? A flip answer would be that NO is the only stamp they have on their pads. It would be much more interesting of course to see in great analytic detail what Sperber and the Frimers would say are the sexual, not textual, motivations powering Orthodoxy on these matters from classical to modern times.
I know -- it won't happen. Such analysis is outside the bars of the rigid paradigm that those folks are voluntarily trapped in. Yet, in reality (pardon my French) the cell door is not locked. And the boys can step outside any time they wish.
I personally have no intellectual, psychological or emotional problem with women receiving aliyyot. The issue is simply halakhic. My disagreement with Prof. Sperber is when to apply kevod haBeriyyot, and my conclusion from the sources is that women's aliyyot is definitely not the instance. This is not a matter of opinion, as you state, but an analysis of the halakhic sources including Bavli, Yerushalmi, Rishonim and Aharonim. Halakha is our guide - and the review demonstrates, I believe, that Prof. Sperber erred in his use of Kevod haBeriyyot bcause he neglected to apply the rules I delineated.
I personally have no intellectual, psychological or emotional problem with women receiving aliyyot.
==============================
R"AF,
I am sure the above is true but I have a question on your statement "The issue is simply halakhic." Do you mean there is no way you can see halacha developing in such a way that would ever allow women aliyot or that given the current state of psak and poskim, it is not acceptable.
As separate questions, are you saying that Beit yaakov was started only after the gedolim were asked for approval? Was there a meeting/consensus of gedolim reached for such a major change? Was there a tshuva published which outlined the psak (the letter from the C-C that I saw only said this wasn't the place to expand on the halachik issues)? BTW was the C-C considered a posek in his time ?
Thanks, my sister speaks highly of your shiurim in Rechovot.
KT
"my conclusion from the sources is..."
Aryeh,
This is your opinion, nothing more. Your analysis serves as the basis for your opinion, Sperber's (though he "erred") serves as the basis for his.
In law courts, that is overt. The Supreme Court renders "Opinions."
To me it seems that in your opinion Sperber's work is all in vain and a brachah levatalah. And to me it seems your work is a detailed validation of the status quo, support of the nearly unanimous NO vote of the Orthodox rabbinate.
Joel Rich asks: "Do you mean there is no way you can see halacha developing in such a way that would ever allow women aliyot or that given the current state of psak and poskim, it is not acceptable."
Everything stems from the fact that women are not hayyavot in Keri'at haTorah - which is the unanimous position of Rishonim, and overwhelming Majority of Aharonim. It's because women are not hayyavot that they can't get an aliyya or be a ba'al korei in a bifurcated oleh/ba'al korei system (even without kevod haTsibbur - unless a women reads for herself).
Furthermore, If our analysis is correct that Kevod haTsibbur stems from women's lack of Hiyyuv - which plays out via Zilzul haMitsva and tsniut considerations - I can't see kevod haTsibbur being set aside at all. Even if a community could be mohel on it Kavod in some (but not all) of the other cases of kevod haTsibbur in halakha - they almost definitely can't by women's aliyyot. But you'll have to wait for the complete article to see all the arguments and their documentation.
Regarding Joel's question about Beit Yaakov schools, Sarah schnirer went about soliciting the support of the various recognized gedolim of her time, which included R. Abraham Mordechai Alter, the Gerer Rebbi; R. Joseph Isaac Schneerson, the Lubavitcher Rebbi; R. Issachar Dov Rokeach, the Belzer Rebbi; R. Israel Meir haKohen Kagan, the Hafets Hayyim; and R. Hayyim Ozer Grodzinsky. For full details see: Shoshana Pantel Zolty, And All Your Children Shall Be Learned: Women and the Study of Torah in Jewish Law and History (Northvale, N.J.: Jason Aronson, 1993), pp. 278-279.
The "halachic advisor" to the shira chadasha type minyan that has started in Skokie, IL is named Rabbi Josh Feigelson. He is a very recent musmach of Chovevei Torah. They meet in the Reform Temple as no other shul in the area would even think of having them.
ever wonder why it's called chovevei torah?
torah is just a hobby for them.
ever wonder why it's called chovevei torah?
torah is just a hobby for them.
anonymous
==========================
Uncalled for comment which imho should be removed. Would a similar comment about another organization be allowed?
KT
Actually, I don't remove any comments no matter how silly they may be. For one I don't have the time to police the comments. And, second I have no inclination.
Dan,
That's certainly your perogative but I respectfully disagree. Maintaining a discussion forum imho includes a certain level of responsibility for the discussion maintained therein - not on a moment by moment basis but on upon noting the posts.
KT
Steve,
Your comments about women learning gemara are misinformed.
For the record there are active womens daf yomi shiurim and alon shvut and beit shemesh. lots of women the world over attend gemara shiurim regularly. Here in beit shemesh lots of women have regular chevrusas, though they tend to be in things other then gemara. Even in MO Nofei Aviv, very few women have received the requisite training to learn gemara on their own.
Finally, many women learn enthusiastically when they are single, but when the marry and have children, their priorities shift. I presume you endorse this phenomena.
Once again, steve, please limit your posts to the many issues on which you are sufficiently knowledgeable to have an intelligent opinion.
I did not read all 91 comments, so I am sorry if someone else already raised this point.
If a women's Torah reading takes place in a women-only prayer group, then many of the issues in play would not be relevant.
Even kavod ha'tsibbur, the primary reason for forbidding women from keriat ha'Torah, may not apply in this case.
Professor Frimer, could you address the specific case of Torah reading in a women-only prayer group? Would Professor Sperber's arguments hold up better in that specific case?
Furthermore, If our analysis is correct that Kevod haTsibbur stems from women's lack of Hiyyuv - which plays out via Zilzul haMitsva and tsniut considerations - I can't see kevod haTsibbur being set aside at all.
If that were correct, don't you think the tosefta or bavli would say it outright? They know how to say כל שאינו מחוייב אינו מוציא את הרבים, and in this case they choose not to. Regardless of how many acharonim you quote on the matter - the fact remains clear that your analysis is flawed on thiss point, and this is why your whole article is like a fortified castle defending a very large hole.
Paul,
The discussion in my review is focussed on Torah readings in Partnership (Shirah Hadasha-type) Minyanim. In a women's service, the pseudo-kei'at haTorah is in fact private Torah study - no different halakhically then 9 men getting together. The rules would be the same; since no Minyan is present, no birkot Keri'at haTorah can be recited. See: at length in “Women's Prayer Services: Theory and Practice. Part 1 - Theory,” Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, Tradition, 32:2, pp. 5-118 (Winter 1998 ). PDF File available online at: http://www.jofa.org/pdf/Batch%20...h%201/0021.pdf;
HTML file available at: http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/engli...mer1.htm#start;
Word file available at: http://www.mail-jewish.org/
Women...yer_Service.doc.
There is also a mahloket among the poskim whether pseudo-aliyyot are permitted, though some do permit. All this will be fully discussed in “Women's Prayer Services: Theory and Practice. Part 2 - Practice,” Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer. (in preparation). We hope to finish it shortly. Patience is the operative word. (Try to remember that Dov and I have day jobs...)
I don't respond to Scoffers.
I don't respond to jeerers or mockers either... (
!
I'm neither a jeerer or a scoffer. Ad hominem attacks are the last refuge of a scoundrel. Please answer my question: why is what you know to be true not known to the Tosefta, the Bavli or the Rambam?
"They know how to say כל שאינו מחוייב אינו מוציא את הרבים, and in this case they choose not to."
An arguments from what the gemara did NOT say... Ok.
"Regardless of how many acharonim you quote on the matter."
That is precisely the point. It matters to Jews who care about halakah how the gedolim and great Torah scholars of generations past have understood something, be it a passage in a gemara or the understanding of minhage bet ha-knesset.
Abe,
Kevod haTsibbur (KH) is not about being yotsei. Obviously, if Hazal indicated that - were it not for the consideration of KH - women and minors could get aliyyot, then the obligation of Keri'at haTorah has been formulated differently than Megillah (a Hovat Yahid of Keri'ah)- so that even those not obligated can read. As the Comentaries and Codifiers understand, Keri'at haTorah is either a Hovat haTsibbur of Keri'ah, or a Hovat ha-yahid of shemi'ah.
KH is about who should le-khathilla be the olim. The Sexual Distraction School suggests that KH is concerned with possible sexual distraction. This large group of leading decisors argues that it is improper, indeed dishonorable, for a community to unnecessarily introduce a possible element of sexual impropriety into the public prayer service. The synagogue is the one place that we try to sanctify our thoughts; and we make particular efforts to avoid all sexual distraction. Since women are not obligated in Keri'at haTorah, it is unnecesary to put them at the center of communal ritual. There is no sexual distraction issue with minor males.
The Lack of Obligation School maintains that while it is true that the Rabbis of the Talmud made a special dispensation to allow women and minors to read, they did so, however, only when absolutely necessary. They certainly did not want this to be a normative situation, because they believed that it was shameful for a community to resort to those who do not share full obligation to fulfill their communal obligation. To do otherwise would suggest one of two scenarios: (1) either this community really is so shamefully illiterate that there are no obligated adult males who know how to read; (2) or alternatively, if there really are men who know how to read, and yet they choose to have the keri’at haTorah carried out by those who are not obligated to do so - this would suggest zilzul or bizayon ha-mitsva (showing disrespect to a mitsva). According to this school, it is not shameful, however, for a community to involve minors. This is because hinukh – educating minors in how to function in the synagogue - is both a parental and communal obligation
Now let us reiterate the point we made previously. It’s not that women were full partners in keri’at haTorah, and kevod haTsibbur came along and took away from women something that was rightfully theirs. Rather, because of rampant illiteracy and lack of education, the Rabbis of the Talmud - as a very special dispensation - considered the possibility of allowing women, despite their lack of obligation - to receive aliyyot. On reconsideration, Haza”l subsequently determined, however, that as normative synagogue practice this would be a bad idea, because there was a clear downside. It might well introduce an unnecessary element of sexual distraction, or reflect zilzul ha-mitzva or indicate that this community was shamefully illiterate. Women’s theoretical empowerment to read remained an option for pressing circumstances (she’at ha-dehak), i.e., when there really is no one else available to read, and the Torah reading will be cancelled as a result
In the interest of correctness, the title should be "lo zo haderech". "zu" means אשר. "zo" is the feminine זה.
Moshe Shoshan-Shiurim in Gush, Alon Shvut and Beit Shemesh and undocumented claims that many women post seminary and marriage attend Gemara shiurim despite their obvious shift in priorities to finding a shidduch and child rearing prove my point-there is no groundswelling for such shiurim despite their availability. There are numerous shiurim in many subjects in many communities but very little evidence of shiurim, chavrusas , etc for women in Talmud.
Anonymous,06.24.08 - 11:48 am
Your "zu" vs "zo" correction is on point. It results from girseta de-yankuta. Interestingly, all my readers missed it too! In fact, 90% of the Hatanim still say "Taba'at zu" instead of "Taba'at zo." But that's still no excuse. I already apologized about it above on 06.22.08 - 4:24 pm.
No Steve,
there is definitely significant interest. I take offense at your reference to "undocumented claims" We are telling you what we see in our communities. Please do not question our credibility.
I think you are working from assumptions about why people advocate teaching gemara to women that are faulty. This is not about meeting market demand. Of what relevance is the existence or lack thereof of a "groundswell".
Rather, because of rampant illiteracy and lack of education, the Rabbis of the Talmud - as a very special dispensation - considered the possibility of allowing women, despite their lack of obligation - to receive aliyyot. On reconsideration, Haza”l subsequently determined, however, that as normative synagogue practice this would be a bad idea, because there was a clear downside.
This is a nice story. Would you mind proving it from Talmudic sources?
Are only Talmudic sources permitted?How about Rishonim: R. Isaac Perfet, Resp. Rivash, sec. 326.
With the first 106 comments on this ongoing discussion imported on the new TSB site, can I kindly request that people add their comments on this article to the new site? Thank you.
This discussion is an outstanding example of the objectification of women that is practiced in the name of psak halacha. From the patronizing mention of Hazal's interest in pacifying women (לעשות נחת רוח לנשים
to the last few comments in which men discuss whether gemara learning for women has been a success, and attribute the lack of success to the "fact" that women drop gemara in favor of shidduchim and babies, it is all about men deciding to what extent they will allow women to participate in communal/public Jewish life.
Gemara learning among women is growing rapidly and surprisingly despite the fact that, for the most part, the girls' schools that teach it teach it as a subject, not as the center of the curriculum as it is taught in yeshivot. Moreover, a young woman has to be exceptionally committed to learning given the social stigma of being a feminist (the "f" word of Orthodox circles) and its ramifications on her social life. Finally, at least in Israel, where dati leumi kids tend to marry young, it is virtually a given that the young women need to do something practical to support their chatanim through 5 or more years of hesder. Given these factors, the growth in learning among women has been nothing short of miraculous.
Finally, I believe that until there is a generation of many learned women who can successfully participate in all the intricacies of the halachic discussion, we're stuck with being the objects of discussions like this.
As for the Frimer approach to psak... in article after article R. Professor Hayim Soloveitchik has documented the responsiveness of halacha to societal dynamics and needs. It is hard to understand how the brothers Frimer can continue to argue that the halachic process is exclusively top-down.
Finally, I would recommend that the Hebrew speakers participating in this discussion check out the interview with Chana Kehat on Ynet from last week. Her remarks about the damage done to Orthodoxy by the Reform movement are right on target...but not what you would think.
Anonymous 2 writes:
As for the Frimer approach to psak... in article after article R. Professor Hayim Soloveitchik has documented the responsiveness of halacha to societal dynamics and needs. It is hard to understand how the brothers Frimer can continue to argue that the halachic process is exclusively top-down.
Yes, we do indeed believe that the most important element of pesak is intellectual honesty. This process focuses on the rules and analysis. The pesak is the result of this analysis - wherever the chips may fall. Within such a framework there should be few, if any, conscious and deliberately predetermined goals. The goals should not precede the pesak, but rather should become evident after the fact. Similarly, Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik repeatedly noted that Jewish philosophy derives its legitimacy and validity from halakha, and not vice versa.
I don't think you understand Prof. Haym soloveitchik correctly. After all he himself writes to the contrary(AJS Review, 12:2, 1987): “If law is conceived of, as religious law must be, as a revelation of the divine will, then any attempt to align that will with human wants, any attempt to have reality control rather than to be itself controlled by the divine norm, is an act of blasphemy and is inconceivable to a G-d-fearing man.”
Moshe Shoshan-The assumptions as to why women learn Talmud are IMO are part of the very sterile and futile discussion as to whether women should learn Talmud and are grossly irrelevant to the discussion.That's a theoretical discussion without a practical resolution as is the related discussion as to why such programs exist in the first place. It is a Pilpul without a Nafkeh Minah LMaaseh. The proponents will never convince the opponents of teaching Talmud to women and vice versa.
OTOH,the presence of Talmud Shiurim or programs for women to learn Talmud and the absence of a groundswell for such programs, aside from certain specified communities is proof that no such groundwell exists. IOW,despite the existence of such programs, the numbers of post seminary and college women interested in the subjet matter is probably an insignificant minority. I think that the issue is of significant sociological interest, especially in determining the impact of year in Israel programs on college and post college aged women. One can state that other interests such as finding a spouse, raising a family and professional considerations and the lack of interest in the subject matter are equally important considerations in the equation, but the facts on the ground are not indicative of a huge desire or interest in many communities by post seminary and collegiate women to learn Talmud or attend Talmud shiurim in their spare time.
" Are only Talmudic sources permitted?How about Rishonim: R. Isaac Perfet, Resp. Rivash, sec. 326."
As was already noted on hirhurim, the Rivash that you quoted says nothing that indicates "rampant illiteracy and lack of education"
RAF writes: The pesak is the result of this analysis - wherever the chips may fall.
Nonsense. And if the chips would fall in favor of counting women to a minayn? And if they would fall in favor of using umbrellas on shabbat? And if they would fall in favor of wearing tefillin on hol hamoed?
Your predisposition and general conservativism (not bad things in and of themselves) are your guides to psak. That is fine and acceptable - just acknowledge them for what they are and don't sanctify them.
amit
you write "Your predisposition and general conservativism (not bad things in and of themselves) are your guides to psak."
do you know RAF to state that he has
a "predisposition" to be conservative
in his ideas or are you talking just from YOUR interpretation of what motivates him and those who hold his
position?
[ by the way,I happen to know RAF and when RAF lived in the States he DID put on tefillin on hol hamoed, but that's a different halachik discussion. He was also the first person to point out to me that there were those who disagreed with Rav Moshe Feinstein about using an Umbrella on shabbos(although Rav Moshe's opinion is the accepted opinion lehalacha by MOST poskim around the world)
Amit,
You obviously have not read RAF's article on Women and Minyan - You're gonna be surprised!!!
“Women and Minyan,” Aryeh A. Frimer, Tradition, 23:4, 54-77 (Summer 198. PDF File available online at: http://www.jofa.org/pdf/Batch%20...h%201/0019.pdf;
HTML file available at http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/engli.../frimer2-1.htm;
Word file available at http://www.mail-jewish.org/
Women..._and_Minyan.doc.
Steve,
It is your comments that are grossly irrelevant, not Moshe Shoshan's.
You persists in discussing issues related to women's learning Talmud on this thread without any explanation of their relevance. When others respond to your comments, you cannot accuse them of irrelevancy.
Looks like the problems have been solved
RD Frimer,
Don't we generally say that a gezera with a reason can be undone if the reason no longer applies?
So we fall back into the question of kevod hatsibbur, is it objective or subjective. R' Sperber seems to think subjective, you think objective, but there is a long history of disagreement on what it means.
And R' Sperber also disagrees with how you interpret "aval amru chachamim" - is it an objective ruling, or a subjective preference? Apparently, it is used to mean both.
Some of the other uses of kevod hatzibur seem to be related to tircha detzibura (rolling the Torah, etc.) Perhaps this is the reason here - that you need time to shuffle the arrangement of men & women on the bimah, like switching all the men off and bringing an all-women set of gabbaiot, korei, and olah? In which case it would be an objective standard.
Reviewing what you say about kevod ha-tsibbur, I note that in your Megillah article, you distinguish kevod ha-tsibbur from lesser obligation, yet here, you equate them.
In fact, you write, at note 25. In addition, keriat ha-Megilla is essentially a private obligation which can be preformed in private, in the absence of a minyan; keriat haTorah, on the other hand, is a communal obligation requiring a minyan.
thus undercutting your own present argument that keriat haTorah is an individual requirement, not a chovat ha-tsibbur.
R' Josh Waxman has an interesting comment on your review - that preponderance of precedent does not necessarily imply that that is what Chazal meant when writing something we find confusing.
http://parsha.blogspot.com/2008/...rticles-
44.html
RMF came in for a lot of criticism for writing his own interpretations of gemaras against the weight of rishonim and acharonim. But just because everyone else says otherwise, doesn't mean you're wrong.
So your distinction between WTGs and partnership minyanim presumes its answer - since you think certain terms mean certain things, women's aliyot must be assur, but there are other ways to interpret those terms that are valid within the Torah system.
A source regarding Kavod HaTzibur which i did not see Quoted in Darcha shel Torah or here is the Tifferes Yisroel, massechet Megillah, Perek 4, Mishna 6, Ois Katan 45, where he states that Kavod Hatzibur does not have to do with the "tzibbur;" rather it has to do with the Tzibbur's kavod to G-D. The difference being whether the "tzibbur" can be moichal.
Jon,
Whether a Takana with an expressed reason can be undone, is a mahloket haPoskim. But even then, only where the reason is clearly expressed. However here, no explicit reason is given - only kevod haTsibbur, about which R. Shapiro is guessing what it means. Besides, our rearch suggests that he is all wrong based on Rishonim and aharonim. Even according to you, How can you undo something, when the reason is unclear. Besides, which recognized bet Din undid it, Rabbis Shapiro and Sperber?
I never said that Keri'at haTorah is a Hovat haYahid or Hovat haTsibbur. Actually, there are two schools. One school argues that in contradistinction to the reading of Megillat Esther, keri’at haTorah is a not a personal obligation (hovat ha-yahid) but a communal one (hovat ha-tsibbur). To this end, the MEN of the community are obligated to ensure that a minyan is available for a Torah reading, and that such a Torah reading does take place via the appropriate number of olim/readers. For our purposes, the important upshot of this analysis - that keri’at haTorah is a not a personal obligation - is that any Jew present at the communal reading, including those not obligated, can serve as olim and read aloud from the Torah scroll for the community.
The second school maintains that the keri’at haTorah obligation may well be a personal one. Nevertheless, in contradistinction to mikra megilla, one’s duty is not to read from the Torah, but rather to listen as the words of the Torah are read aloud from the sefer Torah by several olim (their number ranging from three to seven). Since there is no obligation to read, no mechanism of shome’a ke-oneh is required for the members of the congregation to fulfill their obligation. As to the obligation of listening to the reading, each one can do so by himself. Hence, the exact level of obligation of the readers in keri’at haTorah is unimportant – they can be women or minors, provided they can read aloud.
As you know, I presume very little. I document everything ad nauseum. Wait for the full article, with all the documentation and then judge.
Regarding RAF's argument that if
keri’at haTorah is a hovat ha-tsibbur, then "the MEN of the community are obligated to ensure that a minyan is available for a Torah reading" - true that from a practical point of view the tzibbur comes into being when there are ten men, but that does not mean that it is the men who possess the obligation. The obligation devolves upon the corporate "tzibbur", consisting of women as well as men - which presumably is why the halakha requires the Torah scroll to be lifted and shown to the entire community, including the women (btw, for this reason many shul mechitzot are halakhically offensive). I would argue that it is as obligatory for a woman as for a man to ensure that the community to which s/he belongs be one in which the Torah is read.
R. Frimer neglected to mention two recently-published rishonim who explicitly deny that kevod tzibbur as regards aliyot nashim is a matter of pritzut: Sefer haMeorot and R. Manoach. No rishonim dispute this, as far as I know. See Bnei Vanim 4:3.
Also see Understanding Tzniut, p. 74. Two other rishonim, Ritva and R. Avraham Min haHar, write what kevod tzibbur is: a matter of Meeirah, or opprobrium resulting from the perception that not enough men know how to read the Torah themselves. (See Bnei Vanim there for a slightly different explanation.) And when achronim overlook rishonim, we follow the rishonim
Regarding R. Frimer's novel point that when a woman reads and someone else makes the beracha, there can be no halakhic mechanism for conjoining the oleh's bracha to the woman's reading, because neither shome'a ke'oneh nor shelihut applies to the woman. This again (see my posting above, from 7.24.0 treates Torah reading as devolving upon individuals rather than zibbur. The Rav, in Shiurim Lezekher Abba Mari, 2, p. 92, has already explained that there is no shome'a ke'oneh vis-a-vis Keriyat hatorah because of its character as a hovat ha-zibbur, and I would argue that this applies both to the reading itself and to the beracha (which is why a woman is halakhically able to discharge both obligations - she has no personal obligation, but she is a [normally passive and silent] member of the community. Hence, the conjoining of the beracha and the reading is through the fact that both of them are done as members (not representatives, which would require shelihut) of the community, not through the normal transference mechanisms of areivut and shelihut.
Rav Henkin argues that two Rishonim from Narvonna, R. Meir haMe’ili and R. Mano’ah both explicitly state that kevod haTsibbur has nothing to do with pritsut (promiscuity). However, the “Sexual Distraction School” is supported by other Rishonim: One is Halakhot Gedolot (Behag) according to Tosafot, Sukka 38a, s.v. “be-Emet Amru.” Tosafot’s exact language is: “miShum de-rabim zila be-hu milta” (Because they are a large group/in public it is improper). Zila milta or ziluta in this context is meant to be synonomous with kevod ha-tsibbur. Rav Henkin, Resp. Benai Vanim, II, no. 10, argues that zila milta like kevod haTsibbur is related to the shame of illiteracy. However, from a variety of sources that discuss women making Kiddush for men, it would seem clear that many authorities maintain that the zila milta invoked bt Tosafot is a sexual impropriety/modesty issue.
This brings us to the second Rishon R. Alexander Zuslin haKohen, Sefer haAguda, Berakhot sec. 58, Sukka sec. 32, Megilla sec. 3, and Shevu’ot sec. 9. He maintains that zila milta precludes women from reciting kiddush, for any adult males who are not members of her family. This is presumably because of modesty considerations - otherwise, why would Sefer haAguda, distinguish between family members and those who are not?
Also to be included within this sexual distraction school, are those rishonim who focus on the particular issue of kol be-isha erva (that the singing voice of a woman is sexually distracting; Berakhot 24a). This reason is attributed to R. Isaac ben Aba Mari, Asseret haDibrot as a reason for prohibiting women from reading Megillat Esther for men, even though they share equal obligation. See: R. Meir haMe’ili of Narvonna, Sefer haMe’orot, Megilla 19b; R. Aaron ben Jacob of Lunel, Orhot Hayyim, Hilkhot Megilla uPurim, sec. 2 and Kol Bo, Megilla 103; R. David ben Levi of Narvonna, Sefer haMikhtam, Megilla 4a. This reason is also given in Auerbach’s edition of R. Abraham Av Bet-Din, Sefer haEshkol, Hilkhot Hanukka u-Purim, sec. 9.
Rabbi Walfish is confusing the oleh's relationship with the tzibbur and the oleh's relationship to the ba'al koreh. Rabbi Walfish has correctly noted that Keri’at haTorah to many authorities is a Hovat haTsibbur. But according to the vast majority of poskim (Rishonim and Aharonim) only the oleh is authorized to recite the berakha [extensive documentation will be supplied in the full article]. Otherewise - as the Rosh asks - why is the oleh different than any other shome'ah in the kahal?
Indeed, R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, cited by Rabbi Walfish as a proponent of the Hovat haTsibbur school, explicitly rules that (kevod haTsibur aside) a women can get an Aliyah only if she reads for herself. See: R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, miBet Midrasho Shel haRav, Hilkhot Keri’at ha-Torah, sec. 141, no. 2, p. 50; R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Shiurei haGrid zatsa”l – Inyanei Tsitsit, Tefillen u-Keri’at haTorah, R. Zvi Schachter, ed. (Jerusalem, 5763), Hilkhot Keri’at ha-Torah, sec. 141, no. 2, p. 186; R. Zvi (Hershel) Schachter, “miPeninei haRav: Kuntres beInyanei Pesak Halakha,” Bet Yitshak, 38 (5768 ), pp. 1-8, at p. 2.
1. How is it possible to conclude absolutely "Since women are not obligated in keri’at haTorah, they can serve neither as the oleh nor as the ba’al korei" after qouting the braita "hakol olim... afilu isha"?
2. Based on the qoutes brought in R Frimer's response, R Henkin is correct - there are indeed no rishonim who explicitly state any problem of promiscuity. The explanation of R Frimer's first source is based on later interpretation, and the second on personal extrapolation (I personally see no difficulty in understanding things done "in the family" as being less offensive to male dignity).
3. Relying on (many) achronim to decide the Rambam's (or Shuchan Aruch's) opinion is similarly problematic. It leaves the door quite decidedly open from a halachik point of view.
4. Ironically, accepting R Frimer's assertion that "kevod ha-tsibbur stems from women’s lack of obligation in keri’at haTorah" eliminates R Frimer's first criticism on Kevod Habriot ("it makes no sense that the honor of the individual should have priority over the honor of a large collection of individuals").
5. One cannot ignore the fact that, aside from the legalistic and historic debate, the controversy here arises from "meta halachik" issues regarding the process of halachik psak, the nature of halcha and its place in judaism. These questions have received very different answers, even within orthodox circles. This is why people's opinions and prejudices do indeed play a big part in the discussion.
Amichai Perlman raises 5 issues and I will deal with each in order. Most of these issues will be discussed at length in our forthcoming full article.
1. The Talmud is referring to a situation in which the oleh/olah recites the berakhot and reads for him/herself. However, nowadays the role of the Oleh is bifurcated - one recites the benedictions and another reads aloud. This requires the actions of the ba’al korei to be transferred to the oleh, lest the berakha of the oleh be rendered le-vatala (in vain). This transfer (via areivut) can only occur if both the oleh and the ba’al korei are obligated. Women are not obligated in Keri’at haTorah – hence, no transfer can occur. In this regard, see for example Rav J.B. Soloveitchik’s comments in:
מבית מדרשו של הרב, הלכות קריאת התורה, עמוד ל"א
אבל בזמן הזה, דבעינן לאתויי לידי דינא דשומע כעונה מהבעל קורא להעולה, דדין ג' או ז' קרואים, הוא שיהיו ז' קוראים, או על כל פנים שיהיה הקורא הוא המברך. ואם כן בכדי לומר שומע כעונה בעינן מחוייב בדבר, וקטן ואשה פסולים לקרות בזמן הזה מצד הדין, אם לא שמברכים הם על קריאת עצמם.
2. In my response to Rav Henkin above I noted two Rishonim: Tosafot and Aguda. This understanding of the Rishonim is not mine, but that of many many Aharonim including Elyya Rabba and Mishna Berura. We will have to wait for the full article for the extensive documentation.
3. One who follows the halakhic process and is interested in discovering the correct position, attempts, in part, to take into consideration the opinion of the halakhic giants that preceded him. Rarely is a position totally conclusive; but as a consensus develops – it becomes more convincing – a better approximation of the divine truth.
4. For the reason delineated in Answer 1 above, the issue of Kevod haTsibbur only comes to the fore when the woman receiving the aliyya reads from the Torah by herself (as was the situation described by the Talmud). Even under such circumstance, Hazal, according to one school of Rishonim and Aharonim, mandated that this violated kevod haTsibbur. Women should lehatkhilla not receive aliyyot because it expresses zilzul haMitsva by those obligated in keri’at haTorah who forgo their obligation – and rather call on those who totally lack obligation.
5. Clearly, I’m a positivist.
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