The question is: in the face of scientific evidence that there's a problem and a public largely ignorant and not given to reason quantitatively, what *does* one do?
Exaggeration is a shoddy tactic which tends to allow those who exaggerate the problems with the science more of a foothold than they deserve.
More importantly it provides a false feedback loop. It rewards hysteria through increased media attention, research grants, even Academy Awards these days. What one doesn't do is lie to the public through exaggeration or distortion. And we get plenty of that. I would think if the evidence is compellling that lying wouldn't be necessary. See the links in my post on Gore as examples of the falsehoods.
The evidence is compelling but we face a largely ignorant public equally likely to be swayed by sci-fi novels and Rush Limbaugh. We're in the unfortunate situation in which most people don't know good science--or even good arguments--from bad.
The recourse that climatologists have is argument from authority, but it's both fallacious and distateful. Exaggeration, nonetheless, is worse.
WRT research grants, the problems aren't unique to climate science. They're a result of bad policy at the funding agencies and, in general, depenence on the funding agencies itself! As biophysicists it's worse. There always has to be a story and a bit of bologna about curing rare cancers in one-armed Albanians, it's almost as though the grantors want you to know the result and the long term applications of basic science before it's done.
BenK: You are often very unfair. You know that the skepticism is not built on a scifi novel. It came rather late in the game. Do some members of the public find such stuff giving them their views? Yes. Just like the constant scifi rubbish Hollywood deals out with your side of the debate. Rubbish like Day After Tomorrow. And for Rush (who could listen to that fool?) there is Al Gore on your side. That is not where the real debate lies.
The writer does a disservice to Mike Hulme when he describes him as having a problem with “normal” science. Recent pronouncements by Mike Hulme display a weariness with the way in which “normal” climate science has been hijacked by advocacy groups. He is not responsible for the term “post-normal science” as suggested by the article; this was coined by Jerry Ravetz back in the days when acid rain was responsible for the sky falling down as a formalism for policy making under uncertainty (see for example “Uncertainty and Quality in Science for Policy” Kluwer 1990). My understanding (admittedly second-hand) of Mike Hulme’s position is that he seeks a return to the days when there was “clear blue water” between conventional science from the inputs to policy debates so he can get on with the job of doing the normal stuff.
As to whether this post-normal formalism is required, that is another matter. Personally I don’t understand what it provides that decision theory does not, other than perhaps a checklist of side issues that have to be bundled into the mix when converting science into policy.
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