Thinking Christian Comments
Quick footnote: I've tried here to balance the opposite values of representing the points in the past discussion, and keeping this brief. Eric, Paul, Charlie, ROD, if I've left out something here that you think skews the presentation, let me know. I'll edit it in if it's not too long. Or you can use the comments to say it yourself.
OK, I'll give it a shot. My dictionary's very first definition of "right" is "in accordance with what is good, proper, or just." In relative morality, a local society determines exactly what behavior is good, proper, or just. In one example of absolute morality, a god would determine these things.
Is this the definition you wanted? Or did you want a (short) list of specific behaviors?
How about throwing this in another direction. (like we need one more) Being the creator of the sense of morality doesn't lead directly to having good morals. If I could create life, I could create evil beings that felt guilty if they did good things, or vise versa. I would be the "transendent" giver of morality. Would my goals for my creatures be their ultimate guide, or "should" their goals be their own? If I gave them the power of perception, and then told them the ultimate goal was to make glorify me, making me happy is the only way for them to be happy, and questioning me or my ways was wrong, does it seem fair to my creatures? In my example you would be an objective observer right?
The idea that we need to have our morals created and not just "be", or evolve, leads back to the idea that god somehow can just "be" without being created himself, and we don't want to start the "comment creep" on that one
For god to have a morality, he has to have interactions, decisions, and goals that overlap with "others". Like I said earlier, if I were to live in perfect isolation, I don't need morality. It is a code for interacting with others, and who could be more isolated than god?
Eric,
You've just given one of the best explanations for the importance of the doctrine of the Trinity! More commonly, it's said that because of the Trinity (God is one God, three Persons), God was able to be truly a God of love even before creating creatures like humans to love. He was never isolated.
The Trinity is one of the two or three most challenging doctrines in Christianity. If we get started on a discussion of how it can be possible, I'll probably just find another explanation on the web and refer you there, so we can stay on the ethics topic in this thread.
Being the creator of the sense of morality doesn't lead directly to having good morals. If I could create life, I could create evil beings that felt guilty if they did good things, or vise versa.
Perhaps so, but are you suggesting this is the God that is under consideration here?
There is a mistaken belief here that the existence of a localized right and wrong could somehow imply that there is no absolute right and wrong.
Adherence to the rules of Monopoly is right in the context of the game, but is irrelevant to the rules of the household, which are irrelevant to the bylaws of the city etc. Failure to roll twice on doubles will not necessarily get you grounded by your parents. Failure to take the garbage out might, but it won't get you a ticket from the magistrate, but J-walking could. None of these levels of right v. wrong nullify the existence of the broader level.
As above, there can be codes of conduct which have no bearing on morality. Adherence to certain rules of society is not necessarily a refection on morality, or true right and wrong. It may be expected that you use your outside spoon to eat soup, but you are not immoral if you do not.
Secondarily, morality is not a property of behaviour, but the cause. Electrons, atoms, chemicals, currents and winds have behaviour, but can not be considered moral or immoral. With no knowledge of the workings of an animal's mind we can not properly attach the words right and wrong to their behaviours either.
If the rules are set by the actions of nature, then natural elements are necessarily following those rules, and can be neither right nor wrong. A rock falls when acted upon by gravity. It was neither right nor wrong.
In terms of morals here on earth, as witnessed by man, right and wrong exist only for man. What is left to determine is whether man is just a natural creature.
If he is, then he does only what nature does, and can be neither morally right nor wrong. He can break rules, like a submissive wolf eating out of turn, be punished by the group for it, but it doesn't mean he was morally wrong.
If man can be truly right or wrong, the standard has to be from outside of himself, outside of the group, and outside of nature.
In this context and discussion, my definition of 'right' then, is adherence to those standards, which are set by God, not by decree, but by the essence of His being.
The behaviour, which we normally call morality, is only a reflection of the adherence inwardly to that standard.
The very fact that we question right or wrong, and don't merely label transgressions as anomalous behaviors, is evidence that we have a sense of right and wrong imprinted upon us from outside of nature. The mere question is evidence of God.
Paul,
No, I'm not looking for a list of specific behaviors. What we're discussing here is more meta-ethics than ethics; that is, it's not about what behaviors are ethical, but whether ethics is a viable category of thought. We've brought up a few specific examples of behaviors, but only to serve the meta-ethical question.
I think your definition from the dictionary is fine, except that "good, proper, and just" are locally defined and so culture-dependent that they are untranslatable. It doesn't get us any closer to a real answer than we were before. As I asked in the previous thread,
But it invites another question, which is, what then does "wrong" mean? If you say to this putative other person that they have done wrong, what is the content of that term in your mind, and what is it in that person's mind, and how will you bridge the difference? Your word becomes a nonsense syllable; or it becomes, "I didn't like that!" It's still just a preference, even if, as you said above, it has some stability to it.
Charlie,
Good points--"The mere question is evidence of God." Morality is of interest only if there's something there that transcends chance and necessity.
Good points--"The mere question is evidence of God." Morality is of interest only if there's something there that transcends chance and necessity.
Morality is only of interest to man. Transcendent morality is only of interest to men who think there is a transendent realm.
Telling a natural man that morality is only of interest if there is something that transcends, is simply false. Untrue. The nature, or morality of a transcendent being and what "it means to us" is what is (or should be) unimportant, because there are no transcendent beings. If it isn't part of nature, it isn't real.
Whoa, lots of unsupported assertions here, Eric. I would hope that you would answer in terms of the points that have been made, as you have before.
great post! We know someone who ALWAYS used to tell her kids, "There is no such thing as right and wrong ~ morals are just opinions!"
Needless to say.... almost all her kids have EXTREMELY screwed up lives....one turned out normal but the others... eek.
Tom, I don't understand what you're looking for in the concept for definition of "wrong" when part of relativistic or local morality. I hope you're not looking for what would wind up to be an absoluteness per se in the definition of relativistic/local morality, because, of, course, that's not going to be there by definition. I suspect that you think that relative morals are lacking something, and you ask me what my definition is to confirm this lack, but if that lack is just the lack of absoluteness, that's a done deal. What is it beyond absoluteness per se that you think relative morals lack?
Also, I've commented on the inappropriateness of the word "preference" without your specific reply, and yet you quoted your use of the word again. I'd like you to engage the issue of this word that I've raised. One more time:
Wrongness in local morality is not reducible to "I didn't like that." Liking something (or not) implies a trivialness and a temporariness (I may like/prefer chocolate tomorrow) that has nothing to do with the depth with which local, relative morality is instilled in people.
Lastly, the word "wrong" in local morality is surely not a nonesense syllable: it means behaviors that are specifically prohibited.
I hope Kat's comment
There is no such thing as right and wrong ~ morals are just opinions!is not intended to characterize relative morals, because, if so, it is wildly mistaken.
Local morals are not opinions at all, they are very specific prohibitions and exortations that a society holds, sometimes very strongly. Relative morals *do* say that there is right and wrong (just not absolute right and wrong).
Again,
Morality is of interest only if there's something there that transcends chance and necessity.
False.
Morality is of interest irregardless of whether there is something there that transcends chance and necessity.
Simpler yet: Morality is of interest.
Just one factual statement, and no assertions.
If he is, then he does only what nature does, and can be neither morally right nor wrong. He can break rules, like a submissive wolf eating out of turn, be punished by the group for it, but it doesn't mean he was morally wrong.
If wolves could blog, they would debate wolf morals with the pack, and argue over eating order logic. Wolf moral codes are important to wolves, and their origin is natural. (is that an assertion? can I tie the two ideas together?)
Wolf moral codes are important to wolves, and their origin is another question. Asking the question doesn't make the moral codes uniportant to wolves, nor does it point to an answer by just asking it.
Or, just Wolf moral codes are important to wolves. One fact.
Human morals are important to humans.
Agreed?
When I took out the "I feel that," and the "to me's" out of the last paragraph of my last post, it did turn "snarky", and I apologize. I forget that considering myself a product of nature is just a viewpoint.
Okay, I admit it: the words "of interest" were not well chosen.
What I could have said is, "morality has substance only if there is something there that transcends chance and necessity."
I invite you to think that through for what it says, not for the emotional response it might evoke. (This sentence was not about ethical relativism, even though that's what we've been talking about here a lot.)
Chance does not have a moral component to it. Necessity (the necessary outworking of physical law) has no moral dimension. If there's nothing but chance and necessity, there simply is no morality.
Paul (re 8:52 pm post),
I don't understand what you're looking for in the concept for definition of "wrong" when part of relativistic or local morality.
I'm looking for a definition that would survive translation between cultures, as I said in my 10:05 am post on 9/19/05; a meaning that has a stronger hold than cultural preference. It is in the cross-cultural context that "wrong" becomes a nonsense syllable, and I am wondering what definition you can give to prevent that.
Wrongness in local morality is not reducible to "I didn't like that." Liking something (or not) implies a trivialness and a temporariness (I may like/prefer chocolate tomorrow) that has nothing to do with the depth with which local, relative morality is instilled in people.
I'm sorry if I didn't address this adequately before. "I didn't like that" is of course a hyperbolic form of the idea of preferences. Is there an alternate term for "preference" that does not imply triviality? Or can we just use "strongly held, relatively stable preference?"
If we go back to my previous statements and substitute that more focused term, I think that addresses your concern without undermining my point.
To review briefly, what's lacking still is any clear foundation for any of these strongly held, relatively stable preferences. If it's determined just by social norms, remember how strongly held anti-Semitism was, throughout much of the West, by a large proportion of society, for centuries. By your definition above, that was good, proper, and just:
In relative morality, a local society determines exactly what behavior is good, proper, or just.
These days, most of us think anti-Semitism is none of those things. But by your definition, during the time it held sway in the culture, it was good, it was proper, and it was just.
That illustrates the translation-between-cultures problem I've mentioned. (We were speaking of the negative "wrong," but the same principle applies to positive moral terms.) "Good, proper, and just" have apparently changed meanings, if anti-Semitism was all those things before, and is no longer.
Paul, in regard to your 8:56 pm post, it doesn't look to me like Kat was endorsing that statement. She was describing an extreme case of moral relativism in action, a mother whose kids didn't come out too well under that kind of teaching.
I suppose for fun we could discuss whether that extreme opinion is actually relativism taken to its logical conclusion. But wait--that's what we have been doing! I just wouldn't state it in quite those words.
Chance does not have a moral component to it. Necessity (the necessary outworking of physical law) has no moral dimension. If there's nothing but chance and necessity, there simply is no morality.
You are fond of looking at "meta-views" but seem to see a contradiction in the scaling from chance and necessity at the small biological scale, say a neuron, to the very large, complex scale of human thought.
Language adds another layer of complexity, and concepts are higher yet. We have the capacity to reason, hold different views "in our head", compare them, and act on them. You can express a view that I can consider, and I can act differently because of that thought.
My morality is a concept, a thought, a complex construction dependent on a complex biological construction (me) for its existance, even if my most base biological elements have no "moral dimension". Absolute, transcendent morality would be just as determinate as necessity, with no "dimension" at all. "What should I do" is a simple question, but life is too complex for a simple answer. Unless you are a neuron.
You're right, Eric. I do have a problem with scaling chance and necessity to higher levels.
Probably the best recent attempts to accomplish that scaling have been done by Daniel Dennett. I've reviewed his book Freedom Evolves, in a series you can access most easily here.
Far better, though, is Bill Vallicella's critique Dennett's work, covering a wider range with greater skill.
It's a lot of material, I know. The summary of it is that Dennett starts with chance and necessity as givens and attempts from there to explain consciousness, rationality, and freedom of will. In Freedom Evolves, he equates freedom of will to not being mechanistically determined.
He fails, though, to explain personal agency, that which explains that when "I" do something, it is really "I" that do it, rather than something else like my neurons within me. As you have said, neurons seem to operate on chance and necessity (in the materialist viewpoint, at any rate). Dennett tries and fails to raise the whole organism above chance and necessity.
I don't know of anyone else who has succeeded in that attempt.
(By the way, this being a very condensed and therefore inadequate review of old material, I'm not very interested debating Dennett in this thread. Suffice it to say that I have stated and I think defended a position. If we don't agree, well, we've already discovered that.)
Eric,
Absolute, transcendent morality would be just as determinate as necessity, with no "dimension" at all. "
Would you clarify what you mean here, please? I don't think I get it. Thanks.
OK, Tom, I understand your idea about relative morals not surviving betting translated between cultures. But I disagree that this means that morality is now a nonsense syllable. Relative morals, right and wrong, carry all the meaning that absolute morality does, just without the absolute part. You're asking that relative morality carry the attribute of absoluteness (translating between cultures) which, clearly, is absurd.
Try this: is there some characteristic of relative morality or logical consequence of the relativeness of relative morality that you can name which is the thing that makes relative morality contradictory or nonsensical but which is not just another name for absoluteness?
Absolute, transcendent morality would be just as determinate as necessity, with no "dimension" at all."If the almost infinite complexity between our determinate elements, and our being is the reason the question "what should I do" has an equaly large number of "right" answers, even restricted to the just the "right" answers by the transcendent force, the only worthwhile advantage this force could have is knowing the outcome of every single permeation of the action dictated.
The butterfly effect.
If the transcendent morality dictates a single action, it is as determinate as necessity, and if it dictates multiple correct actions, it is as random as chance.
Applying specific actions to random, or infinitely complex scenarios, will produce random responses. A butterfly flapping it's wings won't always produce a storm across the world. Applying actions relative to the apparent consequence of the first action allows some "feedback", the effectiveness can be mesured, and "tuned". These actions change the scenarios however, and the actions still won't be "correct", just hopefully better than a specific answer to a complex situation.
Having any system that is "better" than random is better than determinate.
I gotta get to work, but hopefully that made my thinking a bit clearer.
Paul (I think you're the anonymous commenter here),
You wrote,
Relative morals, right and wrong, carry all the meaning that absolute morality does, just without the absolute part.
But I don't think there's anything left if you take away the absolute part. I wrote earlier that moral wrong, in my view,
refers to a violation of a objective and universal code of ethics that has its origin in a transcendent giver of morality.
Of course the converse holds if you want to define moral rightness. So I'm still at a loss to say how you would define morals in a relative system.
You're asking that relative morality carry the attribute of absoluteness (translating between cultures) which, clearly, is absurd.
Now we're on to something. I've spent decades, off and on, looking for an explanation of morality without absolutes. All of them lead into absurdity.
You could help end that quest of mine if you could just define morality in a way that carries from one culture to another; that explains, for example, why anti-Semitism was not good and proper and just when it prevailed (as I wrote here).
Try this: is there some characteristic of relative morality or logical consequence of the relativeness of relative morality that you can name which is the thing that makes relative morality contradictory or nonsensical but which is not just another name for absoluteness?
What makes it nonsensical is that it appears to me to be undefined. The only definition I've seen here is one that makes every conceivable action just and proper and good at different times and places. It also makes terrorism just and proper and good to the society committing it. It makes nonsense (as you acknowledged previously) of the thought that we've progressed morally in reducing anti-Semitism in the world. It also makes nonsense of the thought that eliminating slavery was a moral advance. All of this nonsense (I use the word technically, not as an epithet) proceeds directly from the definition.
Thanks for the clarification, Eric.
You're mentioning determinacy and chaos as categories here. Do they have ethical implications? I don't see how you're making the connection between these two categories and ethical theory.
I believe they have the same problems I referred to when I mentioned Dennett above.
The part of morality that is still leftover after you remove absoluteness is distinguishing between right and wrong within one moral code. Relative morals still function within a society (between societies introduces the absoluteness which is contradictory to the idea of relativism, so we can ignore it in this case). Relative morals function because a society can still distinguish between right and wrong within that society's context. This shows that relative morality is not absurd, but is functional within its society.
Tom wrote:
I wrote earlier that moral wrong, in my view,
refers to a violation of a objective and universal code of ethics that has its origin in a transcendent giver of morality.
It is absurd to argue about relative morals when you define morality to be transcendent (=absolute=note relative). Of course, if you define morality to be transcendent, then relative morality is a contradiction.
But there is an aspect of morality beyond whether it is absolute or not: morality includes distinguishing between right and wrong, and that, in and of itself, is perfectly capable, as an empricial look would show, of functioning within one society and not absolutely (because different societies have some morals that are different). Distinguishing between right and wrong, saying what is right and wrong, is an operational definition of morality that has nothing to do with absoluteness (unless you define right and wrong to necesssarily include absoluteness, in which case you're just defining the problem to make a contradition).
Paul, you wrote,
It is absurd to argue about relative morals when you define morality to be transcendent.
I'm really just asking for your definition, not imposing one on you. I gave you mine, and I'm asking for yours. But I'm asking for one that works across cultures, and I think I've given good reasons for why that's important. Here's another try at it:
According to your definition, Paul, was slavery wrong in America? If so, in what way? Please answer in terms that would show whether a slaveholder at that time in history (not in today's perspective, of which they did not have the advantage) was doing something morally right or wrong.
(Comment edited about 1/4 hour after first posting. Blog owner's privilege! But I do the same for any other commenter on request.)
Which reminds me, Tom.
Thank you very much for correcting my earlier typo.
I was actually just hoping the readers would mentally do it themselves.
I don't expect that kind of consideration, but appreciated it.
I already gave you a definition of morality, the one I got from the dictionary, and it is consistent with a relative morality. What more do you need from a definition?
If by "work across cultures" you mean that a definition of morality (and not the content of a morality, that is, not the specific rights and wrongs defined by a morlaity) can apply to any culture, then I did that a long time ago ("that which is proper, correct," etc.). Each culture decides the specific content of their morality; each culture decides what is right and wrong, just like we empirically see throughout history.
Or do you mean something else?
Regarding slavery in America, you already asked that same question with the content of Al Qaeda and the Holocaust, but, here goes again:
It is an empirical fact that, at the time of slavery, the dominant view of American culture was that slavery was not immoral.
Your question seems confused, because on the one hand you're asking me about slavery from the perspective of slave-holding times, but you frame the question in personal terms ("Paul, was slavery wrong?") as if you want my judgment about slavery in absolute terms.
Tom, please forgive me if I'm out of line here, it's your blog, but I'm beginning to question what the point is of my answers to all your questions about relative morality. I have answered every question (or nearly so) that you have put to me, and satisfactorily, too, because your only response has been to ask more questions, not to offer refutations of my answers. At what point do you begin to acknowledge my logic? I mean that not rhetorically, either. In general, when is one required to acknowledge another's points? How much discussion must there be without refutation? I love discussion as much as anyone, but at some point something's got to give, if you know what I mean. I'd ask that you either acknowledge my logic, or offer refutations of the many specific points about relative morality that I have offered (sliding scale, internal consistency, societal mechanisms, emprical support, etc.).
Paul, I'm sorry about the delay in wrapping this up. I thought the questions would lead you to their own answers.
Let me summarize what I see here. Based on your relative ethic, slavery was not immoral at the time it was practiced. By extension, child sacrifice was not immoral at the time it was practiced in ancient Palestine or not-so-ancient Aztec or Mayan culture (forgive me, I forget which). Anti-Semitism was not immoral in the West until quite recently. Suttee (the culturally requirement that widows immolate themselves on their husbands' funeral pyres) was not immoral in India until a couple hundred years ago when Christian missionaries put a stop to it. The dominant American racism of many decades was morally fine. Enslavement in southern Sudan today is not immoral (so why do we bother fighting it?).
I thought this was self-refuting, to be honest, and that you would recognize it if you looked at it enough times.
You hint at your own discomfort with what you say you believe. I asked whether American slavery was immoral, and you didn't actually answer; instead you said,
It is an empirical fact that, at the time of slavery, the dominant view of American culture was that slavery was not immoral.
You gave someone else's opinion rather than your own.
It appears to me that you can't quite bring yourself to say it really wasn't immoral--only that it wasn't viewed as immoral. I think you know it was immoral, in your conscience and in your heart, and I think you know it was immoral even at the time, but you're locking yourself into a position where you can't say so.
What I'm looking for in a definition of morality is one whereby you, Paul, can look at a clearcut situation like this or the others I mentioned above, apply your own defintion, and say, "yes, it was immoral for the reasons I state here."
If you can't do that, I would suggest that might sit very uncomfortably on your heart. I would also suggest you don't have to lock yourself into that position.
I wrote a few weeks ago about how this question of ethics led me to conclude there must be a God. As far as the discussion here has been able to uncover, we have just two choices:
1. There is a transcendent ethics-giver, a God, or
2. Whatever a culture chooses to do is right, even to the extent of child sacrifice, slavery, or whatever.
I've made my choice; it seems pretty clear-cut to me.
You have misread my careful disinctions for uncomfortableness. I only specified the empirical fact of slavery's rightness in its time to make sure we distinguished between what I would believe in my time and what they believed then.
For myself, now, slavery is wrong. For them, then, slavery wasn't. If I was king of the world, I'd outlaw slavery. In my conscience and in my heart, slavery is wrong and I think that slavery *was* wrong, even then. But there is a (non-absolute) context for everyone one of my statements here about slavery being wrong. The lack of an absolute context does not prevent stating and acting on one's moral position; that is, from fully having a functioning, real, actual morality. (Relative) right and wrong are distinguished and acted upon.
The following request begs the question:
What I'm looking for in a definition of morality is one whereby you, Paul, can look at a clearcut situation like this or the others I mentioned above, apply your own defintion, and say, "yes, it was immoral for the reasons I state here."
You are asking me for (1) an absolute moral judgment, aren't you, or are you asking for (2) my society's current judgment? Or are you asking me (3) what other societies believe? My whole point is that these questions must be distinguished before I can answer your question.
As far as the discussion here has been able to uncover, we have just two choices:
1. There is a transcendent ethics-giver, a God, or
2. Whatever a culture chooses to do is right, even to the extent of child sacrifice, slavery, or whatever.
This again begs the question by not to recognizing the distinction between (1), (2), (3) above. The phrase "is right" in your quote above is where those distinctions disappear. These distinctions must be explicit, not implicit. By "is right" you imply absoluteness in rightness.
You cannot refute relative morality by not acknowledging these distinctions.
Paul, you wrote,
You are asking me for (1) an absolute moral judgment, aren't you, or are you asking for (2) my society's current judgment? Or are you asking me (3) what other societies believe? My whole point is that these questions must be distinguished before I can answer your question.
No, Paul, I'm asking, as I have been for many rounds of this discussion, for a definition of ethics that works. Again,
What I'm looking for in a definition of morality is one whereby you, Paul, can look at a clearcut situation like this or the others I mentioned above, apply your own defintion, and say, "yes, it was immoral for the reasons I state here."
I think the point where we're not meeting could be summarized in the word "clearcut." If there is such a thing as something that is clearcut immoral practice, as viewed across the ages, then I am justified in asking you to define it in those terms. You apparently believe there is not such a thing. That's the distinction you want to maintain between absolute and relative, which is legitimate.
It's legitimate, but there's a catch. If you give up on saying something is clearly immoral, as viewed across cultures and ages, then you are (as you have done) giving up the ability to say that in their own times and places, slavery, suttee, and child sacrifice were wrong.
But I don't think you want to do that:
If I was king of the world, I'd outlaw slavery. In my conscience and in my heart, slavery is wrong and I think that slavery *was* wrong, even then
I don't want to do that either. That's why I can't accept a relativist ethic.
Tom, when you say "clearcut," that is the same as what I mean when I say "absolute," that is, something that should be part of any morality, in any society or any age.
I reject that approach and that does mean that I give up
the ability to say that in their own times and places, slavery, suttee, and child sacrifice were wrong
However, I can still "want" to outlaw slavery in other societies because that is my moral code, instilled in me by my society. There is nothing stopping me from doing so, even as I acknowledge that, in slave culture, slavery is not wrong.
I think your word "want" is problematic because we may run up against things we may want to do but which are contrary to logic.
It's legitimate, but there's a catch. If you give up on saying something is clearly immoral, as viewed across cultures and ages, then you are (as you have done) giving up the ability to say that in their own times and places, slavery, suttee, and child sacrifice were wrong.
If I may jump in, you have jumped from Paul stating what is absolutely wrong to other people's actions or beliefs.
Who "gave up" on saying something is clearly immoral? Paul? Those "other people"? Tom? Nobody, as far as I can tell.
Are you ever going to address what is clearly immoral in this blog, like eating animals, gay marrage, or educating women, so that bloggers hundreds of years from now can decide among themselves if they are saying what it clearly immoral to them, when they discuss us?
Tom,
In context, I do realize that you did said that Paul doesn't "want" to give up on saying that something is clearly immoral. I am just pointing out that paul didn't! And now that Paul has posted, (Hi Paul, didn't know you posted in the meantime) he confirms that the only thing he "gave up" was
the ability to say that in their own times and places, slavery, suttee, and child sacrifice were wrong
The relativistic part is that Paul can't ever speak for other people, just Paul.
And I really shouldn't be speaking for Paul either
Just playing the role of the "outside" observer. I can see how appealing the idea that something might appear from beyond and say "Eric! You were right about slavery!" is, especially if the slaveholders agreed that the outsider had access to the right view. What if the outsider said I was wrong? That slavery was fine, I just need to use less lashes when I whip?
Paul,
You acknowledge what you have given up, and for that I give you credit.
But look what a price you pay in coherence of beliefs: if you went to a society that approved slavery and attempted to outlaw it, by your definition you would be committing an immoral act. Actually it would be both moral (by your personal standards) and immoral (by your actual definition of morality).
I think, though, we may be reaching a point of conclusion here, where once again we do not have agreement but at least we have clarity.
Tom, I love your distinction between agreement and clarity. Certainly, clarity is a requirement for agreement; can't have agreement without clarity, so that's the first order of business. But I'm still arguing for agreement that relative morals are not self-contradictory.
An act that is moral to one society may be immoral to another society (unless you require that morals be absolute, but that, again [!] is begging the question). Different perspectives may well lead to different conclusions. I can't believe that you'd think that this idea is necessarily controversial. If you did, you'd be as incorrect as if you said that a multi-colored cube was illogical because one side was red and another blue.
But Paul, you seem to be arguing for a cube whose same side is red at five o'clock and blue at 6.
Or red when viewed with the left eye and blue when viewed with the right.
As I read more and more of your comments I come to realize we may have a fundamental communication problem, and I hate to say it, but I think it comes down to a definition.
Is it possible, as it appears to me, that you view "morals" as ONLY those rules and codes of behaviour endorsed by a given society at a given time?
Although not exactly equal, is your view of morality somewhat akin to lawfulness? ie: if society says it is against the law to drive on the left it is. If it says it is against the law to drive on the right, it is. If society changes its mind, and its laws, it is consistent that an act, once lawful, is now unlawful. Is this the way you see morals?
Paul,
I'm really not begging the question, although you think I am. Charlie's cube illustration--his version of it--is excellent.
I agree there is no necessary logical contradiction in having morals change from time to time and from place to place. It's only a problem if you want the word "morals" to have some content beyond "what we like here." And I do, for reasons I've said frequently here and will repeat again in a slightly different form now.
There is no purchase to such a content-less view of morality, no strength, no real meaning. This matters so that a person and a society can grow, can develop in character, can look back and say, "I (we) did the right thing," and have it actually mean something.
You know, by your definition, if America had laughed at Katrina's victims, if we had said, "Go ahead and drown, starve to death, get sick in your own waste in the Superdome,"--and if we had agreed in that, then we would have been right! We would have been moral.
Instead, large portions of our country are coming through with help, and we view this as right. I've worked hard on hurricane relief with dozens of other people (and we're not done) and I believe there's something ennobling about this. This depends on there being something actually right about it.
By your system, we can't do wrong, at least not as a society--whatever we agree on, is right. If society decides it's right to ignore hurricane victims, then they have the right to make that a moral right. Now, a few maverick individuals may send a truckload of relief, but such bad people can be dealt with. Those who refuse to send aid would be doing the honorable, noble thing.
And what of a world where anything can be right? What of a classroom where any answer is regarded as correct? Will not the whole meaning of excellence vanish in a puff, instantly?
If we can't do wrong, then it's meaningless to do right!
Some people resist universal morality because they think it leads to judgmentalism. Yet a current movie makes it a matter of derision to be a virgin at 40. Do you think that's not judging? There are unmarried 40-year olds who have stayed chaste as a matter of principle, and this "tolerant" society mocks them.
So if you're okay with all that, and with all we've said previously about slavery, anti-Semitism, child sacrifice, and so on, then I'll grant you there's a certain logical consistency to relativist ethics. If whatever some vaguely defined societal grouping decides is right, is right, and this can change whenever it changes, then how can I argue against that?
Promise me one thing, though: next time you look at some society's practices--today or in history--that you think are wrong, give yourself a mental slap on the hand and say, "Paul, that's not right! These people are being entirely moral."
Next time, for example, you see a lone student rolled over by a tank in Tian An Men square, if you feel any revulsion toward it, just say, "Whoops, I'm wrong; actually, I'm so glad for the moral standards of the Chinese leadership." (Don't you dare judge them by your irrelevant American standards!) When Iraqis blow up Iraqis with IEDs (that's the main form of violence happening there now), just recognize they're doing exactly what's right for them. When you see video of the Holocaust, just remember that everywhere on this planet and at every time throughout history, societies have always lived on an equally high plane of following their local morality, and be grateful for humanity's fine and spotless history, apart from a few renegades that each culture has to put up with.
Remember that if you disapprove at all, that's just an accident of where and when you were born, and you have no standing to disagree with any of it.
If you're okay with that, then you can be a consistent relativist. As for me, that just doesn't make sense and I can't do that.
I think the cube analogy is breaking down. One can always extend an analogy past effectiveness, and this is what you're doing. If it helps, think of a cube with one side red and one side blue, and one can only see one side at a time. I only used this analogy to establish a metaphor for the idea that different perspectives can lead to different conclusions; not as a proof, but as a metaphor to help you and Tom understand how relative morals function. If one can understand with cubes how different perspectives lead to different conclusions, then perhaps one can understand how different societies might have different morals, and that that situation is not illogical.
I think I do tend to see morals like laws, in the way you mention, but I'm suspicious that there may be connotations with laws that you see and that I don't which may be problematic, so I'm not quite ready to say that morals = laws, unless we really get into some more detail.
Tom wrote:
I'm really not begging the question, although you think I am.In that case, I used the word "if."
It's only a problem if you want the word "morals" to have some content beyond "what we like here."
Almost: as I've said before, the words you use imply trivialness, and "like here" does as well.
I think it's finally time for me to ask you what your definition of the word "morals" is.
You may "want" the word morals to have some content beyond relativity, but isn't the point here not what we want but whether relative morals is internally consistent and not contradictory?
There is no purchase to such a content-less view of morality, no strength, no real meaning.I've already mentioned the purchase and strength of relative moralty: it *distinguishes* between right and wrong for members of that society. This is an operational function. As far as real meaning, I fear that "real" is a euphemism for "absolute."
This matters so that a person and a society can grow, can develop in character, can look back and say, "I (we) did the right thing," and have it actually mean something.You mean "asbolutely" right, because one can certainly feel all of that within one's socieity's morality.
You know, by your definition, if America had laughed at Katrina's victims, if we had said, "Go ahead and drown, starve to death, get sick in your own waste in the Superdome,"--and if we had agreed in that, then we would have been right! We would have been moral.And, the Holocaust, Al Qaeda, etc., etc. By mentioning one tragedy or atrocity after another, the mere weight of the number of incidents or examples is not persuasive.
Instead, large portions of our country are coming through with help, and we view this as right. I've worked hard on hurricane relief with dozens of other people (and we're not done) and I believe there's something ennobling about this.So do I, because my society has inculcated me with the idea that helping strangers, and other similar ideas, is good.
Again, there may be something essential about helping others through evolution, which helps create social groups (survival of DNA is helped by groups sacrificing for each other). To the extent that the conditions of human life tend societies toward the same moral code, like helping strangers, we can say that morality is not accidental. But this doesn't make it absolute, either. It's somewhere inbetween.
This depends on there being something actually right about it.
Not at all, if by "actually" you mean "absolute." Remember, though, that I've suggested that there are fundamentals about human existence that might lead societies to the same moral codes, helping strangers is another good candidate, but this doesn't equate with "absolute" right or wrong. It's more like "evolutionary" right or wrong, which may be a very powerful thing (evolution has made sex a very powerful thing for humans).
Of course we can do wrong: society says that X is wrong and Y is right, people who do X are wrong, etc.
. . . then I'll grant you there's a certain logical consistency to relativist ethics. If whatever some vaguely defined societal grouping decides is right, is right, and this can change whenever it changes, then how can I argue that?That's all I've been trying to establish.
Promise me one thing, though: next time you look at some society's practices--today or in history--that you think are wrong, give yourself a mental slap on the hand and say, "Paul, that's not right! These people are being entirely moral."Rats, just when I thought we were making progress. You've just caricatured my position. I would (and have) give(n) myself a mental slap and said "Paul, even though you know and feel in your gut that X is wrong, you must remember that you are limited by your culture, as you can see in any number of other realms, so you must be careful in applying your moral code; not deny it, and acting on it is fine, but if it were, say, a matter of life and death, you'd be responsible for the greatest amount of care in applying your moral code, and not just apply it automatically, without thought, because you feel (not know) that it is absolutely right.
Next time, for example, you see a lone student rolled over by a tank in Tian An Men square, if you feel any revulsion toward it, just say, "Whoops, I'm wrong; actually, I'm so glad for the moral standards of the Chinese leadership."Another caricature. Again, a feeling is not a fact.
I would feel that revulsion, and truly feel it. It would be visceral. But I would also understand that Confucianism is very strong in China and biases them toward group-think and authoritarianism just as our Western, scientific traditions bias us towards individualism (as empirical facts).
How many times can I say that one can still take action on one's morals without thinking that they are absolutes? One has no choice but to make a choice between conflicting morals. If I were to say that I can't judge Al Qaeda, the Holocaust, etc., I would be biased toward their morals and against mine. We assert our morals just because that's who we are, even in matters of life and death, because, ultimately, survival depends on it.
Remember that if you disapprove at all, that's just an accident of where and when you were born,
Right
and you have no standing to disagree with any of it.
The only standing you can imagine is that of standing on absolutely solid bedrock. I wrote before about Karl Popper's view of science (I offer this as a metaphor, not as proof): science isn't founded on absolute truth, it's more like driving posts down into a swamp; the further one drives them down, the more sturdy the structure is, but you may never get to bedrock and yet the structure can be stable. Those elements of morality that tend to be cross-cultural provide a little stability for morals, but we can't imagine that they are driven down into bedrock.
I will leave the distinction between malleable, man-written laws and my view of morals for another day (as well as the other view you also seem to hold, but seem to be avoiding at this time " In my conscience and in my heart, slavery is wrong and I think that slavery *was* wrong, even then.")
At least I have an explanation as to how you can hold that an immoral act can subsequently become moral, if not how one view can be both moral and immoral at the same time, in the same place.
Is this all atheists mean when they say they can be as moral as Christians? That they can obey law and comply with societal norms?
I thought it meant so much more.
Paul,
I respect your comments here; I notice also that we're repeating ourselves! We've been there before, and decided we weren't likely to persuade each other. I think that's where we are this time, too.
As I've said, if you can live with the fact that your ethic prohibits you from saying certain things are simply right and others are simply wrong, then you can live with it. I don't think it makes sense, and I don't think I could live with integrity that way. (And yes, since I know you would ask, by "simply" I do mean "absolutely.")
Your stance has logical coherence to a point, but it fails existentially: a fancy way of saying I couldn't live with it, and I don't understand how anybody could.
You'll always have to give yourself that mental slap on the hand whenever you want to say that someone in another culture, doing something supported by that culture, is wrong. You'll also have to do the same if you want to say something is right, since you can't have wrong without right, or vice-versa.
But see, I'm repeating myself too. 
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