Thinking Christian Comments
Original URL: On Theistic Evolution and Intelligent Design
No complaints from me, except I'd label #4 an epistemological objection rather than a theological one.
suspending my disbelief (literally) so that I can look at this post "within a theistic framework", I would say Mike has made his case better from the "inside out" against ID, that I could hope to from the "outside in"... at least to convince those of you in the neighborhood.
As long as I have my theist hat on, have you discussed the simplest theist objection to ID... that it isn't theistic? Not in the round-about manner of the first 4 points, but in the simpler, specific point that there is no God in ID. We don't pray to our ID in heaven, or talk about how ID died for our sins. Theist are supposed to be anyone that believe in one or more gods, but all of us theist know which God we are talking about... the God of the bible, and there is no ID in the bible.
I hope the rebuttal will have biblical references. They are so appropriate and irrefutable for a debate within a theistic framework. How else would you even form a framework (to debate among yourselves) from just saying you believe in god(s)? Some other God might have a different nature, perhaps not inclined towards miracles, "good" behavior or even communicating at all, so we better just stick to the bible. Narrow the "framework" just a little.
With the bible as guide, it should be easier to decide how "he" would work in natural history, and see who is closest to the way it actually happened, correct?
Then you don't have to worry about getting lumped in with those naturalist, or materialist with their mindless universe, God help them.
Sorry, "Throwing In Our Lot with the Atheists" has left me "snarky".
If ID was/is about anything at all, I thought it was aimed at the natural man who appreciated science, who wouldn't mind a little investigation of intelligent "super powers", and how they work, if they exist. But there is nothing there... nothing to object to, nothing to support, in any neighborhood. And now the most interesting debate, even for me, is theological. That says a lot, doesn't it?
ID's properties and claims are as shifting as those attributed to various gods, so the debates follow the same patterns. For and against become "believe it or not".
I also appreciate Tom's summary as I am days behind in the comments.
Eric, thanks for your thoughts. Sorry if "throwing in our lots with the atheists" didn't come across too nice.
As to your objection to ID, that it isn't theistic, I think I covered that here. ID can certainly be theistic.
On the other hand, there really is more of a substantive problem to be dealt with there, and I'm hoping to pick it up soon.
It appears that my arguments are irrefutable!
Or perhaps just that I've worn everyone out... 
SOL!
(That stands for Smiling Out Loud.)
I think you (Mike) make quite a few good points but I don't think they necessarily apply to ID in general, just particular types of ID. (Also keep in mind that I haven't been following all the other conversations, so I'm writing in response to the quoted material in this post.)
On point 1, I think that arguing against a materialist philosophy is a large motivation for many in the ID movement, but I don't see how that can be an objection to ID.
On point 2, I agree that many IDists share a similar view of the world.
On point 3, I think this is why we shouldn't think of ID in the narrow biological sense. When we take into account cosmological ID, too, then the objection in point 3 disappears. I know Tom has linked to the Robin Collins "ID as meta-science" article before and what I like about Collins approach is that ID as "meta-science" or "paradigm" or "research program" could possibly act to unify a bunch of the sciences.
On point 4, I highly disagree. I don't think there is anything postmodernism about ID at all. I don't see how ID is an attack on science. I think IDists are calling for a "revolution" of sorts on the basic guiding assumptions of modern science, but this can't be viewed as an attack on science since science has a history of changing its guiding assumptions (teleogy vs. non-teleogy being one of the major disputes throughout the history of science). I also think that the more philosophically astute IDists don't say that current evolutionary science is based on power, rather than evidence. They agree that it is based on evidence. But they also say that what they are saying is based on evidence and the philosophical assumptions one makes colors how you see the evidence. Again, though, this isn't really an attack on science since this has happened throughout science's history.
On point 5, I'd refer to what I said in point 3 (cosmological ID does understand all of nature to be designed), but I'd also point out that just because something is designed doesn't mean we can detect it as designed. The way we might go about scientifically detecting design may require us to abstain from judgement on some things, especially when there are ambiguities involved. For example, looking at a Jackson Pollack painting, you may not be able to tell if a human actually intentionally made it. But Pollack had a purpose in making it despite the fact that you may not recognize it as human-made.
On point 6, you have a point in that plenty of biologists from Dawkins to Crick think that biological things look designed. The only answer I have is "Why not?" Material scientists, for example, may all agree that steel is hard but that doesn't prevent them from further investigating that hardness. Maybe you'll find out that something isn't as hard as you thought it was.
On point 7, I agree. I don't really think it is an objection to ID, but I agree. For the sake of argument, let's say that God did "intervene" in history to, say, create humans. I wouldn't expect the world where this happens to be the same as a world where God didn't "intervene." That is, I would expect some noticable difference between these two situations. But I wouldn't say that God is leaving a "calling card" for 20th century biologists in either of these situations. All I would say is that these are two different situations and I would expect there to be a difference between them.
On point 8, ID isn't a god of the gaps argument, although it can be. Even though I have problems with both Behe and Dembski, I don't think either are appealing to ignorance.
That's enough for now.
The god of the gaps argument is, unfortunately, used indiscriminately in quite different ways.
In Blind Watchmaker, our good friend Dawkins appeared to consider design arguments as the chief argument in favor of belief in God. He argued that as the gaps closed, our reasons for belief in God inevitably shrink, and someday we can expect them to shrink to nothing. And when, in his opinion, the design argument failed, he pronounced God nonexistent.
In fact, there are many reasons apart from the design argument to believe in God, and if it were ever to fail completely*, we could still believe in God. Dawkins's view of theism is (ahem) extremely limited. We're not committed to an ID-like argument in order to save our theological skins.
Others view the god of the gaps as something less than that, as just an argument from ignorance and nothing more. Arguments from ignorance are of course unsatisfying and often doom to failure. Behe and Dembski are not appealing to ignorance, however. They are not saying, "we can't figure out where this flagellum came from," they're saying, "we believe we know enough about the flagellum and about the way nature works that there is no way, in principle, that it could have arisen without some kind of design involvement." That's an argument from knowledge, based on what we know of nature and of science.
They are also arguing from analogy in saying that when we see certain types of things (you know the rest, I won't go into detail) we always infer intelligence, so we can safely infer it here.
You can attack their logic in saying that things like the flagellum are impossible in principle via merely natural origins. You can dispute their use of the argument from analogy. But you cannot call either approach an argument from ignorance or of the gaps. That's just not what they are
*As to the argument from design "failing," what I mean is the failure of the kind of argument that shows by strong deductive or inductive argument that the apparent design we see in the world must of necessity have come from a designing agent. Even if that were never proved, I and other theists would still see design in everything God has created--even if there is still a logical/scientific door open for others to see it differently.
Leaving God out of the picture for the moment, there doesn't seem to be any good objection to science in principle finding "gaps." Science makes claims all the time about what can and cannot happen. For example, it is considered a scientific fact that perpetual motion machines are impossible. This isn't an argument from ignorance, it's based on known laws of thermodynamics. An argument that says "We know from this and that scientific law that such and such phenomena is impossible" is perfectly legitimate in science.
It may indeed be legitimate in certain situations to argue that a certain naturalistic explanation is impossible: the argument from ignorance comes in when one moves from the insufficiency of known natural explanations to a conclusion that such natural explanations cannot exist, and sometimes even further to the existence of an unspecified designer who serves as a stand-in for this ignorance. Incidentally, any argument of the form "I don't understand X" can be rephrased as "no known natural law can explain X"; it's still an argument from ignorance.
We do not know all the laws of nature, we are not always able to predict the results of natural processes to a perfect degree, and so it is always impossible to claim that something will never be explained by a natural process. Of course if you find a competing explanation for the anomaly, all the better, but appeals to an unknown unspecified designer who acted in an unknown way at an unknown time do not fall under the category of "explanations".
Well said, AR.
AR, remember these things:
1. It's not just "a certain naturalistic explanation is impossible" because of "the insufficiency of known explanations," it's that there is no conceivable path to the current result by any unguided means. That's not the same thing. See Macht's example of the perpetual motion machine above. The argument is not that we can't figure out how to build a perpetual motion machine, it's that it can't be done. Period. And the same class of argument is made in the case of irreducible complexity and specified complexity.
2. It's certainly not "I don't understand X." That's not in the literature of ID's leaders at all.
3. Remember the argument from analogy, AR. ID not just a stand-in for ignorance, it is an argument to the best explanation.
4. As to not knowing all the laws of nature, sure, that's the way science is. Does that prevent us from drawing conclusions to the best available explanation?
5. There's a begging of the question here:
appeals to an unknown unspecified designer who acted in an unknown way at an unknown time do not fall under the category of "explanations".
You'll have to state what qualifies as an "explanation." If an explanation is a decomposed analysis of all the natural processes that lead to an event happening in a certain way at a certain time, then radioactivity also lacks an explanation, especially for why specific particles decay when they do. And if you've defined explanation that way, you've defined ID out of existence from the start; you've begged the question.
If an explanation is defined instead as the best statement of our understanding of what is going on, then ID may well be an explanation. It's an explanation that presents a barrier to further natural investigation, yes. But many (myself included) would argue that's a familiar barrier--there's no "natural" way to explain how people reason and choose, unless one follows a path toward absolute determinism and the destruction of real rationality and choice. I've discussed that previously, I won't go into it now.
The problem here is that moving from the insuffiency of known laws to the conclusion that *some* unknown law explains a gap is also an argument from ignorance.
One could, in such instances, just choose to be agnostic about the phenomenon in question. Alternatively, and this is what I'd advocate, one could try to figure out what kinds of things, in principle, could account for the observed pattern. It may be that one could conclude that, even if there is an unknown law that explains something, that unknown law must have properties making it categorically different from the kinds of laws we are familiar with.
"The problem here is that moving from the insuffiency of known laws to the conclusion that *some* unknown law explains a gap is also an argument from ignorance."
Yes, I call it "naturalism of the gaps."
Remaining agnostic is perfectly OK. Although one might note that naturalistic explanations have a good track record, and this must be factored into our expectations of how likely we are to find future naturalistic explanations of any given phenomenon.
But the question is, is ID a competing explanation? In the (perhaps rather pejorative) way I stated the ID hypothesis ("appeals to an unknown unspecified designer who acted in an unknown way at an unknown time"), I don't see how anybody could seriously say this is an explanation for anything. Does it make predictions? Is it testable?
When asked these questions, Behe and Dembski tend to reply that the design inference, say for the flagellum, can be falsified by producing a evolutionary pathway. This is a direct indication that theirs is an argument from ignorance: as long as we do not know of an evolutionary route, the design hypothesis is viable. ID is not a "statement of our understanding of what is going on", it is the opposite; a statement that we don't understand what's going on. Ask yourself: what does "X was designed" convey beyond "X did not evolve"? If there isn't any further information, ID has added nothing to our understanding.
Do ID theorists want to claim that we understand the flagellum well enough to make these grandiose claims " there are no possible pathways.."? Even systems that have been studied a great deal more (e.g. the human immune system) are just beginning to be understood. I doubt very much that there are more than a handful of people in the world who are working on evolutionary explnations of the flagellum; there are lots of more pressing problems. Even so there appear to be some proposals, notably by Matzke. on possible pathways to the flagellum. Also there are plenty of IC systems for which there are known evolutionary pathways, so IC scarcely rules out naturalistic evolution.
It is also true, BTW, that "I don't understand X" is not in the literature of ID's leaders. Where the phrase should appear, it is replaced by "X was designed".
Remaining agnostic is perfectly OK. Although one might note that naturalistic explanations have a good track record, and this must be factored into our expectations of how likely we are to find future naturalistic explanations of any given phenomenon.As far as we can explain ANY phenomenon, the explanation has been naturalistic, a perfect record. Supernatural explanations, zippo.
Help me to understand what ID explains to me. If I want to "reduce my ignorance" about something (like how the flagellum came about), what additional insight do I have from ID? What are they DOING in their labs?
Just to comment on the thing we aren't commenting on, tom
If, in trying to explain how people "reason and choose", you find determinism at some level, perhaps in the single input/output of a neuron, that is what you have found, not the result of "taking the wrong path". You can't choose not to find the result.Even if you trace every path, and determine and predict every reaction from every action, everything is still like it was before the experiment. The person is still the sum of the parts. If at that point you see choice as "unreal", is is doesn't change anything for the subjects mind, or the experiments legitimacy.
To tie this back to ID, sort of, naturalistic is deterministic when it is useful. All evidence that points to a naturalistic origin seems ultimately deterministic to those that think there is someone/thing outside of nature, not bound to the laws of the universe.
Finding a gap, a loophole, or a man behind the curtain means that we (mankind) might be exempt from the law too. Looking at the rear end of a bacteria for God is WAY too close, step back and see the BIG picture.
The sum of the parts is where you find God, or the person, or humanity, and especially nature/reality. Then zoom right back in on the neurons, atoms, whatever and you can find the same wonder, even if it is only an on/off switch.
AR, your last paragraph does not display a real willingness to listen or engage the issues that are really on the table in AR. And I'm afraid what you wrote before it in that comment has not taken into account much of what I wrote in my answer to your previous comment, about explanations. You will not get far in dealing with ID (or any issue) by re-defining it and answering it according to your definition.
Eric, your comment on what we aren't commenting on is outstanding! If we find that there is design at the end of our scientific inquiries, that is what we have found, whether we choose it or prefer it or not.
If, however, we find there is determinism on the level of our thinking and reasoning, what we have found overthrows all of our thinking and reasoning--including that by which we came to the conclusion about determinism. It is to say, "I have finally proved that no person can prove anything." It is an impossible result.
So even though I like the spirit of your comment on what we haven't been commenting on, the specific application you choose, determinism, is not a good one. (I did most of my work on determinism here early in the blog before I developed ways to track series of entries--but you can find several of the entries through this search.)
"Supernatural explanations, zippo." That view is supportable only if you insist that all explanations be naturalistic ones.
I'm in danger of getting off on a rabbit trail--this thread is about ID, not about religion. God is a marvelous explanation for so many things!
In the realm of ID, though, I have to refer you back to your own phrase. If at the end of our inquiries we find design, and if science is puzzled as to what to do next with that information, well, that is what we have found. If it's not an explanation on a level you seek, well, that is what we have found. If it can't be further decomposed and analyzed into ever more basic particles and interactions, well, that is what we have found.
It is Sunday, so I assume you all are busy I'll just sneak in and put in a link to today's doonesbury, which is topical to the post.
ID is not a "statement of our understanding of what is going on", it is the opposite; a statement that we don't understand what's going on. Ask yourself: what does "X was designed" convey beyond "X did not evolve"? If there isn't any further information, ID has added nothing to our understanding.
Again, well said AR.
If at the end of our inquiries we find design, and if science is puzzled as to what to do next with that information, well, that is what we have found.
We find design all the time.
If I find rocks stacked in a circle in a field in england, knowing they were set up by an intelligent designer (the only one we know of) isn't the end of the questions!
If I find a row of lizards skewered on thorns in a bush, I might assume that a sick human did it, but on further investigation I might be wrong (I hope everyone saw the same special on birds using thorns to dissect larger prey
)Intelligent beings use natural objects and forces to "do their will". The natural objects and forces don't have/need will, or to be designed. Biological objects are natural objects as well, and the only source of intelligence. Nature gets along just fine without it... same with life itself, as far as that goes.
Does the "how did the rocks end up here" have a natural explanation? An ID did it, correct? All explanations are natural, or they aren't explanations. We want to know how did they stack the rocks, why did they line them up that way, and all in the framework of natural law. Remember how far removed from a stick and string the crop circle stories got? Sure, I can imagine an ID deciding that a bacteria needs a motor, and because he can't decide how to make it the normal way, he uses his special powers to "poof" it into existence. I can also imagine giant spaceships twisting messages into corn fields, but guys with sticks is more likely.
Evolution is the guys with sticks, it is the truth, simple and elegant.
ID is the spaceships. If you think you have explained crop circles by postulating spaceships, I would want to see your proof for spaceships. That is why ID breaks down to a theist argument. Spaceships and Gods can explain a lot without explaining anything.
IC suggests that God couldn't figure out how to put something together right (naturally) in the first place. Nature insist on natural explanations.
Tom, if you don't like my definition, please feel free to supply yours. I believe I am accurately describing the ID hypothesis as presented by Behe and Dembski. Which part do you disagree with? Isn't the designer unknown? Isn't the mechanism of design unknown?
Which part of your comments didn't I address? The question on the table is whether ID is or is not an argument from ignorance. You are arguing that it could be "the best statement of our understanding of what is going on". Surely one should ask then: what does ID (as presented by Behe and Dembski) explain about our understanding of something that goes beyond the statement that we don't (currently) know of an evolutionary pathway to it?
As I have said, one could potentially make some claim that IC restricts the possible evolutionary routes (to indirect rather than direct pathways). This might or might not be useful. But ID must, from its very name, go beyond this to a claim that design has been found. It is this last step that is problematic. Does this last step add any new information? How do we test it?
As to my last paragraph, sorry you didn't like it. But I think there's more than a little truth to it.
All explanations are natural, or they aren't explanations
See above, 3/4/06, 7:48 am, point 5, on "begging the question."
IC suggests that God couldn't figure out how to put something together right (naturally) in the first place.
People who misunderstand or want to misrepresent IC are the ones who suggest that. To say that God did it because he couldn't figure out the "right" way is jumping off a logical cliff with your feet tied to a ton of unwarranted assumptions.
The Doonesbury cartoon is worth a post of its own.
I'm travelling this weekend, and so haven't been able to keep up with all the comments. I'll try to catch up later in the week. I think AR's comments are excellent, however.
I will make two brief points:
1) It always strikes me in these abstract discussions how little the proponents of ID actually seem to know about biological systems. It's not always an obvious thing, where they use improper terminology or something. It's more of a general impression that I get over time that they are applying the theory of ID to things they don't understand in any depth. This happens a lot in the analysis of science - which is a big part of the reason that scientists tend to be so skeptical about attempts to analyze science "from the outside", as it were. My general advice to those who want to challenge some aspect of scientific theory is to learn more of the details, and try to learn more about how scientists actually do their work. Otherwise there is always going to be a communication gap when you are trying to argue with scientists.
The second point is one I've made before, without a satisfactory answer, but I'd still like someone to take a stab at it. What exactly is meant by the word design? In most of the examples used as analogies to biological design, there are two distinct steps (e.g. for making Mount Rushmore): the mental conceptualization of the end product, and the implementation of that conceptualization. Is ID referring to the mental process, the implementation, or both? I agree with the notion of design in the sense that I think that everything in nature was in God's mind when He created the universe. I just don't think that He directly "implemented" specific components of that design during the flow of history. So, those of you who favor ID - are you talking about the conceptual act or the implementation? And, since I won't be able to check back for a few days, I'll just lay out the arguments ahead of time: if you are talking about the conceptualization, why can't the implementation be via evolution? If you are talking about the implementation, and it's not via evolution, then why isn't it fair to call that a miraculous intervention?
Hi Mike.
If we are talking about God as the designer then my take is that the conceptualization is the implementation; ie. God's will be done.
That which is "in God's mind" is that which is. The information is created and imparted as God wills it through his word.
It can (as a matter of logic) be implemented via evolution, but that evolution just might show marks of said implementation.
The whole is a product of the design and the mind. Sometimes we will find evidence where the manifestation of some aspect of that product would be improbable to the point of impossibility in a mindless purposeless process.
The list of such aspects is probably endless.
Mike
Otherwise there is always going to be a communication gap when you are trying to argue with scientists.
Very often there will be a communication gap when people insist that they must be arguing.
And sometimes scientists make assertions and pose challenges that are theological, philosophical or logical in nature which may be outside of their scientific expertise.
Being a scientist doesn't give one authority in these areas, and it is not necessarily the layperson at fault for any communication gap in situations where they answer such challenges.
My general advice to those who want to challenge some aspect of scientific theory is to learn more of the details, and try to learn more about how scientists actually do their work.I think this is very good advice.
Related to a personal pet peeve, does the same general advice apply to those who wish to support a scientific position but haven't the relevant training or expertise?
Or is it enough for them to remark "scientists say..." thereby closing the case?
Or is it enough for them to remark "scientists say..." thereby closing the case?
Scientists say, "Yes, it is enough".
Case closed.
Remaining agnostic is perfectly OK. Although one might note that naturalistic explanations have a good track record, and this must be factored into our expectations of how likely we are to find future naturalistic explanations of any given phenomenon.
This is ultimately a cognitively empty claim. The best one can say is that we have explained a lot of things with physical laws. But even this is problematic, because how much is "a lot"? There's no way of knowing what proportion of things there are in need of explaining out there, compared to the proportion that have been explained by laws. Also, there have been a lot of things that we've known about for a long time, but haven't explained by physical laws, simply because they aren't conducive to it. Phenomenal consciousness is one, teleological causation or reason is another (because trying to reduce reasons and beliefs to material entities inherently leaves out precisely the aspects we're trying to explain), and of course the origin of the universe (including the origin of physical laws), among other things. Those things that we have explained by laws, on the other hand, are precisely those things you would expect to be explainable by laws: repeating, consistent, mathematically predictable patterns. All we are really justified in saying is the tautology that those things we have explained with physical laws, we have explained with physical laws. To go beyond that is to mistake our epistemic limitations for ontology.
In the (perhaps rather pejorative) way I stated the ID hypothesis ("appeals to an unknown unspecified designer who acted in an unknown way at an unknown time"), I don't see how anybody could seriously say this is an explanation for anything.
Well, yes, if you were to ask me the explanation for something, and I were to reply "I think it's something unknown and unspecified that acted in an unknown way at an unknown time" that wouldn't be very helpful. But, simply saying that something was designed provides a little more information to go on than that.
For instance, if you say that something is explained by a law, you're giving a little bit of information about it, even if you don't specify precisely what that law is, or the precise way and time in which the law acts (arguably, we don't even completely know these things for the laws we know of). That's because physical laws have some things in common, like simplicity, consistency, mathematical predictability, and so on. It's because of these similarities that we even have the conceptual category of "physical law".
Likewise, when you say that something is designed, you are making an appeal to the category of intentional causation, where things are caused to happen by logical reasons and towards goals. These things also have some predictive value, else we wouldn't use them all the time in logical argument, and in describing and explaining human thought. And like with laws, intentional actions have some things in common, otherwise we wouldn't have the conceptual category. And just as we've argued here before that you can't reduce the category of intentional causation in an account of the human mind to materialistic causes without eliminating precisely what needs to be explained, the IDist argues that reducing it in biological history also loses precisely what needs to be explained. Whether it's true or not, saying that the category of intentional action is needed to account for things in biology is not an empty claim, any more than saying that laws account for it. Of course, as the IDist attempts to elaborate on any particular design they think they have found, they're going to try to fill in a few more details, just as when a physicist attempts to elaborate on a particular law they think they have found.
Good points, Deuce.
While we're on the topic of physical law and explanation, let's remember that there's a barrier to further explanation there as well. If we acknowledge, as I did above, that design explanations present such a barrier, let's remember that this is not unique to design.
Where do physical laws come from? Deuce asked this in the prior comment. Swinburne recently asked Dennett the same question. Can physical laws be explained?
I asked before what it is we mean by explanation. I continue to hold that it must not be defined merely in terms of decomposition and analysis of physical entities and processes, for that is begging the question. Certainly physical explanations are valid and valuable as far as they obtain, but to say that nothing else is an explanation is to deny (to follow Deuce's line as one example) intentional causation.
Which is a serious dead end. For if you wish to say that intentional causation is not an "explanation," I would have to ask whether your act of responding should be explained by your intent (your deciding to respond) or by some physical necessity. If not by intent (if you did not intend to do it, in any meaningful sense that explains your action), then are you a rational, choosing person after all?
Hoo boy, that's on the verge of being an insult. That is not my intent (there's that word again!). For one thing, this is addressed to no one in particular, but just to a general "you." If "you" should try to present that position, then "you" are the one making that claim of no rationality, no choice, about yourself and all of us.
For if you wish to say that intentional causation is not an "explanation," I would have to ask whether your act of responding should be explained by your intent (your deciding to respond) or by some physical necessity. If not by intent (if you did not intend to do it, in any meaningful sense that explains your action), then are you a rational, choosing person after all?
I don't see the necessary opposition between physical explanation and rationality that you imply.
Why can't a materialistc view incorporate a hypothesis that one way in which neurons will cause other neurons to fire, initiating even the behavior of coming to a rational conclusion, is by one set of neurons that represent "Socrates is a man" and one that represents "All men are mortal" both combine to fire a set of neurons that cause someone to say "Socrates is moral." (I'm simplifying the organization of neurons in the brain, but I hope you get what I mean).
Saying something was designed by humans has a lot of predictive value: we have some idea of the goals of humans, we have a good idea of the time period humans acted, and above all, we know a great deal about the limitations of human designers. For instance, we would not reasonably argue that the constants of the universe were set by humans: it is obviously beyond our capabilities.
When we explain something by human design, there are predictive consequences. So the category of intelligent causation *restricted to human causation* has meaning, and human design can indeed be used as explanations. And of course, this is what we typically mean by design; we mean human design.
But the D in ID is not human design. Cosmological ID argues that a designer set the constants of the universe for her own purpose. Different versions of biological ID say different things, but typically it imputes to the designer powers well beyond humans.
And for designers who are not humans, the design hypothesis is much less meaningful.
Also, deuce, you say : "saying that the category of intentional action is needed to account for things in biology is not an empty claim, any more than saying that laws account for it." But I would certainly agree that just saying that "laws" explain something is a completely empty claim.
Until some more detail is added, neither "design" nor "laws" conveys very much.
Don't forget another property of the ID, he is exempt from the need to be designed himself. Somehow he can just be, meaning he is far more complex than all the laws of the universe... but doesn't need to be designed.
It is hard to think how this could be a theistic argument against ID, but perhaps if you think cause/effect/action are all just part of the gods (err.. ID) mind, design wouldn't be recognizable apart from the universe. Except by revelation, and personal relationships with said beings.
It seems simpler to postulate that the ID's are are Human Designed objects, and compare the likelihood against the entire universe being designed (we've certainly imagined quite a few ID's before) but I really can't figure out how to frame that as a theistic objection.
Eventually all the Atheistic arguments can be co-opted by the theistic objectors. Makes things nice and grey, instead of black and white.
Eric, to posit just one Designer is actually quite a simple explanation.
From where did this Designer come? ID doesn't need to answer that question, actually. It only needs to point to design in some reliable manner. If we identified a radio transmission of prime numbers from somewhere in the universe, we would conclude design without knowing a thing about the designers. That's legitimate.
Theism, on the other hand, may respond by pointing out that it's a question of causation. The solidly established philosophical principle is that whatever begins to exist must have a cause. If God did not ever begin--if he is eternal in both past and future--no cause need to assigned to him.
On the other hand, scientists and philosophers are near unanimous in agreement that the universe began to exist--it is not eternal, looking backward. It must be explained in terms of a cause. Furthermore, it must be explained in terms that explain how it could have brought forth life (the anthropic coincidences).
The most common non-theistic answer is to posit a near-infinite array of different universes, of which ours is the lucky one that happened to be conducive to life.
Now, that's what I mean when I say theism is a simple answer. Multiplying zillions of universes does not qualify as simple.
AR, that's a common objection but I fail to see the force of it. Just because design can be hypothesized of someone or something greater than humans does not mean it cannot be recognized as such.
More suppression of dissenting views in the scientific community, or the normal process of scientific verification of claims? (Link is to NYTimes - may require registration.)
From where did this Designer come? ID doesn't need to answer that question, actually. It only needs to point to design in some reliable manner. If we identified a radio transmission of prime numbers from somewhere in the universe, we would conclude design without knowing a thing about the designers. That's legitimate.
Why doesn't ID need to answer this question - who decided that ID's only job is to detect design? Or more loosely, why wouldn't it want to investigate that question? Obviously if we identified the radio transmission a la the movie Contact, we'd be intensely curious about the source of the "design". Moreover, we would know something about the designer(s) merely by the fact that we detected the signal - that they understand mathematics, that they understand physics well enough to construct a powerful radio transmitter, that they know enough astronomy to beam their message out into space, and perhaps that they are curious - why else would they send out a message into space? Presumably the message would have some content, which would give us more clues about their nature.
Notice, though, that the SETI project assumes any messages would come from fellow embodied beings, not from supernatural agents. Which is the big difference between SETI and ID.
So, why can't ID address the source of the purported design? And what information does said design convey to us?
Macht,
In your post a few days ago, you said,
On point 1, I think that arguing against a materialist philosophy is a large motivation for many in the ID movement, but I don't see how that can be an objection to ID.
If the motivation is to "disprove" materialism, but one takes the wrong approach, then one merely confuses the issue, rather than clarifies it. In my view, the materialists make a philosophical error in extrapolating from the empirical evidence for evolution to metaphysical assumptions about the nature of reality. Thus, the proper approach is to refute or correct this philosophical error. But what ID is doing, in my opinion, is attacking the empirical evidence itself. In the equation, "if evolution, then materialism", they are attacking the first part, when I think they should be attacking the second part. In particular, I think their philosophical motivations have caused them to seek empirical evidence where there is none.
On point 3, I think this is why we shouldn't think of ID in the narrow biological sense. When we take into account cosmological ID, too, then the objection in point 3 disappears. I know Tom has linked to the Robin Collins "ID as meta-science" article before and what I like about Collins approach is that ID as "meta-science" or "paradigm" or "research program" could possibly act to unify a bunch of the sciences.
That's all very well and good, but one needs to make distinctions between cosmological design and biological ID as promoted by Dembski and Behe. They are advocating something quite different from cosmological design, and it will not do to just wave our hands and say, "oh, the whole thing is designed - what's the difference?" I'm not sure whether Collins' idea has any merit, but I'm skeptical. In any case, what he's proposing is a long way from the way Dembski and Behe get to their claims that particular biological artifacts are "designed".
On point 4, I highly disagree. I don't think there is anything postmodernism about ID at all.
The attacks on evolutionary theory are highly postmodernist (as opposed to the positive claims for design). They routinely point to various things that evolution can't explain, some more valid than others, and then draw the implicit conclusion that evolutionary theory must be wrong, as opposed to just incomplete. Otherwise, ID would not be a competing theory, but just a potential add-on. Now, Behe may argue along those lines, but the rest of the Discovery Institute does much more than that. They engage in basic deconstructionist techniques - the same kinds of things the Jesus Seminar does.
I'd also point out that just because something is designed doesn't mean we can detect it as designed.
I frequently see this "defense" of ID, but never a real explanation for it. It strikes me as something that arose simply for the sake of defending ID, and not something that's a general principle. The whole argument rests on the assumption that ID in fact has legitimate methods for detecting design. I deny the premise - how then will you convince me that in principle we should be able to detect some kinds of design, but not others? Pollock is a bad example, because paint does not drip in patterns by itself to look like a Pollock painting - the "design" is quite obvious.
On point 6, you have a point in that plenty of biologists from Dawkins to Crick think that biological things look designed. The only answer I have is "Why not?"
This contradicts your earlier point that we might expect to detect design in some cases but not others. If it's "obvious" from looking at nature, then Dembski's filter is detecting something different, since he rules out all kinds of natural artifacts (like snowflakes) as being designed.
On point 8, ID isn't a god of the gaps argument, although it can be. Even though I have problems with both Behe and Dembski, I don't think either are appealing to ignorance.
Then you don't really understand their arguments.
Tom,
Others view the god of the gaps as something less than that, as just an argument from ignorance and nothing more. Arguments from ignorance are of course unsatisfying and often doom to failure. Behe and Dembski are not appealing to ignorance, however. They are not saying, "we can't figure out where this flagellum came from," they're saying, "we believe we know enough about the flagellum and about the way nature works that there is no way, in principle, that it could have arisen without some kind of design involvement." That's an argument from knowledge, based on what we know of nature and of science.
They aren't appealing to ignorance, but they're appealing to what we know, eh? You're just playing word games here. "We know nature can't" is no different from saying "we don't know how". Both statements assume natural explanations can't explain the phenomenon in question. In the latter case, the possible explanation is left open - could be natural, could be non-natural. In the former case, and explicit step is made to a positive case for "design". That is, the only evidence for "design" is the negative fact that natural causes don't suffice. You said yourself that "a Design theory in nature must be an argument from exception or exclusion, a negative argument." (here)
But the more elementary question is, what reason do you have to believe that Dembski and Behe are correct when they say "we believe we know enough about the flagellum and about the way nature works"? Every scientist will say we don't have a complete understanding of nature - what makes Behe and Dembski different?
Charlie,
If we are talking about God as the designer then my take is that the conceptualization is the implementation; ie. God's will be done.
That which is "in God's mind" is that which is. The information is created and imparted as God wills it through his word.
Huh? According to Christian belief, you existed in God's mind at the creation of the universe. But you don't doubt that your body came into existence in your mother's womb, and that you grew and developed over time. You don't claim that you just magically appeared. It would seem that there is a conceptualization, and an actualization, of the human person that is Charlie. In the case of the bacterial flagellum, the same is true. And the actualization occured via evolutionary processes.
It can (as a matter of logic) be implemented via evolution, but that evolution just might show marks of said implementation.
The whole is a product of the design and the mind. Sometimes we will find evidence where the manifestation of some aspect of that product would be improbable to the point of impossibility in a mindless purposeless process.
Is gravity a mindless, purposeless process?
And sometimes scientists make assertions and pose challenges that are theological, philosophical or logical in nature which may be outside of their scientific expertise.
Absolutely. And I try to encourage scientists not to make ignorant comments about, for example, Christian beliefs.
Being a scientist doesn't give one authority in these areas, and it is not necessarily the layperson at fault for any communication gap in situations where they answer such challenges.
Obviously, communication is a two-way street. But if you don't understand the science, you are more likely to make the mistake I mentioned earlier - attempt to correct a philosophical or theological error by "correcting" the empirical evidence. This type of "correcting" usually turns out to be wrong.
Related to a personal pet peeve, does the same general advice apply to those who wish to support a scientific position but haven't the relevant training or expertise?
It generally applies, but obviously is frequently not practicable. The appeal to authority isn't automatically out-of-bounds, in my opinion, but it's not determinative, either.
Mike,
Huh? According to Christian belief, you existed in God's mind at the creation of the universe. But you don't doubt that your body came into existence in your mother's womb, and that you grew and developed over time. You don't claim that you just magically appeared. It would seem that there is a conceptualization, and an actualization, of the human person that is Charlie. In the case of the bacterial flagellum, the same is true. And the actualization occured via evolutionary processes.
"Huh?" what?
Nothing here is contradictory of my answer.
I never claimed that I magically appeared nor that the flagellum did.
The timing and mode of my appearance in a human body is part of the conceptualization.
The implementation is just as it was conceived by God.
Is gravity a mindless, purposeless process?
Gravity has no purpose or mind of its own, no.
But it exists due to the mind of God for the purpose intended by God. It has certain features and capabilities by which the purpose is achieved. It is not an accident of a universe unfolding on its own but a determined feature of the universe.
It has its role and its limitations. The existence of gravity, its parameters and apparent purpose are evidence of God's design, just as many physicist's speculate and attempt to demonstrate through the probability arguments of fine-tuning.
ps.
I don't know what (or if) I am to be correcting here
But if you don't understand the science, you are more likely to make the mistake I mentioned earlier - attempt to correct a philosophical or theological error by "correcting" the empirical evidence.
But I am still open to exploring any rationale that might indicate that my philosophical or theological views in error.
Thus far I haven't seen anything of this sort.
Absolutely. And I try to encourage scientists not to make ignorant comments about, for example, Christian beliefs.As long as we are sharing pet peeves, how would one become educated about "correct" Christian beliefs?
To become an expert on Bacteria, science has recognized the training and experience required to present and report valid opinions in the field of study. (Look at all the "list of the leading" gobblygook on both sides) Controversial views are only controversial until they become the norm, or are dismissed by consensus. The layman who relies on the consensus view is appealing to the ultimate authority of science - the best model of nature at that point, in that area. If, as a layman, I want to become an expert I have a path, and if I want to shake things up with a new idea I have to prove and demonstrate my idea, and line it up with nature.
If, when I become an expert, I say "Christians say that the earth is less than 20,000 years old", are you going to correct me? Is the "correct" view also the consensus view... "some think that, but most don't"?
How do I become an expert Christian? Are you, Charlie, Tom, myself and all the regulars "well-versed" in Christianity enough to have informed opinions of what Christians "know"?
How do you divide out the laymen? Isn't Jesus (the supernatural version) the ultimate authority appeal? If I think Jesus was a hero of the ages, a humanist ahead of his time that changed the world, but I also think he was a mortal man who is quite dead, am I a Christian? Do I need corrected? Can I still join this discussion of Christian objections?
Or if it is strictly theist objections thread, can I join if I believe in god, but I don't think Jesus ever existed?
When I say "scientist believe" I am talking about the statements built on foundational theories like evolution or gravity, or when I say "Dawkins wrote" I am appealing to a specific true authority, and when I say IMHO, I am talking about my own view.
Anyone here can say I am not an expert, and discredit my opinions in science at any amateur level, BUT no matter how many holy books I read, or ceremonies I attend, or apologetic arguments I can summarize, my opinion of Christian views will never be given as much "expert" credit as anyone who just says they are a Christian.
I cannot honestly say "Atheist believe" and speak for anyone but myself. (except, of course, the definition - no gods) But Mike, you can correct a scientist's (or my) ignorance about Christians? Is Christianity also about "relevant training or expertise"?
I am enjoying everyone's writing, and I don't want to change the subject, so just think on it if you want. I just wanted to ask Mike at what point would his hypothetical ignorant scientist need education, and would it require any more effort than accepting Jesus as her savior? Could I correct the scientist by quoting the bible, and if not, why not?
My apologies, Mike.
As I now read your responses to Macht et al. I see you were referring to philosophical/theological errors that you alluded to in those comments.
Disregard my ps. comment.
Gravity has no purpose or mind of its own, no.
But it exists due to the mind of God for the purpose intended by God. It has certain features and capabilities by which the purpose is achieved. It is not an accident of a universe unfolding on its own but a determined feature of the universe.
It has its role and its limitations. The existence of gravity, its parameters and apparent purpose are evidence of God's design, just as many physicist's speculate and attempt to demonstrate through the probability arguments of fine-tuning.
But what is the distinction here between gravity and evolution (or more precisely, the physical laws that govern & constrain evolution - for example, electromagnetism)? Can you be more precise about what you mean by "an accident of a universe unfolding on it's own"? I think you are conflating metaphysical and physical properties here, and would like to try to sort the two out.
I never claimed that I magically appeared nor that the flagellum did.
The timing and mode of my appearance in a human body is part of the conceptualization.
The issue with regard to ID is whether natural forces could have caused the flagellum to be actualized, absent some kind of intervention. The notion of "design" is specifically set against the notion of "natural laws plus chance". Thus a snowflake is not designed, but the flagellum is. If the "timing and mode" of the appearance of the flagellum is part of the conceptualization of the flagellum, then the fact that it was designed - in this definition of "design" - does not preclude the fact that it evolved (just as the fact that there is a biological account of the origin of Charlie doesn't preclude the conclusion that Charlie was intended by God). Thus your definition of design here is at odds with the way that Dembski uses the term. Which would lead to my position: the dispute is over philosophical or metaphysical interpretations of empirical data (i.e. the dispute is over whether God designed the universe, not over whether the flagellum evolved), and not over the correct scientific interpretation of said data.
Eric,
All very good questions/points.
As long as we are sharing pet peeves, how would one become educated about "correct" Christian beliefs?
First, I'll point out that I said that I want scientists not to make ignorant comments about Christian beliefs, not that I want them to understand the "correct" Christian beliefs. There's a subtle but important difference. For example, claiming that some Christians insist that the earth is less than 10,000 years old is not ignorant, it's correct. Claiming that all Christians believe this is ignorant.
If I think Jesus was a hero of the ages, a humanist ahead of his time that changed the world, but I also think he was a mortal man who is quite dead, am I a Christian? Do I need corrected? Can I still join this discussion of Christian objections?
I would say yes, you need corrected. And no, someone who thinks Christ was only a human being is not a Christian - that is primarily what distinguishes Jews and Muslims from Christians. There are self-professed Christians who espouse this view, but they are directly contradicted by Scripture. But the issue here is not what your personal beliefs are - it's whether you accurately characterize the beliefs of Christians. Again, it's not incorrect to say that some Christians believe Jesus was just great man, but not God incarnate. It is incorrect to claim that this view is held by more than a small minority, or that it is well-supported by Scripture.
Could I correct the scientist by quoting the bible, and if not, why not?
This is a favorite tactic of those who criticize or attack Christianity - they pick out particular passages in the Bible and use them to criticize the whole book, or the whole religion. But to be intellectually honest, one would have to base one's criticisms on a wider variety of data. For example, it wouldn't do for a reviewer of a novel to just pick out a handful of passages, or even a couple of chapters, and base the review on that. Furthermore, with regard to religous beliefs, there are many interpretations of the meaning of Scripture - one need not be an expert in all of them to recognize that they exist, and to have some idea of what they say before criticizing a particular belief or interpretation. Basically all I'm getting at are the knee-jerk responses that say that all Christians are idiots, or that religious belief is de facto incompatible with science, or that Christianity has only negative effects on the world.
Anyone here can say I am not an expert, and discredit my opinions in science at any amateur level, BUT no matter how many holy books I read, or ceremonies I attend, or apologetic arguments I can summarize, my opinion of Christian views will never be given as much "expert" credit as anyone who just says they are a Christian.
It's true, there is ultimately an unbridgeable gap between the believer and the nonbeliever. Just like there is basically an unbridgeable gap between the scientist and the nonscientist. The nonscientist will never have a true understanding of the experience of doing science. And a nonbeliever will never have a true understanding of the experience of faith. But that doesn't mean that one can't make an honest effort to characterize the beliefs and practices of that which he is criticizing.
Why doesn't ID need to answer this question - who decided that ID's only job is to detect design? Or more loosely, why wouldn't it want to investigate that question? Obviously if we identified the radio transmission a la the movie Contact, we'd be intensely curious about the source of the "design".
The current SETI project is not trying to do anything but detect evidence of design. If that's all it ever did, it would still be of great value. If it found that mythical prime number series (or whatever) out there, then we would know considerably more about our cosmos than we ever did before.
Is SETI being asked to hypothesize about the nature of the transmitter of those prime numbers today? That would be, as my dad says, a tad previous. Let's approach one question at a time.
What may be confusing this issue is that ID, in contrast to SETI, can be simultaneously approached from a philosophical and theological direction, which allows us to speculate on who or what we would find behind design in nature. Let's not allow that possibility to confuse us into thinking that the two questions are one. There is a question of whether design is evidence in nature, and it can be kept conceptually distinct.
how then will you convince me that in principle we should be able to detect some kinds of design, but not others?
The distinction here, Mike, is in the level of differentiation required. I can "detect" design in the orderly progression of the planets in the solar system. But I cannot show that design is a differentially better explanation than just materialist explanations for it.
in the movies the detective often knows intuitively whodunit, but still has to search hard for that one telltale torn button to show it conclusively. In the same way, I can say I see design intuitively in everything, but I need something that would stand up in a court of law.
This also applies to your objection ending with:
That is, the only evidence for "design" is the negative fact that natural causes don't suffice.
You're just playing word games here. "We know nature can't" is no different from saying "we don't know how".
Is "We know that entropy cannot decrease in a closed system" equivalent to "We've never quite figured out a way for entropy to decrease in a closed system"?
ID arguments are of the first order, that nature displays features that could not arise just by mechanistic means. As a logical, philosophical basis for such arguments, irreducible complexity is pretty solid. Specified complexity is not quite as deductively solid, but probabilitically it's good enough, especially using Dembski's 1 in 10^150 criterion. The dispute is not over whether someone can argue that way, but over whether nature displays IC and SC or not.
So it comes back, as always, to an empirical question, with also the logical component of "what would IC and SC look like if we were to see it in nature?" Why are you so opposed, Mike, to pursuing the empirical question?
Parenthetically, I half expect a reflex reaction from someone that says our knowledge of origins could never be as certain as our knowledge of thermodynamics. (I'd like to see evolutionists apply that humility toward their general theory more than they do.)
I don't know that we would ever reach the same level of certainty there that we have in regard to entropy, but I don't know that it's strictly necessary, either. Most of science is not as certain as thermodynamics
What reason do you have to believe that Dembski and Behe are correct when they say "we believe we know enough about the flagellum and about the way nature works"?
It's a matter of the best available explanation in view of what we do know. And as you know, I'm not personally convinced that they can make that claim already, but I'm highly interested in seeing them pursue it.
Mike,
But what is the distinction here between gravity and evolution (or more precisely, the physical laws that govern & constrain evolution - for example, electromagnetism)?
When you can show the laws of evolution - as observable, repeatable and predictable as the law(s) of gravity - then you will have found design there as well.
Can you be more precise about what you mean by "an accident of a universe unfolding on it's own"?
A fortuitous, chance result of the purposeless material evolution of the universe.
Gravity was created with the very existence of the universe, and thus of life, and thus of man, in mind.
The issue with regard to ID is whether natural forces could have caused the flagellum to be actualized, absent some kind of intervention. The notion of "design" is specifically set against the notion of "natural laws plus chance".
Correct. But you are going to have to corral "chance" a little. A rockslide can be the result of a regular law and chance. But that regular law is not the product of chance.
Thus a snowflake is not designed, but the flagellum is.
As above, this may or may not be so. The snowflake results from chemical and physical necessity, but that necessity was not derived by chance. The snowflake is dependent upon the polarity and construction of the water molecule. The water molecule is a product of design with life/man as an end result.
If the "timing and mode" of the appearance of the flagellum is part of the conceptualization of the flagellum, then the fact that it was designed - in this definition of "design" - does not preclude the fact that it evolved
As I keep saying and saying.
Thus your definition of design here is at odds with the way that Dembski uses the term.
Not strictly speaking. Yes, Dembski's vision of design accommodates some special intervention, but it does not require it.
I can, in fact, repeat this until I am blue in the face.
Dembski:
"Indeed, intelligent design is perfectly compatible with all the design in the world coming to expression by the ordinary means of secondary causes over the course of natural history, much as a computer program's output comes to expression by running the program (and thus without monkeying with the program's operation).
...
Physical necessity can also be the carrier of teleology through laws of form that channel evolution along preset paths.
...
Even a non-Darwinian form of selection and variation can accommodate teleology, provided variations are under intelligent control or the environment is carefully fine-tuned by an intelligence to select for appropriate variations.
...
Intelligent design's only concern is that secondary causes leave room for teleology and that this teleology be empirically detectable.
...
Indeed there are forms of telelogical evolution that are entirely compatible with intelligent design and that involve no break in secondary causes."
"Is "We know that entropy cannot decrease in a closed system" equivalent to "We've never quite figured out a way for entropy to decrease in a closed system"?"
More precisely, it means "as far as we know, in the systems we have studied, to a good approximation, entropy cannot decrease in a closed system. We feel confident in extrapolating it to other systems which are similar. If there is a violation of the second law in some system, there must be something very special about it."
And indeed, in very small systems over very short times, the second law can be violated: see e.g. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/t...ech/
2135779.stm (sorry, don't know how to do hyperlinks in comments)
Tom,
In the same way, I can say I see design intuitively in everything, but I need something that would stand up in a court of law.
Why? (and as a snarky aside, I'll add that apparently ID doesn't meet that standard, according to Dover.)
ID arguments are of the first order, that nature displays features that could not arise just by mechanistic means. As a logical, philosophical basis for such arguments, irreducible complexity is pretty solid. Specified complexity is not quite as deductively solid, but probabilitically it's good enough, especially using Dembski's 1 in 10^150 criterion. The dispute is not over whether someone can argue that way, but over whether nature displays IC and SC or not.
So it comes back, as always, to an empirical question, with also the logical component of "what would IC and SC look like if we were to see it in nature?" Why are you so opposed, Mike, to pursuing the empirical question?
I think a better way to look at it is, if IC really exists, does that point to design and/or against evolution? It's easy to demonstrate via known mechanisms (gene duplication and deletion) that IC structures can be produced via evolution.
An alternative is to ask whether the artifacts that Behe says are IC truly IC? In the case of the clotting system, it clearly isn't, since mice with one of the genes knocked out were viable (that is, they were impaired, but could still have produced offspring). And, according to Behe's definition, the flagellum isn't, since some of it's parts can be used for other functions.
With regard to SC, the issue is whether Dembski has clearly delineated the specificity. His way of doing so is wholly disconnected from the actual biology of the flagellum (note: the only artifact that Dembski has actually produced actual calculations for). To give one quick example: he assumes that a particular protein must have the precise sequence of amino acids seen in the current flagellum. But in fact nobody knows how many different sequences could produce the same 3D structure for the protein. And nobody knows how well a protein with minor changes in it's 3D structure could still function, which adds more possibilities for sequence variation. He simply throws numbers up in the air that have no basis in reality, then he has the audacity to claim that he has proven (to the level of 1 in 10^150) that the flagellum is "designed".
I don't know that we would ever reach the same level of certainty there that we have in regard to entropy, but I don't know that it's strictly necessary, either. Most of science is not as certain as thermodynamics
Where is the quote from Dembski that his calculations might be inaccurate? Where is his realistic estimate of the error bars on his probabilities? Where are the calculations done by independent researchers, on different systems, that corroborate Dembski's claims?
It's a matter of the best available explanation in view of what we do know.
God
of
the
Gaps.
Charlie,
When you can show the laws of evolution - as observable, repeatable and predictable as the law(s) of gravity - then you will have found design there as well.
You have the most elastic definition of design imaginable - it encompasses essentially any natural process. That's fine, but it's not a scientific argument, and it's not the argument that Behe or Dembski make. It also does nothing empirical to distinguish design from theistic evolution, since theistic evolution is empirically indistinguishable from Dawkins' atheistic evolution, it also does nothing empirical to distinguish design from atheistic evolution. It's a purely metaphysical argument, as I've argued all along.
A fortuitous, chance result of the purposeless material evolution of the universe.
"purposeless" is a metaphysical term, not a scientific one. Einstein's theory of GR doesn't include "purpose" within it's definition - it's a mathematical theory, which happens to predict well empirical observations we make of nature. Likewise, evolution doesn't include "purpose" in it's definition (it does in the popular accounts of some scientists, but not in the theory itself) - it's a theory (partly mathematical), that happens to predict and explain well observations we make of nature.
The snowflake is dependent upon the polarity and construction of the water molecule. The water molecule is a product of design with life/man as an end result.
A metaphysical assertion, not a scientific one.
Yes, Dembski's vision of design accommodates some special intervention, but it does not require it.
Wrong.
Indeed there are forms of telelogical evolution that are entirely compatible with intelligent design and that involve no break in secondary causes.
This is flatly contradicted by Dembski's notion of SC. He explicitly rules out natural laws and chance as explanations when applying the EF. Thus, his technical description of ID requires a break in secondary causes. If it did not, how would he detect design, since he wouldn't be able to rule out all natural causes, which by his definition are not part of the definition of design.
A description of the natural history of the flagellum that does not include any breaks in secondary causes is by Dembski's own definition evidence that the flagellum is not designed.
Intelligent design's only concern is that secondary causes leave room for teleology and that this teleology be empirically detectable.
Teleology is a metaphysical concept, it cannot be demonstrated empirically. You cannot empirically demonstrate that your life has meaning and purpose, and you cannot empirically demonstrate that the flagellum has meaning and purpose. For some reason, ID proponents have a deep-seated wish that teleology be empirically provable, but wishing can't make it so.
Mike,
I think Dembski can answer your last point all by himself (he is discussing specifically Fibonacci numbers in biology, but the point is about "natural"):
"The contradiction here is only apparent. The fault is not with the EF but with an equivocation involving the term natural. ...
Is the operation of the process natural? Or is the origin of the process natural? Just because the process of something is natural does not mean that its origin is. This is a widely neglected point.
...
Natural forces can serve as conduits of design. As a result a simple inspection of those natural forces may turn up no evidence of design. Often one must look deeper. To use the EF to identify design requires inputting the right events, objects and structures into the filter."
Another conflation that allows for this error is mistaking material causes to be the same as secondary causes.
"While material mechanisms are perfectly acceptable secondary causes, secondary causes need not be material mechanisms.
...
As a consequence, ID has no stake in upsetting secondary causation. It only seeks to expose naturalism's fallacious attempt to conflate secondary causes with material mechasims. Accordingly, design can be real and discernible without requiring an explicit "design event". like a special creation, miracle, or supernatural intervention."
The point is that, once suitably programmed, complexity may arise of necessity from law or natural events. I know I have used "natural" in slightly different senses before, as I think Dembski has as well, but context is king.
You may find that an event is not contingent, as arising as a result of law, and therefore deem it to be "natural" as it fails at the first node of the EF. ( eg. a paint can falls when a stooge opens a door. It was the result of gravity acting upon an object whose underpinning has been removed, so its falling is "natural".)
But further investigation of the underlying systems reveals that what was natural at that level is not the result strictly of material mechanisms at more basic levels. And as those systems go through the filter they are found to be not "natural", but designed. (eg. the prankster had to place the can. The act of human intelligence, as Van Till told us, is in this context not "natural".)
Mike,
The snowflake is dependent upon the polarity and construction of the water molecule. The water molecule is a product of the design with life/man as an end result.
A metaphysical assertion, not a scientific one.
Yes, the end goal of my assertion (man) is certainly metaphysical. But the consideration of design of the water molecule is empirical. Comparison of water against all other liquids as the universal solvent, comparison of its (life-sustaining) properties when freezing, the (life-sustaining) insulating qualities of snow (and you thought snow wasn't designed
), and its location in liquid form on the thin sliver of the the crust of this planet etc. provide the observational evidence.
Mike,
You have the most elastic definition of design imaginable - it encompasses essentially any natural process. That's fine, but it's not a scientific argument, and it's not the argument that Behe or Dembski make.
Then your questions about why we can attribute "design" to this or that artifact are unwarranted.
You constantly say "if all is designed, why can we apply tests only to certain features, or how can you convince me, in principle...?"
Certain features lend themselves to the scientific study of design, and warrant that scientific designation. If these are the only things to be considered as "designed" (as opposed to the elasticity of my "God is the designer of everything" application) then it is pointless asking why they alone are called "designed".
This scientific endeavor is a limited one and can only reveal the design in a limited field of what exists. Again, that does not mean that only those things are designed but only that the scientific designation of the term "design" is applied to them.
Is any scientific test sensitive to all levels of what is being tested for?
Or is the origin of the process natural? Just because the process of something is natural does not mean that its origin is. This is a widely neglected point.
What is the origin of a process? If he's talking about the origin of the laws of nature, then sure, it's simple to claim a source outside the laws of nature. But that's just the cosmological design argument, which applies equally well to snowflakes and to biology.
Often one must look deeper. To use the EF to identify design requires inputting the right events, objects and structures into the filter.
This is just Dembski saying that he gets to decide what goes into the filter, so that he gets the answer he wants. For example, he simply asserts that it is legitimate to input the bacterial flagellum, taken as a discrete object disconnected from the rest of the bacterium. But this is a totally arbitrary way of treating the flagellum, and does not correspond with the observations we make of nature. And he doesn't attempt any defense of this maneuver - he just asserts that it's a discrete combinatorial object. But he has to treat it that way, because if he didn't he wouldn't get the numbers to come out the way he wants them to.
"While material mechanisms are perfectly acceptable secondary causes, secondary causes need not be material mechanisms."
Question-begging. What are these secondary causes, if not natural mechanisms, and if not direct actions of God? He's just asserting that secondary causes need not be natural, because if they did his theory would be no different than traditional evolutionary theory. But he has no reason to claim that secondary causes aren't natural.
As a consequence, ID has no stake in upsetting secondary causation. It only seeks to expose naturalism's fallacious attempt to conflate secondary causes with material mechasims. Accordingly, design can be real and discernible without requiring an explicit "design event". like a special creation, miracle, or supernatural intervention."
So we should not conflate secondary causes with natural mechanisms, but design doesn't require special creation, miracles, or supernatural intervention. What else would you call non-natural secondary causes?
But the consideration of design of the water molecule is empirical.
You just listed a bunch of the properties of water that make it conducive to life, you haven't demonstrated empirically that there is a telos to water. It's a persuasive argument, one I use myself, but it's not empirically proven.
If these are the only things to be considered as "designed" (as opposed to the elasticity of my "God is the designer of everything" application) then it is pointless asking why they alone are called "designed".
We need two different words to delineate cosmic design and biological artifact design. Say, codesign and biodesign. Codesign consists of the extra-scientific, or metaphysical, claim that nature itself is designed. Since science can only study nature itself, it cannot step outside of nature to asses whether the system as a whole was designed. Once one does that one is doing metaphysics, not science. Biodesign, as described by Behe and Dembski, argues that specific artifacts within the natural order exhibit features that mark them as designed. One of those features is that natural laws aren't sufficient to explain them. That is, codesign isn't sufficient to explain them. Thus biodesign requires something beyond codesign. But if codesign is itself beyond the purview of science, then surely biodesign must also be. Thus ID is not scientific, but metaphysical.
I think what you want to argue is that biodesign is just a subset of codesign, and that there are empirical methods that can rigorously detect codesign - in this case they detect biodesign. The problem is that the means by which Dembski puports to detect biodesign rules out codesign as part of it's methodology. So he cannot be detecting a subset of codesign. In addition, there is the logical flaw of using empirical methods, which are constrained to the boundaries of the natural world, to detect something that is outside the natural world (the conceptualization of the laws of nature in the mind of the creator of those laws).
We've kicked these distinctions around before ("not natural" versus "supernatural" or "not solely caused by material mechanisms" versus "miraculous").
http://www.haloscan.com/comments...12130424/
#96913
What is the origin of a process?
This is akin to a computer program outputting Fibonacci sequences. The process is one of necessity, being perfectly natural in the sense of requiring no ongoing intervention. But the origin of the process did require intelligent input, and was therefore not "natural".
But the consideration of design of the water molecule is empirical.
You just listed a bunch of the properties of water that make it conducive to life, you haven't demonstrated empirically that there is a telos to water. It's a persuasive argument, one I use myself, but it's not empirically proven.
Perhaps I've used "empirical" differently than you would. My use entails that the consideration be based upon observation, the senses, and experience.
But I will certainly take "extra-scientific" as the realm in which the life-sustaining coincidences of the water molecule are considered to be by design. As I said, I am not trying to make a scientific presentation, just a common sense one.
Neither did I mean to imply that I could "prove" design of the water molecule. If I did intend a rigorous proof, that wouldn't be science either, would it?
One of those features is that natural laws aren't sufficient to explain them. That is, codesign isn't sufficient to explain them. Thus biodesign requires something beyond codesign.
The first sentence here I can agree with. Natural laws, absent any intelligence, are not causally sufficient in their programs (Dembski's and Behe's). The rub is that any laws that can bring about the complexity and information content of our world (biotic and otherwise) will be a result and reflection of that intelligence and the teleology. Also, laws as we now know them, being descriptions of repetitive and predictable behaviours can not, on their own, create information (which is antithetical to repetition and predictability). If the description of how things occur (law) includes increasing information then that information has to be an inputted part of the system (at the beginning or otherwise), not a result of the system.
The second and third sentences I can't get behind. The laws of your "codesign" were purposeful and planned such that we have the water molecule, the four forces of nature, the universal rate of expansion and are indicative of design. This same level of planning (your codesign) could be responsible for life itself, and be indicative of design there as well (the biodesign). As both Dembski and Behe allow for this it seems hard-headed to insist that their theories do not.
If your point about this so-called biodesign is that it is not proven, I will certainly agree with you there. I don't really know if it can be proven. But I believe it is there just the same.
I support design theory in the sense that I think it is correct, whether it fits the rules of science as it is described today or not. I think it is correct in the sense that I don't believe this universe, this planet, life or man would exist were the forces naught but chance-driven, random, mindless, material processes. I think the reasons to believe this are sound, empirical, and scientifically derived, even if the conclusion of design does not meet peer-reviewed standards for science.
The assemblage of such molecular machines as the bacterial flagellum and the spliceosome, or the gross physiology of a person, studied scientifically, cries out "design".
I am highly doubtful that a scientific endeavour can ever say "look, proof of design and God" but am completely confident that it can elucidate the situation to the point where a logical, rational person will say "look, design".
Are constraints against the supernatural or teleology really necessary elements of "science"?
Plantinga muses a little on the subject.
http://www.discovery.org/scripts...ws%20and%
20News
Natural laws, absent any intelligence, are not causally sufficient in their programs (Dembski's and Behe's).
This makes no sense - we agree that natural laws are created by an intelligence (and we appear to agree that this is an extra-scientific proposition). So what does it mean to say "natural laws, absent any intelligence"?
The rub is that any laws that can bring about the complexity and information content of our world (biotic and otherwise) will be a result and reflection of that intelligence and the teleology. Also, laws as we now know them, being descriptions of repetitive and predictable behaviours can not, on their own, create information (which is antithetical to repetition and predictability). If the description of how things occur (law) includes increasing information then that information has to be an inputted part of the system (at the beginning or otherwise), not a result of the system.
Wrong, wrong, wrong. This is the big myth spread by Dembski and other anti-evolutionists, but it's simply not true. We have numerous examples of how starting with simple sets of rules, we can generate fantastic complexity by simply applying those simple rules. One common example is Mandelbrot sets. Given what we know today, and I'll certainly grant that our current knowledge of this area is limited and incomplete, it's fully plausible that a few laws of nature could combine to produce biological complexity. I agree that when we get to the point where we have a more comprehensive understanding of how the laws of nature conspire to make biological complexity possible, if not inevitable, one can point to that fact of nature as evidence that nature itself was designed with complex creatures like us in mind. But again, that will be an extra-scientific conclusion, not one that can be refuted or proved within the boundaries of science.
I'll add one more technical point about this business of information in biology. The fact is that we cannot tell the difference between sequences that code for genes and sequences that don't (there are details here that matter, but the general point is correct). So far nobody has come up with an algorithm based solely in theoretical information or statistical principles, that accurately predicts which sections of DNA code for protein, and which don't. The way we do it is almost entirely based upon looking for patterns that match genes that we already know about - it's entirely empirical. In fact, if you run most genefinding programs on sequences of DNA that have been randomized in the computer, it will spit out lots of gene candidates. The point of this is that the accuracy of Dembski's calculations are entirely meaningless. He cannot have the level of accuracy required to make his theory work, because we simply don't know all the parameters.
The second and third sentences I can't get behind. The laws of your "codesign" were purposeful and planned such that we have the water molecule, the four forces of nature, the universal rate of expansion and are indicative of design. This same level of planning (your codesign) could be responsible for life itself, and be indicative of design there as well (the biodesign). As both Dembski and Behe allow for this it seems hard-headed to insist that their theories do not.
Charlie, what do you think the EF is doing when it rules out "natural laws" as explanations for the object under consideration? It means that our current understanding of things like "the water molecule, the four forces of nature, the universal rate of expansion", etc. can't explain the object in question! If it didn't then the EF would point to "natural law" as a possible, or likely, explanation for the object. Which in Dembski's theory means that it is not "(bio)designed". Just because Dembski, or Behe, say that their theory allows for "front loading", or whatever you want to call it, doesn't make it so.
I'm not being hard-headed - I don't dispute that Behe and Dembski are claiming that their theories allow for codesign to account for biodesign. What I dispute is the truth of the statement. I say if you look at their theory, then the statement cannot be true. Or, if the statement is true, then something about the theory must be incorrect.
I support design theory in the sense that I think it is correct, whether it fits the rules of science as it is described today or not.
But the primary focus of the argument is whether ID is scientific or not. If ID was put forth as a purely philosophical or metaphysical proposition, I wouldn't have a problem with it. The problem, of course, is that if you do that you don't get to attack evolutionary theory head on, which is what so many people feel compelled to do.
I think it is correct in the sense that I don't believe this universe, this planet, life or man would exist were the forces naught but chance-driven, random, mindless, material processes. I think the reasons to believe this are sound, empirical, and scientifically derived, even if the conclusion of design does not meet peer-reviewed standards for science.
The assemblage of such molecular machines as the bacterial flagellum and the spliceosome, or the gross physiology of a person, studied scientifically, cries out "design".
I am highly doubtful that a scientific endeavour can ever say "look, proof of design and God" but am completely confident that it can elucidate the situation to the point where a logical, rational person will say "look, design".
That's great - I largely agree with you. As long as the design part stays in the larger worldview, but not in the narrow arena of science, I have no problems. It's when you (or anyone) claims that what you just outlined above means that the current scientific theory of evolution is wrong, or that what you've outlined adds in any way to our scientific understanding of nature that I have a problem.
Mike, just a question about one point you made in your second response. Dembski specifically defines information in such a way that even the complexity of a Mandelbrot set is not high in information content, because the conditions of such a set can be expressed in very few terms (example here).
So in order for your objection to be valid, you would have to overturn that definition of information (which is not original to Dembski), or you would apparently be saying that while organisms are high in complexity they are not high in information content.
That's how it seems to me, at least--am I missing something?
Mike,
A very brief response.
You just said
But the primary focus of the argument is whether ID is scientific or not. If ID was put forth as a purely philosophical or metaphysical proposition, I wouldn't have a problem with it.
But this is rarely your primary focus and you keep playing bait-and-switch.
You present theological, philosophical challenges, ("what a priori reason do you have to believe God's handiwork should be testable?" - "why would God design one thing in one way and something else in another?" - "why should we find design here and not there?") and then switch to scientific demands as the conversation progresses.
Again, this line of discussion was started by your explicit question:
So, those of you who favor ID - are you talking about the conceptual act or the implementation? And, since I won't be able to check back for a few days, I'll just lay out the arguments ahead of time: if you are talking about the conceptualization, why can't the implementation be via evolution? If you are talking about the implementation, and it's not via evolution, then why isn't it fair to call that a miraculous intervention?which is philosophical, albeit with later empirical implications.
I gave an answer reflecting that philosophical focus, and your responded on the basis of theology - "Christian belief is..."
Your point on genes is well taken (or at least one point) and I would expect none other. It never would have occurred to me that one could identify by a sequence whether one stretch of DNA would code for protein or not, unless it happened to be a match for a stretch that we already know does.
I'm not quite sure what the implication to Dembski is here, but I find something else meaningful in your point. You are not saying, I hope, that information exists only in those stretches that do code for proteins,are you?
Speaking of DNA , this also relates to an earlier point about information and natural law that I might be able to expand upon if I can pry the words out of my brain.
We know that DNA itself is not the information, but is the medium upon which the information is carried. Right now, as you say, the ordering of the nucleotides would appear totally random, and yet the cell knows what to do with it. There is, as of yet, no law that catches sequences at node one of the EF and declares their arrangement a legal necessity. There is no such known law (I am going to dismiss chance as the source of this information out of hand for this point - question-begging or no).
At some point let's say it is conceivable that such algorithms can be developed to determine which nucleotides will arrange in what manner. This would make the sequences a product of a law of some sort, and the nucleotide arrangement would be dependent upon a material cause. But that just moves the information-bearing material further down the chain. The bases haven't any discernible preference of bonding which gives rise to the information encoded, but perhaps at some other level there is a preference or pattern enforced upon them. But that pattern still is creating or transmitting a code. If some hypothetical predictive law ever exists to describe that which necessitates the sequence (if this is ever possible) it will only be describing the information found somewhere else.
It is a causal string, but layer after layer of "natural" law-abiding material will be carrying information, but not creating it. Somewhere along the line a mind had to create the information and insert it into the chain.
The predictable, necessary actions of matter will never be sufficient.
A cheap analogy:
A car turns left.
What made the car turn?
Well, the wheels turned, it has a natural cause.
But what made the wheels turn? The steering wheel. But what made the steering wheel turn? The hands.
The hands had no choice but to act in accord with the muscles, which were obeying the nerve impulse, which were obeying the action of the brain.
But at the end of the causal chain is a free will, a mind, which created and imparted the information.
"you would apparently be saying that while organisms are high in complexity they are not high in information content."
I think that's correct, though I'm not well-versed enough in the details of either complexity theory or information theory to say for sure.
What I am pretty sure of is that Dembski's definition of information content is ad-hoc, merely designed (heh) to get him the answers he wants.
Charlie said,
I support design theory in the sense that I think it is correct, whether it fits the rules of science as it is described today or not.
Then I replied:
But the primary focus of the argument is whether ID is scientific or not. If ID was put forth as a purely philosophical or metaphysical proposition, I wouldn't have a problem with it.
Charlie then objected, saying I was pulling a bait-and-switch by changing from a request for philosophical and/or theological reasons to focusing on whether ID is scientific or not.
This is of course one of the problems with this debate - it covers much ground, and it is easy to lose track of whether one is arguing about theological principles, philosophy, biology, or information theory. However, I do not think that I've pulled the bait-and-switch as baldly as Charlie implies. The question of whether ID is in principle a scientifically verifiable proposition is a question about the boundaries of science - it's a question in the realm of the philosophy of science. My objection wasn't specifically that ID was making claims that I think have been scientifically refuted (though I do think that), which would be an intra-scientific question, and more amenable to Charlie's charge. My objection is that ID is being presented as an in principle empirically verifiable proposition, when I don't think they have demonstrated from a philosophical point of view that what they are doing is valid science. Charlie said,
I support design theory in the sense that I think it is correct, whether it fits the rules of science as it is described today or not.
But that's the issue - in what sense is design theory correct? Dembski and Behe claim that it is a scientifically valid theory. If you are arguing in support of it "whether it fits the rules of science ... or not", then you are arguing for something different than what Dembski and Behe are arguing for. Which raises the question, what do you mean by "design theory"?
I think it is correct in the sense that I don't believe this universe, this planet, life or man would exist were the forces naught but chance-driven, random, mindless, material processes. I think the reasons to believe this are sound, empirical, and scientifically derived, even if the conclusion of design does not meet peer-reviewed standards for science.
The reasons are based upon empirical observations, some of which are scientific in nature, but the reasons themselves are not scientific explanations. My claim is that in principle, they never can be. I've yet to see a plausible refutation of this. The only argument I've seen is that my claim might be proven wrong. So might my claim that the sun will rise tomorrow.
The assemblage of such molecular machines as the bacterial flagellum and the spliceosome, or the gross physiology of a person, studied scientifically, cries out "design".
The "studied scientifically" isn't really doing anything - all it means is that we need modern technologies to be able to determine what these complexes look like and how they work. What we're debating is the explanation for how the complexes came into existence. Asserting that something cries out "design" is not a scientific argument that answers this question.
I am highly doubtful that a scientific endeavour can ever say "look, proof of design and God" but am completely confident that it can elucidate the situation to the point where a logical, rational person will say "look, design".
That's fine, but that's not what Dembski and Behe are claiming. Otherwise they would have written a book like Priveleged Planet, or Ancient Physics and Modern Faith, or The Faith of a Physicist. What they are claiming is that they have conclusively shown that certain biological artifacts could not possibly have come into existence via natural mechanisms. As a scientist who knows a lot about molecular biology and protein sequences and structures, I do not think they have done so in any way, shape, or form. As an amateur philosopher, I think the philosophical warrant for such a position (as opposed to a cosmic design position) is weak or nonexistent. As a Christian theist, I find their particular explanation of design highly problematic.
You are not saying, I hope, that information exists only in those stretches that do code for proteins,are you?
That depends. I would say that the information necessary to produce an organism, and allow it to develop and function properly, is contained in some small subset of the genome, based upon what we currently know. This includes more than just the protein coding regions, but I don't think it requires the whole genome. I know that there are large stretches of the genome that contain little or no information in terms of the organisms function. They do contain information related to the history of the organism, but I'm not sure what kind of information you were getting at.
It is a causal string, but layer after layer of "natural" law-abiding material will be carrying information, but not creating it. Somewhere along the line a mind had to create the information and insert it into the chain.
No, this is incorrect. The laws of nature constrain they types of information that are possible, but they don't specify the content ahead of time. The content emerges through the working out of the laws in particular contexts. For example, there are some pretty good arguments for why there is a triplet code contained in the universal genetic code (three DNA bases = 1 amino acid in the protein, see here), and even for why there are 4 DNA bases, as opposed to 3 or 5 or 6. But the particular correspondence between which three bases codes for which amino acid is arbitrary. There's no reason why UUU should encode for a phenylalanine (Phe) amino acid, instead of a cysteine (Cys). If you took the DNA from any organism on earth, and placed it into a cell from another planet that had a different genetic code, the information content would be lost. It would appear to be completely random DNA as far as the alien cell was concerned. But the "choice" of a genetic code was just a historical accident - that's what got established first. Nobody had to "input" the information .
But at the end of the causal chain is a free will, a mind, which created and imparted the information.
The information contained in the Big Bang is very different from what Dembski is calculating for the flagellum. In order for his "front-loading" theory to work, he'd have to include all the causal connections all the way back to the Big Bang. Obviously, he can't do that, and doesn't. But you can't do what your describing in the fashion that Dembski does his calculations.
A couple comments on Plantinga's article.
1) Is he aware of the irony of arguing that a definition of science might include supernatural explanations by referring to Newton? Note: Newton's theories about God's corrective interventions in the orbits of planets were shown to be explained perfectly well by a natural law, Einstein's theory of relativity. It is precisely examples like this that give scientists strong reasons to insist that only naturalistic accounts are valid scientific explanations.
The simple answer to Plantinga's question is no, Newton was not doing science when he invoked God's supernatural actions in his theory. He was also working at the beginning of science - we have 300 years of experience beyond him to lean on.
2) Plantinga says,
What are the advantages and disadvantages of doing science in accord with methodological naturalism? There is a good deal to be said on both sides here. For example, if you exclude the supernatural from science, then if the world or some phenomena within it are supernaturally caused — as most of the world’s people believe — you won’t be able to reach that truth scientifically.
Observing methodological naturalism thus hamstrings science by precluding science from reaching what would be an enormously important truth about the world. It might be that, just as a result of this constraint, even the best science in the long run will wind up with false conclusions.
To the first paragraph, I say, so what? I don't want to be able to reach those conclusions scientifically, and I don't think one can. Plantiga just assumes that one could conceivably do this, but I think he's wrong about that. To the second paragraph, I again say, so what? It's only if one assumes that science must be able to answer all questions that this is a problem. And Plantiga doesn't account for the reverse problem: the erroneous attribution of supernatural causes to events with natural causes. This is the lesson from Newton et al. It's too bad Plantiga and the other IDists haven't caught on.
Mike,
Asserting that something cries out "design" is not a scientific argument that answers this question.
Is there a non-arbitrary, non-question-begging demarcation says that "design" is any less a scientific explanation than luck, chance, and fortuitous accidents?
But the "choice" of a genetic code was just a historical accident - that's what got established first. Nobody had to "input" the information .
There's no reason why UUU should encode for a phenylalanine (Phe) amino acid, instead of a cysteine (Cys).The point here isn't which triplet is used in the code, or even which code is used, but what information it was used to transmit.
"Dog" can be represented in most any language with various combinations of letters or symbols, but the information is still "dog".
The word is unintelligible to many , and the information is inaccessible to them, but the creation or use of the word is still intended to give information.
If a certain amino acid was required in a certain molecule to contribute to a certain function then that information had to be transmitted somehow. The one in a million code that (most) life on earth uses, that you state factually to have arisen by accident, isn't so important as the underlying information being transfered. A message "send help quick" can be sent via Morse code, sign language or binary code, but the message is the same, is sent for a purpose, and originated from a mind.
To the second paragraph, I again say, so what? It's only if one assumes that science must be able to answer all questions that this is a problem.
It isn't only about not being able to answer all questions, but that science asserts, as fact, answers which it can not give. Answers like "this was an accident".
Is there a non-arbitrary, non-question-begging demarcation says that "design" is any less a scientific explanation than luck, chance, and fortuitous accidents?
Luck is not a scientific explanation, nor is fortuitous accident. If chance is defined as a stochastic process, then it is scientific. It means there is a mathematical description of the probability distribution of a particular type of event (e.g. decay of an atom, mutation of a DNA base), but that one cannot predict which specific event will happen next (e.g., you can't predict which specific atom will decay first, or when a particular atom will decay). That is an entirely empirical, scientific, and/or mathematical definition of chance.
However, if chance is defined as "meaningless in any larger sense", then that is not a scientific description either.
If a certain amino acid was required in a certain molecule to contribute to a certain function then that information had to be transmitted somehow.
But you, and the IDers in general, claim to not have any problem with "microevolution". In those cases, nobody is claiming that the change of information required to, e.g., make a bacteria better at digesting some drug, was "designed". But it's the same principle - the information changed. Where is the "input" in a microevolutionary system?
Answers like "this was an accident".
Like I said, you have to distinguish between "accident = stochastic event" and "accident = metaphysically meaningless event". We speak of accidents in daily life all the time without requiring the metaphysical assumption of meaningless - why can't we do so in biology?
Here's an extended discussion of the distinctions I'm talking about by Stephen Barr.
But Communion and Stewardship also explicitly warns that the word “random” as used by biologists, chemists, physicists, and mathematicians in their technical work does not have the same meaning as the words “unguided” and “unplanned” as used in doctrinal statements of the Church. In common speech, “random” is often used to mean “uncaused,” “meaningless,” “inexplicable,” or “pointless.” And there is no question that some biologists, when they explain evolution to the public or to hapless students, do argue from the “randomness” of genetic mutations to the philosophical conclusion that the history of life is “unguided” and “unplanned.” Some do this because of an anti-religious animus, while others are simply careless.
When scientists are actually doing science, however, they do not use the words “unguided” and “unplanned.” The Institute for Scientific Information’s well-known Science Citation Index reveals that only 48 papers exist in the scientific literature with the word “unguided” in the title, most having to do with missiles. Only 467 have the word “unplanned,” almost all referring to pregnancies or medical procedures. By contrast there are 52,633 papers with “random” in the title, from all fields of scientific research. The word “random” is a basic technical term in most branches of science. It is used to discuss the motions of molecules in a gas, the fluctuations of quantum fields, noise in electronic devices, and the statistical errors in a data set, to give but a few examples. So if the word “random” necessarily entails the idea that some events are “unguided” in the sense of falling “outside of the bounds of divine providence,” we should have to condemn as incompatible with Christian faith a great deal of modern physics, chemistry, geology, and astronomy, as well as biology.
This is absurd, of course. The word “random” as used in science does not mean uncaused, unplanned, or inexplicable; it means uncorrelated. My children like to observe the license plates of the cars that pass us on the highway, to see which states they are from. The sequence of states exhibits a degree of randomness: a car from Kentucky, then New Jersey, then Florida, and so on—because the cars are uncorrelated: Knowing where one car comes from tells us nothing about where the next one comes from. And yet, each car comes to that place at that time for a reason. Each trip is planned, each guided by some map and schedule. Each driver’s trip fits into the story of his life in some intelligible way, though the story of these drivers’ lives are not usually closely correlated with the other drivers’ lives.
Another snippet...
People have used the words “random,” “probability,” “chance,” for millennia without anyone imagining that it must always imply a denial of divine providence. “I returned and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favor to men of skill, but time and chance happeneth to them all,” as Ecclesiastes notes. Or, to make the point in dry technical terms, there is not a perfect correlation between being strong and winning or between having bread and being wise.
Mike, thanks for the quotes.
You have previously related the differences regarding what "random" means in a scientific v. everyday usage. I appreciate that, but the constraints and initial conditions that encompass random events are predetermined. It's like saying that you can't get a random hand of cards because the deck of cards is constraining the results. Surely I would never deal myself four suited fluboonns and a guatch of caarres, because those things don't exist. But the hand I do deal is still generated at random, and its likelihood can submit to a probability analysis. And if I am cheating one will know it because some events are not likely to ever occur by chance, when dealing with randomness, even when constrained.
I like the analogy to the randomness of car license plates and mindful people driving the cars.
Many things may appear unpredictable and random and will not yield to mathematical equations but are still reflective of purpose. Kick over an ant hill and watch the ants move about randomly and unpredictability. Try to develop an algorithm to describe which will go where and bump into which other and I imagine great futility. But at the end look at what their "random" acts end up achieving.
The specific paths and actions of atoms and gas molecules may well be "random" but they are behaving as constrained by their physical make-up and under the laws of physics and chemistry. There are no such laws that say molecules will gather into RNA, replicate, code for protein, create life and reproduce until man appears.
But you, and the IDers in general, claim to not have any problem with "microevolution". In those cases, nobody is claiming that the change of information required to, e.g., make a bacteria better at digesting some drug, was "designed". But it's the same principle - the information changed. Where is the "input" in a microevolutionary system?
The information is already present and is being found. Mutations (giving rise to a change in a bacteria's ability to digest certain compounds, for instance) are not occurring throughout the genome without a plan, but in some cases are confined to mutations on certain plasmids. In some cases there are zones on the DNA itself which are especially susceptible to mutation, while the rest of the genome is unaffected. As "mutations" are studied it is found that many of these are repeatable, and in fact, are predictable. They are not happening throughout the genome with the same regularity and the same effect. The question is "why?"
Scientific inquiry, especially presuming design, may well find that mutations will, in fact, be one day predictable. They will be constrained to certain portions of DNA, they will operate under certain parameters, they will have certain constraints. And these parameters are then reflective of the presence of information. Such inquiry just might rid the system of either version of randomness and again point to design.
There is then an additional layer of information regarding which mutations are acceptable, and actually will be expected.
That said, there is no reason that information will not break down, degenerate, or accidentally transmit faulty instructions. But this is not the kind of mutation that is demanded by a theory that brought us from a primordial sea to man.
This reminds me of my first response upon learning of dehalococcoides ethenogenes and was challenged "how did they get here when we have only had chlorine pollution for the last 50 years or so?"
My first thought was "certainly not by Darwinian evolution".
How could random mutation and natural selection create such a thing? Is the claim that in this small 50-100 year window of opportunity out of the billions of years of the existence of bacteria, just where and just when there happened to be chlorine pollution, a lucky mutation occurred to allow the bacteria to metabolize it? Not very likely. If not just a freak event (completely improbable, given the above numbers) then the other Darwinian solution is that this type of mutation occurred all along, but was useless, and so the organisms exhibiting it died off. But given the nature of natural selection, the ability for such a mutation should certainly have been culled over billions of years. Natural selection preserves that which is helpful, not that which is wasteful. The genome, or the relevant portion, that allowed for this wasted mutation over and over again should have been eliminated in favour of one that didn't expend resources so frivolously.
So, of course, I thought, the information has always been there in bacteria which were, at the time, metabolizing other substances. It was waiting to be turned on, or was preserved these billions of years for a purpose. Either way, it is the product of design. (I also waxed a little poetic on the nature of God and His divine foreknowledge).
Not long after the challenge the real answers were published.
(I have cut the long reference, in the interest of length)
Notice that D. ethenogenes is highly adaptable and has been able to, and still can, survive on a variety of substances, that it has likely been metabolizing naturally occurring chlorine all along, and has a very active section of on-off genes. I also put a little personal stock in the line about it possessing gene remnants for fixing nitrogen and CO2 - I doubt this ability is really lost in all individuals, but is rather another active choice. Note too that the ability to metabolize chlorine was pre-existing and can be transferred between organisms.
Yeesh, sorry for the length. I am a long way off the beaten path here as well.
I really should refer to a real biologist before posting this comment, but you only live once, right?
My point is, the information is pre-existing and is not "created" (it especially is not "increased") just because we find bacteria adapting.
You'll have to work hard to see the connection I am drawing here, but I am rushing to a meeting.
Barrow, this year's recipient of the Templeton prize:
Barrow said, “Astronomy has transformed the simple-minded, life-averse, meaningless universe of the sceptical philosophers. It breathes new life into so many religious questions of ultimate concern and never-ending fascination. Many of the deepest and most engaging questions that we grapple with still about the nature of the universe have their origins in our purely religious quest for meaning. The concept of a lawful universe with order that can be understood and relied upon emerged largely out of religious beliefs about the nature of God.”
He added, “Our scientific picture of the universe has revealed time and again how blinkered and conservative our outlook has often been, how self-serving our interim picture of the universe, how mundane our expectations, and how parochial our attempts to find or deny the links between scientific and religious approaches to the nature of the universe.”
Those are my italics, however.
There are no such laws that say molecules will gather into RNA, replicate, code for protein, create life and reproduce until man appears.
How do you know that?
Charlie, the Barrow quote is excellent - I heartily endorse his point of view. What I don't understand is why you don't see that what Dembski and Behe are doing is to essentially undermine Barrow's point. In Dembski's view, we have a "lawful universe with order that can be understood and not relied upon" - we have to posit the periodic intervention of the designer in order to make sense of it. This is again related to your reliance on the fact that Dembski and Behe claim that their theory is compatible with a theistic evolutionary view of the universe. I like Van Till's description that the universe has functional integrity. Dembski's universe requires the designer to pop in every once in awhile to fix up the place. The distinction is between the order of nature taken as a whole, and the notion that specific, discrete, objects must have been "designed" by some process that doesn't involve the normal working out of natural laws.
And these parameters are then reflective of the presence of information. Such inquiry just might rid the system of either version of randomness and again point to design.
The design of what? Are you arguing that the bacteria (or parts of them) were specially created somehow, or that the laws of nature constrain or guide evolution in certain directions, as Conway Morris claims? What you are arguing for, it appears to me, is the notion that evolution has rules, or constraints, built into it that facilitate adaptability, or complexity. Evolution of evolvability is what some scientists refer to it as. This line of reasoning does not lead to the conclusion that, say, the flagellum, or the clotting cascade, cannnot have evolved - it leads to explanations of how it could have evolved that include something more in the explanation than simple stochastic variation and natural selection. But this is just another form of the argument that the laws of nature are designed so as to produce complex life (cosmic design). It does not add support or validity to the views espoused by Behe or Dembski.
Mike,
I like Van Till's description that the universe has functional integrity. Dembski's universe requires the designer to pop in every once in awhile to fix up the place. The distinction is between the order of nature taken as a whole, and the notion that specific, discrete, objects must have been "designed" by some process that doesn't involve the normal working out of natural laws.
This idea of popping in to fix up the place seems to me to be mostly an aesthetic objection. I don't have the book handy to quote from, but I'm wondering if you've read C. S. Lewis on precisely that objection? He applied it to miracles (in chapter 3 of the book of that name), and what he said about that should apply equally as well to natural history. I don't know why you would view one type of intervention differently than the other.
And by the way, we're not talking about God fixing up the place (though he did that at the cross). We're talking about him building it.
This idea of popping in to fix up the place seems to me to be mostly an aesthetic objection.
It is, partly. But I also think that the aesthetics points to deeper truths about the nature of God and nature, but I'm not equipped to explicate them more clearly than my crude attempts here. That is, the aesthetic sense isn't just personal and arbitrary, I don't think.
He applied it to miracles (in chapter 3 of the book of that name), and what he said about that should apply equally as well to natural history. I don't know why you would view one type of intervention differently than the other.
Tom, I know you told me to read this book, and I haven't done so yet. Does Lewis speak of miracles generally, or specifically of miracles in Scripture, or miracles that occur in relation to human beings? I'm not arguing against miracles per se, just against certain types of miracles. Without knowing exactly what Lewis's argument was, I'd have to tentatively say that I don't think your inference is correct that what he said "should apply equally as well to natural history." But I can't say for sure until I find out what the argument is.
I view different types of miracles differently because they have different manifestations and purposes.
And by the way, we're not talking about God fixing up the place (though he did that at the cross). We're talking about him building it.
So why don't you think that if He had to intervene miraculously to produce various biological artifacts, that doesn't imply that creation was somehow deficient at the start? That the natural world did not contain within it the capacity to bring about all that God desired it to from the moment of the Big Bang, without Him "helping" it along during the course of history? That, at the moment of the Big Bang, it lacked functional integrity?
Lewis talks in the book about the--I forget the exact term--impropriety, or unseemliness, of God messing around with creation (as some people consider it to me). It was general enough to apply to Biblical miracles (his main topic) and to the kinds of things we've been talking about here as well.
God's intervention after the first creation moment would imply deficiency only if there was some "should" out there that says he ought to have done it all at the beginning. (If he planned at the beginning for these interventions, then what would make that a bad plan?) Only God can supply that kind of "should" statement, and I can't think of anyplace where it is stated or even implied in God's word.
There are no such laws that say molecules will gather into RNA, replicate, code for protein, create life and reproduce until man appears.
How do you know that?
I don't. It's an assertion about and based upon what I perceive to be the current knowledge.
I've mentioned many times that I expect there might be some such laws, and that these will be greater evidence of the design.
When you can show the laws of evolution - as observable, repeatable and predictable as the law(s) of gravity - then you will have found design there as well.What I meant was there are no known laws.
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The rub is that any laws that can bring about the complexity and information content of our world (biotic and otherwise) will be a result and reflection of that intelligence and the teleology.
This line of reasoning does not lead to the conclusion that, say, the flagellum, or the clotting cascade, cannnot have evolved - it leads to explanations of how it could have evolved that include something more in the explanation than simple stochastic variation and natural selection.
Right.
But this is just another form of the argument that the laws of nature are designed so as to produce complex life (cosmic design).
Right.
It does not add support or validity to the views espoused by Behe or Dembski.
Right again.
Here's where I came in:
Hi Mike.
If we are talking about God as the designer then my take is that the conceptualization is the implementation; ie. God's will be done.
That which is "in God's mind" is that which is. The information is created and imparted as God wills it through his word.
It can (as a matter of logic) be implemented via evolution, but that evolution just might show marks of said implementation.
The whole is a product of the design and the mind. Sometimes we will find evidence where the manifestation of some aspect of that product would be improbable to the point of impossibility in a mindless purposeless process.
The list of such aspects is probably endless.
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I never claimed that I magically appeared nor that the flagellum did.
The timing and mode of my appearance in a human body is part of the conceptualization.
The implementation is just as it was conceived by God.
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Is gravity a mindless, purposeless process?
Gravity has no purpose or mind of its own, no.
But it exists due to the mind of God for the purpose intended by God. It has certain features and capabilities by which the purpose is achieved. It is not an accident of a universe unfolding on its own but a determined feature of the universe.
It has its role and its limitations. The existence of gravity, its parameters and apparent purpose are evidence of God's design, just as many physicist's speculate and attempt to demonstrate through the probability arguments of fine-tuning.
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