Thinking Christian Comments
Original Post: Neural States and Rationality: Can a Materialist Think?
I'm sure I will have more time to read this, but real quick
If all belief is the result of just physical causes, then how is it that all beliefs are not therefore completely undermined?I would say all thoughts are "undermined" by physical states, as well as determined by them, internal (mental models and such) and external. The mind might not be a physical substance, but the brain is, and mind is just it's current "state". "Right and wrong" are constructs, as you are using them, not physical switches... even though in a well patterned mind they should/could line up for an all over "vote" or thought.
A neuron that fires with enough influence is "correct", and can be described as so, no matter what thought is formed in the end. If drugs or hormones throw off the entire calculation, it might not be correct at a physical level, and thought is still a different question. (it might be more likely to be "correct" with certain drugs.) Thought is completely tied to the physical state.
Still thinking about it.
Any chance of laying off the "merely"s?
This is pretty incoherent, Eric. You say "the mind might not be a physical substance," then, "mind is just [the brain's] current 'state.'" That's contradictory.
"Undermined" -- you seem to mean that in the same sense as "grounded." But what it really means is something more like "ruined."
Right and wrong are not physical switches--that was my point. What do you mean then that they are "constructs"?
If you can define a neuron that fires with enough influence as "correct," then what if you had a neuron fire with enough influence to contradict that definition in your mind? Then you would have a "correct" neuron that by its own conclusion is not "correct." So is it correct or incorrect?
As for "merely," you're right: in some places I should have used "just" or "only" instead--they have less of a pejorative connotation. What I mean either way is, by whatever means is described and none other. There were four instances of it in this post. I'll go back and change what should be changed.
Sometimes patience is rewarded.
Very good post here.
I will be rereading it later when I have more time.
Go easy on me, it was a 5min lunch post, and this is a 5min "doing dishes" rebuttal. I'm hoping somebody has the time to make this thread a must-read, right now it is just knee-jerk
This is pretty incoherent, Eric. You say "the mind might not be a physical substance," then, "mind is just [the brain's] current 'state.'" That's contradictory.Gases and water are physical substance, and their current state is the weather. Weather isn't a substance, it is a descriptive state or trend. The mind doesn't exist without a brain, anymore than weather exist on the moon. Your state of mind is just that, as predictable as a storm front. I thought I would try some other analogy than the more obvious software/hardware... but the point is the same. Saying software isn't hardware isn't a contradiction, or at least I dont' see it.
"Undermined" -- you seem to mean that in the same sense as "grounded." But what it really means is something more like "ruined."Nope, I had the same meaning. Disease, drugs, lack of oxygen and a million other physical influences can/do "ruin" thought, obviously. but the physical state also sets the state in an endless, complex feedback loop. Odds, are 20-30 percent of us reading this are under the influence of prescription "mind altering" drugs... are we ruined before or after this influence? Which state is us?
If you can define a neuron that fires with enough influence as "correct," then what if you had a neuron fire with enough influence to contradict that definition in your mind? Then you would have a "correct" neuron that by its own conclusion is not "correct." So is it correct or incorrect?At the brute physical level, if you have a neuron that should fire when 50% of it's inputs fire, and it does, it is "correct". If it fires endlessly, or not at all, it can't do physical logic correctly. Correct in mind, a state, is a vote of sorts. The meta-logic might line up with the physical along paths and branches, and the meta sets the physical state that the physical responds to. Like interactions of gases and temp in the weather, it feeds on itself in loops. So the meta-state could/should cause a neuron to fire if it is sufficient. Both are correct within ranges, fair enough?
A mind has certain characteristic ranges of "correct" that are predictable, and a brain has the same, especially at the neuron level. If you have hear voices, or have seizures, you are out of range at either or both levels. You are "wrong". If your influences, memory, genetics, etc. all form logical pathways that are correct in fuction, but are different than mine, we are both correct in our brain. The contradiction is at the level of the abstractions and models we use to test our logic, at least if our brains are intelligent enought to use models. (this is the cut-off for intelligence itself right?) Like a higher level computer language abstracts the binary, you count on the object's fuctions and build on it adding complexity.
This would be so much easier in person, lots of "do you see what I mean?". Better get back to the dishes, but I just noticed you also posted on the doonsbury cartoon. Dang, where do you find the time! This place is addicting, and I am blowing one of my new years resolutions
"Only" does work better, thanks. Don't suppose you would go for dropping "Darwinism", for evolution as well?
It just accured to me that I should point out "knee-jerk" was about my comment style, not your post. Your post was very well written, hope I didn't come across wrong 
well, I also didn't intend the mad face. I had better just step away from the keyboard.
Wow, Tom, I'm honored to be featured in this blog post.
Now, allow me to tear your ideas to shreds! ; )
Being erroneous only has meaning in a particular context, which is whether something is a match with reality. That is, when we have 2 apples and put them together with 2 apples, if we then figure out how many apples we have (four apples, for those wondering), we conclude that a system of mathematics that says that 2+2=4 is only correct because it matches what we find in reality, and if we want to be consistent with reality, our neurons get coordinated appropriately. Logic and reason (A = A) can be built up similarly. So "correct" only means that which ultimately matches reality, which our neurons are capable of determining in principle, even if the details contain a very large devil. Our neurons don't have to create correctness, their output only has to match reality.
If you permit me to not go into the details, I think Tom's second objection to materialism can be answered as I outlined above.
Tom's third objection is that materialism destroys free choice. So be it.
Now, allow me to offer an objection to the dualism that Tom suggests, and I require as substantive a response as I offered to each of Tom's objections to materialism: how can a non-material entity, such as the mind, have any effect on a material entity, such as the brain, without being material?
What kind of response to your closing question would satisfy you, Paul? If you're looking for a completely material explanation, then you define its possibility out of existence, for we're talking about a material/non-material interaction. If I invoke an explanation that is even somewhat partially non-material, then I strongly suspect you'll reject it simply on those grounds.
And Paul, no, your neurons (and mine) cannot match with reality as you have proposed they do. They can only be neurons, not mathematical (or any sort of) propositions. The same goes for the neurons' output. Don't you see the huge leap there?
There has to be some place where propositions can reside that is more than physical, because propositions and their relations are not physical, as I said in the blog post.
I think what you are trying to do here is to re-state your thesis without addressing the specific points of failure that I have at least claimed to find in that thesis. I'd like to hear you respond more specifically to my first and second points; specifically, how could a physical state with no choices or "mind" of its own conceivably be correct or incorrect?
Eric, I can appreciate what you're saying about writing in a hurry. I have the luxury here of being able to edit (I'll change the frown face if you want).
I'll have to come back when I myself have more time to respond to what you wrote (unless someone else gets there first) .
propositions as logic:
a. A statement that affirms or denies something.
b. The meaning expressed in such a statement, as opposed to the way it is expressed.
Forgive me, but isn't a proposition exactly what a neuron "is" if you abstract how it is expressed physically (chemically)?
Tom, rejecting an explanation on the grounds that something non-material must be material in some sense in order to affect something material is not begging the question, it is only stating the problem in a way that makes things obvious. Once we make a mutually exclusive distinction between material and non-material, it is incumbent upon those who claim that the non-material can effect the material to show how that could be done while still retaining the non-material characteristics of the non-material. I see it as your problem, not mine.
I'll come back to your other points soon.
Paul,
I only take that requirement as incumbent on me if I have some hope that it will get us somewhere. Your past postings have made it clear you'll accept no explanation that is not scientific. To give a scientific explanation of this would not only be impossible, it would be a category error. I don't think I can deliver what you've asked for, because you're going to be asking for it in an impossible form.
My explanation is going to start where I left off with the post: mind, intention, and personality are more fundamental to reality than matter and energy, and the Creator made it possible somehow for mind to interact with matter.
I'm pretty sure there's no place I can go from that beginning that will suffice as explanation, based on what counts as explanation for you. Is that still the case?
That's the case, but not inappropriately. If you assume mind and intention and personality (non-materialism), then you are closed off to an argument that challenges that assumption, which is my argument.
I also think you cannot assume that I will accept no explanation that is not scientific. I may have done that in the past on some or even all arguments, but give me enough credit that I could change my mind in any particular case, as I do to you (otherwise, why are we spending our time in conversation?).
I'm not asking for a scientific explanation, I'm asking for one that makes sense, that isn't contradictory, and if your idea about non-materialism doesn't make sense, as I claimed above, it's not my assumptions that make my request impossible, it's the nature of your claim that make it impossible. If you claim that the non-material can affect the material, you need to explain how that can possibly be.
I'm not asking for a scientific explanation, I'm asking for one that makes sense, that isn't contradictory, and if your idea about non-materialism doesn't make sense, as I claimed above, it's not my assumptions that make my request impossible, it's the nature of your claim that make it impossible. If you claim that the non-material can affect the material, you need to explain how that can possibly be.
Before he answers that, Paul, explain to us how any two objects can possibly interact. And saying that they just do act in ways defined by mathematical norms won't do, because Tom could reply that the mind just does cause things according to logical norms. We need to know how they can possibly act in ways defiend by mathematical norms. If you can't answer this for material objects, but demand it of Tom, then it shows that your real issue is only a personal incredulity or dislike of Tom's proposed causation, rather than a fair objection.
Thanks, Deuce, and I will also add this quote from a very entertaining (if irreverent) interview with David Berlinski :
DB: Mathematicians are capable of grasping a world of objects that lies beyond space and time ….
Interviewer: … Come again …
DB: No need to come again: I got to where I was going the first time. The number four, after all, did not come into existence at a particular time, and it is not going to go out of existence at another time. It is neither here nor there. Nonetheless we are in some sense able to grasp the number by a faculty of our minds. Mathematical intuition is utterly mysterious. So for that matter is the fact that mathematical objects such as a Lie Group or a differentiable manifold have the power to interact with elementary particles or accelerating forces.
If numbers can interact with physical entities, then your difficulties here, Paul, are multiplied.
Berlinski (like his anonymous [?] interviewer) is an agnostic Jew, a philosopher and mathematician, who is prominent among Darwin skeptics.
Further:
Paul, you say my ideas about materialism do not make sense and are contradictory when in fact you have not begun to show in what way they are contradictory.
And I have to object to your defining the discussion in ways that make it impossible for me to respond. You say you are not looking for scientific evidence but have not answered my question of what other types of explanation you would admit. You have argued vociferously in the past that only scientific explanations are admissible, yet now you say you are not insisting on a scientific explanation. Have you changed your mind on this?
To summarize, you have a great question here from Deuce to address, a challenge to think about from David Berlinski, and a query from me as to what kind of explanation you're looking for. Lest that seem like too much, please recall that I asked for that explanation previously, and you responded without an answer. The Deuce and Berlinski items are somewhat related, so you may be able to respond to them simultaneously. That's up to you, of course.
The interview of Berlinski by Berlinski is hilarious and thought provoking.
I was going to reference it to this discussion myself but didn't want to do the research to support the interaction of "mathematical objects such as a Lie Group or a differentiable manifold" with matter.
Deuce, I don't think the question is specifically *how* two objects can interact, because it is demonstrably true that two objects *do* interact (that is, when a billiard ball hits another one, the 2nd one moves). Any questions about exactly how that happens is irrelevant to the brute fact that it does (kinda in the same way that the god of the gaps argument is fallacious because a gap will always exist; simiarly, another question about how two objects can affect each other will always exist, too).
So, if you can accept the brute fact that two objects can interact, and they are both material, then where is the analogous brute fact that a mind can affect an object beyond a mere assertion of non-materialism? That is, it does no good to merely say "I perceive my mind affect a material object (my body) as a brute fact just like a billiard ball striking another one and causing it to move is a brute fact" because the whole materialist position rests on the hypothesis that what seems like mind is merely an epiphenomenon of mere material effects.
Tom, I certainly did respond to what type of explanation would satisfy me: one that made sense, and, to be clear, I need you to make sense of how a non-material object can affect a material one. Can you explain that for me?
Perhaps "contradictory" or "make sense" were not careful choices. Let me clarify my objection. That a non-material object can affect a material object is not inituitively obvious to me, and that, frankly, is only one person's view (mine). Can you explain how a non-material object can affect a material object (because it doesn't make sense to me intuitively: that is, the analogy for my intuition is that oil and water don't mix, only the material could affect the material; we see material things affecting material things all the time, etc.). Now, my inuition could be completely wrong, but what I'm asking you is to show me how and why.
Deuce, I'd like to leave the mathematical/logical norms issue aside temporarily, unless they are abbsolutely crucial to your response to my points. My argument doesn't have anything to do with that issue, I think, I wasn't going to argue there.
Oh, I'll have to plead complete incompetence discussing whether mathematical entities can affect material objects. Way past my pay grade.
Tom, I was merely trying to give you every benefit of the doubt regarding the requirement of a scientific explanation. It might be that I'd raise its ugly head if the conversation progressed far enough, but it seemed premature at this point.
Thank you, Paul, for those responses. I think we can move forward quite nicely from the response you gave Deuce--but I'll have to get back to it later this evening or tomorrow. Busy afternoon ahead.
In the meantime, I'm wondering yet what your response to my 8:51 pm comment: how can a physical state be both correct and incorrect at the same time?
Thanks for picking up that lost point, Tom.
Specifically, it's not the neurons or a physical state themselves that are correct or incorrect, but the interpretation of the output of those neurons (output = the statement 2=2=4) by other neurons in other brains (or other neurons in the same brain).
Your original comment mentioned it being one *or* the other, not both at the same time.
I predict we will have several back and forths about this one.
Deuce, Tom, the question isn't even how the mind interacts with the brain; it's even more basic. The question is, are there events in the brain that are not consistent with evnts elsewhere? If it is indeed true that mental states affect the brain, then this should be visible as events where the usual operation of physical law is violated. For example when you make a decision, there is some effect on the neurons in your brain. If this is a nonphysical effect, some neuron must fire although the physical conditions would not allow it to.
If we find such effects, then one can go ahead and ask for the mechanism of these events. But a claim that mental states affect physical states must entail these violations of physical law. Would you agree with this?
Paul, you're right about the comment--I was mis-remembering and I misread above here. I did raise the question about "at the same time" but it was here instead, addressed to Eric early in this thread.
Want to take a try at it?
Meanwhile, please tell me what you mean by "output" of neurons. To where is this output given or sent? Is it distinct from physical reality? If not, then you have the original question coming at you again, which is how a physical reality can be right or wrong.
AR: I'll come back to your question a bit later. It's a good one.
Deuce, Tom, the question isn't even how the mind interacts with the brain; it's even more basic. The question is, are there events in the brain that are not consistent with evnts elsewhere? If it is indeed true that mental states affect the brain, then this should be visible as events where the usual operation of physical law is violated. For example when you make a decision, there is some effect on the neurons in your brain. If this is a nonphysical effect, some neuron must fire although the physical conditions would not allow it to.
If we find such effects, then one can go ahead and ask for the mechanism of these events. But a claim that mental states affect physical states must entail these violations of physical law. Would you agree with this?
Actually, I wouldn't and I don't, at least as you've described it. All I would expect is that some parts our brain would appear, much of the time, to behave according to logical norms, rather than strictly mathematical, algorithmic ones. That is to say, our neurons would behave in such a way as to make us act as if we were doing things for reasons. Of course, this is already the case, which is why we're always talking about people doing things for reasons - talking like that gives us the best predictions. The other thing I'd expect is that nobody would ever be able to fully describe and predict the activity of the brain via an algorithm, hence eliminating the need for talk of reasons. Beyond that, there's a lot of possibilities, and I don't know what I might expect to happen specifically.
Now, let me turn this around on you, if you would
. If your position is correct, we should, in principle, be able to describe and predict whatever you write in reply to this in completely algorithmic terms, making absolutely no reference to the "reasons" you "think" you have for writing what you write, or to the "conceptual content" you "think" that you are communicating with your words when you post. Whatever "point" you "think" your words represent is wholly unnecessary to predicting any or all of those words.
Deuce, I think I have a way around the dilemna you pose, give me a little time to work it out (I'm looking for the right metaphor and nothing's coming).
Deuce, in the first place you can have nonalgorithmic systems which are still described by physical laws. So I don't think "algorithmic" is the word you're looking for.
That said, the same process can usually be described in multiple ways. For instance, I can explain the fact that water flows downhill by (a) saying that water is a liquid or (b) computing the motion of each water molecule and showing that the average motion is downward. Each of these explanations is correct, and the fact that I can use the second explanation does not mean that water is not a liquid. The property "liquid" encompasses many features of the microscopic description, but does not contradict them.
Similarly, one can explain a person raising her arm by (a) describing the mental states of the person or (b) computing the action of each neuron and showing that the neurons in the person's brain fire in such a way that the arm is raised. Each of these explanations is correct, and the fact that I can use the second explanation does not mean that the person has no mental states. The property "mental state" encompasses many features of the microscopic description, but does not contradict them.
In the case of the liquid, it is probably impossible to actually the computation molecule by molecule to show the equivalence of (a) and (b). It is notoriously difficult to predict the behavior of a multiparticle system even with complete knowledge of every constituent. It is therefore almost necessary to use the high level description as a liquid to describe liquid flow. For the case of the mind, this is even worse, and we absolutely need the description in terms of mental states to have manageable explanations. This does not mean that the reductionist explanation is false.
The existence of the neuron by neuron description does not mean that mental states are not efficacious. A mental state is a high level description of a brain state, which leaves out many details but captures the important ones. If brain states are causally efficacious, so are mental states.
Finally, I don't understand your last response. You say that you don't expect violations of physical law, but then you say that sometimes the brain will behave this way rather than the other. So suppose somebody took a brain state, modelled it on a comuter, and evolved the state according to the laws of electromagnetism and quantum mechanics etc. Would they or would they not reproduce correctly the time evolution of the real person's brain?
That said, the same process can usually be described in multiple ways. For instance, I can explain the fact that water flows downhill by (a) saying that water is a liquid or (b) computing the motion of each water molecule and showing that the average motion is downward. Each of these explanations is correct, and the fact that I can use the second explanation does not mean that water is not a liquid. The property "liquid" encompasses many features of the microscopic description, but does not contradict them.
Unfortunately, this kind of reduction can only work if one explanation is a more detailed version of the other one, and doesn't leave out anything pertinent to the phenomena at hand that the other one includes ("liquidity" from a) is identical to certain properties of the water molecules, and those properties would be figured into the equations used to predict the water's movement in b)).
So, with that said, are you trying to claim that a mental state is represented by a brain state, or identical to it? If there's one thing I've learned from talking to materialists, it's that they can't keep these two positions straight, and will oscillate between them. So, for example, is your belief in materialism represented by some pattern of neurons, or is it a pattern of neurons? When you try to argue a reason for believing your position, does that reason represent a brain state, or is it a brain state?
Deuce, try out this hypothesis that answers your question above. We might call it "hard materialism."
A belief or a reason or a thought is a brain state. For the case in which a belief/brain state corresponds with reality (like thinking that 2+2=4), that fact that the belief is "merely" a brain state does not dis-privilege it compared to any other brain state (like thinking that 2+2=5) *only* in terms of its usefulness. 2+2=4 is true because that reflects how the real word is, so thinking that is privileged only if you want to get things done or deal with the real world.
So I have a bunch of water molecules. I tell you the position and velocity of each atom. I am thus supplied with 9 numbers for each molecule. I then evolve them using electromagnetism etc. Where have I introduced the property of liquidity?
"Is a mental state is represented by a brain state, or identical to it?" What is the practical difference? (this is a real question)
So, with that said, are you trying to claim that a mental state is represented by a brain state, or identical to it?Both, correct? Isn't a matter of abstraction layers, modeling... whatever you what to call it.
A particular pattern of neurons might actually represent a pattern of neurons, a library of "functions", and another pattern might represent a previous state, like memory, or "data". But I imagine at the upper levels of thought (intelligence) all of the patterns are models. Distinct models of objects interact within overlayers (health, emotions) in complex interactions to make other potential propositions and weigh them in a vote.
At "lower" levels of the brain you might find a physical pattern... temp is up, so release more blood to skin... but at higher levels it becomes more abstract, by the time you are reading this, it is all representational. I believe what I am typing, and the patterns in my neurons at this moment could be said to represent that believe.
It is both represented by a pattern, and it is a pattern. Plus, the patterns use other patterns, and they are all time and environment dependent. Trends. Potential. So what. It isn't two different positions to take.
Tell me how you even see this as two different things?
Whoops, leapfrogged, I was responding to Deuce as well, AR and Paul. And I should have said belief, not beleive.
AR, you said it better, again, and shorter as well.
So I have a bunch of water molecules. I tell you the position and velocity of each atom. I am thus supplied with 9 numbers for each molecule. I then evolve them using electromagnetism etc. Where have I introduced the property of liquidity?
Come on, man, I don't mean to insult you, but I can't help but think you're playing dumb here. You will need to tell me more than just the position and velocity of the atoms in order to capture all the same predictive value communicated in telling me that the substance is a liquid. You will need to tell me the strength of the intermolecular forces the molecules are exerting on each other, for instance. Once you tell me all the molecular properties necessary to predict the motion such that I'm not missing any of the relevant predictive information I'd get from you telling me it's a liquid, you will have ipso facto told me that the substance is a liquid, because liquidity *is* to possess those properties.
"Is a mental state is represented by a brain state, or identical to it?" What is the practical difference?
The practical difference is that each, when combined with only material causation, is incoherent for different reasons
. But in all seriousness, the "two different ways of describing the same thing" account you gave above requires that they be identical, if you wish to hold that the reductive explanation doesn't cut anything out. Do you want to stick with that?
Both, correct? Isn't a matter of abstraction layers, modeling... whatever you what to call it.
Eric, you are teetering dangerously close to embracing outright logical absurdity here. Something could represent something else, while itself being represented by a third thing. But no, obviously being a representation of something is not the same as being that thing.
I believe what I am typing, and the patterns in my neurons at this moment could be said to represent that believe.
I don't really want to argue with everybody at once here, so I'll just give you the question again to think about for yourself: Is your belief a representation of those neurons, or is it those neurons?
Hi, Paul, getting a bit overwhelmed and short on time here, so I'll just give a short answer and direction to think about.
Deuce, try out this hypothesis that answers your question above. We might call it "hard materialism."
What you sketch out here is the position known as behaviorism.
A belief or a reason or a thought is a brain state. For the case in which a belief/brain state corresponds with reality (like thinking that 2+2=4), that fact that the belief is "merely" a brain state does not dis-privilege it compared to any other brain state (like thinking that 2+2=5) *only* in terms of its usefulness. 2+2=4 is true because that reflects how the real word is, so thinking that is privileged only if you want to get things done or deal with the real world
Well, there's still the previous problem of saying that a brain state literally *is* "2+2=4" rather than representing it (since it would require a collection of excited neurons to be true or false). But, additionally, there's the issue of defining truth as usefulness in the real world. Some beliefs could be useful for you, but not for me. I think you can see where that path goes. Alternatively, you could say that true beliefs are true because they correspond to an objective, absolute standard of truth, and that we can know they are true because our minds have access to said standard. This, of course, comes very close to my and Tom's position.
Eric, you are teetering dangerously close to embracing outright logical absurdity here. Something could represent something else, while itself being represented by a third thing. But no, obviously being a representation of something is not the same as being that thing.
A neuron has no other fuction, it is a logic gate, and it builds up from there. Logic is only ever representation, when I say if A = A, or we agree on what we mean when I say "Apple", and it is different that "Orange", everything is a representation in our minds... even the "real" apple and orange on the table. Our model of the apple in our mind isn't an apple, but, again, so what?
We might find a fire pattern in our brain when we see an apple, or hear "apple"... somehow we might also detect a pattern when we think "apple". Is the "apple of our minds eye" the representaion of those neurons, or is it those neurons? How is that a question? They are the same thing.
a representation of something IS the same as being that thing, in the mind. Representing is what a intelligent brain does, using neurons as the hardware. The further the disconnect from input to action, including thought itself, (which is even more input and output) the more intelligent the mind, and the more representational.
The mind is the only place where symbols really "exist" at all. Is Superman a representation? What is "being superman?" Superman only exist as a representation and he only exist in neurons, just like everything else in reality for our brains/minds. Or apples, god, justice, good, evil...whatever. You have a concept of reality, and that is all the reality there is for you... the concept spread across your neurons.
Now, are you asking me to contrast your belief with your neural pattern of that belief? What are you asking?
How odd, Deuce. I did say that i was evolving the system using the laws of electromagnetism. You also want to know the intermolecular forces? Did you think they were something other than electromagnetic forces?
And you seem to be missing my point. Of course once I tell you everything about the microscopic properties of the liquid, I have told you enough to (in principle) show that water behaves as a liquid. This is in relation to your (or was it Tom's) objection that a description of the mind which does not directly use mental states somehow implies that mental states do not exist. For water, we have a description which does not directly use the property of liquidity, which arises s a derived quantity.. This is analogus to the situation where mental states are derivable from neuronic states.
"But in all seriousness, the "two different ways of describing the same thing" account you gave above requires that they be identical, if you wish to hold that the reductive explanation doesn't cut anything out. Do you want to stick with that?"
I have no idea. I still don't know what you're asking me here. Perhaps I will understand if you tell me: is a brain state identical to the neurons in the brain, or is it a representation of the neurons?
And hopefully, my question above for the dualists won't get lost in the shuffle: suppose somebody took a brain state, modelled it on a comuter, and evolved the state according to the laws of electromagnetism and quantum mechanics etc. Would they or would they not reproduce correctly the time evolution of the real person's brain?
Eric, before I said that you were dangerously close to delving into incoherence. As I see it, you're now there.
a representation of something IS the same as being that thing, in the mind.
I'm sorry, this makes absolutely no sense. If representing something is just the same as being that something, then talking about representations at all is redundant and an abuse of language.
Representing is what a intelligent brain does, using neurons as the hardware. The further the disconnect from input to action, including thought itself, (which is even more input and output) the more intelligent the mind, and the more representational.
If being a representation of something is the same as being that thing, then it's complete gibberish to say that it can be more or less representational. You're now saying that something can be equivalent to itself to a greater or lesser degree. Anyhow, it's been my contention that materialism entails post-modernist incoherence, and rather than debate this any further, I'll just hold this forth as a case in point.
I'm sorry, this makes absolutely no sense. If representing something is just the same as being that something, then talking about representations at all is redundant and an abuse of languagewhy did you leave out "in the mind"? And you left it out in the second paragraph as well. Holding my view as incoherent is easy if you misrepresent it, and an "abuse of the language".
You're now saying that something can be equivalent to itself to a greater or lesser degreeumm, no.
I used the word input for a reason. In a non-intelegent system an outside input (stimuli) might relate directly to an systems action(s) one to one. Stimulate the nerve or whatever, and the muscle contracts everytime. Action is taken, but no decisions. The more compexity between the two, and the more processing needed by more and more inputs, the closer to a brain. By the time you add intelligence, the INPUT is processed as a representation... a model. IN THE MIND, the representation is equivalent to the object or concept. You don't have a apple receptor in the eye that fires the apple neuron. An intelligent mind can bring the concept to mind at will, without any outside sensory input. I was talking about greater and lesser degree of equivalence to a given stimulus. Abstracting the "something", and manipulating it mentally is what thinking is! The model can be more or less equivalent to itself.
I am developing a mental model of your personality, and it might be equvalent to you to a greater or lesser degree. If it has good predictive powers, it is more equivalent to "you" than if not. It is also the only "you" there is, in MY mind. I can add to the accuracy of my model with your next post (more input). My model says that you still won't clarify your question so somebody can answer it. How accurate is it?
(I bet I confirmed your model of me
)
why did you leave out "in the mind"?
Because it's an incoherent equivocation regardless of where you put it. It's like saying that a square can be a circle in the mind, and then telling someone you don't even understand the question when they ask you the difference between a square and a circle. There's just no point in continuing in that line of conversation, or any conversation where the other party has decided that logical contradiction will not dissuade them.
I did say that i was evolving the system using the laws of electromagnetism. You also want to know the intermolecular forces? Did you think they were something other than electromagnetic forces?
You said that you were giving only the position and velocity of each atom. You're going to need more information than that to evolve the system using the laws of electromagnetism, while capturing all the predictive power of liquidity. I suspected that the reason you only mentioned position and velocity is that you knew that that information alone couldn't entail liquidity, and you wanted to make it look like you were somehow getting a complete prediction of the system that didn't include all the relevant properties that are liquidity, so I felt I should point it out to clarify.
If there are any properties communicated by the term "liquidity" which aren't communicated by stating the intermolecular forces, it's the phenomenal qualities of it (how it feels to us when we touch it, etc), which are not relevant to how it will go downhill. I'm guessing by your last post that we agree on this point, right?
Deuce wrote:
Well, there's still the previous problem of saying that a brain state literally *is* "2+2=4" rather than representing it (since it would require a collection of excited neurons to be true or false).Not quite. I'm saying that a brain state is the *belief* that 2+2=4, not that the brain state *is* 2+2=4. I think.
But, additionally, there's the issue of defining truth as usefulness in the real world. Some beliefs could be useful for you, but not for me. I think you can see where that path goes. Alternatively, you could say that true beliefs are true because they correspond to an objective, absolute standard of truth, and that we can know they are true because our minds have access to said standard. This, of course, comes very close to my and Tom's position.Truth is correspondance with the real world, strictly, and that correspodance turns out to be useful in a practical sense, not definitionally or ontologically. I'm not sure which part of which position that's close to, but it's still a materialistic one, and least so far in our discussion.
Tom, I hope you're still going to reply to my 03.08.06 - 12:14 pm post. I just don't want it to get lost in a flurry of activity since then.
Truth is correspondance with the real world, strictly, and that correspodance turns out to be useful in a practical sense
Ah, but is a useful belief always true? And if not, how can we tell apart a useful but objectively false belief from an objectively true one? And keep in mind, you can't appeal to an objective standard of truth in answering this, in order to be consistent with the position. You can only appeal to the usefulness of any means of telling them apart. And you can't say that it's objectively useful either, because that would be to refer to an objective standard of truth.
And hopefully, my question above for the dualists won't get lost in the shuffle: suppose somebody took a brain state, modelled it on a comuter, and evolved the state according to the laws of electromagnetism and quantum mechanics etc. Would they or would they not reproduce correctly the time evolution of the real person's brain?
Btw, I don't want to look like I'm dodging the question, so I'll give you a straight answer: in a word, no. I would hold that intentional causation is irreducible to material causation, and that if we come up with a model that only includes mathematically predictable causation, we will therefore fail to get a completely correct predictive model (at least if we run it long enough).
why did you leave out "in the mind"?
Picking up on Deuce's 7:11 am response: If there is something about "in the mind" that resolves the contradiction Deuce has pointed out, it cannot be just increased complexity of physical states, as you indicated, Eric in your 3:01 am (huh?! I thought you were in US mountain time? I wish you more rest than that!) post.
You talk about adding intelligence as a route to resolution. Now, greater intelligence is certainly an increase of complexity in brain capacity. I think, Eric, your approach here would say that on a physical descriptive level, that's all that it is.
I don't know how an increase in physical complexity--or even any increased processing complexity in the brain--can turn a representation of a thing into the thing itself, or vice versa.
This is hardly to deny that there are such things as representations or things represented, or that the two correspond in some way. It's just to say that they are not identical even in the most intelligent physical brains. (Maybe, following Bishop Berkeley, they are in the mind of God, but that view is more a matter of historical interest than being germane here.)
Truth is correspondance with the real world, strictly, and that correspodance turns out to be useful in a practical sense, not definitionally or ontologically. I'm not sure which part of which position that's close to, but it's still a materialistic one, and least so far in our discussion.
Paul, can we define "correspondence" in a way that doesn't contradict itself in your system?
As we've said before, there is no way a neuron simpliciter can correspond to something outside itself. Even set theory, which discusses things like one-to-one correspondence, requires a mind to do the corresponding. Piano keys correspond to audible pitch, mathematical frequency, letter or solfege names of notes, marks on a musical staff, etc.--but only if there's a mind mediating that relationship. Otherwise piano keys are only piano keys.
Complexifying neurons doesn't get them any closer to corresponding to the outside world--not unless you hold to a theory that neurons re-arrange themselves somehow so that there's a unique neural state for each possible outside entity, with some kind of one-to-one match between this neural state and that outside entity. That gets it closer, but not nearly close enough.
There's still something required to interpret those neural states, to judge them as corresponding. If a correspondence is just the neural state, and a thought is just the neural state, then the correspondence is equivalent to the thought. But we can have thoughts about such correspondence. Is that yet another neural state? What if we have thoughts about that thought? Another neural state? We move toward an infinite progression here. We can never say that a thought is never anything but a neural state, which is one of these correspondences. We're stuck there.
Why is that so bad, though? Can we be content with thoughts being nothing but correspondences? Remember that a correspondence is nothing without a mind mediating it. If a thought is nothing but a correspondence, there is no correspondence, because there is nothing to perform that act of correspondence. There is no musician there to say that "This key = Middle C." There is no . . . whatever it might be . . . to say, this correspondence obtains between this neural state and this thought or this outside entity.
So I conclude that the term correspondence cannot be coherently defined in the context you have suggested.
Paul, I haven't forgotten your 12:14 comment from yesterday. It's a good question and I'm working on it for a blog entry. Comments are keeping pretty busy in the meantime!
Deuce, you keep beating me to it!
I was working on those other comments, but I had AR's question in mind to answer too, but you got there first in your 9:23 comment. (The other time you "beat me to it" was your first answer to AR on liquidity.)
For the record, I agree and I would add this. AR, if you want to claim that a computer set up to run in some way equivalent to a brain's physical function would produce a mental "person" in some way equivalent to a human, with thoughts, intentions, free will, values, spirituality, emotions, and so on, you're welcome to make that claim. It won't be tested any time soon, practically speaking. In the meantime, it's pure speculation, and I'm afraid you may just be saying, "I think a computer could do this, and you probably should too, which shows I'm right."
There's just no point in continuing in that line of conversation, or any conversation where the other party has decided that logical contradiction will not dissuade them.
I admire Deuce's and Tom's doggedness on this matter. I gave up long ago on Paul or Eric being persuaded by logical arguments on this particular issue. It will take a change of heart for them to change their minds (pun intended), not more examples of the incoherence of the strict materialist position.
Deuce, Tom, I didn't intend to suggest that anybody was dodging a question. It's easy to miss questions; we're going in a lot of directions.
Also I didn't say that I'd proven that a computer was equivalent to a person. I was clarifying the consequences of dualism.
But you should note that that the burden of proof really isn't on me here. We perform experiments all the time on nonliving material, and our understanding of physical law works pretty well in all of those cases. Now the claim is that there is something in the brain that behaves differently. Why do these effects never show up anywhere else? Are "minds" incapable of influencing the motion of electrons outside the brain?
Ity is not clear to me at all that these difiiculties are smaller than the difficulties for the materialist position.
Mike, I think you should give me more credit that than. Haven't I shown my ability to acknowledge *some* points over the last months for you to give me the benefit of the doubt and so interpret the current argument as being an honest disagreement, or at the very least a devil's advocate approach? You cut me to the quick when you say it's my heart talking and not my mind for this type of conversation.
"You said that you were giving only the position and velocity of each atom. You're going to need more information than that to evolve the system using the laws of electromagnetism..."
No, I don't. The intermolecular force is trivially calculated once you know the position of each atom. Apply Coulomb's law with the relevant charges.
And it is simply not the case that you can work out the properties of liquidity easily by knowing the intermolecular forces. How would you do that? I don't think *anybody* has directly derived liquid properties from molecular level simulations.
Deuce, we could argue the idea of usefulness, but I don't think it's crucial to the argument, so I'm going to move onto Tom's point about corresponance with reality, which I think is a healthy challenge to materialism.
Tom, what does "simpliciter" mean? I check a couple sources and couldn't find a definition.
Tom, allow me to address your point in general at first. I take your position to mean that any universe could not exist without mind, but that seems absurd (we can imagine every living thing in the universe dying, and with them every single mortal mind). Can you clarify if your position means that the universe must have minds in it?
The inifinite progression you mention seems only possible, not necessary, so I don't see the problem with it. We certainly do, for instance, have thoughts about thoughts, etc., to the limit of our processing capability.
You may think I'm dense, but why does set theory require a mind to do the corresponding, why can't neurons do it? A computer is perfectly capable of comparing two files to see if they match, and it doesn't have a mind. I'm specifically not talking about some person perceiving the results of the computer file match, just the computer itself.
Simpliciter means in its simplest form, without other conceptual baggage that often accompanies [whatever is referenced].
Phone just rang, I'll be back.
Paul,
Mike, I think you should give me more credit that than. Haven't I shown my ability to acknowledge *some* points over the last months for you to give me the benefit of the doubt and so interpret the current argument as being an honest disagreement, or at the very least a devil's advocate approach? You cut me to the quick when you say it's my heart talking and not my mind for this type of conversation.
I was trying to limit the charge to the issue of whether strict materialism is a coherent position, not to your general intransigence or lack thereof. I obviously don't know what is going on in your head, only what you type into the comment box, but I've seen too many times where Deuce, Tom, Charlie, or I make what appears to me a perfectly clear explanation of the illogic of the strict materialist position, only to have you ignore it, or quibble about word definitions, or just assert that you aren't convinced. Whether you are doing this intentionally as an intellectual exercise, or because you have an emotional attachment to materialism, or unintentionally for some unknown reason I cannot say. I'm just commenting on what I see in front of me. I wasn't (necessarily) trying to accuse you of being intellectually dishonest, but only to say that repeating the same types of arguments seem unlikely to sway your views, if they haven't worked to date.
To address a question I was asked earlier:
I would describe a brain state as a representation of the neurons in a brain. It would be analogous to a specification of the position and velocity (and intermolecular forces, whatever) of each atom of water. Similarly the brain state represents the position, potential etc. of each neuron.
The mental state is a higher level description. it describes some aspects of the brain state but leaves out others. This is like specifying the liquid properties of water without providing detailed molecular information. The mental state is not in general the same as the brain state. If the mental state is detailed enough, it may be equivalent to the brain state. An example of a mental state would be a belief that 2+2=5.
Is there a problem with any of this?
AR,
And it is simply not the case that you can work out the properties of liquidity easily by knowing the intermolecular forces. How would you do that? I don't think *anybody* has directly derived liquid properties from molecular level simulations.
That's because we don't have the requisite computational power, not because there's something intrinsic that prevents us from doing so. Obviously if you had accurate enough parameters and enough computational power you could derive macroscopic properties (gas, liquid, or solid) from molecular-level simulations. Surely you aren't claiming that there is some property of water that is due to something other than the interactions between water molecules?
No, I don't. The intermolecular force is trivially calculated once you know the position of each atom. Apply Coulomb's law with the relevant charges.
One needs to use quantum mechanics to do this accurately. And one needs to do it for large numbers of water molecules. It is far from a trivial problem. Which is why most such calculations involve various simplifications and/or small numbers of atoms in order to make them tractable.
Hi Mike,
Yes, I agree. It is very difficult to use the molecular level dynamics to derive macroscopic properties, but it is in principle possible.
The way we got into this is that Tom and deuce seem to argue that the existence of a reductionist description of the brain at the level of neurons somehow implies the nonexistence, or at least the lack of causal efficacy, of mental states. I was arguing that this does not follow; the description of water at the level of molecules does not invalidate a simpler description using the properties of liquids, and does not address the existence or causal efficacy of this other description.
AR, just to clarify, there's a specific kind of causal efficacy that is unexplainable on your theory.
It would be possible to place the mind/brain into a hypothesized mechanistic framework, where complex neuronal interactions cause behaviors. That's not where the weakness of physicalism lies.
The problem is when one says that there is reasoning behind one's decisions, leading to behaviors. If one says, "I decided to write a comment in favor of physicalism for the reason that I believe it is true," then one is affirming that it is a belief, a reason, an attitude that causes one's behavior. This is causation in a completely different and noncommensurate category than physical causation.
Paul,
I take your position to mean that any universe could not exist without mind, but that seems absurd (we can imagine every living thing in the universe dying, and with them every single mortal mind). Can you clarify if your position means that the universe must have minds in it?
Wow, that's a major question. There have indeed been theorists (like Berkeley) who have said something like that. There's some interesting stuff there from the history of philosophy, and there's been no end of discussion over it. But apart from the fact that theism obviously postulates an eternal Mind, I wouldn't know how to defend it myself.
But that wasn't where I was heading with the point I was making. I was saying that the word "correspondence" is meaningless without mind.
The inifinite progression you mention seems only possible, not necessary, so I don't see the problem with it. We certainly do, for instance, have thoughts about thoughts, etc., to the limit of our processing capability.
You know, I was in the car thinking about that argument after I wrote it and worrying about it. It needs work. I'm not sure it's all that strong. I'll have to come back to it when I've given it more thought.
You may think I'm dense, but why does set theory require a mind to do the corresponding, why can't neurons do it? A computer is perfectly capable of comparing two files to see if they match, and it doesn't have a mind. I'm specifically not talking about some person perceiving the results of the computer file match, just the computer itself.
A computer is just another example like the piano keyboard. It produces output that a mind can interpret as correspondence. Without that interpretation, the letters I am typing here would just be squiggles on a screen. A computer's output demonstrating correspondence would just be squiggles on a screen, marks on a sheet of paper, or voltage states inside the box. In fact, that output itself would probably not display any set-like correspondence to what was analyzed (there's no one-to-one match from one line of the output to one object of a set, for example). So there's no actual correspondence there, only symbols representing it, for interpretation by minds.
"This is causation in a completely different and noncommensurate category than physical causation."
Why on earth is it noncommensurate? A belief is a description of a mental state whcih has a relation to a physical state. "My belief caused this" is shorthand for "the physical state which corresponds to the mental state which corresponds to my belief caused this". This isn't ruled out a priori.
Why on earth is it noncommensurate? A belief is a description of a mental state whcih has a relation to a physical state.
I knew you would switch between beliefs being brain states and being representations of mental states sooner or later
(saying that a belief is a "description" of a mental state is just another way of saying that it's a "representation" of it, rather than the state itself). It happens *every* time in my experience. That's why I asked upfront.
Then do you consider that descriptions have causal efficacy? It would seem so, according to the way you've defined "belief."
There, you beat me in getting to an answer again, Deuce! By one minute!
Since I carefully distinguished between mental states and brain states above, I don't see how you read anywhere that I said that a belief is a brain state.
Anyway, these objections are not very serious. Consider the statement "AR is typing this post". But AR is "just" a username. Does it follow that usernames have causal efficacy? Not at all; all this means is that a physical entity associated with this username is typing this post. AR is a shorthand for many concepts which can be invoked in context.
And the same is true of beliefs. A belief is a "name" describing a mental state . When we describe a belief as having causal efficacy, we are referring to the complex of physical systems associated with this belief. No problem as far as I can see.
Whether a belief *is* a mental state (NOT a brain state) or not depends on your definition of a mental state. Typically a belief would only capture a part of a mental state. That is, mental states capture a portion of the information in the brain state, a belief captures part of the information in a mental state. They are all inequivalent.
Why on earth is it noncommensurate? A belief is a description of a mental state whcih has a relation to a physical state.
Okay, let's now take this back to the parallel you drew with the water running downhill. Is liquidity a causal property of the water going down the hill, or is it a description of a causal property? If it's a description of a causal property, it can't literally cause the water to do anything. On the other hand, if it's an actual property of the water, and not a description of one, then your reductive analogy to beliefs is broken.
Yikes, will someone collect and organize every single argument for and against materialism in this thread? This thread is fairly complex if I say so myself. Reading a summary outline, I might make then up my mind (er, I mean, make up my neuronal state). ; )
Tom, good point about my computer example. But let me take it one step further. The computer, upon comparing two files, will cause something to happen if the files are the same, something else if they are different. So there is no need to interpret whether the files are the same; rather, there is one real world occurence if the files are the same, and different one if they are not. Is that a closer analogy for materialism? Or, that's how correspondence can have a real-world meaning, effect, existence, whatever, without a mind.
About the universe without minds: where I was going was to pose the question that, if all minds were wiped away from the universe, let's assume the universe continues to exist (if you don't want to assume that, that's a conversation I don't think I want to have). I would claim that correspondences would still exist: solar system A would still have the same number of planets as solar system B. So mind is not necessary for correspondence.
"Is liquidity a causal property of the water going down the hill, or is it a description of a causal property? "
What is a "causal property"?
When we describe a belief as having causal efficacy, we are referring to the complex of physical systems associated with this belief.
This, btw, is a dodge of Tom's question, though a subtle one. He didn't ask "what we are referring to" when we describe a belief as having causal efficacy. He asked whether it actually does.
What is a "causal property"?
A property that plays a causal role. Liquidity is a causal property because the water's liquidity causes it to flow down the hill, or joins with other factors to cause that (unless, of course, liquidity is just a description of a causal property, in which case liquidity doesn't cause water to do anything).
Oops, above post was from me :-D
I am unable to grasp the idea of water itself having a property that causes its own flow. If you asked me the cause of the flow, I'd probably go with gravity. Water is a liquid, so it is allowed to flow, but is that a cause?
"He didn't ask "what we are referring to" when we describe a belief as having causal efficacy. He asked whether it actually does."
The thing referred to by the word "belief" actually has causal efficacy.
AR, then you're saying that the causal efficacy is entirely in the brain state, is that correct?
Hey, AR, what Tom and I are doing is trying to get you to clarify your terms as much as possible, because we are sure that when you make clean, consistent distinctions with your position, and analyze it closely, contradictions come up.
Anyhow, with the water example, you are attempting to defend something logically like the following premises:
1. The molecular properties of the water completely account for some of the water's behavior.
2. Liquidity is a property of the water. It is not identical to the water's molecular properties, and it is not identical to a subset of them.
3. Liquidity accounts for part of the same behavior of the water as the molecular properties do.
Now, you should be able to see the problem here. If the molecular properties fully account for the water's behavior, and liquidity isn't identical to them, then what is left over of that behavior that liquidity could possibly explain? Clearly there's some fuzzy thinking that needs to be resolved here.
The resolution is to realize that liquidity *is* identical to a subset of the water's molecular properties. This can be confusing, because we use the term "liquidity" in different ways, for instance in referring to the way water feels when we touch it. However, liquidity, and here I'm referring only to the property that causes the water to go down the hill, is *identical* to a subset of the water's molecular properties.
Here, one might object that liquidity is not identical to the molecular properties of the water, but is rather shorthand for them. But this is an equivocation on the use of "liquidity", a subtle switching of the word's meaning mid-argument to refer the word "liquidity" rather than the property of water. The word liquidity is shorthand for the molecular properties, and it has no effect on the water's behavior. Liquidity the causal property of water *is* those molecular properties.
For your analogy to truly work, you must be prepared to say that beliefs *are* brain states, or are subsets of brain states.
"If the molecular properties fully account for the water's behavior, and liquidity isn't identical to them, then what is left over of that behavior that liquidity could possibly explain?"
What's the problem? One can fully account for the motion by the molecular properties. One can also describe the flow of water by assigning a property called "liquidity" to water, and this property tells us that water can flow. It isn't left-over behavior, these are two different ways of reaching conclusions about the water movement.
Liquidity is not a molecular property. No single molecule has such a property, and even small numbers of molecules do not.
It isn't left-over behavior, these are two different ways of reaching conclusions about the water movement.
Exactly, it's two different ways of thinking about water, not two different properties of the water. You are confusing an epistemic distinction, a distinction between two different concepts, with an ontological distinction in the water itself.
One can also describe the flow of water by assigning a property called "liquidity" to water
But of course you can't literally assign a property to water. You can think about it in a particular way, but you don't actually endow it with a new property in that manner.
No single molecule has such a property, and even small numbers of molecules do not.
That's true. The water's liquidity is the combined molecular properties of many molecules. Different behavior occurs when you have many molecules close together (a single water molecule wouldn't flow down that hill). However, that proximity would be figured into your calculation as you calculated all the molecules' movements.
Here's another way of conceptualizing it:
1) 5+5 completely accounts for 10
2) 3+7 is not identical to 5+5
3) 3+7 also accounts for 10
The resolution, of course, is that 3+7 is identical to 5+5, and 2) is wrong. There are two different concepts in our minds, two different ways of reaching 10 in our thinking, but only one real value being described.
Deuce,if my position contains a contradiction, then you must be saying that these two statements contradict each other:
1) The motion of the water can be explained by a computation at the molecular level.
2) The motion of water can be explained by using its property of liquidity, without regard to its molecular motion.
It is irrelevant if one can be derived from the other. If there is a contradiction, one or other statement must be false. Which one?
If both are true, then there cannot be a contradiction.
AR, I'm trying to get back to why this question is being raised. I think it has been your position that "liquidity" explains or describes something about water that is unexplained or undescribed in a complete accounting of the position and motion of all of its molecules.
The reason you want to be able to claim this is to show, by analogy, that there is something about the idea of a "mental state" that explains or describes something more than is explained by the physical state, potential, etc. of the brain and its parts.
That is, you want to view mental states as being emergent properties of the brain.
If my read on this is correct, then your last comment here goes off on a tangent. Liquidity as a general term, and the state of molecules as a set of detailed particulars, may certainly both describe the same thing. The interesting question is whether liquidity explains something more than is explained in terms of the molecules.
"The interesting question is whether liquidity explains something more than is explained in terms of the molecules."
No that is not the question. Under a physicalist view, a complete knowledge of the position and momentum of all the molecules completely determines the time evolution of the water, and there is nothing more to determine.
The interesting question is: under a physicalist viewpoint, is it then incoherent to claim that water has a property called liquidity? This would be the analogue of your claim that under a physicalist viewpoint, it is incoherent to speak of mental states as existing/having causal efficacy.
I would maintain that the two explanations in terms of molecular motion and liquidity are different, and each valid in their own way. In the same way the physicalist explanation of beliefs etc. through neuronic activity etc. is valid, and the explanation of beliefs etc. through mental states is also valid in its own way. As Deuce might say, 10 is both 5+5 and 3+7.
Tom,
You state in regard to the Christian concept of "substance dualism": "the brain being the (relatively) familiar physical substance, and the mind being a non-physical substance."
That's not correct. If you wish to present a "Christian" position, then may I remind you of the statement in the Book of Hebrews 4:12 that, although "soul" and "spirit" are both spiritual entities -- entities in the category of things spiritual -- there is a difference between "soul" and "spirit." All living animal-life has a "soul" (Deuteronomy 12:23), but neither animals nor every living human being (a subcategory of animal-life) have a "spirit" (1 Corinthians 2:14). The property of being alive requires that an animal have a living soul integral to its physical body. The soul cannot survive without the body of which it is integral; just as the physical body cannot remain alive without the soul integral to it. The "mind" (which you mischaracterize in your discussion) is a resultant of the interaction between the physical body and the spiritual soul. As such, the consciousness of living animals will vary according to the specific characteristics of the body/soul interface. A house-fly, a paramecium, and a hourse all have different kinds of conscious awareness (thoughts and perceptions) because of the differences which characterize the interactions between the soul and the respective body types. (The soul is the same entity in all living animals; the difference stems from the particular interface with the qualities of the specific body types.) But since human beings were also designed to contain "spirit," their body/soul interface allows for a supervening spirit connection as well (that is, for a "spirit" integral to the physical body, and not a spirit-being within the physical body). This is how human beings could be the "image of God" (Who is spirit; John 4:24). But for life to exist requires that life existed. That is why God -- a Living Spirit Being -- is the Sole Source and Creator not only of the physical universe, but also of the spiritual entities within the physical universe -- angelic spirit-beings, demonic spirit-beings, and animal soul-beings. (Angelic and demonic "spirit-beings" have spiritual bodies in contradistinction to the physical bodies required of animal "souls-beings.")
So if you were using the term "mind" in a way consistent with some trend in philosophy, that trend is erroneous in its usage of the term and you should use the proper Christian usage if you wish to discuss the Christian meaning of concepts related to "the 'mind-body' problem."
Anyway, that's my .02.
Ari
1) The motion of the water can be explained by a computation at the molecular level.
2) The motion of water can be explained by using its property of liquidity, without regard to its molecular motion.
No, I'm saying that you are confusing two different ways of thinking about the same thing with there being two different things to think about. Or put another way, you're mistaking two different references with two different referees. Prior to knowing the details of what makes the water act a particular way, we can observe that it nevertheless does act a particular way. We can say "The water must have a property that causes it to act this way. Let's call this property liquidity" without knowing precisely what that property is, only what its effects are. Later we may learn that the water's liquidity (at least the aspects of its liquidity that contribute to the water's behavior) is actually the combination of a bunch of molecular factors. Ontologically speaking, the property causing the water to act a particular way, and the molecular factors, are one and the same, even though our conceptualizations of them are different (In fact, our original conceptualization may have been just plain wrong in some ways, depending on what it was. Look at what some of the ancients thought about water). In order for this to be analagous to the mind, we must say that, ontologically speaking, beliefs are actually one and the same with certain brain states (ie. identity theory), even if it's convenient for us to think of them differently. It's important to keep in mind that two different mental representations of something do not imply two different representees. Heck, it's even possible for us to have representations of things that don't exist, in which case there is no representee at all! (for instance, when a child thinks of Santa Clause)
Ari,
The mind, soul, spirit, and even heart are related terms that are used in different ways throughout Scripture. All of them are immaterial, except in those rare cases where "heart" means the actual physical heart, if there are any. (I'm having trouble thinking of any.)
I have not used the term soul or spirit in this discussion because it is an apologetic approach, an argument from rationality in favor of Christian theism (see my related comment earlier today). In view of the purpose and intended audience, I've stuck with the one term that is commonly used by both theists and secularists, mind.
J. P. Moreland, whose books have mentored me on this topic, points out that the difference between soul, mind, and spirit are very significant in some contexts but not in this one, where the purpose is to discover what the real constitution of the mind is.
The question of whether humans are bipartite (body and soul/mind/spirit) or tripartite (body, soul, spirit, with mind in there somewhere as well) is controversial among theologians, as is the matter of what "soul" means in animals. It didn't seem necessary here to go into it for these purposes.
AR:
The interesting question is: under a physicalist viewpoint, is it then incoherent to claim that water has a property called liquidity? This would be the analogue of your claim that under a physicalist viewpoint, it is incoherent to speak of mental states as existing/having causal efficacy.
There is a sharp break in that analogy, AR, because properties are not generally considered to have causal efficacy. Without going into whether that is always or generally true, it would certainly seem to be so in this case.
Under physicalism, it would appear that mental states are more or less thrown up as properties of brain states. A given brain state has a given mental state associated with it. Following my mentor Moreland again, it looks something like this image, in which B stands for brain state and M stands for mental state. (This simply could not be done in any form in Haloscan, so I put up an image of it instead.)
What we see here is a succession of brain states, causally connected from one to the next through physical regularity. Each brain state has a mental state associated with it, as water has liquidity associated with it. Because each brain state is different, each associated state is different.
This seems to me to be a fair picture of physicalism. You may tell me if it fails to convey your views properly.
The most telling thing about it is that there is no causal connection from one mental state to the next. There is no causation from any M to anything at all. (If I could have done it in ASCII, I would have had arrows on the line upward from the B toward the M, to indicate that brain states cause mental states but not vice-versa.)
So one cannot, on this view, say that one thought leads to the next, if thoughts are mental states. My thought, "Michigan State lost the Big Ten semi-final on Saturday," cannot lead to the thought, "then they cannot play in the Final." I cannot judge that the second thought follows from the first, because in fact it doesn't. The two thoughts are not connected in any direct manner. They are just properties thrown up out of brain states--and these brain states, as physical systems, are determined by natural law and quantum effects, not by logic, rationality, or any agency of myself acting as a person.
This, it appears to me, is what happens when mental states are taken to be properties of brain states.
Now, additionally, to return to what you said,
The interesting question is: under a physicalist viewpoint, is it then incoherent to claim that water has a property called liquidity? This would be the analogue of your claim that under a physicalist viewpoint, it is incoherent to speak of mental states as existing/having causal efficacy.
The analogy assumes rather than demonstrates that mental states are related to brain states as liquidity is related to water molecules. But that is the point in question. The analogue does not hold.
"..properties are not generally considered to have causal efficacy."
You sure? I refer you to Deuce: "Liquidity is a causal property because the water's liquidity causes it to flow down the hill..." Perhaps you two could first agree on a position on this matter.
You also said: "The analogy assumes rather than demonstrates that mental states are related to brain states as liquidity is related to water molecules. But that is the point in question." It illustrates a point: we can have two very different types of explanations for the same thing. Perhaps you could just answer the question: is it incoherent under physicalism to speak of liquidity?
You conflate psychological correctness (fidelity of a model with the facts) with causal correctness (fidelity of events to natural law). The two are totally different things. One is the ability of a system to accurately model its universe, the other consists of the actual facts of the universe. There is no contradiction in having the accuracy of the model be another fact of the universe.
Further, I dispute your premise that all beliefs that are the direct result of physical causes are held in doubt. The witness who was causally disconnected (e.g., unconscious) at the time of the crime is held to be an even less reliable witness than the drunk who saw it happen. Only those physical causes that reduce the fidelity of the brain with its environment are held to reduce our confidence in testimony.
Then, your claim that "it is hard to see how our decisions are our own, or are in any meaningful sense free choices," is a statement about what you see as the moral repugnance of materialism. It isn't a counterargument.
They are just properties thrown up out of brain states--and these brain states, as physical systems, are determined by natural law and quantum effects, not by logic, rationality, or any agency of myself acting as a person.
You are begging the question by asserting that physical systems cannot be logical, rational or have a sense of self.
Your claim that brain states are not causally related comes out of nowhere. Of course, they are causally connected. Playback of autoassociative memories can trigger recognition in other memories.
doctor(logic), I have trouble understanding where the conflation you mention in the first paragraph takes place.
RE: your second paragraph, what I was getting at is this: to the extent that reasons can be ascribed to physical causes rather than a rational flow of thought, to that extent we are skeptical that the rational flow of thought really has produced the conclusions. I think that's consistent with what you said here.
But you take it a step further, of course, in saying that the reason for this doubt is that the "fidelity of the brain with its environment" is reduced. That's an interesting direction to take. If you ever have time to look at Alvin Plantinga's highly influential epistemology, he places a great deal of emphasis on "proper function" including something a lot like your environmental fit. The problem many people have with this view is that it rather seems to require a God to determine what is "proper function."
Then, your claim that "it is hard to see how our decisions are our own, or are in any meaningful sense free choices," is a statement about what you see as the moral repugnance of materialism. It isn't a counterargument.
If our decisions are not free, then your decision to disagree with me is not free. Neither of us is taking a reasoned stand on the issue, we are instead being driven by the physical necessity of physico-chemical reactions. We only have an illusion of taking a reasoned position. That is the logical consequence of what you appear to be affirming.
What that is saying, then, is that "my position on the issue concludes that no one has any positions on the issue." This is self-refuting; it is indeed a counter-argument after all.
I didn't beg the question by asserting physical systems cannot be logical, I argued toward that position by attempting to show that they cannot.
I never said that brain states are not causally related (if I did, there's a typo somewhere I need to correct). Brain states, under physicalism, cause ensuing brain states and behaviors. They also cause mental states. Mental states do not cause anything.
See my 9:48 pm comment, and the image linked from it. The vertical arrows go one way, from brain state to mental state, but not the reverse. This is an accurate picture of the way physicalism is conceived by its proponents.
AR:
"..properties are not generally considered to have causal efficacy."
You sure? I refer you to Deuce: "Liquidity is a causal property because the water's liquidity causes it to flow down the hill..." Perhaps you two could first agree on a position on this matter.
In casual language we often speak as if properties have causal efficacy, but in analysis many thinkers conclude that it turns out not to be so. I might disagree with Deuce if he were to say this was the conclusion of a complete analysis.
Perhaps you could just answer the question: is it incoherent under physicalism to speak of liquidity?
Of course not. Liquidity is a property frequently possessed by water, oils, alcohol, etc., and too infrequently possessed by my bank account. To speak of liquidity as a substance would be incoherent, of course.
In casual language we often speak as if properties have causal efficacy, but in analysis many thinkers conclude that it turns out not to be so. I might disagree with Deuce if he were to say this was the conclusion of a complete analysis.
Yeah, there are different senses in which "cause" can be used. It's not exactly the same when you speak of a substance causing things, and properties of the substance causing things. Maybe the best way to say it is that a substance causes things in accordance with its causal properties, or something like that.
Neither of us is taking a reasoned stand on the issue, we are instead being driven by the physical necessity of physico-chemical reactions.
As we've said before, there is no way a neuron simpliciter can correspond to something outside itself.
They don't need to correspond, they only need to produce behavior. That is, the neurons and their connections that function when a person is thinking "2+2=4" don't need to stand for reason or represent rationality, they only need to function. They function when some neurons fire when the brain has perceived two bags with two apples in each bag and hears the words "I'll give you $100 if you can tell me how many apples are in the bags?"
Even set theory, which discusses things like one-to-one correspondence, requires a mind to do the corresponding.To interpret the corresponding, perhaps, but not to *do* the corresponding, because computers can do that and they don't have minds.
Neurons can be configured to produce behavior that can be characterized in a certain way that we label rational or true, just as a computer can be configured to produce behavior, and there is no need for anyone to intepret the behavior of the computer, nor the neurons. All that need happen afterwards is the possibility of other neurons in other brains (or other software in other computers, for that matter) to produce their own behavior in response. This views truth and rationality in more functional terms.
They don't need to correspond, they only need to produce behavior. That is, the neurons and their connections that function when a person is thinking "2+2=4" don't need to stand for reason or represent rationality, they only need to function. They function when some neurons fire when the brain has perceived two bags with two apples in each bag and hears the words "I'll give you $100 if you can tell me how many apples are in the bags?"
You are either making a statement of eliminativism here (that reason and rationality don't exist), or one of ephiphenomenalism (that reason and rationality are unrelated to our behavior).
Anyhow, you and Tom are displaying different behaviors by arguing for opposing positions here. Why is your position more correct than his? If you claim that it's because your behavior represents actual, absolute truth, reason, and rationality, you have thereby debunked yourself.
Neurons can be configured to produce behavior that can be characterized in a certain way that we label rational or true
Are they actually rational or true, or are these just labels that we can give them? If the latter (as you stated), then I label my behavior as rational and true, and yours as irrational and false. That was pretty easy! Hey, and you can label yours as true, and mine as false. Everybody can right and wrong at the same time! (I'll point out again my contention that materialism must lead to Post-Modernist incoherence)
Deuce said,
Everybody can right and wrong at the same time! (I'll point out again my contention that materialism must lead to Post-Modernist incoherence)
This has been the result of many a discussion here.
This is just plain juvenile.
Here I am, not even a participant in the conversation, but I come in to snake comment #100.
6/6. Nice.
Who said I had an obsessive/compulsive disorder?
Congratulations, Charlie!
Deuce, let's go with just the label, not the actually true.
Even in that case, neurons can be configured produce different behavior if the labels are consistent or not. Labelling cats as "dogs" will fire one set of neurons. What this means, though is that you can't claim that labelling cats as dogs will fire the same set of neurons as labelling dogs as "dogs."
They don't need to correspond, they only need to produce behavior.
Please read what preceded this, Paul, where correspondence was considered pretty important.
The rest of your comment is, I'm afraid, a repeat of what's been said and answered before. The existence of two physical states does not produce a correspondence between them without someone to recognize it as such. Again, I refer you to the squiggles auf diese Seite. Wenn du erkennst sie nicht, dann bedeuten sie nichts.
Oops, what I meant was, if you don't recognize a correspondence between squiggles on a page and some meaning, there is no meaning there. If you don't know German, there was no meaning in that last sentence for you; if nobody knew German, then there would be no meaning at all. The squiggles would correspond to nothing--at least, nothing in the context of rationality. In fact, there is no correspondence unless someone can see it as such. (My German is so rusty there may be less correspondence there than I intended, too!)
There can be a similarity in count (the same number of apples as oranges), but in what sense could an apple be said to correspond to an orange absent some agent regarding them as such?
Computers don't count as mental or corresponding instruments or agents. Computers have voltage states and magnetic states, and they produce light in various configurations. These change according to fixed, deterministic rules that correspond only to the fixed deterministic rules set up by agents for them to follow. That's all they do. Without an interpreting agent, they are nothing but that. Their voltage states and light outputs correspond to nothing whatsoever without an interpreting mind.
Deuce,
Anyhow, you and Tom are displaying different behaviors by arguing for opposing positions here. Why is your position more correct than his? If you claim that it's because your behavior represents actual, absolute truth, reason, and rationality, you have thereby debunked yourself.
Don't go there, as it will send us back onto Paul's insistence that there's no such thing as absolute anything (he's an absolute relativist, natch). Which is of a piece with the implication of his positions that "Everybody can be right and wrong at the same time!" Which raises the question, why does he argue with us? Perhaps it is just to avoid doing work, which is one of the reasons I spend a lot of time here...
Don't go there, as it will send us back onto Paul's insistence that there's no such thing as absolute anything (he's an absolute relativist, natch). Which is of a piece with the implication of his positions that "Everybody can be right and wrong at the same time!" Which raises the question, why does he argue with us?
Well, heck, if he does that, then I'll just link it, and next time he argues I'll refer him back to where he admitted I was right
First of all, I just want to be clear that I'm taking the devil's advocate position here.
Now, onto the meaty stuff:
Tom, the difference between my last several posts and the ones you say that my last several posts are merely repeating is that I'm claiming that correspondance can lead to *behavior* changes without mind, as computers can do (or output changes, in the case of computers).
Also, whatever happened to my earlier question (paraphrasing), "Does all logic, correspondance, and rationality in the universe disappear if all minds do? If not, then in what sense is mind necessary for logic, correspondance, and rationality?"
"It's not exactly the same when you speak of a substance causing things, and properties of the substance causing things. Maybe the best way to say it is that a substance causes things in accordance with its causal properties, or something like that."
1. Define causal property.
2. Is liquidity a causal property or shorthand for other causal effects?
1. Define causal property.
I've done that before. You can look that up again, or you can figure it out from the context of my sentence.
2. Is liquidity a causal property or shorthand for other causal effects?
Liquidity is a causal property. The word "liquidity" is shorthand for the causal properties which are liquidity.
Mike, forgive me, I didn't catch your last comment above, LOL!
Seriously, sometimes I take positions as a devil's advocate, sometimes I kinda believe in what I write, and sometimes I really believe in what I write. I'm not gonna say which is which, though. Including what I just wrote!
Tom,
I've read your reply of 3/13 (#103703) and I understand your purpose of opening the discussion to the broadest possible audience. My concern, especially given that the question of what constitutes "mind," "consciousness," and even "life" itself often elicits discussions that go in circles due to the problem of defining terms, was that the concept you offered of the "mind" itself as a nonmaterial substance misconstrues what "mind" is. The word "mind" as it is usually used by secularists is indeed a distinct substance of some kind which permits the overt properties/abilities associated with living creatures. But the definition of the word "mind" itself should be made clear because the discussion of "mind" is likely to go in circles otherwise. I have sugggested, based on the Judeo-Christian usage, that "mind" is only an abstract idea which is applied to describe the resultant manifestation of self-awareness because of the soul's interaction with the physical body of which it is integral. I realize that the word "soul" can cause consternation among the secularists which may impel them toward the exits. But if you are to make any headway in determining what the mind is and how it functions in relation to inanimate matter then there must be some acknowledgement that consciousness is directly associated with "life" and that, therefore, the discussion turns on one's definition of exactly what constitutes the difference between "life" and "nonlife." The discussion in this comments section, in so far as I have understood it, seems to hang on how to get an entity characterized as "nonlife" to behave as though it were one characterized as "life." But this sort of reasoning leads to category errors which merely beg the question.
Discussions of "mind" among secularists often incorporate (perhaps unknowingly) concepts drawn from Eastern religions. (This is also why some christians have problems with the Intelligent Design movement.) But the Judeo-Christian concept of "life," and thus of the concept of "mind" that results from that "life," is distinctly different from that propounded in many Eastern religions (Buddhism, for example). The "Eastern" concept of life's origin is that all physical matter is imbued with some measure of "life" as a by-product of being immersed within a universal life-substance. This concept is obviously pantheistic (i.e., a religious concept), but is found in ostensibly atheistic scientific circles, nevertheless (as, for example, the Gaia Hypothesis; the "Tao" hypothesis applied to quantum physics; and "creation ex nihilo" as applied to "Big Bang" cosmogony). But the obvious problem with the "Eastern" approach is that it is circular reasoning -- the individual "mind" is only an interconnected fragment of the Universal Mind, ipso facto inanmate matter has the property of being animate. So even a rock can be alive and can express that "life" to the extent its physical "body" permits. This is nuts on its face; but that is the unspoken reasoning that sometimes underlies the discussion of "mind."
That is why I suggested applying the Judeo-Christian perspective -- not as an apologetic, but as a remedy -- to the exploration of the concept of "mind." In this perspective "life" is a spiritual phenomenon, and "mind" is a manifestation of "life" as it interacts with the physical -- but only under certain conditions. "Life" is not universal (a rock is not alive), but rather is a particular quality inherent to a particular two-part construction of physical substance (a physical body) which happens to incorporate a particular construction of spiritual substance (a spiritual "soul"). It is the functional organization of both physical matter and spiritual substance in combination that permits the various expressions of "life" -- including that of "mind." That perspective should not be dismissed merely because it is "religious" since everyone has a religion (even atheists). The value of the religious perspective should be determined by how scientifically efficacious it is. And in this regard I think you should be aware that your mentor, J. P. Moreland, has characterized himself as a Platonist (with all the philosophical baggage that comes with it; see quote in: Dennis Bielfeldt, "Three Questions about Minding God," Zygon, pp. 591-604). In Platonism the "soul" is a "spark of the divine" (sound familiar?) and so cannot die. But that is not Judeo-Christian theology (i.e., in which the spiritual "soul" is a construction just like the physical "body" is a construction).
So if the discussion is to gain traction, the definition of basic underlying terms should be of importance. The "Forrest Gump approach" of defining what "mind" is in terms of what "mind" does won't do it.
Best Wishes,
Ari Noggin
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