Thinking Christian Comments
Original Post: Non-material Vs. Material Mind
So, Tom, may I take your argument to be that the way the mind affects the material world is unexplainable; it is merely a brute fact that we cannot break down into component parts, nor find details of causation, etc.?
Is that a fair statement of your position?
Ya know, I should say that sometimes the type of question I posed above is a trap (laid by others, not moi), but at this point I just want to be sure I've got Tom's point correctly. I think I stated it accurately, but it seems kinda extreme, so I thought I'd better check before I go off half-cracked about it.
Paul, you're on track, but I'm planning to draw it out further in a day or two.
BTW, on further reflection there's probably an opening to object to how I treated the infinite regress matter with sub-particles making up quarks. It doesn't affect the overall point, however, which is about the kinds of things we accept as satisfactory explanations. Here's why. Let's suppose that somehow the physicists concluded that there's nothing more basic than a quark--or you can take it down one level if you wish, as long as we suppose that we've agreed it was the most basic particle in a hadron (most of the subatomic particles other than electrons).
The question is, would we be satisfied there, or would we insist on a more basic explanation? We'd pretty much be forced to accept it, and we would have to admit that we had all the explanation we were going to get. We wouldn't conclude that quarks are unreal just because there is no lower level of reality by which they are explained. That's what I'm trying to get at--an example of limits to explanation, and how we handle them.
The question is, would we be satisfied there, or would we insist on a more basic explanation? We'd pretty much be forced to accept it, and we would have to admit that we had all the explanation we were going to get.
I don't think we'd be forced to accept it. Physicists would still keep looking for the GUT - Grand Unified Theory (or TOE - Theory of Everything), in areas like string theory or M-theory. At this point, we don't know if such a theory exists, whether we can experimentally confirm it, or what implications it would have for our views of nature. Some physicists think such a theory will produce a self-contained theory of the universe - in a sense, "proving" that there's nothing outside of nature. Personally, I don't understand how such a thing could even be possible in principle, but we'll just have to wait and see.
You're right on one level, Mike, though it's not a key point, anyway. I'm just trying to set up a hypothetical situation where physicists actually do say they've reached the smallest (hadron) particle possible--what would we do then?
Tom,
You say this: "You can't regress to smaller and smaller particles, all the way to infinity, because a finite number of infinitely small particles is infinitely small, unless these infinitely small particles are separated by finite distances, which seems to yield just a picture of nothingness. An infinite number of infinitely small particles poses paradoxes that would be tedious to go into here."
This seems to betray a certain confusion about the concept of infinity. The endless subdivision of matter need not imply that at some point we reach infinitely small particles. Rather it simply implies that every particle is such that there is another smaller that is part of it. Every such particle in such a sequence has finite, though small, size. Never do we reach a particle that is infinitely small (whatever that might mean). There's no paradox about infinity that shows that matter is not infinitely divisible.
Again: infinite divisibility does not imply that there is an end to division in an infinitely small particle. Rather all it means is that, for any particle of whatever size you like, there is another smaller. But the "there is another smaller" clause does not imply that there is an end to the division in a particle vanishingly small.
For all we know, Democritus is dead wrong.
Well, as I said last night, I've realized there's room for objection to that part of the argument, but it wasn't essential to the main point of what I was trying to say anyway.
The whole matter of infinity is fraught with dispute and discussion, but your point seems correct here, Franklin. Thanks for the clarifications.
I think there is some limit past which particles cannot be smaller as a matter of physics.
I don't think the infinite divisioins of particles is the essence of the entire issue here.
I think it is a positive sign that you recognize the nature of explanation. An explanation is a set of boundary conditions and rules (natural laws) under which our observations (or some aspect of them) had to have been made. That is, the observed facts were implied by the rules of the explanation. There are only scientific explanations.
This does not mean that there are things that cannot be explained. What I fail to understand is why anyone would advocate the position that some things are inexplicable. Why would you assume that you cannot explain things? Isn't that just a curiosity killer?
IMO, the reason why mathematics can describe the world is that the world is assumed to be consistent. As such, the world must be isomorphic to one of the logically consistent systems enumerated by mathematics. Might the universe be inconsistent? Sure. But then we would not be able to comprehend it. The universe is intelligible because, if it weren't, we couldn't ask the question.
doctor(logic), I think you said there are only scientific explanations. If I misread your point there, please let me know. If not, then would you oblige me with a scientific explanation why you come to that conclusion? Please be careful to define what you mean by scientific, and avoid recourse to other disciplines. Thanks.
Your final paragraph is one statement of the anthropic explanation for the way the world is for humans. In what sense is this strictly a scientific explanation?
"Why is mathematics so good for describing the world? It almost seems there ought to be a causal principle working in one direction or the other there..."
A little while ago, I argued that we should expect natural laws to explain still unknown phenomena. Deuce then replied (http://www.haloscan.com/
comments/tgilblog/E20060301160557/
#102829)
"This is ultimately a cognitively empty claim. The best one can say is that we have explained a lot of things with physical laws....Those things that we have explained by laws, on the other hand, are precisely those things you would expect to be explainable by laws: repeating, consistent, mathematically predictable patterns. All we are really justified in saying is the tautology that those things we have explained with physical laws, we have explained with physical laws. To go beyond that is to mistake our epistemic limitations for ontology."
You presumably agreed, since you said these were good points.
So this putative excellent fit between mathematics and nature seems to come and go with time.
Tom,
I consider both mental and physical sensations to be empirical. (My experience of dreaming about Pamela Anderson is as real an experience as actually seeing her, despite the fact that the two experiences are quite distinguishable.) Thus, mathematical facts are empirical ones.
There are two empirical facts that turn out to be particularly important. Consistency and predictability (causality) are empirical properties without which knowledge would be impossible. I offer no proof that the world is wholly knowable (it may not be), but I claim that only those parts of the world that are consistent and causal are accessible. Giving up either condition makes it impossible to meaningfully maintain true propositions about the world or our own thoughts.
If we assume the world is knowable, then we must be able to generate and test predictive mathematical models of it, i.e., do science. These claims work as well for physics as they do for love and honor. Everything we know is the result of formal or informal science.
Could we know something without science? If we could, then we could also claim that a thermostat knows the temperature, or that a book about gardening knows how to garden. I think that our definition of knowledge requires the ability to create and test theories, i.e., to justify our beliefs. Science is our only means of justification.
As for my anthropic claim, it is merely a logical deduction. We could not find the universe to be wholly unintelligible, for we could have no knowledge of such a universe. So, the very fact that we have enough intelligibility to ask the question presupposes the answer. Logic is an empirical science because we have recipes for assigning logical properties.
It's fair to argue that I have broadened the definition of science to include other disciplines. However, my definitions do not admit every discipline as science. If there's no constraint to consistency or detectable natural law, then its not science. Under my definitions, most of metaphysics is just mathematics with worldly symbols.
doctor(logic), you have changed the subject, from explanations to mere observations. Yes, we experience a world where mathematics works to help us understand a great deal. That fact is part of the question to be explained, so re-asserting it is not helpful. What remains unexplained is why that connection exists, which you have not addressed.
You have also re-asserted your claim that science is the only form of explanation without answering the questions I raised after your last post, so we're not really making progress there, either.
Your claim about the anthropic principle is rather outrageous. It is "merely a logical deduction," yes, but from a specific set of materialist assumptions. Either that or else it's a tautology. Yes, we must live in a universe conducive to life and to questions and answers, if we're going to live here and look for answers to our questions. That's obvious. The question that remains is how the universe came to be such as it is. There are many solutions suggested for this, and the form you seem (I think) to be suggesting is one that presupposes a materialist view of the universe. (The other primary option is the theistic answer, that God created the universe with that kind of order in mind.) I'll acknowledge that I'm reading between the lines there, and I may have misread your assumptions, so you can straighten me out if I'm wrong there.
Going back to the source of all these lines of discussion, my point has been simply that there are limits to what we can explain by any means. I'm not really planning to pursue a trail into the metaphysics of numbers or the anthropic principle, since that's off the topic. Interesting questions, though.
Tom,
You asked me for an explanation of my claim that all knowledge is scientific. If you don't consider my response adequate, please feel free to state where you think it's lacking.
Let's look at your suggestion that the universe is orderly because God made it so. Your claim really amounts to the argument that the universe is orderly because there is something orderly (God) that guarantees that is it is orderly. First, this just leaves you with an infinite regress, i.e., why is God orderly? Second, you don't have an explanation unless you can describe mechanism. If you were to ask me to explain how the Sun burns, you would reject an explanation like "the Sun burns due to natural laws that make it so." Such a response is , of course, a restatement of the question because it fails to describe any mechanisms.
Furthermore, we do not accept as explanations rules that only apply once, in unique situations. If I observe event X followed by event Y, I have not explained Y with the rule "X causes Y" unless it is possible to observe X once again. That is, history does not explain itself. We have to identify regularities, patterns that repeat themselves, before we have an explanation. Explanations are always predictive. Yet, God is not predictive.
You are correct to question whether any progress can be made in explaining the order in the universe. I suspect that order is inexplicable. To have an explanation of order, there would have to be order in the first place (some rule that says why there is order), and that leads to the aforementioned infinite regress.
Your claim about the anthropic principle is rather outrageous. It is "merely a logical deduction," yes, but from a specific set of materialist assumptions. Either that or else it's a tautology. Yes, we must live in a universe conducive to life and to questions and answers, if we're going to live here and look for answers to our questions. That's obvious. The question that remains is how the universe came to be such as it is.
Hey, Tom, I think it's even worse than that. Those arguments that attempt to present "If things weren't that way, we wouldn't be able to observe them that way" as an explanation, can, in principle, be used as an "explanation" for anything. For instance, a really lousy detective, in trying to figure out the cause of a murder, could argue "Well, if the victim hadn't been killed, I wouldn't be here to see it" which has the same form as "If the universe were not mathematically intelligible, I wouldn't be able to understand it as mathematically intelligible". The other way of phrasing it, "The fact that we possess intelligibility guarantees that we're in an intelligible universe" is of the same form as "The fact that I am in a position to see a victim guarantees that he was killed". Both explanations also explain the wrong thing. In the first case, what we want to know is "why was the victim killed", not "why do I see that the victim was killed", and in the second case, what we want to know is "why is the universe intelligible" not "why do we see that the universe is intelligible". Both arguments, in response to the former questions, respond with answers to the latter. The argument's effect is to snare a person in a self-referential trap, so that they don't look for an external, more ultimate explanation.
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doctor(logic),
I'm just not going to take this discussion off on the tack you seem to want to take it. The topic of this thread, based on the post, is that there exist some barriers to ultimate explanation by scientific means. You have acknowledged that point by saying order seems to be inexplicable. I doubt we agree on just what is unexplainable, but we agree that there are barriers to explanation.
I know you probably missed it, but we went through a very long discussion here some months ago on whether there is any such thing as non-scientific knowledge, and we don't need to detour there again now.
Your infinite regress argument regarding God is certainly answerable, but if we were to go there, that would also be a detour.
Of math and the universe
http://www.christianitytoday.com.../003/
26.44.html
On pi, e and i
The idea that these two irrational numbers should combine with an imaginary one to yield so utilitarian a result is breathtaking. It is like deconstructing a chemical necessary for life (salt) and finding that it consists of two deadly poisons (sodium and chlorine). That these three strange numbers with such diverse origins should work together to produce a result so basic to mathematics argues that there is a profound elegance or beauty built into the system.
The discovery of this number gave mathematicians the same sense of delight and wonder that would come from the discovery that three broken pieces of pottery, each made in different countries, could be fitted together to make a perfect sphere. It seemed to argue that there was a plan where no plan should be.
Because of the serendipitous elegance of this formula, a mathematics professor at MIT, an atheist, once wrote this formula on the blackboard, saying, "There is no God, but if there were, this formula would be proof of his existence."
Today, numbers from astronomy, biology, and theoretical mathematics point to a rational mind behind the universe.
I'm wondering whether AR and doctor(logic) are familiar with Godel's theorem, and what they think about it's implications for the limitations on our knowledge.
I also highly recommend Stephen Barr's book, Modern Physics and Ancient Faith. It's a very accessible discussion of this issue.
Mike, I'm aware of Godel's theorem at least at a popular level. I do not see its relevance here. The theorem applies to logical limitations on axiomatic systems, not to empirical knowledge.
Incidentally, I quite agree that there will always be things that we are unable to explain.
Mike,
Gödel's Theorem tells us that certain axiomatic systems are either inconsistent or incomplete. If they are incomplete, then there are truths that cannot be deductively proven.
This makes no difference, not even to logical positivists like myself. We make no claim that every true proposition can be deductively proven.
I thought everyone gave up on positivism in the '50's. Why are you still on the bandwagon?
Mike,
The logical positivists had one vital contribution in the Principle of Verifiability. This principle is a definition of semantic meaning. The PoV says that the meaning of a proposition is confined to the distinct propositions that are implied or denied by its truth. As it happens, those propositions fall into two broad categories, mathematics and empirical science, depending on whether or not you admit propositions of empirical fact.
The biggest charge levelled at the logical positivists was that the PoV did not satisfy its own standards of verifiability, i.e., that there was no empirical test that would confirm or falsify the PoV. However, charge was founded on a confusion. The PoV is an executable definition of meaning. It is not an empirical discovery about meaning, as if meaning was floating out there somewhere. It meets its own criteria for meaning because we have a well-defined procedure for attaching the property "meaningful" to a proposition. Of course, you can claim that meaning should be defined differently, but the PoV sets the bar pretty low. It's hard to imagine that I could know the meaning of a proposition without knowing what the proposition's truth would imply and deny.
LP eliminated 95% of metaphysics, which was a bit of a downer for many philosophers. Fortunately for the metaphysicians, philosophy has no technology, so (unlike physics) there's no economic disadvantage in sticking with nonsensical ideas from ages past. In fact, there's probably an economic advantage in choosing meaningless poetry over dry linguistic analysis. It seems to me that philosophers decided it would be better to have no criteria for meaning at all than to lose metaphysics. Also, there's good paper out there by George Reisch entitled "How the Cold War Killed Logical Empiricism" which describes some of the political reasons why LP was driven out of the mainstream.
The PoV says that the meaning of a proposition is confined to the distinct propositions that are implied or denied by its truth. As it happens, those propositions fall into two broad categories, mathematics and empirical science, depending on whether or not you admit propositions of empirical fact.
I don't understand this. "A proposition" could be anything, right? So what is a "distinct proposition" (implied by the first proposition)? And how is it that they are confined to mathematics and empirical science?
Isn't it easier to just say that no statement has any meaning unless it is provable (supportable?) with mathematical and/or empirical evidence?
The biggest charge levelled at the logical positivists was that the PoV did not satisfy its own standards of verifiability, i.e., that there was no empirical test that would confirm or falsify the PoV. However, charge was founded on a confusion. The PoV is an executable definition of meaning. It is not an empirical discovery about meaning, as if meaning was floating out there somewhere. It meets its own criteria for meaning because we have a well-defined procedure for attaching the property "meaningful" to a proposition. Of course, you can claim that meaning should be defined differently, but the PoV sets the bar pretty low. It's hard to imagine that I could know the meaning of a proposition without knowing what the proposition's truth would imply and deny.
I don't see how this resolves the contradiction. It seems like you are just playing semantic games by substituting "executable definition of meaning" for "the meaning of the PoV". Why can't one ask whether the executable definition of meaning is true?
It's hard to imagine that I could know the meaning of a proposition without knowing what the proposition's truth would imply and deny.
Isn't the issue whether the object of 'imply and deny' is solely mathematical and/or scientific?
The PoV is an executable definition of meaning. It is not an empirical discovery about meaning, as if meaning was floating out there somewhere.
That's nonsense. If it's a definition, rather than a statement about meaning "out there", then it's just a subjectivist declaration about yourself and your odd language usage: "I, dr(lo), use the words 'meaning' and 'empirical basis' interchangeabely". In that case, nobody else cares (except inasmuch as it may make them want to avoid wierd conversations with you). The only other option, that the PoV was a proposition about meaning (as everybody knows it was), leaves it meaningless by it's own criterion.
And even if the PoV had been killed for political reasons during the Cold War (rather than by it's own incoherence), who cares? Reasons are illusory anyway, remember? It's "begging the question" to say that a physical process doesn't lead to valid "conclusions".
Mike,
I don't understand this. "A proposition" could be anything, right? So what is a "distinct proposition" (implied by the first proposition)?
I mean distinct from the original proposition. If I know that the proposition P = "The cat is on the mat" implies that "The cat is on the mat," then I still don't know what the proposition means with any precision.
Language translation is not perfectly determinate, but we aim to create consistent theories about what each proposition actually means. For example, I may theorize that the truth of P implies that "the cat is in the same room as the mat" and denies "the cat is in contact with the tile." I can know the meaning of P when I have a predictive theory about the consequences of P.
And how is it that they are confined to mathematics and empirical science?
There can be no meaning when there are no rules of implication. If P implies Q, it does so because there are axioms that say it must do so. Axioms are usually assumptions that are assumed true (e.g., consistency). The only axioms that we are not free to impose by assumption are propositions about the outcomes of experiment. These are determined directly by experience. Therefore, P implies Q because it follows from assumed axioms, or because it follows from assumed axioms and measured axioms. Mathematics and science are the only options.
It seems like you are just playing semantic games by substituting "executable definition of meaning" for "the meaning of the PoV". Why can't one ask whether the executable definition of meaning is true?
We have an intuitive sense of what "meaning" is. We can ask to what degree the LP definition of meaning conforms to our intuitive sense of meaning. That is, we can ask under what conditions we understand a given proposition. My answer to that question is that the LP definition is a minimum requirement for my personal intuition of meaning to be consistent. I understand a proposition when I know what experiences (physical or computational) follow from its truth.
Of course, you can declare that meaning is always subjective, i.e., that a proposition is meaningful when you "feel" it to be meaningful, but that's not a reliable basis for discussion. There's no reason why inconsistent systems can't "feel" meaningful (e.g., Back to the Future Part II). Our emotional response to a proposition is a poor guide to its validity.
The real underlying problem behind logical positivism, btw, is that it's an attempt to use logic to justify Begging Of The Question, a logical fallacy. As with any instance of unsound logic, question-begging can't be justified with sound logic, and those who try too hard to do so become visibly insane.
Deuce,
That's nonsense. If it's a definition, rather than a statement about meaning "out there", then it's just a subjectivist declaration about yourself and your odd language usage: "I, dr(lo), use the words 'meaning' and 'empirical basis' interchangeabely". In that case, nobody else cares (except inasmuch as it may make them want to avoid wierd conversations with you).This is an interesting response considering I am the one proposing an objective metric of meaning, and you are the one claiming that meaning is what we personally "feel" it to be.
Reasons are illusory anyway, remember? It's "begging the question" to say that a physical process doesn't lead to valid "conclusions".
Physical necessity isn't identical with "correctness". Correctness is a measure of conformance with a specification. Since you see supernatural specification in the laws of physics, you interpret physical events as being correct with respect to natural law. This is why you are begging the question. If there's no agency to create a specification, there is no such thing as correctness.
doctor(logic),
You're tripping over yourself badly now. You said it was a definition, not in the sense of specifying meaning "out there," but in some "executable" sense, which I take to mean pragmatic or heuristic but not realistic--especially in view of your identifying free will and rationality as illusory. So your objective metric of meaning sure looks to me like, "objective meaning is what I subjectively find useful to me."
Physical necessity isn't identical with "correctness". Correctness is a measure of conformance with a specification.
Now why would you put "correctness" in quotes? Just what are you quoting? The word doesn't appear in this thread before this.
Anyway, "correctness" can mean more than conformance with a specification--unless you want to continue defining terms according to their pragmatic value only. It may mean something a lot like truth, or correspondence with reality. But you brought up the term, and I don't know what you meant by it, or even why you brought it up.
But I really do like your last sentence--it's one of the points I've tried to make repeatedly, though in different terminology. I'll stick with your terms here, since you wrote it, so I don't have to worry about your disagreeing with it. You said, if there's no agent to create a specification, there is no such thing as correctness. I take it you believe there is no such agent. In that case, lacking a source of a specification, how could your own view be correct?
I really hope you can see that a lot of what you've written is like that--self-referentially incoherent. Your commitment to materialism at all costs has led you to believe thought and free will are illusion, and into all kinds of looping contradictions. I've said it before--I think it's kind of sad to see. Why would you be so tied to a worldview that you would give up on all of reality for it? Not that you asked for that kind of response, I know, but that's what I'm thinking now.
This is an interesting response considering I am the one proposing an objective metric of meaning, and you are the one claiming that meaning is what we personally "feel" it to be.
Oh, so now you're giving us a metric of meaning? Why, only a second ago it was just a definition. Is the PoV just a subjective way that you, personally, define the word "meaning" for your own use, or is it a proposition about meaning "out there" that is meaningless by its own standard? C'mon d-lo, you can't have it both ways. Is your position subjectivist or incoherent?
Physical necessity isn't identical with "correctness". Correctness is a measure of conformance with a specification. Since you see supernatural specification in the laws of physics, you interpret physical events as being correct with respect to natural law. This is why you are begging the question. If there's no agency to create a specification, there is no such thing as correctness.
Oookaaay... amidst all that unmitigated... stuff you just said, you didn't provide an answer (Unless you're speaking completely in code now!). Why are the results of the physical events leading to the mass abandonment of positivism incorrect? Why should the influence of the Cold War make that result any less valid? If you claim that physical events don't lead to correct conclusions, you'd be "begging the question" just like Tom, right?
At any rate, I think my question about why the good doctor has not given up on logical positivism has been answered...
Tom, Deuce & Mike,
When I say my definition of meaning is objective, I mean it can be shared. It may not be a unique definition, but it is one algorithm for computing meaningfulness that we can all execute and get the same result.
In contrast, a personal sense of whether or not something feels meaningful is wholly subjective because we can each get a different result, and that's the end of the story.
You said, if there's no agent to create a specification, there is no such thing as correctness. I take it you believe there is no such agent. In that case, lacking a source of a specification, how could your own view be correct?
Um, I thought there were about four agents in this discussion!
You cannot lift the word correct out of the context of one specification and expect it to mean the identical thing in the context of another specification. If there's no agent setting specs for the laws of physics, that doesn't mean that there are no other agents who create specifications to which things may be regarded as correct.
The confusion about what's referentially incoherent is due to your presumption that there is one controlling agent, one specification, and thus one global test of correctness. You are assuming your worldview in your definition of specification and correctness. If we four humans agree on a specification (e.g., consistency, fidelity to experiment, etc.), the we have established a criteria for correctness to which we should hold our arguments. This definition of correctness holds whether or not there is a God. Claiming that it only holds when there is one overarching spec created by some über-agency is begging the question.
Oh, so now you're giving us a metric of meaning? Why, only a second ago it was just a definition.
Is a meter a metric of distance? How about a cubit? Will alien civilizations use feet and inches? Does the meter have a definition?
An objective metric is one upon which two people can agree. Metrics aren't always universal, even when they're objective standards.
doctor(logic),
I think the last several responses that Deuce, Mike and I gave to you are sufficient. Your internal contradictions have continued to make it hard to make any progress, and, as I pointed out in another related thread, we don't really have any basis for discussion.
You cannot lift the word correct out of the context of one specification and expect it to mean the identical thing in the context of another specification. If there's no agent setting specs for the laws of physics, that doesn't mean that there are no other agents who create specifications to which things may be regarded as correct.
The confusion about what's referentially incoherent is due to your presumption that there is one controlling agent, one specification, and thus one global test of correctness.
So, first the madman says that truth is subjective, relative, and defined by each person...
If we four humans agree on a specification (e.g., consistency, fidelity to experiment, etc.), the we have established a criteria for correctness to which we should hold our arguments. This definition of correctness holds whether or not there is a God. Claiming that it only holds when there is one overarching spec created by some über-agency is begging the question.
...then he goes on to try and make three absolute statements of truth (four, if you count the assertion that truth is relative). I won't bother addressing the other stuff, such as talk of agents coming from an eliminativist, since it's blatant lunacy for all to see. I know I've said more than enough times that materialism implies Post-Modernist mush, but I think this is a good time to reiterate. Eric, Paul, and others, watch yourselves. You too could end up this way!
Deuce,
So if I prefer the National League baseball rules and you prefer the American League baseball rules, then only one of us is correct?
If you believe that then you'll have to settle it in the usual absolutist way by declaring jihad against NLB!
You cannot assess correctness (give it meaning) unless you have a model or spec to compare with. In science, correctness is fidelity of model with experiment. In logic, it is the fidelity of theorem derivation with the axioms of computation. In baseball, it is fidelity of play with the (arbitrary) rules of the game. In this discussion, we want correctness with respect to logic and empirical fact.
The question up for debate is whether there can be material minds that work as our minds appear to work.
You claim that a material mind cannot possibly produce correct answers even when it gives the same answers that a human would. But in that case, how are you assessing correctness? It sure sounds like correctness for you is fidelity to the outcome you prefer, not the one justified by reason.
The correctness of the thesis that minds are material should be assessed according to the consistency of the model and by the fidelity of the model to empirical fact. For example, by the Turing test for AI, or by neurological experiments, etc.
Savvy?
doctor(logic),
I wasn't going to answer you again, as I hinted in my last post, but against my better judgment I'm going to point out a couple more things:
It sure sounds like correctness for you is fidelity to the outcome you prefer, not the one justified by reason.
Actually, we've been saying nothing like that (though I will acknowledge I "prefer" an outcome that is not self-refuting). I have been saying that it's clear your preference for materialism is driving you to assume a catastrophic kind of non-realism and to argue in a self-contradictory manner.
Your test for the correctness of the thesis is that it would account for empirical data--but look at the kind of tests you propose. Their very methodologies assume materialism and offer nothing by way of an answer to the dualist position I've put forth. (Dualism does not deny a material component to thinking processes.)
You also say we can test according to the consistency of the model, but you've been ignoring all of the inconsistencies of your model.
This is why I say we're not getting anywhere here, and this is going to be where I close off the discussion. I may allow you or somebody else the last word on it--I'll decide when the time comes--but be advised that in order to bring this to closure, I may delete future comments by doctor(logic) and/or pertaining to his arguments, at my discretion.
So if I prefer the National League baseball rules and you prefer the American League baseball rules, then only one of us is correct?
Preferring something isn't a proposition, and can't be true or false. Hence neither of us would be correct or incorrect.
It sure sounds like correctness for you is fidelity to the outcome you prefer
Actually, that's what you explicitly stated in your last absurd post, when you declared that truth was relative and defined by the individual.
not the one justified by reason.
Let's see, he declares reason an illusion, leaving him stuck advocating a relativist version of truth, then when he wants to say that his position is absolutely true, he appeals to reason again. Classic. Drillo, you've sacrificed logic and your sanity to your materialism.
Tom,
Just to make my position clear in the record...
If minds are deterministic machines, then our mental sensations are also deterministic. The sensation that we are making a choice could be regarded as an illusion, e.g., if you think that computers don't make real decisions. (I happen to think computers do make decisions, even when they're deterministic.) The claim that minds are material has nothing to do with non-realism, nor does it preclude the kind of debate we are having here.
Such machine reasoning will always be correct if the standard of correctness is conformance to the laws of physics. However, if the standard of correctness is the machine mind's ability to model the world with logical consistency and fidelity to empirical fact, then a machine mind can still be incorrect (even though it operates according to the laws of physics).
Again, my concern with your argument is that it appears to claim that any discussion between deterministic minds would be so absurd as to negate the possibility of such minds, and that such a claim would amount to making a gut pre-judgement, rather than a judgement on the merits of the claim itself.
Deuce,
I'm very sorry to hear that propositions about your preferences don't have truth values.
Commenting by HaloScan
