Thinking Christian Comments
Original Post: Ehrman's Assumptions
The position Dr. Craig in fact took is that there is historical evidence for the resurrection of Jesus. That's different from claiming proof. He explicitly speaks of a probabilistic interpretation of that evidence.
I agree there is evidence as Dr. Craig pointed out. But how much evidence, and how much probability is needed before it is reasonable to conclude such an event probably happened? I don't think anyone can answer that question objectively, which is why we have believers and non-believers.
One can compare how much evidence and its quality to other events and thereby measure the consistency of measuring quantity and quality of evidence.
I still think the maxim that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence holds because an extraordinary claim runs counter to the great weight of evidence that ordinariness implies. If something is ordinary, it happens all the time, and so, as evidence, confirms the ordinary conclusion over and over again. Therefore, it must require a great amount or quality of evidence to outweigh the great amount of ordinary evidence, accumulated through its ordinariness.
"It's almost comical when in the Q&A (page 30) he says,
"So the historian can't have a presupposition; they have to back up whatever their metaphysical beliefs they're going to bring to the table.""
This wasn't said by Ehrman, but by a questioner.
Oops. You're right, thanks. I'll edit it.
I asked my wife (her knowledge of the history of Christianity is much deeper than mine - she has a degree in Religious Studies) about the historicity of the Gospel accounts of the death and resurrection of Christ. Here's a short summary of what she said. (I have distilled down what she said and have drawn conclusions. I take responsibility for what I say below - I don't put it on her.)
I asked her first about the claim that we have multiple independent sources for the Gospel accounts of the life and death of Jesus. She was quite dubious, though she admitted the possibility of it. Debates rage about the relation of Mark to Matthew and Luke. Some hold that Mark comes first; some hold that it comes after. Debate rages as well about the use of the so-called 'Q' source, a source how lost. Did Mark use it? Likely not. Did Luke and Matthew? Almost certainly. How many independent sources do we have in these three gospels then? Two perhaps - the Markan Gospel and the Q source. But one cannot say with any assurance. What of John? It is assumed by most to have drawn upon sources distinct from those used by the other three Gospel writers. So now we are perhaps at three sources. But when we inquire into the decades (likely at least six or seven) that passed between the death of Christ and the composition of the gospels and ask how the accounts of Christ's life and death were preserved then and by how many distinct sources, one must simply remain silent. We have no evidence on the matter.
She said as well that the Gospels are already confessional documents and as such must be read skeptically if we wish to find within them genuine historical accounts of the events they describe. Their purpose was to shore up the faith of a certain community and as such their authors approached the material very differently than would a modern-day historian. They would have taken the oral tradition that preceded them at face value, and would have reworked that material to fit the needs of the community for which they wrote.
The point is that, based upon what we have in the Gospels, one takes a very great risk if one assumes that the Gospel accounts of the death and resurrection of Christ are genuinely historical. We cannot establish the provenance of the Gospel accounts, for the time between their composition and the events they relate is now lost to history. Moroever, we could reasonably expect the Gospel authors not to approach their subjects with the skepticism appropriate to a historian but rather with the credulity characteristic of one already convinced of the truth of what they say.
A comment to add to Franklin's; Q is usually taken to be a sayings document, and therefore contains no information on aspects of Jesus' life like the passion narrative. So the independent sources on the four points raised by Tom (originally by Craig) are at most Paul, Mark, and John. As such Craig's claim of five or six independent witnesses is disingenuous at best.
"In one comment on this blog today, Dr. Craig has already been accused of basing his historical conclusions on his prior presuppositions".
You are probably referring to a comment I made-but I was actually giving an example of an ad hominem argument parallel to the one you gave for Ehrman. I think any such accusation is irrelevant to the substance of the debate, and in particular, I was not accusing Craig of anything.
"This alternative explanation I've given you--which again is not one that I believe--is at least plausible, and it's historical, as opposed to Bill's explanation, which is not a historical explanation. Bill's explanation is a theological explanation."
Heh, does that sound familiar, Tom? Of course, this is just methodological naturalism being applied to human history. It's exactly parallel to the argument that design is by definition not part of natural history (which is what is meant by "science" in that context), and is therefore "theology". Actually, I wouldn't even say it's parallel. In fact, it's the exact same argument, that events that are incompatible with materialism are by definition outside history. Just a couple thoughts on it:
- Since it's the same argument in both cases, a person who accepts one application of it must accept the other. For instance, if you are a theistic evolutionist who says that design is outside science (natural history) by definition, then you are obligated to say that the resurrection is not historical. On the other hand, if you say that the resurrection is historical, you must accept that design is not outside the consideration of natural history.
- Craig's argument wasn't that the resurrection is "historical" by Ehrman's definition of the word, but that it actually happened. Of course, by "historical" most people mean that something actually happened. Instead of debating that it actually happened, Ehrman comes up with his own private definition of "historical" with which the resurrection doesn't fit. As a result, Ehrman isn't really even offering an argument. All he's really doing is informing us that he uses a personal definition of the word "history" which the resurrection doesn't fit into.
- To go along with the last point, Ehrman is making a somewhat common Orwell-ish mistake of thinking that relabeling things can somehow change the underlying reality. So, for instance, just change what you mean by "history", and suddenly *poof*, the resurrection is no longer a possible reality!
- Building on the last two points, Ehrman's methodological materialism relies on a constructivist or anti-realist view of history, both human and natural, for its validity. A realist is somebody who thinks that there is a reality independent of himself, and that it's our job to discover what that reality is, using our rational minds. A constructivist believes that we are basically constructing history and reality, not discovering them. A realist therefore cannot be a methodological naturalist, or a methodological anything-ist, because that would be deciding for reality what reality is, but must try to discover if reality is in fact that way. A constructivist, though, can declare a methodological -ism without being inconsistent with their subjectivist approach, since they consider themselves to be constructing it all anyway, and if they want to construct history such that materialism holds, why not?
I just realized that was more than a couple thoughts. I need to remind myself to go back and read the beginning of my posts again before posting 
It's been said here before that 2=3, for large values of 2. Maybe for even larger values it equals 4 
.
Some other thoughts:
"People who are historians can be of any theological persuasion. They can be Buddhists, they can be Hindus, they can be Muslims, they can be Christians, they can be Jews, they can be agnostics, they can be atheists, and the theory behind the canons in historical research is that people of every persuasion can look at the evidence and draw the same conclusions. But Bill's hypothesis requires a person to believe in God."
The contradiction here is so obvious that it seems almost impossible to miss! Ehrman argues that the resurrection can't be historical, because it contradicts some people's religious beliefs, and historical propositions have to be propositions that are compatible with anybody's beliefs. But if that's the case, then the denial of the resurrection can't be historical either, because you can't be a Christian and deny the resurrection!
Ehrman might respond that Christian historians don't need to deny that the resurrection actually happened, they can just pretend that it didn't happen for the sake of doing history while still believing that it actually did happen (again highlighting Ehrman's constructivist approach to history), and that therefore the denial of the resurrection as history isn't incompatible with being a Christian historian. But, if that's the case, atheist historians could likewise pretend that the resurrection did happen for the sake of doing history, while believing that it actually didn't. So this objection is contradictory no matter how you slice it.
Deuce,
Don't confuse history with historical analysis.
History is what happened.
Historical analysis is how we find out what happened, e.g., by using Bayesian analysis.
Surely, there will be cases in which the evidence and statistics will mislead us. Yet, this merely justifies skepticism in historical conclusions. It does not justify belief in particular, highly-improbably past events.
As I posted earlier, Craig's Bayesian analysis falsely assumes that P(R/B) is high, when it's actually tiny. From observation, the odds against resurrection are around 1 in 10 billion. Ancient hearsay does not overcome 10 orders of magnitude. I wouldn't give the NT even 1 order of magnitude, but even giving it 6 orders wouldn't help. For you to believe in the resurrection, you have to believe that the odds of the NT being factually wrong are 1 in 10 billion. That's just not rationally sustainable.
So, it is inaccurate to say that Ehrman is defining miracles out of history. He's not. He saying that historical analysis is blind to them even if they did occur.
Deuce,
Ehrman argues that the resurrection can't be historical, because it contradicts some people's religious beliefs, and historical propositions have to be propositions that are compatible with anybody's beliefs. But if that's the case, then the denial of the resurrection can't be historical either, because you can't be a Christian and deny the resurrection!Wrong again. Ehrman is saying that historical conclusions must be intersubjectively persuasive to those who accept scientific priciples of historical analysis. If you accept that we can apply probability theory and evidence in a reasonably objective fashion to reach conclusions, then you are a historian. Otherwise, you reject the validity of historical analysis. Buddhist, atheist and Christian historians must all accept, on a professional level, the validity of historical analysis. If they don't, they're incompetent as historians. Of course, competent historians are free to perform historical analysis with due diligence, and then personally reject historical conclusions in favor of religious ones. I don't think that's very consistent, but it can be done.
Historical analysis is how we find out what happened, e.g., by using Bayesian analysis.
...
So, it is inaccurate to say that Ehrman is defining miracles out of history. He's not. He saying that historical analysis is blind to them even if they did occur.
These two statements contradict each other. If history is what happened, but "historical analysis" is blind (by which you presumably mean, must deny) to historical possibilities, then historical analysis is not "how we find out what happened". On the other hand, if historical analysis is how we find out what happened, then it isn't in-principle required to deny anything that may be history.
Second, everything you've said here is confirmation of what I said about this approach being constructivist. There's a lot of other inconsistencies, but I'll leave it to others to point them out if they want. I don't really want to get into this with you, because you haven't shown yourself to be particularly susceptible to reasonable exchange in the past, even when faced with outright incoherence in your positions.
Deuce,
If history is what happened, but "historical analysis" is blind (by which you presumably mean, must deny) to historical possibilities, then historical analysis is not "how we find out what happened". On the other hand, if historical analysis is how we find out what happened, then it isn't in-principle required to deny anything that may be history.You presume too much. Historical analysis is how we find out what probably happened. It doesn't deny miracles. It's just that we cannot rationally conclude that they occurred when there are other far more probable explanations.
I don't really want to get into this with you, because you haven't shown yourself to be particularly susceptible to reasonable exchange in the past, even when faced with outright incoherence in your positions.You know, if you don't have a response of any substance, you can just say so.
Deuce, there are things that have happened that we will never *know* to have happened, because our knowledge is imperfect. If you accept that, then your objections to Ehrman's analysis disappear.
I don't know about that, AR. It looks a lot to me like both AR and doctor(logic) are saying the history demonstrates the resurrection didn't happen, regardless of what happened. That's contradictory.
Tom,
It looks a lot to me like both AR and doctor(logic) are saying the history demonstrates the resurrection didn't happen, regardless of what happened. That's contradictory.At best, historical analysis tells you the probability that an event occurred.
Is it possible that Elvis is still alive? That JFK was not assassinated in 1963? That Napoleon was never imprisoned? Sure, it's possible, but historians think it's incredibly unlikely.
Historical analysis does not say that the resurrection was impossible. It says that it is highly improbable that it occurred.
Rationality forces us to treat like as like. If we're going to accept that Jesus returned from the dead as a historical conclusion, then we must also reject all other historical conclusions that have a confidence level less than 10 billion to 1.
So, if you call the resurrection a valid historical conclusion, you undermine all historical conclusions. How will you answer the Holocaust deniers? Even if the odds of the Holocaust having been faked are only 1 in a million, that's nothing compared to the one in ten billion odds that a man was resurrected. The faking of events has been shown to occur with some regularity, but a resurrection has never been observed.
Just to clarify, I have confidence that the Holocaust did occur, that the U.S. landed on the Moon in 1969, that Harold was shot in the eye at the battle of Hastings, all because I have justified confidence in historical analysis.
Your claim that the resurrection occurred is not a historically justified one. Either it's justified for some other reason, or it's unjustified.
"..saying the history demonstrates the resurrection didn't happen, regardless of what happened."
In the first place, it's not contradictory. Historical conclusions could be wrong, you know. Or incomplete. Seems to be tough to accept for some, though.
Secondly, do not confuse DL's or my position with Ehrman's, which is the only relevant thing here.
OK, on to presuppositions. The entire line of argumentation that Craig uses relies on an evaluation of the probability that God supernaturally raised Jesus from the dead. He claims that he sees no reason why this is improbable.
And right there we have a whole boatload of presuppositions. An atheist historian would not suppose this supernatural occurrence probable, nor would a Muslim or Buddhist. Probably many Christians would be repelled by this argument.
All Ehrman is saying that presuppositions which are not shared by a wide class (indeed, most) of historians should not be brought into historical research. Theological presuppositions have their place, but not in history. Do you disagree?
Incidentally, I have no idea how you can say that Craig "is arguing toward the conclusion of a God, not from the assumption of a God." This is completely counter to everything in his approach here.
And is Craig really so open-minded? Has he considered the possibility that Allah engineered somebody else's crucifixion in place of Jesus, and magically removed the body? What is the probability of this occurrence? What probability calculus tells us that it is unlikely that Loki played a major prank on the apostles? How unlikely is it? 10%? 1%?
Indeed Ehrman raised alternative theological explanations in his talk. Please tell us a systematic way of working out the probability of each one. (Note that assuming that the Biblical God is the only god is tantamount to begging the question.) Unless such calculations can be done, the claim that a supernatural occurrence is probable is unjustified.
How much does it really matter whether the resurrection of Jesus can be considered to be historically probable? Would probability make Tom more of a believer, or doctorlogic less of one? Would refuting Ehrman's method of argument make it more probable that the resurrection occurred?
Tom, I know your goal on this blog is to have these types of discussions, but personally I think more about how my faith and ethics affect my life and how I interact with others.
Rossecorp:
“How much does it really matter whether the resurrection of Jesus can be considered to be historically probable?”
Urgent Memo: It matters a great deal, and it’s not a matter of personal perspective. If something is true, you adhere to it. If not, you abandon it. It’s silly to relegate truth to a secondary status like you propose. Why? Consider your personal opinion of what you believe to be “most” important: “I think more about how my faith and ethics affect my life and how I interact with others.” I, for one, will never believe you. Why should I? (1) If I apply your own criterion against you, there’s no reason to believe it: it’s not important as “true” to my “faith and ethics.” (2) As a homosexual, the depraved behavior you choose to act out is not only downright false (in terms of being against the true, the good, the beautiful), but (again per your criterion) I can easily elevate my personal “faith and ethics” (using your words) above and beyond the truth of any and every other person’s (with no need to back myself up) since my intentions and sincerity are more important. Doesn’t that sound silly? Well, then, why are you promoting it?
Would a coach who loved her players and treated them well but knew nothing about soccer make a good soccer coach? Would a teacher who treated students with respect but knew nothing about calculus make a good calculus teacher? Would a homosexual “couple” who are “kind” (yeah, right... in whose opinion?) to their adopted children be doing those children any good by “normalizing” depraved behavior or teaching them a “faith” that supports such depravity? Is love reducible to mere “kindness,” or is there a significant component of truth involved as well? Real caring isn’t a warm fuzzy feeling and “acting nice,” but a knowledgeable approach to individual needs.
Neither truth—nor even probable truth—are important in you world… so, what is the intention behind your comments if truth isn’t that important? Why are you trying to convince us of anything if the truth isn’t that important?
Tom:
Anyone who claims that the historical record of the life of Jesus (including his miracles) are “highly improbably” is intentionally imposing broad brush statements without producing a gram of evidence in support of such silliness. That same person’s “historical eugenics”-like track record by broad brushing all people that came before us a inferior is silly historicism and bigotry… and then when asked to provide evidence, we are met with silence. See comments to your earlier post.
I don’t need to convince you of the historical veracity of the Scriptures as compared to other similar documents of that period: there are enough references out there to choke a mule regarding the historical accuracy of the Scriptures—starting with Pliny the Younger and Josepheus, and then working all the way up to our time. It’s those who have abandoned reasoning (as commented upon here) by sneaking in personal agendas that should be ignored. As with rossecorp, it seems this person has abandoned the truth for a personal agenda as well… or is getting “history” lessons from The DaVinci Code.
Holo,
You missed the word "probable" in my comment, although at the very end of your response you seemed to remember that I had used it. I think there is a great deal of difference between what can be considered probable and what can be proven true. If the resurrection could somehow be proven to be true, it would change the world.
None of which has anything to do with my homosexuality.
Holopupenko,
I suggest you apologize for your last comment to rossecorp. Your statement wasn't aimed at homosexuality in general, but at rossecorp personally. It is offensive to me, and I'm pretty sure it was offensive to rossecorp.
And enough with the hypocritical accusations of bigotry. Not only do you make bigoted statements in the VERY SAME COMMENT as you make the accusation, but you've already admitted on this blog that you are filled with hate (for homosexuality and atheism, among other things) and that you're happy about it.
If you've already decided you will "never believe" others in this conversation, and that we should be "ignored," then I suggest you make your apology, and then make like a tree.
Hatred of demonic IDEAS (but not people) is not only acceptable--it's obligatory. To not hate interpreting homosexual behavior as normal or atheism or of Nazism or slavery or [choose your poison] would be the height of foolishness and an extreme lack of charity. No, I neither hate you nor rossecorp: whether you interpret it another way is sad. That I tell you and demonstrate to you (by using your own words) that such ideas are self-defeating and evil... is to be welcomed. You, however, choose to turn reality on its head. Another one of the those intrinsically evil IDEAS is moral relativism--yet you acede to that IDEA. Therefore, YOU have no objective moral claim on me or anyone because (a) of your stated (your own words!) moral relativism, (b) because you've abandoned reasoned thinking in your blog. That all this grates on your ears betrays a deep problem. There is a Way out.
Maybe I'm reading this wrong, but it seems to me that we should look at the cause and effect together and the probability of THAT instead of the cause all by itself.
The cause is the resurrection event and the effect is what happened afterward.
A light-hearted example:
Suppose a group of 12 people over a span of several years claimed to meet a space alien who claimed to live on a planet 10 million light years away. The alien told them they are planning to blow up the earth in the year 2050 if humans didn't stop eating Twinkies. Nothing else was mentioned, just Twinkies.
The aliens demonstrated some of their technology before leaving convincing the people they could really blow the earth up. After the aliens left, the people lived their lives consistent with what they saw and heard. The lived their lives preaching the 'stop eating Twinkies' message and willingly allowed themselves to be ridiculed and slandered and would not stop preaching this message. You could tell they were convinced it was true.
Did it happen? The probability is most likely in the realm of impossible, but if 12 people lived out their convictions in a convincing way I'd tend to believe them more than disbelieve. I certainly wouldn't say there is no proof.
AR, your comment on presuppositions is an important one. I think Dr. Ehrman showed quite clearly that he
a) has beliefs that would render the resurrection historically non-existent, regardless of the evidence, and
b) used those beliefs as presuppositions to argue toward his conclusion that the resurrection did not happen.
Dr. Craig, on the other hand,
a) has beliefs that are consistent with the historicity of the resurrection, and
b) did not rely on those beliefs as premises in his argumentation in this debate.
Ehrman's presuppositions, furthermore, assume the conclusion that he draws; he is arguing in a circle. Craig did not do that.
More specifically in regard to this:
All Ehrman is saying that presuppositions which are not shared by a wide class (indeed, most) of historians should not be brought into historical research. Theological presuppositions have their place, but not in history. Do you disagree?
The only "theological" presupposition that Dr. Craig seems to have relied on is that the possible conclusion should not be ruled out in advance of considering the evidence. Are we faulting him for approaching the question with an open mind? Is he to be blamed for not deciding it prior to any evidence?
I refer you also to Dr. Craig's words on assessing probabilities in light of all the relevant background information. One piece of vital information is the evidences for the existence of God. You do not accept those evidences, I know, but see how this important step of analysis affects historical analysis, which Ehrman says is agnostic towards the existence of God. Dr. Craig put it this way on page 17:
But I see no reason whatsoever to think that it is improbable that God raised Jesus from the dead.
In order to show that that hypothesis is improbable, you’d have to show that God’s existence is improbable. But Dr. Ehrman says that the historian cannot say anything about God. Therefore, he cannot say that God’s existence is improbable. But if he can’t say that, neither can he say that the resurrection of Jesus is improbable. So Dr. Ehrman’s position is literally self-refuting.
Do you see how Bart Ehrman has boxed himself in a corner of his own making?
H, I wonder if you are really prepared to go to the logical conclusion of where HATRED of ideas might lead? Look at history and where HATRED of ideas has led.
I'm not arguing that we shouldn't evaluate ideas and condemn bad ones. But there must be some limit somewhere, because when people don't place limits on the where their ideas lead them, bad things usually happen.
This is the problem with absolutism. When you believe in any idea absolutely (no limits), absolute bad as well as good things can happen, even if the original idea is nominally perceived as good.
Deuce,
Heh, does that sound familiar, Tom? Of course, this is just methodological naturalism being applied to human history. It's exactly parallel to the argument that design is by definition not part of natural history (which is what is meant by "science" in that context), and is therefore "theology". Actually, I wouldn't even say it's parallel. In fact, it's the exact same argument, that events that are incompatible with materialism are by definition outside history. Just a couple thoughts on it:
- Since it's the same argument in both cases, a person who accepts one application of it must accept the other. For instance, if you are a theistic evolutionist who says that design is outside science (natural history) by definition, then you are obligated to say that the resurrection is not historical. On the other hand, if you say that the resurrection is historical, you must accept that design is not outside the consideration of natural history.
I think you are eliding some important distinctions between science and history here. First, I agree that the modern habit is to declare certain claims "theological", by which one means "perhaps subjectively true to you, but not objectively true", as a way of dismissing them without actually addressing the claims.
However, I think science does have a legitimate reason to define supernatural events as "not part of science" - namely, that science is limited to the study of the regular, repeatable laws of nature. A unique, non-repeatable, supernaturally caused event can't be tested, can't predict the outcome of any experiments, and can't be added to the corpus of collective scientific knowledge we've built up over 400+ years.
Now, the problem is as stated above - people assume, implicitly or explicitly, that some that is "non-scientific" is not objective. But if one grants that science is limited in it's methodology and scope of explanation to a subset of reality, then the fact that a particular event, such as a biological "design" event or a resurrection event is thought to be supernatural, and thus outside of science, does not mean the event didn't actually happen in a historical sense.
For example, my claims are that the available evidence indicates that evolution happened; that even if events that the ID proponents say happened actually happened, they can't properly be considered scientific explanations; that Jesus Christ was actually resurrected; and that his resurrection is plausible, though not proven, from a historical perspective.
I don't see any inconsistencies here, but your welcome to point any out...
Paul:
Let’s see... the hatred of slavery in the United States wasn’t enough, so a war had to be prosecuted. Nazism? First there was appeasement and the idiocy of Chamberlain, and we got the Sudatenland… and the Anschulss… and Kristelnactch. When that wasn’t enough, the Nazism kept going with Jews, Gypsies, Slavs… until a World War was fought to destroy it. Yet, surprise, surprise, we still have Nazis and Skinheads… all hiding behind “freedom of speech” (read: freedom to hate and hurt PEOPLE). Today we have Sudan, and yet we stand more or less idly by… while people die in slavery. Abortionists claim the lives of a bit less than 1.5 million lives a year alone in the U.S. The overall estimates for communism (remember: its ideology is FULLY based on “scientific” ATHEISM) is now over 100 million lives over the course of the 20th century… and yet we tolerate (meaning etymologically: putting up with that which is bad) communist parties, placating our consciences that “it will never happen again.” Pedophilia has now become a political –ism with the establishment of a political party DEFINED by that depravity. I could go on, and on, and on.
If you think atheism isn’t about hate of PEOPLE, please visit ANY site promulgating it with respect to what they feel about faith. Do you know why a Nazi would never ask a Jew whether they were justified in hating Nazism? Because the Nazi had already relegated that Jew to status of untermeschen (sub-human). Why don’t you get the opinion of a baby in the womb whether they might not be justified in hating abortion? Oh, that’s right… I forgot… we have laws stating “choice” let’s people decide whether unborn babies are person or not. Why don’t you ask a person who’s been infected by AIDs tainted blood drawn from an active homosexual or drug user whether he’s justified in hating these… or doesn’t his views (and life) count?
Indeed, force (and even less, war) is not always the answer. But in some limited cases it was quite necessary. To not have prosecuted the war against the Nazis would have, arguably, incurred an almost greater sin of omission because of a deep, deep lack of charity. I repeat: charity (love) is NOT reducible to “kindness” or “tolerance”… and, in fact, is often quite tough and highly demanding.
Your thinking is muddled because you believe evil in the form of ideas doesn’t deserve hatred… and then you speculate (with no empirical evidence upon which real predictions can be made) as to where hatred of ideas can lead… which is frankly underhanded and fallaciously reasoning. Your thinking is also muddled because you appear to have lost the ability to distinguish between good and evil… with the further implication that force is NEVER acceptable. (Isn’t that a moral absolute, by the way, which you rail against?) Why do I say that? Because, per your own words, you think a “limit” should exist wrt to how to deal with evil ideas… and you do this by implying hating certain evil IDEAS (to repeat: NOT people) merits a “limit.” On what well-supported and philosophically-demonstrated basis do you make that claim… or is it like the warm-fuzzy “feelings” that drive rossecorp? Pray tell, what “limit” should be imposed to permit Nazism to operate and realize its full potential and openly-stated goals… and (again) what is the basis for your limit? Are you seriously suggesting one should not hate (use “loathe” or “despise” if you prefer) the IDEA of Nazism?
What I suggest is a deep fear you may have that the truth inherent in the fact that evil ideas DO exist and should be stopped, logically leads to the next step: just what ideas and actions can be objectively designated evil? And, what that further entails is a fear that maybe, just maybe, there is a very good basis for condemning homosexuality, its brother-in-arms pedophilia, communism, abortion, Nazism, pornography, etc., etc. Otherwise, what are we left with? Moral relativism… and if that’s the case, you have NO objective grounds for criticizing anyone on any ideas or actions they may have.
There is no reasonable limit to NOT be imposed on the practice of Nazism. Alcoholism appears to have a partial genetic precursor… do we tolerate it? Homosexuals claim (as has been shown to be false) that weak genetic disposition exists. But even if true, so what Should we tolerate it being taught as “normal” or “natural.” Certain deadly genetically-based diseases kill lots of people every year. In as much as these genetically-based diseases are a part of nature—and therefore “natural”—does it mean we should not strive to eradicate them. Schizophrenia appears to have some genetic precursors… does this mean we shouldn’t treat it?
Finally, why are NONE of the direct challenges to rossecorp’s assertions addressed, while she, DL, and you go off on tangents? Rossecorp relegated truth to a lower level below fuzzy-wuzzy feelings and personal opinions on “morals and ethics,” within the context of the Craig/Erhman—not addressing the substance of that being discussed. Why?
"The only "theological" presupposition that Dr. Craig seems to have relied on is that the possible conclusion should not be ruled out in advance of considering the evidence."
But this is simply not the case. It is crucial that we be able to evaluate the probability of God causing the resurrection for Craig's argument to go through. This is a theological question. *Even if* we assume there is a god, it is not immediate that he is likely to do any given act. Of course, if we assume that the god in question is the Biblical God, the probability is large, but that would be begging the question.
Craig's approach would indeed throw all historical analysis into confusion, as DL has pointed out before. If we should evaluate all evidence with the possibility of God's intervention in mind, can we be sure that any implausible event could b ruled out? For example as in DL's argument, are we sure that God did not miraculously fake the holocaust? How would you evaluate the probability of this, given that God is so mysterious? And again, I return to the questions in my last post; how do we evaluate the probability of any supernatural occurrence?
Lastly, I think you and Craig misunderstand Ehrman's position slightly. He did not deny that the resurrection occurred; he denied that we could *know* it had happened through historical analysis. Similarly he did not say that the supernatural resurrection of Jesus was improbable; he would probably agree that we cannot know that through historical analysis. He only argued that if theological mechanisms are not used, then the resurrection is improbable, and Craig agreed. So I do not agree that he boxed himself in.
(BTW, I am travelling and may not be able to respond immediately to responses; but eventually I will.)
We have two different discussions going here, and one of them is off topic. I hope that's enough said on that.
AR, I understand that Ehrman said in many places we don't know if the resurrection occurred. But it sure seems to me in other places he's saying it didn't. I haven't read his books so I can't state that with more confidence than that, but that seems to be what he's doing here.
As to theological presuppositions, I suppose you have a point there: Craig is presupposing not just that the resurrection is possible, but if it is to be considered possible, it must be considered possible in light of the monotheistic religion in which context Jesus lived and taught.
It is that very context of monotheism and of consistent teaching that protects us from overusing those types of explanations. Here's one test: within the context of the teaching as well as the evidence, is it reasonable to propose that something out of the ordinary has happened?
Note that Craig was entirely open and above board about the source and the evaluation of his presuppositions in connection to the evidence. That was the point of his probability calculus section: it is a formal, technical, and accepted means of testing these things in open discussion.
Ehrman, by contrast, just kept saying miracles can never be the conclusion of historical inquiry. The only way that could be good history is if miracles never happened. But that is the question on the table. He's assuming his conclusion in his premises, no matter how you slice it.
H, you are reading in a whole lot to what I said. I never said one couldn't go to war to combat an evil idea. I was just cautioning you that sometimes absolutism leads to its own evil.
I (as well as everyone here) get to decide what points I want to engage, and I was never part of the conversation about rossecorp’s points, so I just decided to bring up my own tangent.
Paul:
No, I was not reading into what you said because I specifically used the word "force" -- which was what you alluded to in your absolutist statement. The term "war" was added to drive home the point.
Other than that, all my points stand. Especially at the end wrt to Tom's latest (correct) admonition that we're getting off topic. My point was to show rossecorp did exactly that--get off topic: not addressing the Craig/Ehrman issue at hand by bringing in "personal ethics and morals" and relegating truth to something secondary. The latter compounded her problems and underminded her position.
With hat tip to Tom, there is nothing further that needs to be added.
Tom,
You are trying to say that the story of Jesus is so remarkable in itself, that his resurrection would be unremarkable. Yet, this assumes that Jesus was plausibly who he said he was, and that other parts of the NT description of Jesus are also true. However, it is clear that the gospels are not an impartial historical commentary. They're not even biased historical journalism. They are each portraits, written long after the events in question supposedly took place, intended to convert people to a particular religious perspective.
It is itself an extraordinary claim that Jesus was who he supposedly claimed to be. For the claim to be mundane, you have to believe that
1) God exists
2) God interacts with humans
3) a God can have a human son
4) Jesus was such a person
5) Jesus was sent here for a particular reason
6) What Jesus said and did was appropriate for his status, etc.
If you assume these things, you can almost predict his resurrection, but why would one assume these things? The NT. Yet, the NT is not its own historical proof. These assumptions from the NT cannot be used to bolster the case for other claims of the NT.
Few people doubt that the gospels were written in the first century, and few doubt that they refer to some real people and some real places. This is because independent evidence has been found to support these facts. Yet, there is no independent evidence that Jesus even existed, let alone that he said certain things or performed miracles. It's all hearsay.
I missed this one. H. wrote
Yet, surprise, surprise, we still have Nazis and Skinheads… all hiding behind “freedom of speech”Yes, that pesky freedom of speech. Where does that idea come from, anyway?! [sarcasm mode off] This puts your thought about hating ideas into a clearer perspective, one with which I now disagree even more because of your comment above.
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you believe evil in the form of ideas doesn’t deserve hatredI never said that, and you cannot quote anything I've ever posted on this blog that shows that I said that. My request to you (and to everyone) is to not interpret what I write, but just respond to exactly what I write. Drawing a logical conclusion from another's idea is one thing, re-interpreting that idea into something else is another. See immediately below about black and white.
you appear to have lost the ability to distinguish between good and evil… with the further implication that force is NEVER acceptable.I never said that, either. I think you're stuck between black and white: if I ask a question about the history of hatred, implying something about the use of force, I must be against it in all cases.
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That some limits to absolutism or hatred of ideas should exist cannot not refuted by a single example such as Nazism. Saying that some limits exist does not mean that no limits are never appropriate. If you are against some limits, then you must be against any limits.
Here's the choices: (1) no limits on behavior or use of force anytime anywhere against hateful ideas, (2) some limits sometimes and in some places for responding against hateful ideas, (3) or complete restriction, force is forbidden, anytime, anywhere, anyplace against hateful ideas. Which of these three options do you hold?
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There is no reasonable limit to NOT be imposed on the practice of NazismWhat happens if imposing a limit on Nazism contradicts some other value that you hold? How do you judge between competing values? I don't mean that rhetorically, I am looking for a real answer.
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Finally, why are NONE of the direct challenges to rossecorp’s assertions addressed, while she, DL, and you go off on tangents?I hope you accept the idea that all contributions to a blog are voluntary, and that everyone (including you) gets to decide what topics they are interested in responding to.
Holopupenko,
[from Paul]
I hope you accept the idea that all contributions to a blog are voluntary, and that everyone (including you) gets to decide what topics they are interested in responding to.
I believe you said that you were only on this site to counter DL, not to post for yourself, or to oppose any one else.
Do you have a new policy? Or did I get that wrong?
Eric:
Please point out to me when I said I was here ONLY to counter DL. By the way, DL is doing a fine job of countering himself: most of the time I just echo it back by applying his criteria to his own assertions... and watch the house of cards -- built on wet sand -- fall.
WRT Paul's latest questions (and in due deference to Tom together with my last comment not to pursue things further), I'll paraphrase Paul's suggestion (while correcting the English sentence ending in a preposition): all contributions to a blog are voluntary, and everyone gets to decide to which topics they are interested in responding.
H, I wasn't clear about your last post (3:52 pm). Did you intend to just re-state my suggestion with proper grammar, or did you intend to support the content of my suggestion? I can't tell which you intended.
Someone reportedly took Winston Churchill to task for ending a sentence with a preposition--or, using a preposition to end a sentence with () . Churchill responded, "That's the kind of pedantic nonsense up with which I shall not put!"
I'm in good company, then, eh?
Do you know the one about Winston Churchill sitting next to a matron at a dinner and the two of the did not get along at all? It got so bad that the matron turned to Churchill and said, "Sir Winston, I believe that if we were married, I would poison your soup!" Churchill replied, "Madam, if we were married, I would drink it!"
Okay... I'll break my own rule... with a poor joke.
An Arkansas farmer drove into Harvard Square to proudly attend his son's graduation. He pulled over to the curb and asked a student passing by, "Hey, boy! Can you tell me where Widner Library is at?"
With obvious contempt, the sophomore responded, "Hahvahd men don't end their sentences with a preposition."
The farmer thought for a moment and said, "Okay. Would you please tell me where Widner Library is at, idiot?"
Hi, Mike S:
I think you are eliding some important distinctions between science and history here. First, I agree that the modern habit is to declare certain claims "theological", by which one means "perhaps subjectively true to you, but not objectively true", as a way of dismissing them without actually addressing the claims.
However, I think science does have a legitimate reason to define supernatural events as "not part of science" - namely, that science is limited to the study of the regular, repeatable laws of nature.
Note the qualifier I gave here:
It's exactly parallel to the argument that design is by definition not part of natural history (which is what is meant by "science" in that context)
In other words, I wasn't talking about applied, experimental science. I'm talking about natural history specifically (the word "science", unfortunately, is used very inconsistently in modern day). MN applied as a rule in this case isn't just similar to MN applied to human history, it's the same application - MN as a rule for interpreting history.
Deuce,
Naturalism just says that there are laws governing events. Those laws are what make it possible to predict and postdict, and to deduce histories from observations. If there's no nomological connection between past events and current ones (or future ones), how are we to know anything about the past? How do we "interpret history" sans law?
Naturalism certainly does not "just" say there are laws governing events. It says there is nothing except those laws, and the physical entities on which they act (whatever that means ontologically). It says that's all there is. It says that history is nothing but the action of those laws.
So one way not to interpret history under naturalism is in terms of human personalities and values.
But under theism, we are not required to address the question you closed with, dl. That's a straw man. We believe there are laws, but there is also personality.
Tom,
Naturalism certainly does not "just" say there are laws governing events. It says there is nothing except those laws, and the physical entities on which they act (whatever that means ontologically).But naturalism is perfectly happy with randomness. It says that either things appear to be lawful, or else they appear to be random. If things appear to be random, we don't know anything about them except that fact.
We believe there are laws, but there is also personality.Personality is a kind of law inasmuch as it is detectable. Personality is a statistical correlation. Statements like "Betty is friendly" are predictive. Such statements are fuzzier than Newtonian gravity, but they're still lawful to the extent that they have any content.
"Personality is a statistical correlation."
I don't think there's any future to this conversation. Sorry. We're too far apart to have any point of agreement to start from. I think personality is a lot more than that. We've discussed this enough in the past for me to know that, unless you're changing your mind, you will not see that personality cannot simultaneously be both a reality and a matter of just law and chance. You want to see it as both.
Well, I'll try one more time anyway. Your answer to nature being just laws is that it also includes randomness. Well, that's reassuring. Every thought, every rational movement of my mind, every value, every emotion in me is just a product of laws operating on me, inexorably, irresistibly, even mechanically--but wait, no! It's not that awful! Take heart, Tom! Some of your thoughts and values and loves are not so determined! Some of them are random!
Thank you for that encouragement.
Don't you want to pull your beliefs together? Don't you believe that what you think and feel has more to it than law and chance? Don't you want to have a coherent way to explain it, better than that?
First, on Ehrman's position: you said "AR, I understand that Ehrman said in many places we don't know if the resurrection occurred. But it sure seems to me in other places he's saying it didn't."
It is quite possible that he made both statements, but is still consistent in the sense that one can argue that historical analysis cannot say anything about the resurrection, either supporting or refuting it. But one can still believe that the resurrection occurred or didn't occur as a matter of faith. (An analogy is Gould's insistence that evolution does not affect religious belief, but he was an atheist anyway.) I tend to feel that there is a certain amount of doublespeak going on here in most cases, but it is a consistent position nevertheless.
"Ehrman, by contrast, just kept saying miracles can never be the conclusion of historical inquiry. The only way that could be good history is if miracles never happened."
Indeed, Ehrman states that historical analysis would miss miracles if they happened. Quite so. But the question is, is there a method of modifying historical analysis so that it would *reliably* identify a miracle? That is the issue being raised, and if there is not, then Ehrman's position would be correct, if disappointing for advocates of natural religion.
"As to theological presuppositions, I suppose you have a point there: Craig is presupposing not just that the resurrection is possible, but if it is to be considered possible, it must be considered possible in light of the monotheistic religion in which context Jesus lived and taught."
I would guess that means you are in pretty much in agreement with me that Craig's argument needs theological input. Would you not agree that that's a problem?
"Here's one test: within the context of the teaching as well as the evidence, is it reasonable to propose that something out of the ordinary has happened?"
Remember that the theology was developed in response to the resurrection. So using the teaching as a context for the evidence is extremely dangerous.
"That was the point of his probability calculus section: it is a formal, technical, and accepted means of testing these things in open discussion. "
It's open, yes; but one of the factors in the equation is the probability of God, which is hard to decide.
Naturalism just says that there are laws governing events. Those laws are what make it possible to predict and postdict, and to deduce histories from observations.
Total bull. Everybody here knows what naturalism is, so don't bother trying to rope-a-dope us and finesse it's meaning into something else. If you honestly don't know, just go look it up in a dictionary or go to naturalism.org
Tom,
Don't you want to pull your beliefs together? Don't you believe that what you think and feel has more to it than law and chance? Don't you want to have a coherent way to explain it, better than that?I just wrote about this on my blog, yesterday.
What you and I want is irrelevant. Law and chance are two complementary categories. If a thing isn't determined, it must be random.
You keep insisting that "free" is a third category after "determined" and "random," but all you have to support your contention is your dislike of the dichotomy. Perhaps you would feel better if we used the word free in place of random?
All I have to support my contention is the uniform agreed experience of billions and billions of people.
All you have to support your contention is a contested philosophical position.
Deuce,
Don't confuse the conclusions of naturalism with its foundations.
The alternatives to naturalism claim understanding and explanatory power from the unpredictable. Where a naturalist sees the unexplained, the theist sees a miracle. Where the naturalist finds no predictive power, the theist is satisfied with an explanation.
This is amply illustrated by this debate. Probability analysis is predicated on the naturalist's assumption that laws operated the same way in the past as in the present. If the theist assumes that the laws of the universe don't apply to past events, why bother with historical analysis at all? I can only think that it is to give their unsupportable claims the false veneer of scientific respectability.
'Q' source, a source how lost.
It was never found.
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