Thinking Christian Comments
Original Post: Grab Bag
I think it is impossible to refute that some people misuse evolution to justify a relativistic morality, and to attack the Christian view of man. But unless one addresses whether the conclusions they draw from the scientific theory are reasonable, it doesn't tell us anything about the rightness or wrongness, or goodness or badness, of the theory in question. The theory may be perfectly correct from a scientific point of view, but some people may have drawn erroneous philosophical conclusions from it. People also use quantum theory as a basis for relativism ("it's all just chance anyway"), but we don't see anyone arguing that quantum theory is wrong on that basis. Some people also misuse Einstein's theory of relativity to argue for moral or metaphysical relativism. But in that case we don't generally have people opposed to this conclusion attacking Einstein, or "Einsteinism". What is the difference between evolutionary theory on the one hand, and quantum mechanics or relativity on the other?
Good question, Mike, and I agree wholeheartedly that conclusions that are drawn falsely out of evolutionary theory should not be taken as evidence against it. If you refute a distortion of a theory, you do not refute the theory. (The same applies to the way ID is too often handled, by the way.)
What is the difference between evolutionary theory and quantum mechanics or relativity? I think it is that even where philosophical conclusions have been drawn from these theories (as in The Tao of Physics, for example), it is evident that the connection is weak. Quantum mechanics may show that all particles, once having interacted with one another, remain forever linked to one another, which is a central point in The Tao of Physics. From there to that author's pantheism is a long leap, however. It is an even longer leap (though some have made it) from relativity in Einsteinian terms to moral relativism. As scientific bases for worldviews, these theories just aren't very compelling. So those who have tried to take them that direction haven't gone very far.
Evolution, on the other hand, may not entail philosophical materialism but its cultural and philosophical link to it is undeniable--because taking it the other direction, materialism does seem to entail evolution. It can hardly be an accident that the most prominent and vocal proponents of evolution have been materialists, while theistic evolution's voice remains a whisper. Dawkins was right when he said Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist (which to him is virtually synonymous with materialist).
Does this mean theistic evolution is wrong? It's certainly a minority view--it shares that with Intelligent Design. No, it's not wrong on that account.
But your question was what makes evolution different from these physical theories, and it seems to me that the answer lies in how closely the theories are linked to materialism and atheism.
Regarding happiness, you might be interested in some of David Myers' articles on the subject. He's also written an entire book on the subject.
Excellent! Thanks, Macht.
Mike & Tom & Macht:
Good points. I might add that secular scientists feel an immense pressure—some of it self-imposed, antecedent, non-scientific baggage, some of it by sheer moment of the success of science over the past three hundred or so years in their own areas of specialty—to judge all knowledge against the methodologies and tools of the modern empirical sciences. That notion is false, but it’s so deeply ingrained in scientists who have little or no philosophical training to understand how it negatively impacts even their own science. (To be fair, the same happens on the “other side” with the emphasis flipped.)
The modern empirical sciences are not—and demonstrably cannot be—the epistemological arbiters of all human knowledge. To believe otherwise is to accede to self-refuting scientism.
Anyway, because of the pressure, certain scientists (Hawking, Dawkins, Sagan, and Weinberg to name just a few) feel they may make grand metaphysical claims about the universe (like the really DUMB “the universe is meaningless” or “there is no mind, only a brain”) with no proper demonstration as to their soundness. Any undergraduate can tell you science can’t—by its job description—draw non-scientific conclusions like these. Science can supply good “input data” in order to then permit philosophy to progress further on understanding what causality, meaning, existence, design, purpose, and why the scientific method is an excellent procedural tool. But the modern empirical sciences can’t touch the full philosophical import of these concepts.
(By the way, that’s why some of the more inept secularist scientists despise metaphysics because it makes claims beyond (by definition) what the modern empirical sciences can achieve, and hence escapes their control. Then, they make non-scientific assertions out of hand, like: “Metaphysics is meaningless or doesn’t exist” which is—yep, you guessed it—a metaphysical claim!)
Unfortunately and all too often, careless scientists do feel the need to pontificate on knowledge outside their expertise. Why? Because they’re scientists (everyone say “ooh, ahh” and bow). Moreover, Dawkins and Weinberg are simply dishonest: you’ll never hear them drawing the careful distinction, “Okay, now I’m making a philosophical or metaphysical claim…” Why? Because, at that very moment they’ll be forced to employ philosophical tools and methods to prove the validity of any such claim. Yet, the very fact they make such inept philosophical assertions shows they’re not good at it… and, frankly, I think they know it.
P.S. Macht: interesting blog you have!
Tom,
But your question was what makes evolution different from these physical theories, and it seems to me that the answer lies in how closely the theories are linked to materialism and atheism.What!!!!
Materialism and atheism do not de-value human life!!! That's just as big an unjustified leap as the idea that natural selection de-values human life. Materialism gives you an "is," not an "ought."
Need I remind you that theism doesn't automatically value human life?
Thank you for that solid word of support!
Materialism and atheism do not de-value human life!!! That's just as big an unjustified leap as the idea that natural selection de-values human life. Materialism gives you an "is," not an "ought."
See? There you have it, plain as day! With materialism, you have an is. You have no ought. (If there is an ought, in a system where the material is all there is, then where does it come from??)
No, you need not remind me that theism doesn't automatically value human life. Christian and Judaic theism, the only kind I can speak to, do value human life. You may believe they do not, but only if your view of Judeo/Christian theism is distorted. You may not agree with it, but don't change what it says and then say you disagree with that. Please.
Tom,
You are confusing two issues. There is the experience of morality (what we feel we ought to do), and then there is a description of why we feel that way.
The feeling of morality is common to theists and materialists. The actions commanded by those feelings may not be common across or within belief systems, but no one I know goes through life deliberately acting against their moral values, except through minor personal failings like laziness, etc.
Let's compare the two worldviews, first from a descriptive view of morality.
The materialist says that either moral feelings are inexplicable, or else they can be explained in terms of regularities (e.g., chemistry, neural networks, evolutionary advantage, etc.).
The theist says that the moral feelings are the result of some form of intelligent programming and that they are a reflection of God's morality.
Okay, so far, this is all descriptive.
When it comes to normativity, what does each say?
Materialism offers no prescription for what we should do independent of our feelings. Our subjective morality is what it is. We can do what we want or do what we don't want. Not surprisingly, we usually do what we want.
[You originally implied that the materialist ought to choose between alternatives by emulating natural processes such as natural selection. As I think you know, materialism does not lead to any such conclusion.]
Theism can be rigged to prescribe whatever you want it to. Theism says that our moral feelings are basically correct (they are a reflection of God), and that, broadly, we should follow our hearts. Indeed, Judaism and Christianity have been pretty much in lock-step with changing cultural norms from day one. Scriptures have been continuously re-interpreted (in successively less literal ways) in light of our evolving cultural sense of morality.
If you believe you should do what God says, it's not because you believe you should always do what a deity tells you. No, you will do what God says because it aligns with what you already think the good is, and because you think doing God's will is a guidepost to your existing sense of moral good. That's why people tend not to believe in Gods that don't align with their own personal moralities. Most people want (and get) a rubber stamp for their personal morality.
I see no sign of moral superiority in the theistic worldview. You might claim that theism dictates that people should behave in a way we all find morally good, but then why did we need theism to tell us to do what we all agree we should do anyway?
doctor(logic),
First a correction; maybe I was unclear:
[You originally implied that the materialist ought to choose between alternatives by emulating natural processes such as natural selection. As I think you know, materialism does not lead to any such conclusion.]
I would not intend to imply that. What I see is that the materialist has no grounds for choosing between alternatives, and that emulating natural selection is certainly not one of them, for it is allegedly a blind process, not a choice.
Your description of feelings, under your system, is another "is." It does not contain an "ought."
Theism can be rigged to prescribe whatever you want it to. Theism says that our moral feelings are basically correct (they are a reflection of God), and that, broadly, we should follow our hearts. Indeed, Judaism and Christianity have been pretty much in lock-step with changing cultural norms from day one. Scriptures have been continuously re-interpreted (in successively less literal ways) in light of our evolving cultural sense of morality.
Sad to say, this shows a very distorted understanding of the history of Judaic and Christian religion. Maybe at another time I'll take time to show the problems with it. In brief, the tendency has not been from more literal to less literal. Check out Augustine. Christianity has not been in lockstep with the culture: Check out the books of Ezra and Nehemiah, check out Jesus' life, look at the abolitionists, look at Total Truth by Nancy Pearcey to see where women's rights came from; check out anything by Rodney Stark; look at the life of Patrick in Ireland; look at where almost all the hospitals in the non-Western world came from (and consider where they came from in the non-Western world). That's not my rebuttal, it's just a short list, out of a much longer one possible, of some things I might talk about further in a rebuttal.
You might claim that theism dictates that people should behave in a way we all find morally good,
No, I can't imagine claiming that. Your prior paragraph is also a sad distortion of theism. As I said recently, it is easy for you to give a distorted version of theism or Christianity and then to knock it down. I'd love to see you grapple with the real thing for a change.
I do agree with one thing: "Most people want (and get) a rubber stamp for their morality." I think many people are unwilling to consider the reality of God just because they are uncomfortable with the morality that he calls for. I don't think we see God for who he is without being willing to humble ourselves before him. I chose to follow God in the first place, partly because I see clearly how empty decisions and choices are without some kind of transcendence. I had not yet read Dostoyevsky, but I knew "without God, everything is permitted." And I knew that if that was true, then choice loses its meaning.
I look to God as my rescuer from my failings, not as the stamp of approval on my goodness. I wish everyone could know the peace and joy that come from humbling ourselves before his mercy and goodness.
doctor(logic), one more question:
You wrote,
Theism says that our moral feelings are basically correct (they are a reflection of God), and that, broadly, we should follow our hearts.
I'm wondering where you got that from. It is a serious distortion of orthodox Christianity. Yes, we are created in the image of God, but the Christian view is that following our hearts leads us in a path of self-oriented error and blindness toward God. Our hearts betray us. We need something greater to follow.
More on this in a blog entry later.
Tom,
Under no circumstances does an "is" become an "ought," not even for theism. The only case when an "is" becomes an "ought' is when one of the "is's" is itself an "ought."
For example, if it is the case that I ought to reduce suffering, and it is the case that feeding the poor will reduce suffering, then I ought to give food to the poor.
But you are suggesting that theism provides an ought whether we have one to begin with which is unsupportable, unless you already feel an ought that translates descriptive facts into imperatives.
Theism says that our moral feelings are basically correct (they are a reflection of God), and that, broadly, we should follow our hearts.I got it from TC, among other places. When we discuss morality, you and others appeal to the common revulsion we feel about heinous acts. If XYZ, then the Holocaust was not evil, etc. However, you and I only know that the Holocaust was evil because we feel it so.
I'm wondering where you got that from. It is a serious distortion of orthodox Christianity.
Do you execute the commands of the Bible literally? No. You don't kill people for minor infractions. Why? Because you interpret the Bible in the context of your own pre-existing moral views. You still see theism as placing restrictions upon your actions, but you read the rules through tinted glasses. For you, the Bible does not seek goals you oppose, even though it may require discipline that's uncomfortable. I have a hard time believing that you feel that the NT wants to achieve something you feel is evil, but you obey in spite of your feelings.
Okay, here's my question: have we explained this so poorly? Is the message of God as sovereign creator and redeemer so unclear? Is it we who have failed to get the point across? Or is it that some people (like dl here) have heard it clearly but can't accept that what we're saying is what we're saying?
Let's be clear about one thing: if God is the sovereign creator, he speaks what ought to be, and that provides the ought. You can shake your fist at him and say that his "is" doesn't produce an ought, and he'll say "Oh, really?" If your view of theism is different than that, then your view of theism is not the one that we're talking about here.
And your understanding of my view of morality is equally distorted. I have been saying that we all have a common belief that there is morality, but I've not been saying that we can discover its content by following our hearts. We discover it from God, through his Word. Our commonly held sense of revulsion even at things like the Holocaust is unreliable--because it is not a commonly held sense. If it was, the Holocaust wouldn't have happened. People made it happen, after all.
The commands of the Old Testament were revised in the New Testament era--that's why we don't kill people for minor infractions. If my understanding and application of the Bible's commands are incomplete and inadequate, that does not surprise me--I don't claim to have a perfect grasp on it. But I view it as authoritative: if I come to understand that I've viewed it wrongly, then it is incumbent on me to change, not to ask the Bible to change.
If you don't agree with that, please at least do us the favor of trying to understand that this is what we are talking about.
Tom:
I offer this not to be patronizing to you: step back and ignore such unreasoned baiting... and enjoy the blessings of this day. (I realize I often fail to heed my own advice.) When witnessing at a level even as benign as simply attempting to remove barriers to understanding doesn't seem to work, it's time to move on.
Tom,
You can shake your fist at him and say that his "is" doesn't produce an ought, and he'll say "Oh, really?" If your view of theism is different than that, then your view of theism is not the one that we're talking about here.In the past you have reasonably rejected the idea that power to deliver reward and punishment does not bestow moral authority.
You also appear to agree that, in general, an "is" does not imply an "ought".
So, should I conclude that you partially define God by his ability to turn an "is" into an "ought"?
Or is there an attribute of God that you think gives God this power, e.g., his having designed the universe?
I have been saying that we all have a common belief that there is morality, but I've not been saying that we can discover its content by following our hearts. We discover it from God, through his Word.Okay, noted. You think people cannot trust their moral senses, so men should follow their religious leaders' interpretations of scripture instead of their hearts. How should they choose their religion and their religious leaders?
DL:
In response to your last question, one word: TRUTH. ALWAYS pursue the truth, no matter how hard, no matter how many false starts, no matter how blind alleys, no matter how many disappointments, no matter how much hypocrisy. ALWAYS pursue the TRUTH; NEVER give up.
IF you then ask, as Pilate did condescendingly, "what is truth?", you've already conceded the fight--and a struggle it is, don't let anyone convince you otherwise. My fear is, because of your stated position on moral relativism and against the truths of the first principles, you've wiped out any possibility of knowning truth objectively, and hence have undermined any possible reason for pursuing the truth.
doctor(logic), God's moral authority is his by right of his being the one eternal, transcendent, holy creator. That he has power to deliver reward and punishment is also true for the same reasons. The "ought" that flows from him is as essential to his eternal nature as is the "is."
I like Holo's answer to your last question.
Tom,
Your answer is still unclear.
Are you stating (1) that any being with certain morally neutral attributes (omnipotence, creator, eternal, uniqueness, omnsicient, etc.) can turn an "is" into an "ought?"
Or are you saying that (2) absolute moral authority is an independent attribute?
I'm curious to know which of these unjustified assumptions you make.
Thanks for the vote of confidence in your last line, doctor(logic)! 
Rather than buying into your false dilemma, I'll try to clarify my point. I'm not saying that God turns an is into an ought. I'm saying that the ought is co-eternal with the is, as facets or attributes of who God is.
Okay, I think that's what I actually meant by (2).
H,
In response to your last question, one word: TRUTH. ALWAYS pursue the truth, no matter how hard, no matter how many false starts, no matter how blind alleys, no matter how many disappointments, no matter how much hypocrisy. ALWAYS pursue the TRUTH; NEVER give up.I asked how people should choose how they should choose. If they cannot trust their feelings about what they should do, why should they trust feelings that tell them to pursue truth? You're not answering the question at all.
Furthermore, your reference to false starts and blind alleys assumes something else. If a person accepts some moral authority, how does that person know the authority is wrong, and that they have made a false start? Answer: personal feelings.
You criticize personal feelings as unreliable, then propose schemes that rely upon them. A house of cards built on wet sand, by your own criteria.
What I wrote doesn't sound a lot like what you wrote in #2, doctor(logic). Moral authority is not independent of the rest of who and what God is.
If the pursuit of truth is itself in question, as you just wrote to holopupenko, we have nothing further to discuss. If it's just a game to you, I don't really care to play it. If personal feelings are your only answer to all questions, why do you bother asking them?
Tom:
Ditto, dude. Man... I tried, I really honestly tried. I thought I was a good boy and kept the sarcasm with DL to a bare minimum. There's something else at work here...
Tom,
Moral authority is not independent of the rest of who and what God is.Okay, let's try again. Are the morally neutral attributes of God sufficent to bestow moral authority, or are they just necessary for that moral authority?
If the pursuit of truth is itself in question, as you just wrote to holopupenko. we have nothing further to discuss. If it's just a game to you, I don't really care to play it. If personal feelings are your only answer to all questions, why do you bother asking them?You are missing the point, and/or dodging the question. You already know that I feel I should search for truth (for what seems consistent and knowable). I'm asking why I am right to search for truth beyond my "unreliable" feelings that I should do so. Read carefully, and you'll see that you are the one calling into doubt my feelings that tell me I should search for truth.
You say that feelings are unreliable, and H suggests that this presents no problem for objectivism because there is some sort of corrective mechanism that allows us to eventually detect blind alleys and wrong turns. Well, what is that mechanism and how do we know that it works (beyond personal feelings)?
"The commands of the Old Testament were revised in the New Testament era.."
Like the Ten Commandments, for example?
Actually, yes, the command regarding the Sabbath was revised by Jesus himself. The other 9 were not.
Others that were revised had to do with ceremonial cleanliness (foods, washings, etc.), circumcision, the sacrifice and other activities related to the temple, and more.
doctor(logic>
Are the morally neutral attributes of God sufficent to bestow moral authority, or are they just necessary for that moral authority?
The question you're asking shows that you haven't understood my previous answers. God's moral authority inheres in his being God. There is no aspect or attribute of God that is logically or temporally prior to any other. To say that one attribute of God is necessary or sufficient for another attribute is to misunderstand the eternal unity of God's person. The attributes are not different parts of which God is composed, after all.
You say that feelings are unreliable, and H suggests that this presents no problem for objectivism because there is some sort of corrective mechanism that allows us to eventually detect blind alleys and wrong turns. Well, what is that mechanism and how do we know that it works (beyond personal feelings)?
Interesting question. I could ask you the same, since you are convinced, I'm sure, that science contains the kind of corrective mechanisms you are asking for here.
But you probably think that in the case of morals it's a different question than for science. You argue that morality is based on personal feelings. What would science be if it had the same foundation? It would collapse instantly.
I say that personal feelings are unreliable guides for morality. I can't see how that would be controversial. Look at the variety of personal feelings! Which one is right? How can one decide? By one's own personal feelings? Each one makes his own decision. But if I disagree with yours--if you think suicide-bombing a bus is just fine and dandy, and I disagree--it's my feelings against yours.
So there has to be a more solid foundation. How does one know what that is? Therein lies the axiological argument for God: we need something or someone bigger than us to settle the matter.
Given (for the sake of argument, at least) that there is a God, is it still a matter of personal feelings how one views God's ethical standards? Well, it is to some extent a matter of personal interpretation, yes, although the basics of God's injunctions are not foggy. But two things prevent even that from being a morass of indecision:
1) It's not just up to us to determine what God is saying. He communicates.
2) Even if we get it wrong, at least we know there is such a thing. I mean just that: there is such a thing as getting it wrong. We know there is a right and a wrong that is bigger than someone's feeling that it's good to blow up a bus, or someone else's feeling that it's good to serve in a hospital for the underprivileged.
Don't underestimate the importance of (2). If there is no right answer to the question of what is ethical, there is no wrong answer either, and no one can commit a blameworthy act. Settle there for a while and think about that. It's logically prior to the question of which specific acts are good or bad. Consider whether it's important that there be such a thing as a right or wrong act. Then we can move on to the next step in the question.
Tom,
Interesting question. I could ask you the same, since you are convinced, I'm sure, that science contains the kind of corrective mechanisms you are asking for here.Science is dependent on an assumption, one that is accepted on personal feeling. Specifically, scientists agree to be bound by prediction, come what may. How they feel about specific predictions is subservient to the the broader principle. This principle cannot be proven, but it is founded on deeper assumptions of consistency and law.
Morality is different. Morality is a question of which assumptions we should accept. There's no doubt that certain things follow deductively (and objectively) from particular assumptions. Assuming you are being consistent, if I adopt your assumptions, I will reach the same conclusions as you. However, acceptance of those assumptions is itself a moral choice. That's why I can see no basis for morality beyond personal feelings.
Each one makes his own decision. But if I disagree with yours--if you think suicide-bombing a bus is just fine and dandy, and I disagree--it's my feelings against yours.No, there doesn't have to be a more solid foundation. That's not a rational argument. That's displeasure with a conclusion.
So there has to be a more solid foundation.
Searching for truth means facing up to answers you don't want to hear. I cannot prove that searching for truth is the right thing to do (beyond my feeling that it is), but I can point out where it would be inconsistent for people to simultaneously hold that view and ignore truth.
Even if we get it wrong, at least we know there is such a thing. I mean just that: there is such a thing as getting it wrong. We know there is a right and a wrong that is bigger than someone's feeling that it's good to blow up a bus, or someone else's feeling that it's good to serve in a hospital for the underprivileged.Arguments with moral objectivists always end up in the same place. The objectivist points to acts that inspire great admiration or extreme revulsion, and claims that there must be more there than feelings. How can it be that the justification for there being more than feelings is... our feelings? Not to mention the rhetorical value of the claim, as if any contradiction of the objectivist view would serve to lessen our respective admiration and revulsion.
Don't underestimate the importance of (2). If there is no right answer to the question of what is ethical, there is no wrong answer either, and no one can commit a blameworthy act.This is false, and you can verify that it is false by applying the same rules you would apply to other subjectives, like aesthetics or taste.
By analogy with art, your claim is that, if art appreciation is subjective, then nothing is beautiful and nothing is ugly, and therefore, I should decorate my house to look like an Abercrombie and Fitch catalog, even though I think that such decoration would look ugly.
If taste in food is subjective, then nothing really tastes good or bad, therefore, I should eat what tastes bad to me.
I'll just pre-empt a likely objection to my claim...
Should we try to impose our subjective views on others? Sometimes. When the subjective proclivities of others are deeply offensive to us, we are often compelled to take political or military action to limit the freedoms of others. Liberal democracy establishes a social contract that balances our dislike for the subjective decisions of others with protections for our own subjective tastes. Moral relativism leads to the (relatively) lawful society that we have today.
No, there doesn't have to be a more solid foundation. That's not a rational argument. That's displeasure with a conclusion.
Okay--then will you agree from now on, for the rest of your life, never to say, "That's wrong!" You may only say, "I'm displeased with that."
That's if you want to be consistent with yourself, of course. If being inconsistent with yourself is not something that displeases you, then you can say whatever you want. You seem to value rational thinking, though, or at least you say you do; which presupposes a certain level of consistency.
Okay--then will you agree from now on, for the rest of your life, never to say, "That's wrong!" You may only say, "I'm displeased with that."For a moral relativist, saying "That's wrong" must be understood to be a shorthand that means either
(1) "I'm displeased," or
2) "That is inconsistent with other moral codes that you [the person who is "wrong"] would agree is "wrong," so if you want to claim consistency, you'd better change your behavior," or
(3) "That is inconsistent with the morality of your society, so if you want to function in your society, you'd better change your behavior."
I think 2 and 3 are stronger forms of relative morality than 1.
Yes, Paul is right.
Tom, if you were to claim, say, that "water" and "H2O" meant the same thing, would you then promise never again to use the word "water" in place of "H2O"?
"Water" and "H2O" are synonymous.
"Wrong" and "displeasing" are not.
(2) and (3) are fine when they work. They aren't much good with the suicide bomber, though, are they? Don't tell him he's wrong. Tell him, "I didn't like that!"
Yes, Tom, you're right, all we have to do is to tell the suicide bomber that we don't like that (because we, or, at least I, for one, truly don't like that) and we can take steps, even violent ones, to prevent suicide bomber from bombing suicidally.
You haven't been explicit in your last couple of posts about what the problem is. Or, perhaps you're agreeing?
"Wrong" and "displeasing" are not [synonyms].This is your claim. However, if I hold that they are synonyms, I would not be inconsistent by treating them as such.
They aren't much good with the suicide bomber, though, are they? Don't tell him he's wrong. Tell him, "I didn't like that!"The basic question is this: is there a practical difference between telling someone (1), (2) and (3) and telling them that they are objectively wrong? Surely, intersubjective persuasion is the practical concern, and persuasion relies on appeals to the values already held by the person you're persuading.
For example, if you claim that some objectivist terrorists are objectively wrong, the terrorists would have to regard you as a moral authority (or authority proxy) according to their own rules for determining authority. I doubt that you would be regarded as an authority by Al-Quaida, or that an Imam would be regarded as an authority by a pro-Christian terrorist. About the only commonly held assumption is that consistency is good, but that's covered by (2).
Objectivists and relativists end up having to apply persuasion in exactly the same way, i.e., reason within a shared worldview, reason within the other's framework, civil coercion, then violent coercion. At each stage, the persuader must evaluate the costs and benefits of each form of persuasion.
Jeez, I must be in an incredibly picky mood to say
Water and H2O are NOT synonymous. Water is what comes out of my tap, right? As in "Hey, get me a glass of water, 'K?" But what comes out of my tap isn't pure H20 (would that it were).
The lesson is that if you keep going far enough, you can make an equality seem like a difference. So the question is *at what level* (on what criteria, etc.) are things equal or different? So DL can say that displeasing and wrong are equal on the level he defines.
It's just a semantic thing. LIttle else isn't, eh?
Or, I might be wrong about this.
If you hold that "wrong" and "displeasing" are synonyms, doctor(logic), you are changing the meaning of the words.
And you're back to confusing objectivity with intersubjective persuasiveness:
For example, if you claim that some objectivist terrorists are objectively wrong, the terrorists would have to regard you as a moral authority (or authority proxy) according to their own rules for determining authority.
Under God, it does not matter what I claim or what I hold, or what others can be convinced about. What matters is what is true.
Your system doesn't even have a category for that. It can't even ask the question of what is morally true; it denies that there is such a thing. I was saying the same thing earlier in point (2) here.
And your last paragraph there comes down to questions of power; what's right or wrong has nothing to do with it, only what is most pleasing or displeasing to the side with the biggest weapons.
Note that this is not just a discussion about what is wrong; it is also about what is right. Do you ever come to the end of the day with the satisfied sense that you've done something right? If so, then you must deny yourself that description. You've done what is pleasing, a tautological condition. You cannot be satisfied that you've done something that was right, but you can be pleased that you've done something that pleased you.
If you're willing to say that's the right way, the true way, the way things are, then I'm very sad for you. You are so enamored of a materialist, positivist viewpoint that you will give up the most basic of human values for it. You will give up some of the most basic human words: right and wrong, good and evil. You will tell yourself that much of what you regard as true cannot be, because it doesn't fit in the materialist universe you have concocted. You cannot seem to consider the possibility that this materialist universe is indeed your own concoction, and that there is something true in those basic human values that points you to the real truth of the universe. I grieve for you. I don't mean that patronizingly. It's just true.
Tom wrote:
And your last paragraph there comes down to questions of power; what's right or wrong has nothing to do with it, only what is most pleasing or displeasing to the side with the biggest weapons.I think relative morality, at some level (note, that isn't *every* level), comes down to power. It's not pretty, but that's the world I find myself in, for better or worse.
It doesn't matter what we give up (right, wrong, etc.) as long as it's reality, as best as one can determine (and I'm trying really hard). I could grieve for Tom as much as he does for materialists.
Tom,
You will tell yourself that much of what you regard as true cannot be, because it doesn't fit in the materialist universe you have concocted.Before you get all teary-eyed over my loss, maybe you can describe what it is about my experience that's different from yours in light of my analysis.
Suppose you like music by Shakira. Then, one day, you determine that musical taste is subjective/relative. You realize that your sense of the goodness of her music would be merely a measure of the degree to which it pleased you. What would you be giving up in your experience of Shakira's music by claiming that musical goodness was subjective?
I can only think of one thing you might sacrifice: pride. You might originally have been proud of your objectively good taste in music. Discovering that there was no objective basis for music appreciation, would rob you of that pride. I suppose it might also make you less intent on imposing your musical tastes on others. However, I see no reason why you would lose your passion for listening to the music you love.
What you give up, doctor(logic), is two things, one of which I will not expect you to agree with--a relationship with God. The other I have tried to communicate in terms that would make sense from your position. It's the ability to recognize what is good.
The analogy in arts is interesting, because I'm a musician, and I've thought long about whether one kind of music is "better" than another. We could look at that two distinct ways, actually: is one kind of music better, and is one kind of musical enjoyment better?
What's very distinct here is that there are no inherent contradictions in liking different styles. I like classical and jazz more than other styles, but I enjoy classic rock, and I also really like various "World" musical styles, especially from China. If I were to decide that hip-hop was (musically speaking) a lot of fun to listen to, there's room for that as well.
One style does not contradict another. In ethics there is contradiction. Suicide bombing is good to one person and awful to another. In art there is no need to resolve differences. In ethics there is.
This need for resolution is not just for intersubjective persuasion. It's a fundamental requirement, you are ever going to use the language, "that was the right thing to do," or "that was wrong," and if you're going to resort to something other than power to determine which is which.
One style does not contradict another. In ethics there is contradiction. Suicide bombing is good to one person and awful to another. In art there is no need to resolve differences. In ethics there is.Tom, I don't think this is relevant to my analogy at all. The question was about what is being given up experientially when we give up objectivism.
While I think the music analogy is a good one, we can make it more than an analogy. If we suppose that there were only one musical venue and one radio station, we would be able to turn it into an actual ethical decision instead of an analogy to one. Musical taste would then become an ethical issue, and there would be conflict over which musical style would be played. Yet, musical taste would still not be objective. People would still fight over it, and some might claim objectivity, but all would still enjoy the music they like best.
If Johnny hates Jazz, he doesn't give anything up when he realizes musical taste is subjective. Jazz still causes him suffering even when he knows Jazz is not objectively bad. Johnny still contends to have his music played instead of Jazz, and still enjoys music the same way he did before.
doctor(logic), the latter part of my answer was about what you give up experientially, as were previous messages. You give up the ability to use certain types of language--and all the meaning implied in them! And you give up the ability to use anything other than power to settle ethical questions.
The music analogy is just too great a stretch the way you've extended it here.
Tom,
Well, as already discussed, I don't give up the ability to use synonyms. So, the difference you are talking about has to be in the meaning.
Are you saying that you can feel proud of doing what feels right, whereas I can only do what feels right? Or perhaps that you can appreciate a "universal harmony" when doing what feels right, where I merely do what feels right?
On a side note, I dug Tom's music analogy, but, like any analogy, it can be taken too far. (Wait, does that mean I'm supporting Tom or DL?)
doctor(logic), I wasn't talking about synonyms but about meaning. I could explain it again but it would just be repetitive, unless you have a more specific question.
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