Original Post: Dog Bites Man
Tom Gilson | Homepage | 10.16.06 - 12:03 pm | #

He's a man of faith, but he doesn't see that it's so. His blindness is a fatal flaw.

Well said, Tom. It's a different kind of faith but faith nonetheless. I can respect a man like Dawkins admitting to such faith and then defending it with logic/evidence, but he doesn't do that. To him it's the gospel truth. Too bad it's the wrong gospel.
SteveK | 10.16.06 - 12:24 pm | #

If you reduce faith to merely meaning that we make predictions about the future (will science discover X?), then it is uncontroversial that Dawkins has faith. I don't see where Dawkins' approach is different from that. I think he means that religion is based more on what we call blind faith.
Paul | 10.16.06 - 12:50 pm | #

Paul:
     “Blind faith”? You are falling for Dawkins’ trap of defining the terms of the argument and then demanding everyone play by these rules. (Sometimes called the “loaded dice” fallacy.) What Dawkin’s means by “blind” is lack of “proof” accessible to the modern empirical sciences, i.e., data available to the five primary senses and the scientific method. That is a positivistic outlook on reality (which is a certain philosophical interpretation of what reality is all about, and decidedly NOT an MES interpretation) that a priori limits the acquisition of knowledge to material entities and physical phenomena, and it’s inherently self-defeating.
     Humans are distinguished from the brute animals (for among other reasons) because they are able to reason (rather than merely think) to entities that are wholly inaccessible to the five primary senses. Pray tell, which MES can observe “virtue” or “dignity” or “predicate” or “the day after tomorrow”? Not a single one. I can even provide you one example (of an infinite number of potential examples) from mathematics: Most people have little difficulty forming a fairly clear mental image of a five-sided object (pentagon), but no person sincerely claims to be able to form a clear mental image of a thousand-sided object (chiliagon). Nonetheless, it is not especially difficult to form a clear concept of a chiliagon. Now, if a chiliagon is conceivable but not imaginable, how much more unimaginable is “justice”? I think you get the point.
     So, I’ve just provided you only a cursory overview of the undeniable fact that much of reality is inaccessible to the modern empirical sciences, and I was able to do it without basing my point on the MESs. Did I do so by appealing to your “blind faith”? Of course not: I appealed to your capacity to reason beyond the reach of the MESs. (And, I didn’t even mention faith in the true, theological sense of the word whose object is God, i.e., faith is NOT about “making predictions about the future” to employ your words.) Now, if Dawkins (or you, for that matter) nonetheless want to label what I’ve shown as “blind faith,” then by all means, go at it! But please don’t expect anyone to take you seriously.
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.16.06 - 2:14 pm | #

Post deleted for multiple violations of comment guidelines. This blog welcomes real discussion, but not name-calling, invective, or ad hominems.

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Anonymous | 10.16.06 - 8:26 pm | #

Humans are distinguished from the brute animals (for among other reasons) because they are able to reason (rather than merely think) to entities that are wholly inaccessible to the five primary senses. Pray tell, which MES can observe “virtue” or “dignity” or “predicate” or “the day after tomorrow”?

Yes, Eric. Justice exists only in our heads, and our heads are material.
Paul | 10.17.06 - 9:21 am | #

Eric and Paul,

You've missed the point of what Holo was saying. He was talking about where knowledge comes from, and that the MESs (as he puts it) are not the only source of knowledge. Therefore Dawkins sets up an illicit test of evidences when he says that all evidence, all knowledge, must be grounded in the MESs.

I can't tell how your answer relates to that at all.

But since you said it, realize you're saying more here than you probably want to. For example, numbers exist only in our heads--or do they? Where else do they have any reality? (Go find a number for me somewhere and show it to me; not a numeral, of course, but a number. ) And yet reality is such that we have to acknowledge that mathematics is intertwined in all of it.

Numbers exist only in our heads, and our heads are material. Are numbers material? Or are they fictitious? Or what?
Tom Gilson | Homepage | 10.17.06 - 9:52 am | #

Logic is also in our heads and we use it to rearrange those 'non-existing' numbers in such a way as to make a 10-story building possible.

Amazing how all of these non-empirical concepts can help us build cities and get ahead.

As Holo said, it's an undeniable fact that much of reality is inaccessible to the modern empirical sciences.
SteveK | 10.17.06 - 12:39 pm | #

A number is a concept, which is potentially reducible to a material brain state. These concepts are *useful* for negotiating the real world, sometimes exceedingly well. Just because they are very useful doesn't mean that they have some non-material reality.
Paul | 10.17.06 - 12:53 pm | #

Just because they are very useful doesn't mean that they have some non-material reality.

Are all of these concepts tied to a material reality? I don't think so but maybe I'm wrong about that. There's some pretty wild abstract theory out there.

In any case, the concept itself is not the same thing as the material reality it is linked to. They may be linked, but they are two different 'things' just as letters on a page are distinct from the information they convey.

If numbers and information are real - yet not physical, measureable entities - then why not justice, love, forgiveness, patience, etc?
SteveK | 10.17.06 - 1:16 pm | #

That's a big "if." I think you can outline a consistent, coherent system without getting into that "if."
Paul | 10.17.06 - 1:49 pm | #

Paul:
     Okay, do it.
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.17.06 - 2:42 pm | #

Admittedly it's a pretty brief outline, but didn't I do that in my 10.17.06 - 12:53 pm post?

Where is the need to define numbers, justice, etc., as being non-material, as opposed to being concepts that are ultimately reducible to material brain states?
Paul | 10.17.06 - 5:23 pm | #

Paul:
     You’re begging the question something awful: you a priori assume concepts are reducible to material states of the brain without first defining what a concept in general is, or what any of the particular concepts are. As it is, both your short statement here and your referenced previous post are little more wishful thinking for a particular outcome—in this case, materialistic.
     But let’s say I let that important point slip by... for now. Given your belief that concepts are reducible to material brain states, you’ll find you’re in an even bigger mess: What is it about complex patterns of electro-chemical signals crossing synapses that animates the concept of, say, justice, with any capacity to impart a moral imperative? Are you saying that the IS of electrons and chemicals in the brain are magically turned into an OUGHT? (I LOVE using Hume back against materialists!) Even if you could point out to me on a PET computer monitor an example of “justice,” why should I feel any compulsion to believe those electrons (or whatever material you like) impart an imperative? Put crudely but insightfully: how can a group of electrons or other material be “good,” “evil,” or “indifferent”? How about the concept of truth: when is a group of electrons and gray matter complex enough or large enough in number to be considered “true” or “false”? Would you like to extend this to all the examples I provided above… as well as the potentially infinite varieties of concepts? I showed you above that things exist that are completely inaccessible to the five primary senses (like the concept of the “day after tomorrow”), yet you assert the thing “day after tomorrow” exists only as a material brain state. Really? You should feel quite uncomfortable about these difficult questions—which is my point: I can’t move on to what concepts are without first showing you the utter inadequacy of materialism in addressing what concepts are.
     For the record, a concept is a universal term that captures the essence (definition, meaning, nature) shared by some group of existants. An image is a mental representation of a concrete existent. I can have a concrete image of my particular dog Lassie in my mind, but at the same time I have the universal concept of “doginess” in my mind that Lassie shares with ALL other dogs. A concept is NOT that which you understand, it is that by which you understand something. The only way you can know a concept is to conceptualize by reflecting back upon it. In that sense, concepts are invisible and, metaphorically speaking, should be as invisible as a good pair of lenses in the glasses I’m wearing: like good eye glasses, concepts work best when they are not seen. I don’t understand “doginess”—I understand what dogs are by means of the concept “doginess.”
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.17.06 - 6:10 pm | #

How about the concept of truth: when is a group of electrons and gray matter complex enough or large enough in number to be considered “true” or “false”?

I also would like to know how the materialist can tell the difference between a brain state that corresponds to truth/correctness and one that corresponds to false/incorrectness.

Perhaps another brain state tells you which brain state reflects truth. But then how do you know that one is true?
SteveK | 10.17.06 - 7:35 pm | #

Holo, I'll get back to you soon.
Paul | 10.17.06 - 8:23 pm | #

Holo, I don't get it, I define concept just like the dictionary does. What's wrong with that definition?

What is it about complex patterns of electro-chemical signals crossing synapses that animates the concept of, say, justice, with any capacity to impart a moral imperative?

Are you saying that the IS of electrons and chemicals in the brain are magically turned into an OUGHT?

Paul:
     Why is using the dictionary definition of the word “concept” insufficient for philosophical discussions (which is what I believe we’re having)? Because words aren’t the only things that “have” definitions. You’re using the word “concept” merely as a label—to name something… and you look for the definition of the word rather than the thing you’re supposed to understand. What’s the difference between the word hammer and using a hammer? Everything! In the former case you’re focusing on the symbol of the thing; in the latter you’re focusing on the thing itself. I’m trying to focus your attention away from the word so that you can focus on the thing. I keep on asking you WHAT a concept is, and you keep on giving me new names or pushing the problem/question away by using other concepts—“useful” for example.
     “There are many blocks in the box” and “There is a lot of dirt in our rug,” the word “in” is being used in the same way [univocally]. But in the sentences “There is a lot of dirt in our rug” and “There is a lot of meaning in what you say,” the word “in” is being used analogically. While there is a clear connection in the use of “in” in all these sentences, there is also a clear difference. Words are analogical when they refer to things that are related but different.
     Most emphatically you will NOT be able to understand what a concept IS (and you will be left with merely defining words rather than the thing itself) unless you realize and accept the analogous naming of things is the only way to speak of things that are similar but not the same in kind., i.e., that things exist in various ways. You speak of a certain concrete tree, but you also speak of “treeness” as a concept. You also speak of “meaning.” The word meaning is critically important: it’s not detectable by any of the five primary senses (if you doubt me, challenge me), and yet you talk about it. The only, only, only way you can talk about “meaning” is if exists in some mode. It must exist, or you wouldn’t be talking about it. Now, just because I can’t point to the meaning of a word or concept or whatever using my five primary senses doesn’t mean “meaning” doesn’t exist. Yet, its existence MUST be explained. “Meaning” does not enjoy the real existence a tree does, but it DOES enjoy some rarified form of existence. IF you claim “meaning” is reducible to material brain states, not only do you fail to explain what it is, but you equivocate its beingness (i.e., what kind of a thing it is) to the beingness of a tree: both are material. Really? If a tree is material, then use your senses to point one out. Good. You can do that, and I agree with you. But, per your logic, if “meaning” is the same kind of material thing, then use your senses to point one out to me. Ahh, therein lies the rub… You use the word “meaning” yet you can’t seem to point to an example of “meaning” in the real world using your five senses.
     Now, given that, don’t you think you need to expand your understanding of what it means “to be” or “existence” are all about? If you revert (as you invariably seem to do) back to the wishful thinking (called: materialism’s epistemological promissory note) that it’s all material, you’re back to square one and there is no way you can tell me just what “meaning” means. “A complex pattern of time-dependent electro-chemical signals across brain synapses”? Well, then, that’s all it is… and you yourself should NOT be trying to sneak meaning into those physical processes… and, yet, you do… over and over and over again. Your gut feeling tells you one thing, your philosophical antecedents tell you another. So, which one is true. Ahh, but you can’t ask that question, can you: nothing is “true” because material is not “true” or “false,” “good” or “bad,” etc. You’re stuck.

     “Usefulness” instead of moral categories or instead of “truth”? That just pushes the question further away instead of answering it. Okay, I’m game: what do you mean by “usefulness”? Where is a “usefulness”? If your criterion for existence is materiality, then show me a material-based (accessible to the five primary senses) “usefulness”? Moreover, isn’t “usefulness” a highly teleologically-charged word? I mean, something is useful FOR something: there’s an inherent goal in mind. What goal? What IS a goal? NOTHING you’ve said sheds even the tiniest glimmer of light on what the words you bandy about actually mean. You’re running around in a materialist cage, acting as if the immaterial exists but loathe to explore what it means to be immaterial. You set the rules up to ONLY accept material beingness, and then run in the worst of troubles trying to explain anything only in those terms. Why not challenge your premises?
     Here’s another example of “meaning” which none of the MESs can deal with at all: Consider the word “RED” and “red”. The size of a file of a digital photograph of first word would be greater than that of the second word, because the first is bigger and therefore mathematically more complex. This is a wholly observational perspective, i.e., one that is observable by at least one of the five primary senses. Because you CAN observe both these words using your sense of sight, it creates the possibility of quantifying each of these words’ mathematical complexities. Why? Because the physical shape of all words is wholly determined by the location of, say, the ink molecules out of which they are composed. So, since the fist word is bigger than the second, it is composed of a greater number of molecules than the smaller. Therefore, to specify the precise location of each molecule in the first word is mathematically more complex than to do the same with the second (small) word. BUT, BUT, BUT… obviously the greater mathematical complexity of the first word does not carry with it greater meaning. Speaking ontologically, the complexity of both words is the same. Speaking conceptually, the meaning of the words is exactly the same. Go figure. Now, using just the MES, please explain to us the meaning of what redness IS. You can’t. If you tell me red “means” a certain wavelength of EM radiation, you haven’t told me what it is: you’ve merely substitute some fancy words to NAME redness. In other words, you haven’t answered the question.

     You say: “Where did you show that the concept of ‘the day after tomorrow’ exists as something beyond a material brain state? Please recap that for me.” Easy: I didn’t. Why? Because YOU are the one making the claim that “the day after tomorrow” is ONLY a material brain state. Therefore, the onus is on you to demonstrate that to us. I’m pushing you to do just that (remember: you made the claim, and I said “do it”) by employing your own rules of the game. Where, by the way, are your “rules? If “to exist” means ONLY “to exist materially” then PLEASE show me those rules in all their material glory! Are they merely material brain states? Well then, so be it… but don’t call them RULES… they’re merely electrons and chemicals: stop trying to sneak into your words a mysterious “something”!) I’m trying to push you (using your own rules) to the point where you realize those rule are inadequate to explain all of reality—utterly inadequate, in fact.

     One could take your “relativism” to the cleaners all day… starting by applying this criterion back upon itself, to wit, if truth is relative to you, then the “truth” of this claim is relative as well. So, what are you left with? The dictionary word is “nonsense.” How about this simple example: It is a truth that I did NOT paint the Mona Lisa. Would you consider that a “relative” truth? Probably not.

     Ready yet to challenge your premises and views?
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.18.06 - 7:58 am | #

Holo, you wrote in your 10.17.06 - 6:10 pm post:

I showed you above that things exist that are completely inaccessible to the five primary senses (like the concept of the “day after tomorrow”),

You say: “Where did you show that the concept of ‘the day after tomorrow’ exists as something beyond a material brain state? Please recap that for me.” Easy: I didn’t.

Paul:
     First, please be careful in drawing distinctions: to say 1. (as I did) "completely inaccessible to the five primary senses" is different from questioning 2. (as you did because I quoted you) "the concept... exists as something beyond a material brain state." I did NOT go so far as to draw the latter conclusion. I'm taking things one step at a time: first show materialism is inadequate, then move on to reason to another explanation. Immateriality? Maybe. Maybe there's a sixth physical sense. Maybe God or aliens impart knowledge directly into our minds. Maybe our minds (as opposed to our brains) are immaterial. But we're not there yet. So, there is no contradiction... just you missing the distinction.
     Second, challenging me with this non-contradiction in order to merit a response from you is not playing fair, and you know it. The questions I pose to you won't go away whether you want to answer them or not. What's more, it is quite ironic that you "believe" in moral relativism and yet are making (seemingly) objective moral claims on me by accusing me of contradicting myself. IF things are relative, then what possible objective truth claim or moral imperative could you have on me? None, in fact. This is another reason why you're stuck. You seems to impose moral and epistemological on everyone... but yourself. If you're going to set up the rules, then at least humor us in playing by them.
     Now, please try to answer the questions.
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.18.06 - 9:42 am | #

A summary of Holo's comments:

If a tree is nothing but physical material then you should be able to describe a tree using only physical data from your 5 senses: atoms, electrons, neutrons, energy, dimension, wavelength, etc, etc.

If I were to hand you the tree data and ask you what the data was you couldn't tell me. The 'treeness' is gone because it can't be represented in physical terms.

The fact is materialism fails to fully describe the universe as we humans know it. Our universe is filled with truth, redness, pain, treeness, justice, warmth, love, etc.
SteveK | 10.18.06 - 12:36 pm | #

Second, challenging me with this non-contradiction in order to merit a response from you is not playing fair, and you know it.

I apologize to Holo and Steve for not directly addressing their points as I posit an outline for materialism (I plead lack of time).

Let's say there exists atoms A, F, Y, and Z, and I call that group of atoms "Group 8." Group 8, as a collection of atoms, doesn't have any non-material existence apart from atoms A, F, Y, and Z. Now, the *concept* of Group 8 has an existence inside my head, but that is nothing more than a group of atoms/neurons in my head that configure themselves in such a way such that I say "Group 8 is atoms A, F, Y, and Z." Just like the atoms of Group 8, the concept of Group 8 doesn't have any existence apart from the atoms/neurons in my head. So, nowhere is there something apart from its materialistic definition.
Paul | 10.18.06 - 1:39 pm | #

SteveK:
     Thanks for the succinct summary. As I’ve noted previously in commenting on this blog’s posts: I am a sound-byte free zone! Also, your example of a tree expressed as data example accessed by the MESs (empirical data) is a good one—I hadn’t thought of it that way, but it makes perfect sense. (Do you mind if I add it to my own quiver of examples?)
     Your example is somewhat similar to imagining a scientific contraption that that contains the following detectors: (1) a sophisticated video camera to record visual images of a tree; (2) a “sniffer” probe to collect air samples in the vicinity of the tree and carry out chemical analyses; (3) a “wet sticky sheet” to pat the tree to collect surface chemicals for analysis; (4) a collection of sensitive listening devices to record and mathematically analyze sound emanating from the tree; and (5) a tactile meter to ascertain the geometric and surface tension characteristics of the tree.
     Let’s leave aside the blindingly obvious point that an intelligent human being would have to design, construct, and program this contraption—which teleology like there’s no day-after-tomorrow. No matter how sophisticated the contraption (which is a machine, i.e., a heterogeneous entity of accidental unity), neither the contraption as a whole nor any of its parts could ever “know” what a tree is: describing a tree is not knowing it, and I cover “knowing” here (example: a cool rock warming up in the presence of sunlight doesn’t “know” sunlight.). Now, consider a concept: could this contraption ever record data on a concept such as “the day after tomorrow”? Possibly it could record the necessary physical data as “seen” on a PET monitor that records human brain signals, but never the sufficient nature of the concept itself. Could this contraption ever record the meaning of the day after tomorrow? No. Could this contraption ever record data on “the data after tomorrow” apart from any human conceiving of the concept. No.
     Here’s another example you might find interesting. If, as materialists claim, all things are reducible to the material—including concepts to brain states, then the concepts of logic (predicate, premise, conclusion, syllogism, argument, etc., etc.) must ALL be similarly reduced. So, if an argument and its premises are nothing more than complex time-dependent patterns of electrochemical signals crossing brain synapses, then what possibly could be compelling about such material process? I.e., how does a material process “compel” anything? (Don’t we need to know what these terms “mean”?) How can material process accurately reflect the truth content of external realities? Why can’t materialists deal with these questions instead of promising us that science will figure it out? How can the MESs figure out things that are inherently inaccessible to the five primary senses? Ah… but it gets even better.
     The premise of an argument does not physically cause assent to the conclusion. If it did, shouting the argument in the presence of a materialist would eventually cause him to believe that they were wrong and that the mind (as opposed to the brain) is immaterial. Or, if the materialists could shout louder and longer, then the non-materialists could be “convinced.” Doesn’t that sound absolutely ridiculous? Maybe this explains why atheists on their blogs and sites feel mostly compelled to shout people down, flame at them, use obscenities… after all, if everything is material entities and physical processes, then “the more the better,” which is another way of saying “might makes right.” They can’t seem to grasp the fact that the truth of arguments compels assent through our immaterial capacity to reason. Rational arguments do not and cannot physically compel anything—especially the truth of the matter.
     Again, thanks for your example.
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.18.06 - 2:38 pm | #

Eric and Paul,

You've missed the point of what Holo was saying. He was talking about where knowledge comes from, and that the MESs (as he puts it) are not the only source of knowledge. Therefore Dawkins sets up an illicit test of evidences when he says that all evidence, all knowledge, must be grounded in the MESs.

Paul:
     I do, honestly, sympathize with your plea of lack of time… but only to a certain extent. These are NOT easy issues—people have spent lifetimes studying them over thousands of years. Moreover, I can assure you (as only one example) the concept of the analogousness of being is something that takes LOTS of time, effort, patience and prayer to wrap one’s mind around. But it is not less valid than MES knowledge just because you can’t study it in a test tube. Because the subject matter of philosophy is different than the immediately-accessible empirical data of externally-existent things, different “tools” and methodologies must be used. And yet, the knowledge and data of the MESs—especially these days—forces scientists to specialize more and more, and to use sophisticated instruments more and more, so that this knowledge is immediately accessible to only a few. The subject matter of philosophy, on the other hand, is accessible to everyone instantly. While rough, one can summarize three basic and undeniable things all people have known throughout all time and in all cultures, i.e., these are the “raw materials” of philosophical knowledge: (1) minerals, plants, and animals exist; (2) square circles don’t exist; (3) nothing comes from nothing. It’s stunning how much you can get from these few building blocks… but, again, it takes lots of time, effort, patience, and prayer.
     Now, not being able to address the issues Steve and Tom and I raise because of practical time considerations is one thing. Yet, you seem to have the time to produce examples that supposedly “show” everything can be reduced to the material. In the interests of fairness (oops! what does “fairness” mean in a reality that lacks objective moral categories?!) you should take a stab at some of the questions. And, in the interests of addressing your latest example, here’s my response:
     Note very carefully what you say: “I call that group of atoms…” Yes, YOU call that group of atoms something. But that’s a monumental begging of the question: who and what are YOU than enables you to interpret what a concept is? If YOU and the atoms are essentially (according to your understanding) the same kind of beings, i.e., material beings, then why do “know” the group, but the group doesn’t “know” itself… after all, YOU know YOURSELF? You could, of course, claim that it’s a matter of degree: if there were enough atoms, they would be sophisticated enough to “know” things. Really? (What about my example of RED vs. red?) Well, we’re back to the same question: WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE, i.e., what is it to know something (see the comments I just recently posted). The atoms themselves can’t call themselves anything, just like the raw empirical data of the MESs can’t interpret themselves. You need an intelligence to do it… BUT that requires you to understand what a rational being is. Is it simply a sophisticated collection of atoms? Prove it. Demonstrate to me your claim that “the concept of Group 8… is nothing more than a group of atoms/neurons in my head…” Is the empirical pattern itself capable of universal application? No. Consider SteveK’s tree example: it’s is a good one. Your example answers little except to provide us a picture you purport explains your point, and raise far more serious questions (like the ones I provide).
     Finally, you’re mixing images of things with concepts of things in your example. I don’t need an immaterial concept to imagine a group of four atoms: I can record them in my head and recall the memory whenever I wish. That image is connect with a specific, concrete collection of four atoms. But what about the concept “group”? When is a collection of things a “group”? Is three enough? Isn’t a google + 1 collection of things a group. In fact, there are potentially an infinite number of things that can be termed a group. The idea of a “group” is indeed a concept because it applies universally to things that share a specific characteristic. I can certainly “see” the atoms in the group, but the concept “group” I cannot see. Where is it in your example? It’s one thing to tell me: there, see, a group of four atoms as a pattern of brain signals. It’s something altogether different to try to convince me you see the concept “group.” The concept “group” exists (albeit in some rarified manner) apart from any concrete collection of things to which it can apply.
     (Note: I am NOT a Platonist, i.e., I do NOT believe Idea or concept of a “group” exists “somewhere out there.” Plato’s preference for the world of preexistent Ideas led him to argue that “doginess” somehow existed prior to dogs and in fact was more real than individual dogs. Descartes error was worse, for he believe that for all human beings the realm of ideas and images is the only realm to which they have direct access. Kant’s error was to think that we cannot know anything directly. Later philosophers believed we can know nothing… which is funny since how do they “know” we can “know nothing”?... but I’ve digressed.)
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.18.06 - 3:36 pm | #

Eric:
     With all due respect, you demonstrate a deep lack of understanding of the concepts you're bandying about, and in your case the materialistic antecedent is even stronger than in others. You start with the undemonstrated premise that all existents can only be material existents... and proceed downhill from there. You conflate "brain" with "mind" (what do you mean that a "human mind exists"?). "Supernaturalist"?!? The only thing that is "supernatural" is God--even angels aren't supernatural because they are creations. You're using the term loosely as a stand in for the philosophical backdrop of naturalism. As such, what you mean by "A thought cannot influence reality without measurable action," is that the way things can exist is if they're measurable. Well, why don't you come right out and say "existence = measurability"... and then try to demonstrate it instead of decorating it with pretty sounding words? Moreover, turn the issue around: how is it that the ink on a page forms a concept in your mind? And, "the universe is filled with love"?!? Where? Show me using ONLY your own existence criterion of "measurability". Do it now. Finally, I will be the first in line to agree with you that the human mind requires a material brain to "function" properly. That the material aspect is necessary is clear. BUT... is it sufficient? No.
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.18.06 - 3:48 pm | #

ts even better.
The premise of an argument does not physically cause assent to the conclusion. If it did, shouting the argument in the presence of a materialist would eventually cause him to believe that they were wrong and that the mind (as opposed to the brain) is immaterial. Or, if the materialists could shout louder and longer, then the non-materialists could be “convinced.” Doesn't’t that sound absolutely ridiculous? Maybe this explains why atheists on their blogs and sites feel mostly compelled to shout people down, flame at them, use obscenities… after all, if everything is material entities and physical processes, then “the more the better,” which is another way of saying “might makes right.” They can’t seem to grasp the fact that the truth of arguments compels assent through our immaterial capacity to reason. Rational arguments do not and cannot physically compel anything—especially the truth of the matter.

leapfrogging comments. Angels? Angels are materialistic, not supernatural? I did not know that. How many fit on a pin? I don't know much about the properties of angels I guess. Is there some place I can find out the properties of angels besides "pretty sounding words"? Or someplace I can find them besides in my (or your) mind? Measure their effect?

What is your def. of evidence?
eric | Homepage | 10.18.06 - 4:20 pm | #

Eric:
     Are you serious? Dawkins "soft spoken"? Where have you been? Are we talking about the same Dawkins that said "It is absolutely safe to say that if you meet somebody who claims not to believe in evolution, that person is ignorant, stupid or insane (or wicked, but I'd rather not consider that)."? I've seen in him TV interviews--in particular one where he interviews an evangelical Christian preacher (I believe in Colorado): you could FEEL the flames of hatred shooting out of Dawkin's eyes, and his words were nothing short of belligerent. Most atheists "soft spoken"? Try the comments section of the Raving Atheists, Choobus.blogspot, and many, many (count them if you wish) atheist blogs easily found through links. The hatred and rage of being challenged literally drips from them. That's not to say it doesn't happen on sites who call themselves Christians (see atheismsucks.blogspot), but for you to make such a sweeping goody-two-shoes generalization about atheists is, well, insane given the empirical data.
     But that is not the intent of my comment. Where are the challenges to what I've posed to Paul? You haven't addressed a single one with a rational argument. Also, please provide me the evidence that I stated atheists are "inferior" to me or that "atheists are evil"... or is your personal interpretation getting the best of you? No, I don't conflate "generalities" with "obscenities". Some generalities are, after all, true... and some are largely false, like the one's you just provided about people of faith. Isn't that called "bigotry" in the dictionary?
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.18.06 - 4:30 pm | #

Eric:
     Your ignorance of the terms does not absolve you of responsibility to argue rationally. First, where did I say if something is NOT supernatural, then it IS material? Second, nature here is used in the widest sense that incorporates all of creation and the natures (read: essences) contained therein. That you don't know much about the "properties" of angels is so blatantly true as to be laugable... if it weren't so tragic. Thanks, in any event, for the admission.
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.18.06 - 4:34 pm | #

Calm down boys! Let's be respectful of each other.

Take my 'treeness' comment and do something similar using brain states. If everything in reality can be boiled down to a brain state then I should be able to see reality in the data of every brain state. I should be able to hand you the physical data of various brain states and you should be able to read them correctly and see reality.

Look at one set of data and say something like "here is a man thinking of a large oak tree about 2 stories high", look at another and say "here is a man thinking of a soft blue and white rug next to a couch".

In other words, you should be able to read peoples minds. You should be able to know what people are dreaming about, what they are feeling, what they are planning without having to ask them. Quite frankly, it can't be done.
SteveK | 10.18.06 - 5:06 pm | #

Good word, SteveK. Not only is it impossible to be done, but there are numerous serious thinker on the topic who agree that it can never be done, in principle. Your treeness example is one good reason why that is true. Physical brain states have always been quite incommensurable with mind states (thoughts, beliefs, feelings). There is every reason to believe that this is not due to limitations of science so far, but a limitation of physical investigation in principle.

Eric, I go back to your caution that we should not try to explain away the brain. That shows that you do not understand the points here. We do not try to explain away physical reality by any means. We do not deny that nonphysical reality must have an interface point with the physical world. The brain is the interface with the mind.
Tom Gilson | Homepage | 10.18.06 - 5:19 pm | #

That you don't know much about the "properties" of angels is so blatantly true as to be laughable... if it weren't so tragic.

(sura 79)"In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful.
I swear by the angels who violently pull out the souls of the wicked,
And by those who gently draw out the souls of the blessed."

(from LDS page)The word angel is used in various ways. A person who is a divine messenger is called an angel. Thus Moroni, John the Baptist, Peter, James, John, Moses, Elijah, and Elias all ministered to Joseph Smith as angels. These all shall be exalted and inherit celestial glory. The scriptures also speak of another class of persons who, because of failure to obey the gospel, will not be exalted and will become angels in eternity.... This latter designation should not be confused with the use of the term angels having reference to the heavenly messengers sent forth to minister to the inhabitants of the earth." Thus when the term angel is used it usually means the person is a resurrect being, such as the Angel Moroni.

Note very carefully what you say: “I call that group of atoms…” Yes, YOU call that group of atoms something. But that’s a monumental begging of the question: who and what are YOU than enables you to interpret what a concept is?

why do “know” the group, but the group doesn’t “know” itself… after all, YOU know YOURSELF?

You need an intelligence to do it… BUT that requires you to understand what a rational being is. Is it simply a sophisticated collection of atoms? Prove it.Demonstrate to me your claim that “the concept of Group 8… is nothing more than a group of atoms/neurons in my head…” I

In other words, you should be able to read peoples minds. You should be able to know what people are dreaming about, what they are feeling, what they are planning without having to ask them. Quite frankly, it can't be done.

Paul:
Is that because it can't be done in principle, or just because we haven't found out how to do it yet?

Tom mentioned the serious thinkers that think this can't be done in principle. I'm not a great thinker by any stretch (serious, maybe), and I tend to agree with them because of philosophical arguments such as Mary's Room. If Mary can never know what it means to experience the color red then it seems to me you must conclude that all the physical data in the universe can not account for what it means to experience the color red. Ockham's razor has shaved too closly in my opinion.

About the out-of-body research you mentioned. I like what I read over at another blog:

"So they've found the location in the brain associated with out-of-body experiences. If anything, that only makes it more mysterious that the electrical stimulation of that bit of tissue can trigger the experience of being up near the ceiling looking down at one's own body. Why? How? How can you see without your eyes? Are those experiences just hallucinations? Is the storied accuracy of things seen and heard during "near-death" OBEs strictly apocryphal? The purely material explanation is not the simplest one, the Occam's Razor close shave. You'd have to go through contortions to explain why the brain would accurately record precise details of a scene in the midst of a mortal crisis, then choose to hallucinate an accurate view of that scene from a physically impossible perspective."

Steve K.: I'll bet your hat that there are some pretty good thinkers who think that materialism can be proven.

Also,

That is a good question don't you think?

I'll bet your hat that there are some pretty good thinkers who think that materialism can be proven.

I just gave you one example of that: that is, an example for which we have a solid correlation between a subjective experience (the out-of-body experience) and materialistic brain state (tweak these neurons with this electrode).

So, we have now refuted the idea that there are *no* correlations between brain states and subjective experience, and so an argument that materialism is wrong because we can't correlate material states with subjective experiences is wrong itself.

Paul:
     Not a single one of my questions has been addressed. Why can I say that? Because they are philosophical questions—not MES questions. You’re trying (I believe honestly) to address them, but from the a priori position that ONLY the MESs are permitted to address ANY questions. Hence, your responses and examples are MES-based... and therefore missing the point of these questions.

Eric:
     Don’t flatter yourself: your arguments do not “hit home”... but they have hit an intellectual rock bottom. I’m not looking for agreement but for the the interlocutor to formulate coherent arguments. When you can demonstrate the non-scientific assertion that ONLY material-based “evidence” counts as evidence, I may begin to listen. Paul’s trying; you’re not.
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.19.06 - 2:51 am | #

Holo, thank you for believing that I am trying to honestly answer your questions.

Steve K., you wrote

You should be able to know what people are dreaming about, what they are feeling, what they are planning without having to ask them. Quite frankly, it can't be done.

I should be able to hand you the physical data of various brain states and you should be able to read them correctly and see reality.

Paul,
I've really enjoyed our discussion here. You have been most kind and reasonable.

I hand you the data of exciting neurons A and B, we we *can* see the reality of an oob experience. Or am I missing your point?

Don’t flatter yourself: your arguments do not “hit home”... but they have hit an intellectual rock bottom. I’m not looking for agreement but for the the interlocutor to formulate coherent arguments. When you can demonstrate the non-scientific assertion that ONLY material-based “evidence” counts as evidence, I may begin to listen. Paul’s trying; you’re not.

Paul and Steve,
I've been enjoying the OOB discussion.

Any thoughts on the research of religious experience as brain states, and/or "the god gene"?
Are there issues with doing this kind of research for atheist as well as theist?
If you can induce an experience, is it still "valid"? Would either of you try OOB via stimulation?
eric | Homepage | 10.19.06 - 12:48 pm | #

Eric:
     Please come out and say it directly instead of dancing around the issue. To make it easier, let me formulate it for you:
     You believe the modern empirical sciences (MESs) are the epistemological arbiters of ALL knowledge. What that means to you is that we ONLY know (either in part or in whole) those things that are accessible through the five primary senses as observable using the instruments of the MESs and the scientific method. You claim that because assertions concerning non-material existents cannot be verified only by the MESs, they either don't exist or in any event do not matter because the MESs can say nothing about them in the first place. Furthermore, you believe that those things which currently cannot be explained by the MESs will either eventually be explained or will be considered unverifiable (using the MESs only) and therefore nonexistent. In summary, the MESs are the necessary AND sufficient means by which humans understand the world around them, and therefore the only valid knowledge is MES knowledge. All things that are named by humans are ultimately understood by reducing them to their constituent parts, and systemically understood as a collection of those parts.
     Is that a fair assessment of your position?
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.19.06 - 1:28 pm | #

SteveK wrote

The data can not tell you what it's like to smell a rose

The data fails to tell you why it is wrong to torture babies for fun.

Initial research (2nd google hit!) on qualia and materialism:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Eli...ive_materialism

Tough sledding, I admit. Qualia and experience and consciousness in general are problems for materialism that haven't been solved. . . .yet.
Paul | 10.19.06 - 1:46 pm | #

I don't know a theory of materialism that accounts for qualia (the experience of how a rose smells), but let me research that a bit.

Morality can be accounted for by evolution, at least hypothetically.

Qualia and experience and consciousness in general are problems for materialism that haven't been solved. . . .yet.

Knowing how something came to exist does nothing to explain what that something is. Knowing that the combution process produces water vapor does nothing to explain what water vapor is. Water vapor has it's own physical properties in an all-material universe but it doesn't have wetness or warmth as a property. Why is that? Is it because we can't measure it accurately or is it because it is immeasureable?

Would you agree that knowing how something came to exist doesn't answer the question "What exactly is this thing?" To me it is obvious that it doesn't.

As an example, knowing how Pepsi is made does not answer the question "What is Pepsi?". You seem to be comforable saying "Pepsi is the result of a sophisticated manufacturing process." just like "Morality is the result of a sophisticated evolutionary process." To me those answers are non-answers.

The problem as I see it is morality, just like consciousness, thoughts, logic, experience and qualia, are not physical things. They have no physical properties and can't be measured, observed, weighed, probed or even put in a test tube. Science can't detect morality, nor can it detect love - but I have experienced these things and I know they exist.
SteveK | 10.19.06 - 5:19 pm | #

Paul:
     You’ve claimed that concepts are reducible to brain states, but have not answered my questions. Okay, we’ll continue to let that go. But, what about your perception of “you-ness,” i.e., the perception of yourself—your self-identity as a conscious being—which means you’re reflecting back not on sensory perceptions but upon your reasoning itself. How do you justify reducing your “I-ness” to brain states when you’re not basing the perception of consciousness on material entities or physical processes observable through the five primary senses but as a reflection on those observations?
     Moreover, given that you appear to be (literally) equating brain = mind, you have a big problem. If you’re going to use mathematics (an abstraction away from physical objects, i.e., it’s not the ruler you’re imagining as a concrete thing but a straight line you’re conceptualizing as a universal that applies potentially to an infinite number of things), you’ll have to balance the equation—which means you’ll have to compare the same kinds of things on each side of the equation. Another way of saying this is the dimension or the units have to be the same: is one apple equal to one orange. Only in number, but not in essence. An orange is not an apple, so you can’t just say apple = orange even though the number is the same. Yes, on an abstract level one dollar equal 4 quarters, but in an ontological sense the one paper dollar I’m holding in my left hand is not equal to the 4 quarters I’m holding in my right hand.
     In comparing the mind to the brain you have the same problem. In fact, the problem is worse because while apples and oranges (or quarters and a dollar) are all the same kind of things (material entities), the mind and the brain are ontologically of different order. An analogy may help: the word “blue” may be, materially speaking, so much ink on a page, but the meaning of “blue” is not. The printed word “blue” and the meaning of red are ontologically of different orders. (The printed notes on a page representing the “Ode to Joy” is different from the sound waves generated by choir and orchestra, is different again from the conceptualization of beauty you “know” when you hear it.)
     Again, your mind is ontologically different from your brain because the former has qualitative subjectivity while the brain does not. Why? Your conscious experience of “blue” (to which ONLY YOU have access) is quite different from the firings of signals across the synapse of neurons (to which, in principle, ANYONE has access): I and Tom and SteveK can “see” the firings of the neurons and we may even agree that the patterns WE observe on a PET monitor represent the perception of “blue”… but most emphatically is not the actually experience of “blue” to which ONLY YOU have access. Your experience of “blue” is a subjective first-person phenomenon, whereas the firings of your neurons is a third-person phenomena that would appear the same to any outside observer. (I’m using “subjective” here not in the sense of “never certain” and dependent upon individual perception, but a reference to YOU the subject of discussion.)
     A final difficulty you face: even though we all perceive things as individuals, we know things by their natures, their essences, their meanings. If not, there is NO WAY we could even be holding this discussion. Why? The “knowing” of the universal essences of things is the binding element that permits us to discuss concrete things and abstract concepts. Now, for the umpteenth time and using your own rules of the game, show me—using your five primary senses—You, yourself, your “I-ness” which you defend, promote, take care of, improve, etc., etc. Don’t give me a promissary note of “materialism or science will eventually figure it out.” That’s not good enough, and it’s evasive. It’s a "materialism of the gaps" response that, ironically, is similar to the same accusation atheists throw at Christians.
     I’m still waiting for a response to my philosophical questions...
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.19.06 - 5:26 pm | #

Consider this question that I asked earlier:

a) Perception A = brain state A
b) Perception B = brain state B
c) Perception C = brain state C

Lets say C tells you that A is true and B is false. In a materialistic world, how can a brain state know the truthfulness of another brain state? What makes one chemical reaction in your brain false and other one true? And just as important, how do we know C is telling us the truth about A and B?
SteveK | 10.19.06 - 6:26 pm | #

Holo: our styles are just too different. Your posts are too long and have too much in them. Compare them to the exchange SteveK and I have had. The difference is crucial to me.

SteveK:

Would you agree that knowing how something came to exist doesn't answer the question "What exactly is this thing?"

As an example, knowing how Pepsi is made does not answer the question "What is Pepsi?". You seem to be comforable saying "Pepsi is the result of a sophisticated manufacturing process." just like "Morality is the result of a sophisticated evolutionary process." To me those answers are non-answers.

The problem as I see it is morality, just like consciousness, thoughts, logic, experience and qualia, are not physical things. They have no physical properties and can't be measured, observed, weighed, probed or even put in a test tube. Science can't detect morality, nor can it detect love - but I have experienced these things and I know they exist.

You aren't considering, I think, the possibility that (some of) those non-physical things can be reduced to physical things. Morality can be--not as "rightness," but as behavior, or even a system that controls behavior.

I'm trying my best to consider it, but I think all of them fail for one reason or another. Redness has to be experienced. That is the only way to know it exists. You can't know redness by knowing it's wavelength.

Each item in your non-physical list may have to be treated very differently, they're all not necessarily of the same type of non-physical thing.

My goal all along was to argue against materialism/physicalism, which I think you were arguing for. By your statement above I think you agree that not everything is physical.

You and I seem to disagree about these things being reduced to the physical. I agree that they can in part, but not completely. Something is lost in the process and that's why materialism as a worldview is incomplete. The knowledge of 'treeness' and 'redness' and the knowledge of all experience/qualia are lost when you reduce everything to the properties of physics and chemistry. Materialism can't explain all of reality.

Would you agree that there are some (many!) things that can't be detected by science or proven/disproven by the scientific method? Can science prove/disprove that I love my wife? No.

It seems clear to me that science and the scientific method can't explain all of reality either. I like science, but I don't let it inform me of things it has no knowledge of.
SteveK | 10.20.06 - 12:11 pm | #

SteveK,why bring up qualia again (through "redness")? I've already addressed that. Can we be done with it, unless there's something new to add?

I'm not saying that not everything is physical, I'm saying that those things that you listed as being not physical are different types of things, so you can't necessarily treat all of them the same in terms of whether they exist as non-physical things. Some of them may exist, some of them may not, or all of them may not exist for very different reasons.

I've only admitted that qualia have not been able to be explained yet by materialism. For other things--let's take love, as you brought it up. If we remove the qualia of love from the discussion, then what is it that you mean when you say "love?" For me, it would only be certain behaviors, which most certainly can be confirmed scientifically. If subject A does enough of the behaviors from the list of love behaviors directed toward B over a certain amount of time (or however you want to define it), then A loves B. I predict that any definition of love that excludes qualia will be able to be reduced to a similar formulation.
Paul | 10.20.06 - 12:39 pm | #

Paul:
     Regarding your previous response to me, we say in Ukrainian, "Khai Tobi na sovist'." I leave to you as a challenge to determine its meaning—which means you'll be looking for something beyond the material aspects of these untranslated words appearing on your monitor.
     No, despite your claim to the contrary you have addressed neither fully the qualia of "redness" nor the entity redness as such because you keep on making materialist MES assertions and floundering with possible explanations with no support for the soundness of your assertions. At least provide us an argument. As such, your "prediction" (discounting qualia!!) is lame indeed. What if I predict "Christ will come again—you just wait and see, nah-nah-nah!"? Think about what you're saying: it's like claiming "I'll remove these pieces of the chess set, and yet I'll be able to fully explain chess." It's like arguing, "Except for me, there is no one in this room. Therefore, there is no one in this room." With respect to the example of love SteveK brings up, you conflate observed behavior with the thing itself—which is analogous to observing the trees being moved by the wind and claiming the trees ARE the wind, or observing the motion of a wheel and claiming the wheel IS the motion.
     With all due respect, you have a LOT of thinking to do... I'm just worried you've straitjacketed yourself into a particular vision of reality and can't get out of it.
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.20.06 - 1:51 pm | #

Holo, I decline your invitation to look up the meaning, materially-based or otherwise, of the phrase in Ukranian.

The only way in which I addressed qualia was to admit that materialism had not accunted for it. Yet you're still critiquing me as if I'm claiming that materialism has addressed qualia. Yikes.

I admit the equivalence of my prediction of materialism accounting for qualia with your predication that Christ will come again.

Your idea that my definition of love conflates behavior with the thing itself is begging the question: my definition excludes any thing that love is beyond the behavior. If you want to define love as something beyond behavior (and qualia, which I admit cannot yet be accounted for in materialism), then feel free and we can examine what else love might be beyond behavior and qualia. I'd be interested on what basis you think love is anything beyond behavior and qualia.

Your last comment about how thinking I have to do has more to do with your frustration, valid or not, discussing things we me, and less about how much I think or not. We *all* have a lot of thinking to do, a la the title of this web site.
Paul | 10.20.06 - 7:45 pm | #

Paul:
     Frustrated? No, just highlighting your evasiveness to deal with certain topics... which is very similar to Richard Dawkin's evading question on "free will": see the Raving Atheist's latest post. As I've said before, I'm not looking for agreement from you, but that you at least address the arguments, issues, and questions on their own merits rather than stating up front everything MUST be epistemologically captured by materialism/science and then proceeding from there. That's why I gave you the challenge of trying to find the meaning of the Ukrainian phrase: the meaning is not going to come to you as a direct sensory experience.
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.21.06 - 3:49 am | #

Where in this thread did I state up front that everything MUST be captured by materialism? I merely offered a hypothesis, and admitted when my hypothesis fails (qualia). This is like the other time when you claimed that I wanted to PROVE materialism.

I have less confidence that your ideas are worth pursuing when you misrepresent mine.
Paul | 10.21.06 - 10:26 am | #

Paul:
     Where? How about every time you asserted the mind, love, concepts, justice, usefulness, etc., etc., etc. are all reducible to the material (by means of evolutionary mechanisms as you claim)? Consider this egregious claim of yours, for example: “Qualia and experience and consciousness in general are problems for materialism that haven’t been solved… yet.” Apart from everything else that’s been said in these threads, the only way you can claim these are captured by materialism is if you know for certain that they are only material. But you can’t… yet you plunge ahead anyway. Why?
     Is this an hypothesis? No, only an assertion with no way to check apart for a promissary note that science/materialism will eventually explain things—despite the fact that in most cases we’re not speaking of scientifically-accessible concepts but philosophical ones. You’re asked philosophical questions, and you flounder in responding only in scientific categories. You’re asked questions, and you come back with a rather lame excuse of “style difference,” and yet expect us to respond to your sound-bite, over-simplifications of reality. You’re presented with examples upon examples and asked to use your own rules of the game, and you fall silent. And then, when confronted with the obvious evasiveness, you apply a the cute rhetorical trick of projecting some false humility by trying to turn the table of “confidence” back upon me when you can’t (or won’t) respond. (That by the way, is a moral claim which you state as if it were objective, and yet you “believe” in moral relativism inspired merely by evolutionary pragmatism.) You are like a shape-shifter: when things get difficult, you rephrase the issue or feign being bullied to avoid directly confronting the issues. We spend more time trying to wade through non-substantive, irrelevant claims you make that facing the issues—of which your last response is a perfect example. I have yet to see you address the philosophical merits of what has been posed so far in this thread.
     Now, to be very fair, we’re finally (after 58 exchanges in this thread!) managed to elicit an admission that not everything is captured by materialism and that your hypothesis as failed wrt qualia—notwithstanding the fact that I provided you with examples far easier and more accessible to inquiry than qualia. Well, given those admissions, why do you insist on continuing to push materialistic explanations? Why not examine, entertain, consider other possibilities? Why? Because they might prove too risky to your a priori non-scientific, materialistically-based assertions. It’s like I stated near the beginning of this threat: you may make all the assertions you want, set up the rules as you see fit (and call them “hypotheses”…
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.21.06 - 12:41 pm | #

I'm not hopeful that further discussion between Holo and I will be fruitful. If it's not too far off topic, I'd love to hear from someone else about whether I'd admitted anything about qualia and materialism, whether Holo is misrepresenting my ideas, etc. However, responses that reduce to arguing for or against materialism will be less forceful, if you know what I mean.l
Paul | 10.22.06 - 11:19 am | #

Good grief... are evasiveness and obfuscation your middle names? I hereby retract my characterization of "honestly"...
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.22.06 - 11:56 am | #

Paul,
I think you admited that qualia, consciousness and experience all present problems for the materialism hypothesis.
SteveK | 10.23.06 - 1:21 pm | #

So, SteveK, how do I deal with the exchange with Holo in which

1. I admit that qualia hasn't been explained by materialism (10.19.06 - 1:46 pm)

2. Holo says that I claim that "everything MUST be epistemologically captured by materialism/science" (10.21.06 - 3:49 am);

3. I ask him so show me where in the thread I said that (10.21.06 - 10:26 am);

4. He responds with a finite list of things that, regardless of whether I claim that they are all materialistic or not, is not a list of *everything* that he mentioned in his 10.21.06 - 3:49 am post;

5. I respond with pessimism (10.22.06 - 11:19 am);

6. He replies by saying I'm evasive and obfusctory.

How can I respond? I don't mean that rhetorically at all, I'm very serious.
Paul | 10.23.06 - 6:32 pm | #

I think you have made your position known even though you have not answered Holo's questions directly.

Do you believe science will eventually show materialism to be true? My opinion is that there will always be some things out of reach of science and this is one of them.
SteveK | 10.24.06 - 12:49 am | #

That's a good question. I think science will show materialism to be true. We couldn't imagine how science could explain many things until science explained it. It's a little reminiscient of the god-of-the-gaps argument.

But, whether science will show materialism to be true or not is just opinion, hard to really prove.
Paul | 10.24.06 - 9:24 am | #

I found Richard Dawkins quote that addresses this question better than I could (from http://ravingatheist.com/):

"The origin of matter – the origin of the whole universe -- is a very difficult matter. It's one that scientists are working on, it's one that they hope, eventually, to solve. Just as before Darwin, biology was a mystery, Darwin solved that, now cosmology is a mystery. The origin of the universe is a mystery. It's a mystery to everyone. Physicists are working on it, they have theories. . . ."
Paul | 10.24.06 - 9:34 am | #

SteveK:
     The modern empirical sciences (oftentimes called the natural sciences) are designed to concentrate on two causal aspects of reality: the material (“what” it’s made of) and the efficient (“how” it came to be), which means the MESs can ONLY “see” (deal with, research, study, hypothesize about, etc.) material entities and physical causes. Full stop. The formal cause (the “whatness” of the thing is) and the final cause (the “why-forness” of a thing, or the teleological [purpose, goal, intent) considerations] are inaccessible to the MESs. Again, full stop.
     Think about what Paul just said (slightly but accurately paraphrased): the MESs “will show materialism to be true.” In other words, an instrument for understanding the material and physical aspects of reality will show materialism (a philosophical worldview) to be true. That is tautological at best… but in fact is circular reasoning—a fallacy. One can NEVER logically support the use the MESs to prove why the MESs work, to prove the efficacy of the scientific method (which is a subset of the greater epistemic cycle), and worst to prove that it’s subject matter (change in material beings) is the only existent. The per se conceptualizations of causality, induction, substance, existence, etc. are NOT subject matters of the MESs. A philosophical understanding of these things is prior to (in the order of knowing) what the MESs can know.
     That is precisely what lies at the base of why Paul refuses to address my questions (which are philosophical—not MES) and why he flounders with your questions, SteveK: he’s using the wrong epistemological tools. By the very definition of what the MESs are (which even scientistic thugs like Dawkins admit to, i.e., limited to material and efficient causality) he can NOT answer these questions using the MESs… and that’s where the obfuscation and pity-party tactics come in. The game is subtle—it seems innocent and even reasonable on the surface (decorated with catchy phrases like “materialism hasn’t explained it… yet” wink, wink), but what’s happening is the rules of the game are set up and the demand is made that everyone play by them. THAT is dishonest. It’s not an issue of materialism not being able to “explain” things yet, it’s an issue of materialism not being able to explain some things at all—ever. You can show that fairly easily (that’s at the basis of my questions) without needing to resort to the MESs to do so. In fact, as just explained above, you cannot—by definition—explain some things using materialism. It’s not a temporal question, i.e., it won’t be resolved by waiting long enough, in the same way you won’t get a genius no matter how many idiots you put in a room: their collective IQ will NEVER add up to that of a genius. For a materialist to “cry foul” is a non-starter, for to “cry foul” presupposes they have a basis upon which to cry foul. But a materialist basis can’t be used to support a materialist epistemology. Again, that’s circular reasoning.
     Moreover, what this points to is a problem with the will to “see.” Paul does NOT want to see because that would wreck his initial premises—and he will NOT let those premises be challenged. (Critical thinking? “Free” thinking? Not!) . Why? If one’s reasoning is disordered (including the imposition of an a priori metaphysical limitation like materialism), then that capacity to reason does not produce the whole truth. The will acts on the truth as presented to it by intellect (the intellect “informs” the will)… but if that truth is partial, stunted, or not a truth at all, the will works with what it has and makes its choices based not on the truth but upon the mere appearance of truth. What we’re witnessing is scientistic thinking, i.e., thinking not thought through.
     To close, think about how philosophically inept is the Dawkins quote Paul provides and by which Paul is so enamored: Dawkins conflates the “mystery of biology” prior to Darwin to the very existence of the universe itself, he mislabels the latter as cosmology (which makes me question even Dawkins’ MESs skills), and by virtue of these he subtly conflates “existence” with “material.” What Dawkins is trying (and failing!) to convince the smart reader of is that existence as such is explained by science. Balderdash! Again, science deals with material entities, not with metaphysical concepts. To uncover this, one should rephrase Dawkins’ question as “why is there something rather than nothing at all,” and it becomes immediately clear this is not a question the MESs can deal with—by definition.
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.24.06 - 12:48 pm | #

Holo, you set up a straw man by changing, in a way crucial to your point, what I said about science proving materialism. It's only a tautology because you deciding to re-phrase what I said in a way that makes it a tautology.

As I've said before, the main reason why I don't address *every* one of your points is because your posting style is a bit overwhelming. You write long posts, with complex ideas, to address all of them sufficiently just takes too long. You should pick the really crucial ideas and whittle them down if you want me to respond more.

And spare me the psychologizing about failing to critique my initial motives. It's the oldest trick in the book, let's stay with the substance of the argument.

Dawkins' conflation, such as it is, is not germaine to his point. Dawkins is treating the fact of the universe not as a metaphysical question. You're setting up those straw men again.

Lastly, I am perfectly happy to leave it to any disinterested observer to judge the intellectual honesty of what we both write.
Paul | 10.24.06 - 8:51 pm | #

Hey Paul,
I have my hands full elsewhere, so I am not prepared to enter a debate here (nor do I want to get in the way of Steve and Holopupenko), but since you keep soliciting opinions I will add a cent or two.
You may address this with the other participants here, or you may ignore it.

As in our own previous discussions, I find you long on assertion and short on defences. But then I am not really disinterested, am I?

Here are some of your assertions for which I have seen no support:
1) Justice exists only in our heads, and our heads are material.
2) A number is a concept, which is potentially reducible to a material brain state.
("potentially" in what way? What is the evidence of this potential reduction?)
3) If numbers and information are real - yet not physical, measureable entities - then why not justice, love, forgiveness, patience, etc?
That's a big "if." I think you can outline a consistent, coherent system without getting into that "if."
(Holo challenged you to do so, and you said you already had. Perhaps you could restate this system?)
4) Only an "ought" that is reducible to a material brain state.
(there are such "oughts"?)
5) Morality can be accounted for by evolution, at least hypothetically.
(What does these mean, "hypothetically"? Anything can be accounted for by any system, hypothetically.)
6) Qualia and experience and consciousness in general are problems for materialism that haven't been solved. . . .yet.
(you presume they will be?... yes, as you later say.)
7) To "explain what [morality] is" is a simple thing, even if morality can be accounted for by evolution.
Morality is a group of behaviors.
(really? Grouped how? According to what, and whom?)
9) If subject A does enough of the behaviors from the list of love behaviors directed toward B over a certain amount of time (or however you want to define it), then A loves B.
(you've described how one might recognize a person in love, but you've said nothing about what love is. You sloughed off Holpupenko's question about this.)
10) I merely offered a hypothesis, and admitted when my hypothesis fails (qualia).
(but you are defending this failed hypothesis, and somehow still claim to have faith in it.)
11) Holo, you set up a straw man by changing, in a way crucial to your point, what I said about science proving materialism.
(why don't you describe in what substantial way Holo has done this, and then demonstrate why it is not as he says?)
12) Dawkins' conflation, such as it is, is not germaine to his point. Dawkins is treating the fact of the universe not as a metaphysical question. You're setting up those straw men again.
(Same here. What is Dawkins doing then? What has he said that you would defend, and how would you do so?)

If it's not too far off topic, I'd love to hear from someone else about whether I'd admitted anything about qualia and materialism, whether Holo is misrepresenting my ideas, etc.

I don't find that you've really presented any actual ideas. You admit your hypothesis has failed, and yet you say "I think science will show materialism to be true."
I think Holopupenko is interested in your defending such a thought.

I personally think you've staked out a claim which doesn't defend well, and are trying to avoid saying much of anything responsive in order that you can't be proven wrong.
You continually state your problems with what others (Holo, this time around) are saying or asking, but never address what they are saying or asking.
When the unanswered questions mount up as they have here you then claim that you are being overburdened - but not in a substantive way - by their sheer weight or differing styles.

For what it's worth.
Charlie | 10.25.06 - 12:45 am | #

Hey Charlie, long time, eh?

I cheerfully admit that I did not offer any proof or evidence for many assertions. You may have missed my previous post in which I said that I was just trying to outline a consistent, non-contradictory hypothesis.

How many examples of my addressing specifically what Holo and others have asked would it take for you to retract your claim that I never address what they are saying or asking? That is not a rhetorical question.
Paul | 10.25.06 - 8:02 am | #

Hi Paul,
But it seems like just yesterday, don't you think?

You asked, not rhetorically:

How many examples of my addressing specifically what Holo and others have asked would it take for you to retract your claim that I never address what they are saying or asking?

You may have missed my previous post in which I said that I was just trying to outline a consistent, non-contradictory hypothesis.

When I said my question wasn't rhetorical, I meant that I wanted an actual number - 1, 4, 10, 100, whatever - of examples of me addressing others' points that would convince you that I do do that. I'll show you one example:

Tom asked: "Numbers exist only in our heads, and our heads are material. Are numbers material? Or are they fictitious? Or what?" and I replied, "A number is a concept, which is potentially reducible to a material brain state."

I directly addressed Tom's topic. How many more examples do you need? Give me a number.

If you really mean that I don't address *every* point posted in a thread, I plead exhaustion, especially when it comes to Holo. And, is everyone else replying directly to every other point that everyone else makes, or am I being held to a different standard?

And, yes, it *does* seem like yesterday! ; )
Paul | 10.25.06 - 1:09 pm | #

Paul,
I'm happy to cut you some slack with regard to answering all these questions. I've been in similar situations with 5 people asking me different questions. It's overwhelming.

That is why I said your position is known, despite failing to answer *every* question hurled you way. You seem convinced that everything boils down to the material and that science will someday figure it all out.

As Tom said about Dawkins I will say about you...

"The faith he (Paul) practices is that science will explain all of life."

and again

"He's (Paul) a man of faith, but he doesn't recognize himself as one."
SteveK | 10.25.06 - 1:26 pm | #

Paul,
One is enough.
I took it back, remember?
"Never address" was obviously hyperbole, and I replaced it with "often fail to address".
Charlie | 10.25.06 - 2:01 pm | #

Paul:
     Echoing Dawkins' new book, are you delusional? I don’t mean that rhetorically at all, I’m very serious. (to quote you) Here’s the example you just provided:

Tom asked: "Numbers exist only in our heads, and our heads are material. Are numbers material? Or are they fictitious? Or what?" and I replied, "A number is a concept, which is potentially reducible to a material brain state." I directly addressed Tom's topic. How many more examples do you need? Give me a number.

Holo,
While you and I agree that Paul can't adequately defend materialism, I think you are jumping the gun saying he's being dishonest.

It's one thing to fail the adequately respond to the question asked, it's quite another to claim that Paul is purposely being dishonest.

Consider it an opportunity to show Paul why his answers are not answers and then let Paul respond. I think you did that in your last post. Now it's Paul's turn to respond.
SteveK | 10.25.06 - 5:22 pm | #

SteveK, thanks for the slack, it's refreshing.

"You seem convinced that everything boils down to the material and that science will someday figure it all out."

Yeah, I kinda am. At the same time, I try to defend materialism just as an exercise, too. It's helpful: the problem of qualia is one that can't be denied, so while I try to defend materialism, you also have to be ready to admit when it can't answer a question.
Paul | 10.25.06 - 5:37 pm | #

Holo, I'm not going to respond to you unless you treat me more politely, not impune my motives, etc. I've never used the words like "fallacious balderdash," "delusional," "chutzpah," "murdering rational discussion," "dishonest," when I disagreed with you, even when I thought you were completely wrong.

When you're ready for a respectful discussion, so am I. But if you're not willing to change, then game over.
Paul | 10.25.06 - 5:42 pm | #

Paul:
...the problem of qualia is one that can't be denied

Think about the role qualia plays in our lives. Qualia plays a part in nearly everything we experience in life so that problem turns out to be a huge problem.

This relates to my questions earlier. Questions that nobody here has bothered to comment on. One such question is:

What makes one chemical reaction in your brain false and other one true?

I see no way that materialism can answer that question....ever.
SteveK | 10.25.06 - 7:44 pm | #

SteveK:
     The charge of dishonesty stands. Note the distinction: one can be dishonest in one’s responses, and one can be dishonest in one’s approach (and, of course, one can be both). The charge of dishonesty in Paul’s case rests squarely on his intentional obfuscation, not on his replies themselves. How could they rest on the replies? They’re empty or invite more questions… which are never addressed. In other words, it’s not an issue of a “failure to adequately respond to the question asked,” it’s an issue of rhetorical sophistry. I think Charlie captured it best: “trying to avoid saying much of anything responsive in order that you can’t be proven wrong.”
     There’s no “real” discussion here, there’s no “give-and-take,” there’s no defense of his worldview of materialism apart from a few assertions and non-answers. (I’ve stated twice I’m not looking for agreement on the issues but for competent defenses of real “answers.” Alas, there are none.)
     You note,

… show Paul why his answers are not answers and then let Paul respond. I think you did that in your last post. Now it’s Paul’s turn to respond.”

SteveK: What makes one brain chemical reaction in a brain true is merely that it produces behavior that matches with reality. If we view truth less as some overarching, kinda infinite concepts and more as just that which matches reality, then materialism doesn't have to fail on that score.

Another way to look at it: imagine there exists no consciosness anyway in the entire universe, and that God doesn't exist: would it still be true that 2+2=4? Does a tree falling in the forest make a sound if no one is around to hear it? The answer to both questions is yes for the same reason.
Paul | 10.26.06 - 9:06 am | #

Paul, this still doesn't make sense.

First of all, are you saying that if there is no behavior, there is no truth? Suppose you read this and decide not to answer. Suppose you disagree with me. Is your disagreement true or false? By your definition, it cannot be either true or false, since there is no behavior.

Second, what does it mean for behavior to match reality? You'll have to explicate that in order for your answer to have any meaning. If I say aloud, or write, "2+2=4," does that behavior match reality? Only if the terms in the equation have some meaning. Where does that meaning reside? It resides in the mind. By your understanding, it resides in brain states. But here we are back where we started from--do those brain states match reality? Around the circle we go . . .

Your second paragraph is a problematic hypothetical, for we theists would say that if there is no God and no consciousness, then there is no universe. That's not something easily hypothesized away. But forget that for a moment. If there is no God and no consciousness, is there any such thing as "2"? Show me 2 somewhere (not the numeral but the numeric concept), apart from a mind, and I might be able to accept your thesis here. I can't find any such 2, myself.
Tom Gilson | Homepage | 10.26.06 - 9:45 am | #

What makes one brain chemical reaction in a brain true is merely that it produces behavior that matches with reality.

Another way to look at it: imagine there exists no consciosness anyway in the entire universe, and that God doesn't exist: would it still be true that 2+2=4?

Deuce: Correct.

SteveK:
     Don’t buy it. It’s an unresponsive, contentless “answer” again.
     First, truth is a transcendental concept: every being is a thing, is one, is true, is good: these terms are coextensive—whatever comes under one comes under all the others, and like being they all apply to everything coming under any of the ten highest categories (substance, quantity, quality, relation, etc.), which beingness as such must be carefully considered.
     Second (following upon the first), “What makes one brain chemical reaction in a brain true is merely that it produces behavior that matches with reality,” is yet another example of an empty (contentless) statement because it draws a direct connection between a (material) chemical reaction and certain behavior without demonstration that this is even possible.
     Note the subtle equivocation: a specific chemical reaction in the brain is the same kind of thing (i.e., material) as a certain behavior, say, the unjust behavior (act) of stealing candy from a baby. This is presented as unquestionable: we must accept it because materialism is (it is claimed) a priori true Well, apply the rule back upon itself: what is the “trueness” of materialism as a concept in the brain and materialism as supposedly evident in reality external to the brain. None, in fact. How does one go from the existence of a chemical reaction in the brain to the existence of “injustice” or “virtue” or “the day after tomorrow” or “predicate,” etc., under the rubric of “trueness” based merely upon materialism’s equivocation of these two? One cannot.
     Now, for fun, let’s bring moral relativism into the picture (again, assumed to be true): even if… how can one rationally conflate the existence of such a chemical reaction in the brain with the “trueness” or “oughtness” of injustice when, according to moral relativism, there is no objective basis for justice in the first place? Yet again we see the emptiness of the rule (“a [true] chemical reaction… produces behavior that matches with [true] reality”) when applied back upon itself in the context of moral relativism: a [true] chemical reaction produces a [true] moral behavior… hey, wait! There is no “true” or “false” moral behavior: all morality is relative. Oh well, there goes that idea.
     Third, the second paragraph’s examples are empty as well in the context of what is being discussed. Why? Because one still needs to account for the existence of the universe, trueness, logic, trees falling in the forest, etc. And, this comes back to the previous critically important question: why is there something rather than nothing at all? One can provide such second-paragraph examples till the cows come home, but they demonstrate nothing about the truth of materialism. And, note the interesting—quite revealing—slip of tongue: God was brought in when we weren’t talking about theology but rather about the trueness of materialism… So, what is Paul’s real intent, demonstrating the soundness of materialism as a worldview or disproving the existence of God. Inquiring minds want to know…
     Now that I’ve cooled off a bit, this is becoming as easy as shooting fish in a barrel… To Christians out there listening in: I hope it’s apparent just how empty and unsupportable the atheist position is, and why one should not fear entering into “discussions” (if they can be called that) with them: they can be readily defeated on philosophical grounds without needing to get into the beauty and depth of revealed truth and faith. Almost all atheist arguments are directed at straw men caricatures of faith (witness Dawkins’ latest book), and the best they have to offer is philosophically untenable. It’s like an exhibitionist exposing himself to a statue instead of a human being… and having nothing to show for it.
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.26.06 - 10:02 am | #

Paul,
As others here have pointed out, your answer doesn't solve the problem. What the others said is all good. If I could add to their comments I would ask you to consider the other question I asked:

"How do we know C is telling us the truth about A and B"

Your interpretation of 'behavior that matches reality', as you say it, is merely another brain state. I call it state C in the above question. Tom hit the nail on the head when saying:

"But here we are back where we started from--do those brain states match reality? Around the circle we go . . ."

Holo: Don't worry, I'm not buying it.
SteveK | 10.26.06 - 12:00 pm | #

What makes one chemical reaction in your brain false and other one true?
I see no way that materialism can answer that question....ever.

Eric:
     Sigh... again, we go around in non-substantive circles. The important thing is to flush out what animates your assertions. To this end, are you still mulling the question I posed to you on 10.19.06 - 1:28 pm?
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.26.06 - 1:05 pm | #

Tom wrote:

Show me 2 somewhere (not the numeral but the numeric concept), apart from a mind, and I might be able to accept your thesis here. I can't find any such 2, myself.

Suppose you read this and decide not to answer. Suppose you disagree with me. Is your disagreement true or false? By your definition, it cannot be either true or false, since there is no behavior.

Second, what does it mean for behavior to match reality?

Paul,
Materialism is only allowed to use material/energy properties to explain reality. Using only material properties (dimension, wavelength, energy, mass, force, etc) tell me how you can determine the numeric quantity of a particular grouping? You can't because numeric quantity is not part of any material property (not to mention 'grouping').

As Holo has pointed out to you , you are sneaking in non-materialistic concepts in order to answer the question. Unless the concept of addition (or grouping) is a material property, and I know it's not, then it isn't available for you to use.
SteveK | 10.26.06 - 4:33 pm | #

Paul, there are planets there in the case you described, but there is not "2". To have "2", there needs to be someone or something to make the assessment that there is a plurality of objects that share some common characteristic. Like I said before, show me a "2"--you haven't done it yet. By your example you've shown me planets, but not a "2".

I have to get something else done before 5:00 so I'll come back to you again later.
Tom Gilson | Homepage | 10.26.06 - 4:41 pm | #

SteveK, let's try this: if there are no minds, there are still 2 apples, but the *idea* of 2 needs a mind.

Is there any other situation or problem that isn't accounted for?
Paul | 10.26.06 - 4:51 pm | #

That's a good answer, Paul.

Now, back to what you said before (and Eric also said). You said without mind or consciousness, 2+2 still equals 4.

But the idea of 2 does not exist without a mind, as you have recognized. So your earlier assertion is impossible.

We can then go back and decide whether the larger point you were then trying to make is successful. You were trying to say there is truth without mind, I think. (Where were we, anyway?)
Tom Gilson | Homepage | 10.26.06 - 5:13 pm | #

Oh, yes, where were we!? I completely agree with you there!

Tom, the idea of 2 doesn't exist without a mind, but 2 planets would. So I can still say that there are two planets in solar system X even if there are no minds because we are judging that hypothetical situation from our perspective, not from within the perspective of the hypothetical world with no minds.

I'll go track down the larger point and get back to you.
Paul | 10.26.06 - 6:07 pm | #

I'll be quite blunt. Every time I see these conversations, I become convinced that materialism is like a sort of mental ebola, taking perfectly good minds and rotting them into mush, until they become permanently trapped in self-referential absurdity and can't even remember what lucid, coherent thought is like.

eric:

The chemical reaction in the brain is the only place in universe where "false and true" exist. We (brains) might have ideals in common, and come to the conclusion that they must be external or objective, but they can't exist anywhere else. We can point to whatever philosophical theory we want, but it is still a mental exercise. Truth will always be a judgement, and judgement requires a mind.

2+2=4 is true outside of a brain, in that a properly functioning brain will hold that as true.

Paul and Eric will NOT answer the the substantive questions because they cannot—they simply don't have the tools, and neither to they want the tools or the implications of a wider reality. They will continue to cover their tracks with inconsistent, incomplete, or non-answers or they will cry "impoliteness" or "too long" or whatever excuse is available. To agree with Deuce, but to use other words that echo Chesterton, minds not ordered to the truth will believe in anything. They've convinced themselves they are correct based on undemonstrated, a priori, non-scientific, presuppositions... and nothing will shake that "faith" (to echo Tom's overall point about Dawkins.) I suggest we drop this string.
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.27.06 - 12:38 am | #

So, I've made a decision.
Charlie | 10.27.06 - 8:37 am | #

Just for old time's sake.
Charlie | 10.27.06 - 8:37 am | #

And because I might have an OC disorder.
Charlie | 10.27.06 - 8:38 am | #

I see. So if one person believes that Santa exists, and another person doesn't, then both of their beliefs are true, because it's true in their minds, and truth is just a judgement call. Thanks for clearing that up.

Btw, is what you just said objectively true, or just a subjective "mental exercise" on your part?

..and, trying to have it both ways, you try to squeeze out a standard of objective truth, having just defined it as a subjective invention of our minds. I know I'll regret asking (because your answer will surely be circular), but what marks a brain as "properly functioning" for the purposes of discerning truth? If one person says that 2+2=4, and another says that 2+2=5, which is "properly functioning" and why?

Tom, I think the larger point is about materialsim (see post 10.16.06 - 2:14 pm, 2nd paragraph). If the idea of 2 exists only in our heads (like I said that justice is only in our heads), then is the idea of 2 reducible to material only? I think the conversation about 2 didn't get us anywhere regarding materialism, but I guess that happens.
Paul | 10.27.06 - 9:52 am | #

If you were going to believe in Santa at this point, you might need to make an appeal to "wider reality" and tell me "the implications of the truth" of Santa is why I find your truth ridiculous.

I believe it is true, and I believe my judgement was sound, matching the evidence of reality.

If we were to find the "2+2=5" person, and ask them to count 2 groups of 2 objects, some mistake has to take place.

I suppose it seems circular, in that we don't know we are right objectively either, and the big circle of "only a brain can decide if a brain is correct", but there is no "out", even as a mental exercise.

What does it mean to say that a bunch of neurons "match" reality?

Paul,
You just don't get it. You really don't.

The fatal flaw in all of your arguments is you appeal to experience to justify/support your experience. It's bogus, it's circular, it's a non-answer.

Can't you see that? Ugh...
SteveK | 10.27.06 - 1:31 pm | #

SteveK:
     Remember Plato's cave? Shadows are their ONLY reality. All else is way too dangerous to consider. They killed Socrates, after all, for challenging sacred-cow presuppositions.
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.27.06 - 3:02 pm | #

SteveK, you were nearly claiming victory because no one could say what neurons matching reality meant, and now that I did, you're claiming victory because of another question that I will answer right below. Unfortunately, I'm beginning to see a pattern here.

But, masochist that I am, I'll address your last point. I have to guess that you meant that I introduced the experience of hunger in my last post. But there's nothing stopping me from explaining hunger as a materialistic brain state just like I did neurons matching reality.

What you see as circular is only the result of *you* asking me to continually interpret something non-materialistic as materialistic. Also, to be able, successfully, to reduce the material to the non-material is not circular, it's consistent. Again, though, you didn't specify where the circularity was, so I can only guess.

The other telling point, SteveK, is that your last post is only a claim, and provides nothing to support it. You didn't even specify what part of my last post appealed to experience. When the specifics are lacking, it's suspicious that there's little behind it. But I'm willing to listen, so if you can be more specific, we can continue the conversation.
Paul | 10.27.06 - 3:28 pm | #

Paul,

You have not answered what "neurons matching reality" is, though you did give it another shot, for which I'll give you credit.

There are a huge number of assumptions under your example. The first one that comes to mind is that instrumentality equals truth. Your neurons led you to an outcome here that is instrumental for the preservation of your health. What that means is that an organism continues to exist in its approximately same condition. Does that necessarily mean that there is truth in that?

We all believe in the value of our own survival, but from where is that value smuggled in? If it is as Dawkins claimed, just the work of the Selfish Gene, then it's an illusion, a lie. It's just our DNA pulling one over on us. It's a trick played by a bunch of sugars and acids, all way too small to see.

If Dawkins is wrong, and yet we want to place it in a strictly materialistic viewpoint, we still have to explain where that survival value comes from. Is it animal instinct? Is animal instinct truth?

You have backed up the question a step, by saying that neurons firing to cause you to choose food over rocks is a match to reality. But keep going back, step upon step. Why does reality call on you to prefer health?

And you still haven't answered the mathematical question we've been batting around for a while. Not all truth is material.

I appreciate your hanging in there on this. SteveK and Holo have been shaking their heads here, metaphorically, wondering when you're going to "get it." I think you're still on the right subject, at any rate.
Tom Gilson | Homepage | 10.27.06 - 4:06 pm | #

Hi, Paul, you're putting in good faith effort, so unlike some other people, you still exist according to "my truth" .

OK, I'll bite. It means that a bunch of neurons fire and sets in motion behavior that is dependent on accurately determining what reality is.

Tom, I take your point about instrumentality, so let me try to take the instrumentality out of my example. Please be patient, I'm a complete amateur, if we keep running in circles, I promise I will consider that it's my ignorance and I'll consider relenting.

Let's start by defining truth operationally.

Food is that which can be eaten. Bag A has food in it. When I look in bag A, some set of neurons fire that also fire when I look at whatever I eat. If someone asks me "What's in the bag?" and I say "Bag A has food in it" and start to munch on an apple with no ill effect, I've said something true because it matches reality. If food can be eaten, and I can eat what's in bag A, then when I say "Bag A has food in it," I've said something true. True means nothing more than that.

Tom, what was the mathematical question? I thought we had reduced 2 to an idea, and ideas only occur in our brains, and brains are material. Surely you'd agree that the concept 2 has a material component, if not that that material component is *all* that 2 is.

Deuce, let me get back to you about your last post at a later time.
Paul | 10.27.06 - 8:21 pm | #

I punch 'thinkingchristian.net' into the search engine and the 2nd link is to this article which is on the same subject we're discussing now with Paul making the same arguments. Amazing!

This has been done before, at great length, and it appears he hasn't budged an inch from his position.

Heck, the comments are even at 110 just like here (although they are 111 here thanks to this comment).

Just thought it was funny.
SteveK | 10.28.06 - 12:07 am | #

SteveK:
     That’s correct, but it’s sad rather than funny: intellectual atrophy and cowardice are no laughing matter. No need to pick on either of these fellows: ignorance of the issues is also no laughing matter… and neither is the materialistic strait jacket they’ve imposed upon themselves. If they need to believe the concepts of (for example) “wisdom” and “prudence” are reducible to chemical reactions, so be it. One should not fall prey to those who advance their (lost) cause by exploiting a problem they themselves have created. It is their problem inasmuch as it stifles critical thinking on their part. But it becomes our problem as well when (on that basis) they employ moral relativism to rationalize (for example) the killing of innocents.
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.28.06 - 8:15 am | #

Deuce, the problem here is that you can always ask questions like "what is matching reality," by ignoring the *examples* that I give you. Language is such that you can always ask for a definition, even of words in a definition. That aspect of language holds for *any* argument. I could apply it to your argument against me. Maybe this is why you can find a circularity. But the *example* that I gave you (matching reality is when I choose the bag with food in it when I'm hungry) establishes my point, regardless of whether I go in to the infinite regress of you always asking what my last definition means.

Tom, your instrumentality point is now, I see, not a critique at all. We can define truth in terms of instrumentality. Truth is that which works, that is, for instance, when I choose a bag with food in it when I'm hungry, I've made the right choice. By my actions and my behavior, I do as much as say "I think it is true that bag A has food in it." We establish that Newton's law is true and governs the path of the planets when our calculations based on his law works: that is, when the rockets we send up go where we want them to.
Paul | 10.29.06 - 10:09 am | #

Deuce & Tom:
     Paul doesn’t know what he’s talking about.
     First, words in a language are not the only things that have definitions or can be defined. Paul’s ignorance of this doesn’t permit him to understand that logic is not only formal (i.e., if the words in an argument “follow the rules” then everything is okay), but material as well (i.e., the content or “import” of a term matters deeply). You are correct to ask Paul to get off the little hamster wheel in his head which doesn’t permit him to import ontologically-vital meaning into terms. That’s why he (falsely) believes you’re asking for an infinite regress: you are not, and you are correct to pursue that line of reasoning—he can only deal with words, you know words refer to real things.
     Second, the example Paul provides of the “bag of food” flows from the just-mentioned error. Interesting, it’s so typical of an error Plato pointed out 2,500 years ago in the Meno. In that case, Socrates asks a young man to tell him what virtue is… and he doesn’t succeed. Paul is trying to define what truth is, and he’s failing miserably. I’ll provide an example that should make it clear.
     Imagine you walk into a clock and watch store and want to buy yourself a new watch. However, since you’ve been living in the wilderness of Mongolia for the past 40 years, while you’ve heard of “digital” watches, you don’t know what one is. So, you ask the salesman: “Please tell me what a digital watch is.” The salesman makes the mistake Paul makes: he points to examples of digital watches: “Here’s one, and here’s one… oh, and here’s another one.” Of course, salesman is not telling you anything about what a digital watch is—he’s merely pointing to examples [words should point to real things or to concepts, not merely to themselves]… and examples alone don’t tell anyone about the whatness of the term “digital” and how a watch can be “digital.” (In fact, if you don’t know what digital means or is, you won’t know whether the salesperson is pulling the wool over your eyes.) You are rightfully skeptical, and ask the salesman again to tell you what a digital watch is. He then says something like, “Oh, a digital watch doesn’t have hands to tell the time, whereas an analog watch does,” and he provides some contrasting examples. Now, any electronics engineer will tell you that the salesperson has (again) not told you what a digital watch is: he’s merely provided examples of what a digital watch is not. You are beginning to lose your patience and, again, ask the salesman what a digital watch is. The salesman tries again, saying it has something to do with the insides of the watch. At that point, you leave the store because you realize the salesman is either a charlatan or ignorant… or both.
     That story mimics quite closely the situation Paul and Eric are in. They’re stuck trying to explain the whatness of truth or other concepts in the mind or any other aspect of reality by only using the materialist words they know, and as such they can only provide examples without being able to explain what they mean. (They also seem to have an amateurish understanding of what materialism is given the inept way terms like “instrumentality” are bandied about… but that’s not immediately important to the main issue.) “Morality is reducible to material brain states.” “Truth is my picking a bag of food when I’m hungry.” “A rocket makes it to the moon because of Newton’s Laws.” Etc., etc., ad nauseum. Interesting examples reflecting stifled and quite empty thinking. They fail even with examples from the MESs, so you can imagine how lost they are when it comes to abstractions, universals, ideas, morality, etc., etc. Sigh… yet again, we see “thinking” not thought through—so typical of materialists.
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.29.06 - 12:15 pm | #

Deuce, the problem here is that you can always ask questions like "what is matching reality," by ignoring the *examples* that I give you.... But the *example* that I gave you (matching reality is when I choose the bag with food in it when I'm hungry) establishes my point, regardless of whether I go in to the infinite regress of you always asking what my last definition means.

However, I do not conceptually see that that belief, if it exists, is something material, or that the trueness of it is a material property.

Deuce:
     Paul says:

Perhaps I’m suggesting a lesser form of truth. Truth is a concept, made solely of a material brain state, that happens when behavior matches up with the world.

Holopupenko,
I want to measure my words here very carefully so as not to give the wrong impression.
I enjoy your comments here and always gain from your insights (as I do from your own blog) and as a mere commenter I wish only to encourage your participation.
That said, as an observer only, and as one with no authority whatsoever, I have to say that I'd like to see you tone down the style.
I don't see any reason to continue with words like "silly" and "whining".

I completely understand your frustration at not getting the materialists here (or elsewhere) to see or admit your points - no one else here has ever been able to either - but that doesn't justify the insults.

That's just my two cents, and having offered them, I would like to see you continue to follow every one of Paul's comments with your rebuttals. No matter how repetitive or pointless you may feel the exercise, there are always others of us listening and learning.

Thanks.
Charlie
Charlie | 10.30.06 - 4:14 pm | #

Charlie:
     Thanks. Understood and well-taken. Note, however, I've been pretty careful to qualify Paul's ideas, thoughts, criteria, examples of what is spouted, and assertions as "inept," "silly," "incoherent trash," "disordered," (which they are) rather than the person. It's about the ideas, not the person... although the person himself is affected by bad ideas: that's clear.
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.31.06 - 2:33 am | #

I am wondering what you make of research that indicates that the greater a person's intelligence and/or education, the less likely that person is to believe in a traditional God?
rossecorp | 10.31.06 - 9:19 am | #

Holo, I want to note my agreement with Charlie. Although you've been careful to criticize only the ideas, I think the effect has been stronger and more personally attacking than you realize. I would prefer you continue to challenge the ideas without using so many pejorative adjectives to describe them, since those adjectives aren't at all necessary to advancing your argument. Thanks.

Tom
Tom Gilson | Homepage | 10.31.06 - 11:10 am | #

Rossecorp,

That's way off topic. But a good question.

I have to pull away from the computer right now, but later this afternoon I'll post a thread where we can discuss that, rather than here.

Tom
Tom Gilson | Homepage | 10.31.06 - 11:11 am | #

Thanks Tom. I thought it was relevant here because I read it in the Dawkins Salon interview.
Anonymous | 10.31.06 - 12:30 pm | #

Oh--good point. Anyway, I over-promised. I'll get that post up tomorrow, I hope.
Tom Gilson | Homepage | 10.31.06 - 12:36 pm | #

rossecorp,
I think there is such research and I think there is such a correlation.
Charlie | 10.31.06 - 1:20 pm | #

Charlie & Tom;
     Okay, okay... this highly-nuanced rhino will back off. I repeat, however, that I am NOT looking for agreement with MY ideas: all I'm asking for is a coherent argument with well-reasoned (supported) premises. Instead, we get staunch assertions, selective evasiveness, and obfuscation: at its base, it's manipulative.

     WRT to rossecorp's (quite good) question, I would try to draw a distinction: can one distinguish between (1) those with "greater education" who then see how much more is out there to learn, and (2) those with "greater education" who use that education for their own ends and who get "puffed up" about it? It's the ole distinction between "intelligence" or "knowledge" on the one hand, and "wisdom" on the other. (Don't the Psalms and the Proverbs admonish us to love wisdom...? Isn't King Solomon a great example, and weren't the Pharisees a great anti-example? I don't recall a love of "knowledge" per say.)
     But this is where scientists run into a brick wall, isn't it? While intelligence may be "measured" (I'm actually quite skeptical about this), wisdom cannot. A scientismist will boldly reduce wisdom to something measureable (NOT!), while a humble scientist will understand his and science's limitations.
     I recall William Buckley's wonderful quip that he'd rather be ruled by the first 500 names in the Boston Telephone Directory than the members of the faculty club at Harvard. Touché!
Holopupenko | Homepage | 10.31.06 - 2:41 pm | #

Holopupenko,
I hope you noted that it wouldn't please me at all for you to back off.

I think what you are asking for is perfectly reasonable, and I don't think it is being met.
Charlie | 10.31.06 - 2:56 pm | #

Re: education and belief in God.

I think there is a correlation but as Holo said, knowledge is not wisdom.

I see wisdom as the proper application/use of knowledge. Knowledge being the tool and wisdom being the ability to use the tool properly.

My working hypothesis:

1) As knowledge increases humility decreases because people develop a false sense of security. Kind of like the person who owns a gun but doesn't understand how to use it. Lack of humility leads to arrogance.

2) As wisdom increases humility increases because people realize that with an abundance of knowledge comes great responsibility. The person who knows how to use a gun respects the gun and knows the power it has.
SteveK | 10.31.06 - 7:28 pm | #

I am wondering what you make of research that indicates that the greater a person's intelligence and/or education, the less likely that person is to believe in a traditional God?

Charlie, sorry for the delay, but I appreciate your 10.30.06 - 4:14 comments. You and I have argued mightily in the past, but I thank you for the Spirit of your comment [captilization metaphoric but still sincere]. You can't go too far wrong if you're dedicated to "listening and learning," as you say.
Paul | 11.01.06 - 9:25 pm | #