Thinking Christian Comments
Original Post: Miracles and Science
Tom,
Just a quick question: Do you think atheists should take claims of miracles as evidence for the existence of God, and, if so, do you think we should also take claims of alien abductions as evidence for the existence of aliens?
J.P. Moreland on Greg Koukl's show discussing miracles.
http://www.strcast.org/podcast/w...ekly/
021906.mp3
Scroll half-way through, to the second hour.
Jordan,
I hinted very briefly at this, but only hinted, since this falls into an aspect of miracles I wasn't focusing on this time.
If claims of miracles are to be used as evidence for anything at all, then they should be carefully subjected to the kinds of evidential tests that are used in history and forensics. To the extent that they hold up, they could certainly be used as evidence for God.
It would be important that the historical/evidential tests not include the automatic assumption that there is no God and therefore no miracles, because that's an obviously circular approach. Of course the assumption should also not be that every unusual event is an instance of supernatural intervention, for coincidences could happen, too. Still, the question should be, "what happened?" not, "what happened on the assumption that whatever it was, it could never have been a miracle?"
(I don't expect my personal story on this blog entry to be evidence to you for the existence of God, because it can't be independently tested. I understand that fully. For me, as a participant in the event, it's strong evidence, but I know that's not sufficient for anyone who wasn't there.)
I would apply the same kind of standard to claims of alien abductions. I'm skeptical about the existence of aliens, but if a claim was made that stood up to rigorous testing, it would count for me as evidence for the existence of aliens. Wouldn't you say the same?
I think you and I are pretty much on the same page on this one (imagine that... a theist and an atheist agree!
).
Tom, it seems, though, that you did not hold your personal experience that you blogged about up to the rigorous testing that you require for claims of alien abductions before you made your conclusion. Or did you?
Another thought: what was it that made you conclude that the sunshine was not a coincidence, but that your prayers were answered by God?
Tom,
You don't cover the most important objection. While admitting that the miracle could have occurred, we also have to admit that the miraculous event is so improbable that the alternatives are much more likely. In that case, we would not be rational to conclude that the miracle actually did happen.
The story you tell about your college rally illustrates many of the ways that your story is more likely to be told than to actually be an act of God. What if you guys were planning a football game? Would it have been a miracle if the sun came out? Would you have asked God for sunny weather for your match? Or do you not look for miracles when the goal is not holy or consistent with your religious views?
Religious miracles of this type are the epitome of bad science. It's cherry-picking. There are no controls, and you get to decide which data is significant, and which events prove your conclusion.
This doesn't rule out the possibility that there's a God, and it doesn't mean God cannot communicate with us. It only means if God communicates with us through miracles that are less probable than alternative explanations, then either God is playing games with us, or he wants us to be irrational.
The usual questions about personal experience with answered prayers...
First for you, I assume that if it had rained, that would have been Gods will as well? If an Atheist wanted to go for a walk that morning, should he thank you for your request? If the odds are against a coincidence 100 to 1, wouldn't you "beat the odds" 1 out of 100 times, and not remember the other 100, without it being a miracle? And you don't mention the devils role very often, and/or other gods and other beings with powers to mess with nature. Couldn't you have concluded that the devil was trying to keep you from doing Gods work, and you and God defeated him with prayer? Or perhaps Allah had some yard work to get done at a mosque that morning?
And a few questions for God. Why stop the rain, instead of curing (or never causing) some Cancer? If all your reasons are good (not circular at all) then you must have had a good reason for the rain too. And at what level did you throw your tinker switch? Did you nudge a couple molecules 100 miles upwind, so scientist could never detect your sneaky ways, or did you put your big invisible hand over campus? I shouldn't assume ahead of time that you won't/can't answer, unless I willing to learn to read the signs and wonders.
You can assume that everything is subject to the laws of nature, or you can assume nothing is. There is no workable "in-between". The first choice means that there are things that are just not possible, like virgin birth (in humans, on earth, yada yada). The second choice means anything is possible, just ask! Everyone, including me, has had experiences of good luck, or bad luck, and felt like we were in a someones play. I can see how you see that experience as evidence of a director.
I have this discussion at Thanksgiving quite a bit, because I feel amazingly "blessed" in my life. Theist friends say "there you go, prove of Gods love"... then when things are going crappy, they tell me I should get "right with God".
You can count on miracles happening at the rate they happen, if it just means beating the odds of something happening. The odds of the dead coming back to life are zero, not every life ever lived to one.
Sorry for the leapfrog comment, Doctor logic... thought I was here first 
Tom,
The other night on the TV show "Extreme Home Makeover," a women cried out: "Its a miracle." She was looking at her newly unveiled home that was built and paid for by ABC, Sears and the Home Depot.
Was it a miracle? Maybe? But is that really a satisfying explanation? Does one's curosity simply stop there? Is there not something more than making the rather large inferential leap to the conclusion that the hand of God is behind these corporations oh so generous acts? I hope so.
Perhaps this women described what she was seeing and experiencing as a "miracle" because it helped to make meaningful this very concrete and unique experience of having a beautiful new house given to her. In this sense, a "miracle" isn't something to "test" or "prove," it isn't something that is "true" or "false," it is a word used to designate some set of events as significant. By using "miracle," she is enacting a storyline, a living tradition with close ties to the history and culture of Christian practice.
So, Tom, maybe what you experienced during college was the effects of the invisible hand of God, or maybe it was a description you gave to some events that made (and continues to make) them meaningful to you and your friend.
Maybe "God" and "miracle" work together in everyday talk? Maybe they form part of the verbal canopy, or grammar, that reflects and reconstitutes our everyday world view? Maybe?
Paul, the historical/forensic approach is used to determine whether someone's claim is true. I'm not asking that question of myself, so I don't need to use that approach. I know from my own experience that the claim is true. But I can't expect you to say the same thing with any degree of confidence. So you're right, I'm not using that test for my own experience, but it's appropriate to use it for others' claims.
What made me conclude the sunshine was not a coincidence? Two things: lots of experience with God, which tells me that he can and will do this kind of thing occasionally; and the sheer enormity of the coincidence that it would be if that were the explanation. The timing of the rain stoppage would have to also be coincidence, by the way.
doctor(logic),
You don't cover the most important objection. While admitting that the miracle could have occurred, we also have to admit that the miraculous event is so improbable that the alternatives are much more likely. In that case, we would not be rational to conclude that the miracle actually did happen.
That improbability depends on your background knowledge. If you are assuming there is no miracle-performing God, then you are correct. But that's a circular assumption, and it's not the one I make going into this question.
The story you tell about your college rally illustrates many of the ways that your story is more likely to be told than to actually be an act of God. What if you guys were planning a football game? Would it have been a miracle if the sun came out? Would you have asked God for sunny weather for your match? Or do you not look for miracles when the goal is not holy or consistent with your religious views?
I suppose if the same had happened for a football game I would have attributed it to God, but it never has. You see, I think you're at least dangerously close to, if not committing, the error C. S. Lewis attributed to Hume. The question to ask about miracles is whether they have happened.
And it's not inappropriate, as you seem to be implying, to expect miracles more in situations where it clearly involves a spiritual work. Why would it not be?
It only means if God communicates with us through miracles that are less probable than alternative explanations, then either God is playing games with us, or he wants us to be irrational.
That, my friend, is an irrational view of the situation. You are supposing that no matter what God does, it's so improbable it couldn't happen. Or that it's so improbable we should never conclude it was God doing it. If you're going to suppose that, you should remove the word "God" from the supposition, because any God proposed by theism is smarter and more capable than that!
Eric,
The usual questions about answered prayer call for the usual answers: God is a personal God who makes his own decisions, and who works in ways we can't always understand. I think that ought to be in the "job description" of any God worth worshiping, don't you?
If the odds are against a coincidence 100 to 1, wouldn't you "beat the odds" 1 out of 100 times, and not remember the other 100, without it being a miracle?
I would have to set the bar for miracles much, much higher than 1/100. Virgin births are much more rare than that! And the event I experienced in college had a much lower than 1/100 probability.
You can assume that everything is subject to the laws of nature, or you can assume nothing is. There is no workable "in-between".
Huh? Why not?
Jacob, your central question was,
Was it a miracle? Maybe? But is that really a satisfying explanation? Does one's curosity simply stop there? Is there not something more than making the rather large inferential leap to the conclusion that the hand of God is behind these corporations oh so generous?
No, my curiosity doesn't stop there.
As to regular occurrences in the universe, there is every reason to probe them to their most detailed scientific explanation.
As to a miracle like the Virgin Birth, my curiosity doesn't stop at just "God did it." My curiosity extends to matters such as why he did it. What does it reveal about God, about the human condition, about the nature of reality?
I could wonder also how he did it, but that's not available for study. We can't get to that by any scientific method, because it's not happening often enough for us to run the studies. That's the way it is with the miraculous. It's a designation that should only be applied to the truly exceptional, outside-the-natural-order situation, and such things are just not available for science to probe.
Does your curiosity extend only to material causes in the world? I think you let it stop way too soon. There's much more than just that to be discovered!
That miracle is a designation that should only be used to describe truly exceptional events is a nice normative claim. Too often it isn't the case, however. Though, winning a new house is certainly an exceptional event.
I like to think my curiosity is boundless. My supernatural imagination is not as quick as others.
Charlie:
J.P. Moreland on Greg Koukl's show discussing miracles.
I listened to this on Friday. Funny you should link to it here. The stories of the visions/dreams are quite convincing if true. Imagine a Muslim being told to go to a particular place on a particular day and ask a particular man wearing a particular jacket about God.
Of course, we know the miracle didn't really happen because science has demonstrated that it's not possible.
What made me conclude the sunshine was not a coincidence? Two things: lots of experience with God, which tells me that he can and will do this kind of thing occasionally; and the sheer enormity of the coincidence that it would be if that were the explanation. The timing of the rain stoppage would have to also be coincidence, by the way.The mere presumed fact that God can do miracles is not any sort of evidence at all that a miracle occured in the experience you related, it merely says that it *could* have; it merely makes possible the whole question of whether it was a miracle or a coincidence. The idea that God does miracles is not evidence that any specific event is a miracle.
Likewise, the sheer enormity of the presumed coincidence is not at all evidence that it is not a coincidence for the same reason that someone has to win the lottery, against all odds.
Paul, the fact that God can do miracles is a contributor to the conclusion that it was one, because it drastically increases the background probability of miracles. That's a Bayesian probability factor.
And the lottery example does not apply, because this was not a case where someone had to win. The odds of someone winning the lottery (over a period of weeks) are about 100%. The odds of this weather event happening, absent some intervention, were about zero.
My goodness, again. Where have you gone wrong? Everywhere! Does it really makes sense to you that a woman got pregnant from a "spirit"? (Like the Greek 'Heroes') You know the Catholics believe the miracle that Mary's mother was also a virgin. Do you? Maybe that's just a Catholic miracle. That's not a miracle for us unbelieving Prostestants (or Hindus or Jews or Muslims, etc.). There aren't any miracles. There are only things that appear to be miracles because there are no rational explanations for them when they occurred, or appeared to have occurred. Crop circles, UFOs, David Blaine's levitation (right before your eyes - it's a miracle!), and so forth. And, most of all, these purported "miracles" in the Bible aren't necessary to be a Christian - what's necessary is to focus on what Jesus taught us, then try to live that kind of life. That's the problem with literalists of all religions - they focus more on dogma, rules, and regulations rather than practice in their own lives. They seem to enjoy it when people don't believe the inerrancy of the Bible - like John Hagee (a non-Christian if I have ever saw one) - these people relish the prospect of non-literalists "going to hell". My goodness, use the brains God gave you.
Tom, the point of the lottery example was not that the weather in your anecdote had to be such-and-such, or that the analogy was that tight with regard to that factor. The point was that sheer enormity of odds doesn't mean that chance isn't happening.
Can you explain what you mean by the background possibility? I'm not sure that's anything different from my idea that it's merely the idea that God *could* do miracles, as distinct from any contribution to the odds that a miracle did occur in a specific anecdote. And what do you mean by "Bayesian probability factor," I'm not familiar with that.
Tom,
The odds of this weather event happening, absent some intervention, were about zero.I would like you to substantiate this with data.
You seem to be saying that the odds of the Sun temporarily peeking through the clouds on an otherwise rainy day are about zero. I would be very surprised if the probability of such an occurrence were less than once per year, and I would expect it happens about 10 times per year.
However, I agree with Paul. Even the rarity of an event isn't adequate to back up your claims of the miraculous. Your prayers focus your attention on that subset of coincidences that are cognitively significant. All other coincidences are ignored. This is the worst kind of statistical reasoning because you fail to account for all the coincidences that aren't cognitively significant. That means you don't have a random sample, so you can't meaningfully talk about probability.
Take any rare event, e.g., a deadly tornado. We know that tornados can hit one object and miss another similar object in close proximity. Zoom-in on the affected area and look for someone who is in close proximity to the deadly tornado who doesn't die. Here we have a doubly-rare circumstance of cognitive significance, so we roll our own "miracle of the tornado survivor".
But now focus instead on utility boxes. Utility boxes also suffer a distribution of damage from storms wherein some will be destroyed and few others nearby will escape unscathed. If we find a utility box in the tornado touchdown zone that is unscathed, we don't give it a second thought because it's not cognitively significant to us. No one says "It's the miracle utility box!"
Tom,
That improbability depends on your background knowledge. If you are assuming there is no miracle-performing God, then you are correct. But that's a circular assumption, and it's not the one I make going into this question.Actually, it is you who is being circular. You are using miracles to substantiate God, then using God to substantiate miracles.
If I believe that X occurs because of Y, and I believe in Y because of X, I'm being circular. The only way to escape this circularity is to make a prediction that can be falsified. Yet, random prayer studies show that prayer is ineffective. So what's it going to be? Circularity or science?
Hi Tom:
Good post. I only urge a bit of caution in the comments section to fall into the trap of thinking you need to justify miracles strictly from the scientific perspective (title of your post notwithstanding). I'm not saying you are, just that the hostile criticisms to your post are trying to push you in that direction. It's a false start because they don't want to understand the nature and role of miracles within the Providence of God. A lot of good information (and refutation of some of the hostile comments is found here: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/...then/
10338a.htm ) Also, I don't in any way mean to steal your thunder or engage in self-promotion, but you may also want to consider miracles from a faith perspective as I posted here, here, and here.
Paul,
The point was that sheer enormity of odds doesn't mean that chance isn't happening.
The sheer enormity of odds doesn't prove that chance wasn't happening. Right. But enormity of odds against something happening by chance means that, if the thing happens, one can look quite seriously at the possibility that it didn't happen by chance. Why? Because of enormity of odds against it happening. (Simple, if you ask me.)
Thus it counts as probabilistic evidence in favor of a miracle having actually happened. Not absolute, apodictic proof, but strong evidence.
You're probably not going to like the answer I have for both you, Paul, and also for doctor(logic), as to why a coincidence like this counts as evidence. First, doctor(logic), remember it's not just a coincidence of the sun peaking through. It's also the timing--to the very second--of the rain starting again after the event. Before the event the rainfall stopped at just the right time, too, but I can't say it was exactly the right time within a second or two.
I've studied my social psych. I know about cognitively significant coincidences, as you term it here. But the difference between this and the utility box is (this is the part you won't like) specification, a la Dembski.
And again, it's also a matter of background knowledge. I know God does miracles. That doesn't have to count as evidence for you. It does for me.
Holopupenko, I was getting "page not found" errors, probably because of line breaks inserted by Haloscan. I've fixed the links. If anyone has had trouble finding them, try again now. (See his comment just a little ways up the page from here.)
I'm about to look at your posts, but I wanted to take care of this right away.
Tom-
Thanks for this post. It and the comments were thought provoking for me.
I was disappointed that you used personal experience to argue against the third version, but it certainly led to dialog.
What Jacob brought up earlier about the use of the term "miracle", I certainly agree with you that that term should only be used toward the truly exceptional, outside-the-natural-order situation.
At the same time, I've noticed that often the naturalist will automatically say that I am asking for an altering of reality if I ask for anything from God. In their eyes it must seem as if I think miracles are commonplace.
The sovereignty of God reigns not only in miracles, but in the day to day goings on of the universe. This includes all of the natural laws and even the hearts of people. God can provide for our needs through both miraculous and naturalistic means, but they don’t need to be confused. What we regard as “natural” is merely God displaying Himself throughout His creation.
“. . . for all things in heaven and on earth were created by him – all things, whether visible or invisible, whether thrones or dominions, whether principalities or powers – all things were created through him and for him. He himself is before all things and ALL THINGS ARE HELD TOGETHER IN HIM.” (Colossians 1:16-17)
Thanks again for your post, it helped me think through some things.
Nicholas:
That was an excellent comment.
Tom,
(me) You can assume that everything is subject to the laws of nature, or you can assume nothing is. There is no workable "in-between".
(you>Huh? Why not?
Your "modern" miracles are just rare events that could/do happen. Something unusual and rare captures our imagination. If we think God is in charge of all creation, then we would also see those rare events as signs of a rare (special) exception, and try and see a purpose behind it.
The rain didn't just stop, it stopped for you, because you are special.
Once you say anything didn't "just happen", then nothing could "just happen". Everything is a miracle. If all things are held together in him, then the rainy day was just as much a miracle as the sunny.
Most Christians seem to be talking about, and asking for, these "could/do happen" kind of miracles. If some people survive cancer, then it might as well be the one I care about. But if you insisting that these "could/do happen" miracles are somehow things that couldn't happen otherwise, no matter how rare, then you might as well expect anything. Why stop at what could happen? Why not expect the odd person to come back from the dead?
Because it doesn't happen, and it never did. Was there a special time of miracles when the sun sometimes stopped in the sky, or seas parted, that is now over? Modern Christians have a very low standard for signs and wonders. Or, they have a modern understanding of the laws of nature, and they know that they ultimately hold true, unlike most people at Jesus's time.
I think we believe in the same possibilities in life, you just see more than is there, and see that as proof that there is more there.
Tom, Your phrase "taking a look at the possibility" hides a lot. Strictly speaking, "taking a look" means *nothing* in terms of quality of quantity of evidence. What I'm talking about is *after we have taken a looki.* To wit:
We aren't even sure that the odds are enormous, even though they seem that way to you, from your limited perspective. We have no idea what the odds are because we haven't talllied or defined all the other incidents in which nothing coincidental happened. If we assume that an event has a likelihood by chance of one-in-a-million (or whatever), and that event happens to you, you must still conclude that it was due to chance if [and here's the key point] it hasn't happened to a million other people. Stated another way, we would expect by chance five case of a-million-to-one shot in a city of 5 million people. If we got 2,000 million-to-one shots in that same population, then we might have something to look at beyond chance.
The problem with calculating those very same odds with your anecdote is, how do we define what that other populationn is? It can't be just you in your experience because any one of those 5 in a city of 5 million have never had a million-to-one shot happen to them before, so they are astounded by it, but, in a city of 5 million, odds are, just by chance, that such a thing would happen to someone. You're astounded by your anecdote from your limited perspective.
Here's some miracles: (1) Some people have managed to make God in their image, (2) Jesus has been miraculously transformed from looking like a medium-height, dark-skinned, black-haired, brown eyed, first century Semitic Jew to a tall, lean, fair-skinned, blue-eyed, brown (even light brown) haired Caucasian Gentile (a European Christian). (3) Some people are puffed up Christians who worship dogma, a book and church-defined doctrine rather than Christ's teaching.
Some people have managed to make God in their image
This is a restatement of the often-used phrase "Don't put God in a box". I've never understood this one.
In trying to understand the character of God don't I have to try to "wrap my mind around him". In doing that I am attempting to put him in a mental box. I guess we all could give up trying to understand God and therefore give up trying to shove him in a box, but that doesn't help the creator/creation relationship.
The bottom line is God is who he is no matter what you and I think of him. We try our best to figure him out knowing that we will never be able to reach that goal.
Some people are puffed up Christians who worship dogma, a book and church-defined doctrine rather than Christ's teaching.
How would you know Christ's teaching if not for church-defined doctrine passed down through the generations?
Nathan, I said something last night about a ban. It's now going into effect. Your comments are intentionally contemptuous and derisive, and one of them was very graphic. You lay no basis of any carefully laid out discussion for your negative opinions. As a contrast to consider, doctor(logic), whom I disagree with frequently but still respect, takes time to work on what he writes.
As I said before, disagreements are very welcome here and there's all kinds of history to prove it. But rude and offensive language are not.
Here's a belated word of appreciation to Charlie for the link to J. P. Moreland's podcast (see near the top of this thread).
This topic of miracles is not so distant in time and space as many have thought. I encourage all to listen to this discussion.
Charlie:
Could you please send me your e-mail address (if you don't mind) via my blog so that I can add you to our Christmas e-list?
Thanks
(Tom: sorry for the way-off topic comment.)
The Orange County Register is reporting the same kinds of things J. P. Moreland was speaking of in the podcast referenced above: visions, healings, explosive church growth in the southern hemisphere, Muslim conversions. See the article.
Holopupenko,
Thank you for your request.
I tried to give you my address as a comment at your blog but I don't think it worked.
You can contact me at
charlieaaronscott AT yahoo.ca
Tom:
The Orange County Register is reporting the same kinds of things J. P. Moreland was speaking of in the podcast
The Register has been doing a weekly series on Saddleback Church. This is the church my family attends and I can tell you things like this are happening across the globe.
Tom,
You say this:
"The sheer enormity of odds doesn't prove that chance wasn't happening. ... But enormity of odds against something happening by chance means that, if the thing happens, one can look quite seriously at the possibility that it didn't happen by chance. Why? Because of enormity of odds against it happening. (Simple, if you ask me.)"
This can't stand as it is. The mere fact that an event was quite unlikely but did in fact occur is by itself no reason to suppose that it did not occur by chance. Let us say that Hubert won the lottery. Now of course the probability before he won it that he would win it was extraordinarily low. Do we then go off in search of some non-chance explanation when he wins it? Do we go off in search of a non-chance explanation when anyone wins the lottery? Of course not. Rather we suspect non-chance only if we have reason to believe that there is some non-negligible probability that a non-chance cause was in play. If we knew of Hubert that his sister worked in the lottery office, then we might begin to suspect that he didn't win by chance. But if we have no such informationn as that, a non-chance explanation would not - indeed should not - enter our minds.
Apply this to the case of putative miracles. They are often events that we judge quite unlikely. But, as was shown above, the mere fact that they are unlikely is not yet reason to suppose that they are non-chance. Rather, we should suspect that they are non-change only if we have reason to hold that there's a non-negligible probability that a non-chance cause was a work. Thus arguments that attempt to prove that some putative miracle was actually God-caused must assume that there's a real possibility that God exists and is at work in the world. Miracles then can't be used to show that there's such a probability, i.e. miracles arguments can persuade only those who antecedently admit a real probability that God exists and is at work in the world. They can have no force for those who, like the good doctor, take themselves to have no reason to suppose this. Now, it might well be that miracles arguments can be used to increase confidence in God's existence. But they cannot, as it were, get belief in God's existence off the ground.
Second point: the real issue at play in discussion of miracles is a comparison of two probabilities. They are: (i) the probability that the putative miracle had a natural but as yet undiscovered cause, and (ii) the probability that the event had a supernatural cause. I'm unpersuaded that in the case of any "classic" miracle - the virgin birth, say - that the probability of i is significantly less than the probability of ii, as it would have to be if concluding that the cause was supernatural were justified. Is it much less likely that Mary, though still a virgin, was yet near enough to male ejaculate that some managed to enter and then impregnate her than that she was supernaturally impregnated by the Holy Spirit? I can think of no reason to suppose that this is so. Indeed it seems to me that the probability of the former is greater than that of the latter. Of the former, we have some independent experience; of the latter, we (or at least I) have absolutely no independent experience.
In sum: I'm very skeptical that miracle-reports can be used to bolster faith. Rather belief in them is part of faith. Or so say I.
Franklin, it's nice to see you here again.
In terms of actual practice, miracle-reports are not terribly persuasive, except for those who have seen them firsthand. The J. P. Moreland talk referenced above is an easily accessible source for information on that effect.
The lottery example you quote is similar to the question raised in ID. It's not just improbability, but specified improbability, that indicates some intervention. Somebody has to win the lottery, the probability of that over time is 100%. If I specify two weeks in advance that my next-door neighbor is going to win it, and if it proves true, then the fraud police are going to come straight to my door. They will view it as evidence that I've tinkered with the system.
Note that at this point they could be wrong. I could have been just lucky. But note that in spite of that, it would still be viewed as evidence of tinkering, evidence that has to be taken under serious consideration.
What if I did the same thing two or three times in a row? I would either be hauled off in the middle of the night to a government lab where they would study my psychic abilities, or I would be thrown in jail. Because there would be certainty that I did not do it by chance.
Still, your conclusion holds to a good degree, in that a person of no faith in God will conclude that the prior probability of a lucky coincidence is far greater than the prior probability that God has acted. I can't change their view on that. I have a view of God that says he does sometime act, so I have less problem ascribing certain events to his intervention.
Yet if you happen to be the one who sees the before-and-after x-rays of a man healed from multiple fractures overnight (per Moreland), you might take a different view of it. Or you might not.
Franklin:
You assert “… the real issue at play in discussion of miracles is a comparison of two probabilities,” and … of the latter [supernatural causes of miracles], we (or at least I) have absolutely no independent experience.” No, neither one of these is incorrect.
Regarding the former, your words (“comparison of probabilities”) betray an attempt to wrap an MES-only animated mind around the actual event. It’s as if, on the one hand, you’re “insulted” because you can’t confirm that natural causes are explanations for miracles (remember: the MESs abstract from the full ontological import of beingness, and so their explanatory power is limited in any event); while on the other hand you understand quite correctly that if miracles are indeed supernaturally caused, then employing the MESs to “explain” them is clearly a non-starter.
Regarding the latter, that’s just plain false if miracles indeed occurred: miracles have been witnessed—at the very least according to the Gospels—by many people. To claim an alleged absolute lack of “independent experience” leaves one wondering why you feel so comfortable hand-waving away so many other peoples’ experiences. (1) Maybe you haven’t ever experienced a miracle, but that has nothing to do with reports of other peoples’ experiences, and (2) to repeat from the previous paragraph: you’re a priori limiting the evidence to what you feel should be the arbitrating framework, i.e., the MESs. But that’s an interpretation of the evidence, isn’t it?
Contrary to what you claim, miracles are not “confirmed” through “comparisons of probabilities.” Probabilities are highly abstracted tools of mathematics as applied to sensory evidence, while comparisons of probabilities is almost invariably a highly-interpretative act. Yet sensory evidence does not merely import truth into the mind limited to what can be captured by probabilities. (While human knowledge arises through the senses, not all knowledge is sensory.) What you’ve provided in your comments has long since been answered, for which you may consider reading the section entitled “III. Errors” in the Catholic Encyclopedia’s entry on “miracles.” In this context, consider also what miracles are as based on the following excerpts from the entry and see whether you can apply the MESs (including mathematics) to “capture” terms such as “Divine mission,” “faith,” “morals,” “sanctity,” “Providence,” “trust,” etc.:
“evidences attesting and confirming the truth of a Divine mission, or of a doctrine of faith or morals… are wrought to attest true sanctity… an act of God’s supernatural Providence over men. It gives a positive content to “wonder,” for, whereas the wonder shows the miracle as a deviation from the ordinary course of nature, the sign gives the purpose of the deviation.”Faith is not belief without proof, but trust without reservation. For this reason I agree with Tom—who may not realize he is echoing St. Thomas: “To one who has faith, no explanation is necessary. To one without faith, no explanation is possible.”
Tom,
Perhaps I've missed something, but you seem to have in mind a certain type of miraculous event, viz. the true prophesy. Do you mean to so limit your point? I'd thought the discussion concerned miracles generally.
Holo,
Put yourself in my shoes for a moment. For all I know, it might well be the case that many have witnessed miracles. But I'm not responsible for their beliefs. I'm responsible only for my own, and it seems clear to me how I should proceed here. Many miracle reports are patently false. (I suspect you'd agree to that. Many miracle reports come to us from non-Christian religions.) So how then am I to distinguish the true from the false reports? It seems to me that I have to weigh probabilities here: the probabilities that the reports have not been significantly embellished or just plain made up, the probabilities that there exist natural explanations of the events reported, the probabilities that there exist supernatural explanations. I'd have to have a good grip on all of those before I'd render a judgment. Let me make that point as strongly as I can: it is a strict epistemological duty for me to estimate those probabilities and to weigh them against one another.
Now, I really have no idea what probability to assign to supernatural explanations of natural events. Perhaps you can help me along here, but at present I'm in a state of ignorance. Thus it's impossible for me at present to take miracle reports at face value.
Franklin:
First, if there is no God (let's expand beyond miracles for just this point), there is no "duty"—epistemological or otherwise—imposed on you... except possibly (but highly unlikely) by yourself. But then, no one would nor ought to give a hoot.
Second, you're making a classic philosophical mistake initiated by Descartes: you're turned to epistemological considerations before dealing with with ontological ones: things are before they can be known. This is not a trite assertion.
Third, as partially evidenced by the immediately-preceding point, you cannot assign a probability to a supernatural cause. A supernatural cause is not "captureable" by the highly abstract mathematical formalisms of probability theory. But just because this is the case does not justify leaping from a formalism limitation to an ontological conclusion. Moreover, judging from your blog, my sense is (correct me if I'm wrong) you understand this very well. If you a priori and intentionally limit your explanatory import to efficient and material causes alone, you will have your reward: you will merely be left scratching at the door begging, "Please, Sir... may I have some more gruel?"
Franklin, I was speaking of miracles in general; but more to the point, I was speaking of any event that would be highly improbable to occur apart from some intentional action behind it. It applies to the true prophecy and also to the highly improbable weather event we've been discussing. It also applies to miracles of healing, and many other kinds.
In a debate between William Lane Craig and Bart Ehrman on the existence of historical evidence for the resurrection of Jesus, Ehrman made the same objection that doctor(logic) did in his first post on this thread - namely, that miracles are by nature less probable than even the most improbable natural explanation. Craig responded by applying a probability calculus to this question, which Ehrman never answered, merely responding with something along the lines of "I can't believe I'm hearing someone reduce God to an equation." However, it seems fair that, if someone is going to argue against miracles from the mathematical psoition of probabilities, they should be prepared to "do the math" - in other words, not just intuit what would be more or less probable, but, given that you are making a mathematical claim, use the appropriate formula to calculate your answer. I have never seen a response from an "unbeliever" (in the miraculous) to Craig's argument. Ehrman certainly didn't, though it was he that was arguing probabilities. The transcript for the debate can be found here:
http://www.holycross.edu/departm...-
transcript.pdf
Any thoughts, anyone?
P.S. Tom - I don't know if the line breaks in my link are going to come across correctly on haloscan. If they don't would you mind owrking your magic? Thanks!
Hi Aaron.
Tom blogged on what I presume is the same debate, here and here.
The comments do exist, even though Haloscan says they don't. I'm sure you'd be interested.
The more things change...
Aaron:
I find myself in the difficult position of disagreeing both with Craig and Ehrman.
I disagree with Ehrman because his MES-based arguments don’t cut it: God is not a part of the physical universe and therefore cannot be perceived by the methods and tools of the MESs. But He can be reasoned to—Aquinas’ “Five Ways” demonstrate this. Some truths about God (the Trinity and the Incarnation, for example) surpass the ability of human reason to prove… and hence why depend on the authority of revealed truth to maintain faith.
I disagree with Craig because Ehrman’s mumbled complaint (I’m going on your characterization, and will read the transcript next) that Craig reduced a demonstration for God’s existence to mere probability calculus is spot on. There are reasons Craig does this that would take a long time to unpack, but it basically revolves about Craig’s refusal to acknowledge the analogousness of being (you can see that in his and Moreland’s philosophy text book). This is a huge error on Craig’s part, and it ends up forcing him to rely on mathematics (which is an abstraction from reality) than on more robust and far-reaching ontological and metaphysical arguments.
Mathematics, in a nut shell, is contentless—which means its formal aspects you can’t beat with a stick, but its material content is non-existent. In simple terms, if I provide you a quadratic equation, there are an infinite number of values of x and will provide infinite y’s. In other words, it doesn’t matter what number you put in for x, you’ll always get another y: the variables are just that—they can in principle be any number. Now, assume that the same quadratic equation describes the behavior of some characteristic of the stock market. The equation may be a very precise predictor (descriptor) of what happens, but that doesn’t mean the reality behind what the equation describes can be reduced to mathematics! After all, what is the stock market? Very roughly speaking, it’s a complex set of financial relations carried out by, you guessed it, people! Are people, by their very natures, reducible to being fully described by mathematical equations that reflect physical phenomena? Of course not… that’s silly. Yet, Craig uses probability calculus as a “proof” for God?
(pause)
I just skimmed the transcript. My initial suspicion was borne out: Craig is being reductive. However, I qualify this by saying that his approach is used as part of an overall picture… which generally speaking is good. Ehrman is correct not to accept Craig’s mathematical proof: it’s a huge category error. But Ehrman is incorrect to discount miracles by his reductive historical method as well. My biggest problem with Craig—apart from what I just noted regarding his pseudo-monistic vision of reality—is that by virtue of his antecedents he feels a need to buttress his arguments with mathematics… which, as I just all-too-briefly explained, is incorrect. Because of this, he’s limiting himself to playing on the turf of mathematicians and scientists. But that’s, frankly, not smart because (again) God is not a part of the physical universe and therefore cannot be perceived by the methods and tools of the MESs. I cannot complain too strongly against Craig because we are, so to speak, partners in the same effort to witness to an understanding (as much as is humanly possible) of God using philosophy. What I fear is Craig (and Moreland) don’t take as full advantage of metaphysical arguments because they feel a need (from my perspective, unnecessary) to fight (at times) on scientific and mathematical turfs. Trying to defend God’s existence on these grounds, while possibly providing input data for philosophical arguments (where the real battle must be fought), will always lose at the end of the day.
Those are my quick thoughts… I hope they don’t confuse the issue for you. A final qualification: it is impossible to have done Craig’s position any justice in this short summary. To be fair, Craig’s overall position is much more nuanced and should be examined as a whole. So, I leave it to you (with my comments as a possible suggested start) to explore his position. Ultimately, Craig is right... the problem is other’s may stumble on his mistakes to get blasted in MESs forums. 1 Peter 3:15 puts the responsibility squarely upon believers to “be always ready to give a reason for the hope that is in you…” Debating scientists on miracles and the existence of God on their own limited MES turf is not fulfilling that mandate.
Aaron, I don't think you would have a problem with accepting the idea that it is more likely for me to see a friend of mine that I haven't seen in 20 years than it is for me to discover real cold fusion today. You can't give me the mathematical formula for both probabilities, but we're both sure which is more likely.
Charlie-
Thanks, but the two links you provided simply take me to Tom's current blog page and this post's comments.
H-
Thanks for the comments. You give an interesting critique of Craig's approach. Perhaps I am not understanding your position completely, but it seems you have a problem on your hands when you say "God is not a part of the physical universe and therefore cannot be perceived by the methods and tools of the MESs" and yet also affirm a God who has acted in real, detectable ways in the physical world (e.g the resurrection). I would say that you are correct insofar as God, as a non-physical being, cannot *in his essence* be perceived by the methods and tools of the MESs, but this is not what Craig is attempting to do, it seems to me. Rather, he and evidentialists like him are applying the methods and tools of the MESs to the actions and effects of God on the physical world, which are certainly subject to the kinds of inquiry the MESs afford. So not God per se, but certainly the actions of a God who works in the physical world. For this reason, I don't see Craig's move, which was essentially a rebuttal to Ehrman's probability argument (sort of an "OK, if you want to make this kind of claim, let's see where it leads you"), as being a category error - the non-physical God of Christianity does cause physical effects (such as the resurrection), which are in turn available is some ways to the MESs. It is not a question of perceiving God, but perceiving God's actions. Does this make sense? I do see your point about mathematical abstractions as an incomplete picture of reality, however - thanks for the useful example.
Paul-
Sure, but if I had the formula, it should bear out our mutual intuition. If is doesn't, then there's a problem. Further, the analogy you gave is not as useful as it seems on first glance - to intuit that a miracle is less probable than the most improbable natural explanation, one must first presuppose that miracles are by nature the most improbable cause in the universe, which you only get if you presuppose naturalism. There's this hidden presupposition in the "obviousness" of Ehrman's, DL's, and presumably your position that is not in play at all in your analogy. So the "obviousness" of your anaolgy is not like the "obviousness" of the question at hand.
Thanks, guys, for the comments!
How is one like me - an agnostic - to assign probabilities to supernatural explanations of natural events? How am I to compare the probabilites of supernaturalistic explanations to naturalistic ones? Let us say that some extraordinary event has occurred - perhaps the resurrection of a man three days dead. (I assume that we did confirm that he was really dead, and that we saw him after his resurrection and so knew he was resurrected.) Surely such an extraordinary event requires an extraordinary explanation. But many possible extraordinary explanations come to mind:
1. The extraordinary natural sort. Perhaps there's an advanced technology at work here, a technology of which we know nothing, exercised by beings who wish to remain hidden from us. (Can we be certain that no such technology exists? Can we be certain that there exist no such beings? I do not know how we can.) Perhaps there's some natural process at work here of which we know nothing. (We cannot claim to have fully grapsed the laws by which the natural world works, and thus it seems we must admit that the possibility that his resurrection was really quite perfectly natural.)
2. The extraordinary supernatural sort.
How am I - an agnostic - to weigh the probabilites involved in 1? In 2? How am I to compare those of 1 and 2? I well understand why a theist might assign to them the probabilities that he does. But I am not a theist, and so am at a loss. All that I mentioned, and perhaps more, seems possible to me, and I do not know which is more likely. I know nothing of the supernatural. I know nothing of alien technology, nor of alien races. I have but a dim grasp of the laws that govern the natural world. It seems that the best course for one such as me is to claim ignorance.
Often it seems to me that those who would base arguments for theism on reports of miracles suffer from a lack of imagination. There are really a great multitude of possible explanations - both natural and supernatural - of the miracles reported (if miracles they be); and not until all are articulated and weighed can we draw any conclusions at all.
Hi Aaron:
You have perfectly valid and very good questions, but to address them will take a lot of unpacking. I’m actually in the middle of writing a critique of ID that has its roots in the non-analogousness of being problem I alluded to regarding Craig in my previous comment. I’m debating with myself whether I should proceed to unpack this on my blog or not. It’s next to impossible to do it in the comments section here. Two very quick (and hence unfair) points:
(1) One would expect that God, as THE cause of all that exists, would require a different approach to “detecting” effects in the physical world that can then be ascribed to Him. (Mini-digression: I’m using the term “cause” here in the wide, metaphysical sense—not merely the physical “billiard ball” sense—which one must understand in order to understand Aquinas’ ‘five ways.’) Please note the careful wording I used earlier: I did not say God Himself could be “detected” in the real world (because of the materialist baggage this word presupposes), I said that “His existence could be reasoned to”… which needs further qualification by adding: “by employing our minds (for example through Aquinas’ ‘five ways’.” This is a huge, huge difference: it is NOT God that is detectable, but His effects. HOWEVER—and this is a big “however”—the physical effects we see in the material world do NOT interpret themselves. You need a mind (technically speaking, a nous) to interpret the detectable data before (as I noted before) they can be ascribed to Him.
Reasoning to and interpreting causes (writ large) properly belongs to philosophy—not to the MESs. To “see” design in nature, for example, one simply cannot use the MESs to do so except as providers of “input data” to philosophy. Why? Because the MESs literally cannot detect design just like they cannot detect “the day after tomorrow” or virtue or predicate or causality (writ large), etc., etc. The MESs study change as a function of time in physical phenomena and material entities: they observe (and measure), correlate, hypothesize, theorize not to design but to descriptions of physical processes. The MESs employ the very powerful tool (science in its own right) of mathematics to make their descriptions more precise and to enhance the “heavenly manna” of the MES—namely, prediction.
(Digression: The definition of science writ large is (a) certain intellectual (as opposed to sensory) knowledge through causes, or (b) mediate intellectual knowledge obtained through demonstration. The particular science of physics studies generalized (abstracted from particular material entities like “this ball”) physical changes in material entities; the particular science of mathematics studies objects abstracted completely from the material; the general science of metaphysics studies being as being, i.e., the causes of what it means for anything to “be” in the broadest sense. End digression.)
THAT is at the heart of the problem with Craig, and by extension with ID. Craig should not because he cannot use mathematics to prove the effects he observes in nature are ascribed to God—it simply won’t work, and secular scientists are correct to fight him on their own turf. (Craig and Dembski should ask themselves the non-trivial questions as to why most if not all Thomists do not agree with them.) Mathematics can’t even come close to “seeing” or “interpreting” design or miracles or the resurrection or what have you in nature. You need an interpretive power (the nous I described earlier) to do that using the general science of philosophy. The biggest irony in all this is that Craig and Dembski repeat the same mistake Dawkins and Dennett do but from the other side: both abuse the MESs by ascribing to them the capacity to interpret data in the vain attempt to prove one or the other side’s point. That’s ludicrous: the MESs can no more “detect” design in the world than they can supposedly “prove” there is no design. The MESs can no more “detect” the presence of miracles in nature than they can “disprove” them.
That is why I’m just as dead-set against the ID theorists illicitly calling their discipline an MES as I am opposed to the secular scientists trying to usurp philosophy under the limited explanatory power of the MESs. Both sides are talking past each other and both are incorrect. However, that is not to say I’m against IDer’s continuing their work. Indeed they should and they must: they bring a lot of interesting criticisms and pressure to bear against the failed metaphysical vision of neo-Darwinism and they do so by do good scientific work. If I could have one minute with Dembski and the other IDers I’d make the following plea: Please, gentlemen, don’t call the ID movement an MES… it is not. Work with your philosopher colleagues in an efficient science-philosophy tag-team effort, but don’t overstep the bounds of your competence. Use the insights and knowledge gained by realist philosophers (such as Thomists) to strengthen the MES—don’t weaken them or caricaturize them.
Now, coming round full circle, it is because (among other reasons) Craig hamstrings himself by not acceding to the analogousness of being that he views all real beings as a pseudo-monistic way. He literally corners himself onto the turf of the MESs because since there is only one kind of being for him, the MESs are sufficient by themselves to study those beings. End of story. If he were to consider the ontologically different orders of being AND consider causes in their full metaphysical import, the whole secular “scientific” (which it is NOT) fight against God would shatter into a million pieces.
(2) Now, with respect to your bringing up the Incarnation (meaning, for example, the resurrection as a particular event… or even Jesus’ day-to-day walking about), you should draw a careful distinction. The Incarnation is not a “detectable effect” but rather a mystery of faith (like the Trinity), i.e., it is not “provable” by philosophy but must be accepted under the authority of the Scriptures and the teaching authority instituted by Christ to protect and promulgate the faith—including subsequent insights by theologians over the centuries. That’s why you’re not completely correct to say “in His essence” God cannot be detected by the MESs but that His “actions” can be. NO. First God’s essence IS His existence: He is existence itself… so on your first sub-point, God’s beingness is so far beyond any of the MESs (which all study species of being as their subjects) that you should even use it in the same sentence. On your second sub-point, you cannot “detect” God’s actions precisely because of who God is: there is NOTHING potential in God—He is pure actuality, He is the perfection of perfections, i.e., He does not “act” in the way you think for He is infinitely perfected act: He is actuality itself.
Whew! Okay, I’m not sure I covered all your concerns… hope I did… and it’s late here in Kyiv.
Note to Franklin: The barrier you’re trying to cross in understanding is an admittedly difficult one. I can’t add much here except to say that talking about God is not like talking about created beings. It literally has a language of its own because it demands precise terminology. (That is no argument against God’s existence, by the way… just as it is no argument against the efficacy of physics just because it needs the language of mathematics and its own methodologies to explore its subject area: just because most people don’t speak the language of physics doesn’t mean it or its subject area don’t exist or are “meaningless.”) If one does not, for example, understand and accede to the metaphysical concept of the analogousness of being, I see no way one can communicate the arguments that demonstrate His existence (but not His “whatness”). There are other concepts as well that must be mastered. I’m not saying this to be evasive—in fact, I’m suggesting you take the plunge and study a realist metaphysics before passing judgment.
Sorry Aaron.
Don't know how that happened (incompetence, I'd guess).
http://www.thinkingchristian.net...2403/
index.html
http://www.thinkingchristian.net...5909/
index.html
Thanks, Charlie - sorry to rehash old news. Those previous posts and comments were directly to the point I was asking about - thanks for directing me to them.
Holo-
My, you ARE a Thomist, aren't you? I'm not sure if I've come to grips yet with how Aquinas' Aristotelian understanding of God squares with the rather dynamic God of which Scripture (particularly the OT) seems to speak, but I'm working on it. Thanks for the characteristically thorough comments!
Just a quick point from Dr. Craig during the Q and A of that debate:
I myself don't use the probability calculus in arguing for resurrection of Jesus Christ.
The reason I brought it up is because of the response to the Humean sort of argument that Dr. Ehrman was offering, which I think is completely misconceived because he tries to say that the resurrection is improbable simply because of the improbability of the resurrection on the background information alone. In fact, I think that that probability is inscrutable, given that we're dealing with a free agent. I don't see how we can assess or assign specific numbers for those.
I agree with everybody who says that neither miracles, nor the resurrection, nor God Himself can be proven statistically, mathematically, or even historically.
What these arguments are useful for, however, is in disabusing those misled by the so-called scientific/historical claims to disproof of the belief in the rational superiority of their positions.
Aaron,
Craig is highlighting the relevant term in the Bayesian analysis, but he's just wrong about it. Craig admits that if we're accounting only for possible natural causes of the Resurrection, then we ought to conclude that the Resurrection didn't happen. It might have happened, but we would be irrational to conclude that it did.
The probability of a resurrection is on the order of 1 in 10 billion (based on the number of humans who have existed). Even if you think that there is only a 1 in a million chance that the NT could have been written and promulgated if it were false, you're still down by four orderes of magnitude. The Scientologists and Mormons demonstrate that the odds of fake religions appearing and gaining adherents is very high, certainly far higher than one in a million. Indeed, you can look at any isolated, primitive culture and find that it develops its own religions and myths. The odds of there being a large religion emerging in a culture is nearly unity, whether or not there are any deities involved. So the likelihood that the Resurrection actually happened is 1 in 10,000 if you're really, really, really optimistic.
Can Craig appeal to the alleged supernatural powers of Jesus to change the result? Not without circularity. There have been thousands of cults and prophets, and the Middle East had more than its fair share. So why is Jesus special, and not some other poor bloke? Because Jesus was allegedly resurrected, proving he was who he said he was. So, the reason Craig gives for dismissing the probability arguments against the Resurrection are that Jesus is a special case because, get this, he was resurrected. Brilliantly circular.
Aaron, my example wasn't intended as an analogy, I intended to demonstrate that the lack of an explicit formula of probability should not be taken as a proof that we can't assign relative or approximate probabilities. I gave an example, but I wasn't intending it as an analogy.
Aaron:
Thanks for the kind words.
One quick note: you mention “…Aquinas’ Aristotelian understanding of God…” That’s actually not correct. St. Thomas used the best of Aristotle (as well as St. Augustine, Boethius, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Plato, and relied heavily on the Church Fathers) to defend the faith intellectually. In other words he used philosophy as it should be: on the one hand as the handmaid of theology, while on the other as the unifier of knowledge of the particular sciences. Aristotle did not conclude to a god but to the First Unmoved Mover. Aquinas improved upon Aristotle’s arguments, and flat-out called the First Unmoved Mover “who we know as God.” In addition, there are significantly important technical differences between Aristotle and Aquinas. Very briefly: for Aristotle, being and essence are identical in each particular instance. St. Thomas, on the other hand, explicitly held that in all creatures (i.e., created, i.e., contingent beings) there is a real distinction between a thing and its being. Being and essence (or “whatness”) are know by different intellectual acts: the former through apprenhension and then division (or distinction), the latter through reason alone. This distinction between being and essence is at the center of the fundamental truth of Christian philosophy—it is literally the core nerve that separates God from His creatures, and the basis of a real distinction between nature and faculties in creatures. It is essential for the demonstration of the indestructibility of the human soul (compared with the perishable souls of the brute animals, the forms of plants, and the forms of non-living beings. That distinction—so crucial to Christian philosophy and theology—is very unAristotelian (more on this distinction below). Also there are St. Thomas’ “Five Ways’—for which even the basic framework of these arguments is lacking in Aristotle despite their superficial resemblances. Also, there is no mention in Aristotle of efficient causality on the part of separated substances (angels): each could only be aware of himself and could not any actuality outside itself. I realize these are highly technical distinctions… but believe you me, they are critically important ones.
As promised, here’s a Reader’s Digest condensed account of the distinction between nature (essence) and being (is-ness). Nature answers the question what we are (rational animals); person answers the question who we are (Charlie, Holopupenko, or Aaron). Although my nature is the source of all my actions and because my nature governs what kind of operations are possible for me, it is not my nature that does them: I, Holopupenko do them for I am the person. Both person and nature may be considered sources of action, but in a different sense. The person is that which does the actions, the nature is that by virtue of which the actions are done, or, better, that from which the actions are drawn: it is our nature to do certain things, but we do them. Now, contrast this to God whose essence and existence are identical (I AM WHO AM), in other words what He is and who he is are identical: God alone wholly is with all that is can mean. Each created (contingent) thing is, but dependently or conditionally. Each created thing is, but only relatively, only partially. When you say of God, He is, in the first place you have said everything; and in the second, if you still want to add words—e.g., He is infinite, He is omnipotent, He is all-good, He is omniscient—the added words subtract nothing from Him but merely draw out for consideration some special perfection already contained in the fullness of is.
Charlie:
Thanks for bringing the Q&A reference to my attention: I should not have skimmed the transcript. I stand humbly corrected before Aaron… and by extension Dr. Craig. That refers to my assessment of Craig’s position in that particular debate, and it looks like he is (far be it for me to say this) progressing on this point…
But with respect to Craig’s ontological error, I remain firm. That is, as I mentioned, being developed in something I’m preparing. Nevertheless, I should have not let critiquing that error push me ahead of my headlights in this particular case.
I would like to add one thing from the last sentence you quoted of Craig’s: “I don’t see how we can assess or assign specific numbers for these.” Precisely. Numbers and mathematics—abstractions from the full ontological import of reality are useful but woefully rarified tools. They can guide like the stars, but they can’t steer like a captain. They can help us describe and predict, but they can’t explain. They can help to answer “how?” but not even come close to answering “why?”
DL:
I see you’re back at it with your errors. The first and immediate howler coming from someone who imposes the subjective assessment that “physics and mathematics are objective, morality and aesthetics are subjective,” to wit, “The probability of a resurrection is on the order of 1 in 10 billion (based on the number of humans who have existed).” First, that’s as subjective a guess as you can get based on the demons of your own presuppositions. Second, any student of probability and statistics would tell you you’re out to lunch—especially since you’re a physicist and should know better: your subjective assigning of numbers presupposes a very simplistic account with NOTHING concrete to base it upon. Why? You’re equivocating the population group probability (a quantity) with the phenomena—quite literally asserting “resurrection equals 1 in 10^9 because probability equals 1 in 10^9.” Balderdash! On what concrete basis is that probability assigned… on the size of the group and allegedly one example (what about Lazarus?) That’s a similar kind of false claim of the illicit Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics which asserts because we describe the behavior of quantum states using mathematical probability formalisms, then quantum-level entities ARE by their very nature “random.” What a load of cow chips! Mathematics is taken as being able to dictate reality as opposed to following what reality has to say. Do you assert in all seriousness that because one has a population group of 10^9 members one can conclude (a priori without understanding what the group or event are) that the probability of that particular event happening is 1 in 10^9… just like that? And this apart from the fact that you claim never to have witnessed a miracle yourself (I’ll grant you that but remind you your empirical data set is ZERO), and yet you feel justified assigning a number (probability) to it? Maybe, but on what basis… your subjective basis? Come on, DL, it’s a wonder you were granted a degree. I wish I had been on your verbal qualifying exam board: shooting fish in a barrel indeed! Third, what I alluded to above is objectively true: for you to use a tool of abstraction to draw an ontological conclusion is ludicrous. Get that straight.
Memo to DL: reality is not about probabilities; probability theory is a useful tool that readily admits we don’t know most of what’s going on regarding this or that phenomena but at least this shorthand formalistic tools will provide us confidence in describing but not explaining. Take the simplest example possible: just because you can “predict” that a flipped penny will, on average, land 50% of the time heads and 50% of the time tails doesn’t mean you know the physical reasonswhy it did so. Probability formalisms cover up what we don’t know: the greasiness of our fingers, the non-uniformity of the penny, the wind currents, the non-uniformity of the force of the flips themselves, the non-uniform heating of the sides of the penny from our fingers and the non-uniform cooling of the sides of the penny from the air currents, etc., etc., etc. You’re so caught up in your abstract mathematical formalisms that you can’t see through your own subjective prejudices beyond to the real entity or phenomena described.
And all these errors in your second paragraph alone?!? And all these errors in your own alleged turf of physics and mathematics! That’s why, as I mentioned in the comments to the “Is Christianity Opposed to the Pursuit of Science? (Part II)” post below, no one is taking you seriously. I won’t waste my time with your other false claim (per a straw man you conveniently set up) that Craig is being circular… it’s just not worth it.
I swear, atheism does for the mind what crack does for the brain…
H,
Probability formalisms cover up what we don’t knowDuh!!
Again, your reading comprehension is letting you down. I'm not ruling out the possibility that Jesus was resurrected. I'm simply missing the information I would need to make that conclusion a likelihood. It's simply far more likely that the story is untrue. Savvy?
It's simply far more likely that the story is untrue.
What if there is a God?
And miracles?
Since neither empirical science nor History (per Erhman) has anything to say on the subject we already know that you have no knowledge one way or the other here.
What was it you said about probabilities and OOL, or probabilities and Fine-tuning?
When you have no idea of the range of possibilities how can you justify discussing probabilities?
Charlie,
What if there is a God?And what if there really are aliens in Earth orbit? Abductions would be likely!
And miracles?
What was it you said about probabilities and OOL, or probabilities and Fine-tuning?There are two very big differences. First, fine-tuning is necessary for our observation. We can't be sitting here in a non-fine-tuned universe making observations (assuming fine-tuning is real). Second, we don't get to replay multiple trials of universe creation, either sequentially or by ensemble. We can't evaluate probability based on a sample size of one. In these cases, it's questionable whether we can properly assign probabilities.
In the case of miracles, it's very different. Miracles are claimed every day, but none are substatiated and many are debunked. There are probably thousands of people in the world who make outlandish claims about their abilities or divine status, and none of them seem to be getting resurrected, levitating, curing AIDS, or performing any such magic. So there are thousands of statistical trials in progress every day, and probably millions throughout history. For any of these prophets we could argue that, if their claims of magical powers were uniquely true, we would be dealing with a unique case, and no probability assessment can be made about their claims of having performed miracles. However, this clearly leads to the total abandonment of probability theory because the same argument can be applied to any probability argument just by using the word 'magical'.
What is the probability that a my computer printer will print original copies of ancient Egyptian papyrus? The guy who sold it to me said that it could do so. Odds are very slim... UNLESS... it is a unique magical printer that can print original copies of ancient manuscripts. After all, no one ought to be surprised that a magical printer can do this. Can I say nothing about the odds that this printer is magical given my background experience with printers in general? Or should I call the museum immediately?
DL,
First, fine-tuning is necessary for our observation.
Necessary? Necessarily accommodated by whom, then?
The puddle rejoinder is far from convincing and flies in the face of the testimony of those cosmologists who admit that the fine-tuning requires a real answer.
We can't evaluate probability based on a sample size of one. In these cases, it's questionable whether we can properly assign probabilities.
Is that the only time we can't assign probabilities? How about when you don't know anything about the background conditions? How about when miracles require the existence of God and you have no basis to decide about God?
Can I say nothing about the odds that this printer is magical given my background experience with printers in general? Or should I call the museum immediately?
What evidence do you have of magical printers and ET visitors to earth? Do you have multiple lines of evidence to argue for them?
Do you have an entire worldview based upon their non-existence which fails in its inconsistency every time you enter into a debate about it?
Is the opposite of "ET abduction" and "magical printers" the only reasonable choice given the incoherence of your position?
Does the very fitness of our metaphysic which assumes we can understand reality, that the universe is orderly, and that we can expect uniformity rely upon a worldview which requires their existence?
No?
Then, apart from demonstrating your sarcastic wit, you've provide little support for your argument with these examples.
There are probably thousands of people in the world who make outlandish claims about their abilities or divine status, and none of them seem to be getting resurrected, levitating, curing AIDS, or performing any such magic.
As Lewis said:
Most stories about miracles are probably false: if it comes to that, most stories about natural events are false."
Miracles
On historians he had this to say, and you can see it paralleled in comments above:
That is, he will accept the most improbable 'natural' explanations rather than say that a miracles occurred. Collective hallucination, hypnotism of unconsenting spectators, widespread instantaneous conspiracy in lying by persons otherwise not known to be liars and not likely to gain by the lie - all these are known to be very improbable events: so improbable that, except for the special purpose of excluding a miracle, they are never suggested. But they are preferred to the admission of a miracle..
Such a procedure is, from the purely historical point of view, sheer midsummer madness unless we start by knowing that any Miracle, whatsoever is more improbable than the most improbable natural event. Do we know this?
Commenting by HaloScan
