Thinking Christian Comments
Original Post: Putting Faith to the Test
Tom:
Where was God? Perhaps we should first consider God’s prior questions to us: Where were you when Love itself was nailed to the Cross? Where were you when I permitted my own creatures to commit the greatest crime of history—deicide—because of that Love? Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth?
Theodicy is an important part of trying to peer into the mysteries of why evil occurs. One of the first things one realizes—in spite of all the shrill screams of those opposed to faith of the alleged “inconsistency” of who God claims to be—is that God doesn’t “want” evil to occur, for that is a false and ridiculous notion on its face. We balk at tragedies that are a result of natural events or innocent mistakes (such as what occurred on Mt. Hood), but when a male prostitute walks into a church… well, we find that somehow more difficult—and we are correct… for it concerns us a human beings.
By the way, based on the article link provided, this guy Jones did not emulate the harlot caught in the act of adultery and brought to Jesus for stoning: she was repentant, while he complained of superficialities—missing the point of the gratitude the congregation expressed to him: “Jones… said he wasn’t impressed on the whole. If the Gospel message is enough, he said, why the loud music and MTV-quality production?” Superficially, he has a point… but it’s not the “production” that changed the hearts of those people, and it’s not the “production” that animates their desire for his good and their blessing him. For Jones to miss that is the saddest irony of the whole thing. The repentant harlot stopped sinning, dropped all, and followed Christ... all the way to the Cross and beyond. Jones (again, based only on the article) is still clinging to the homosexuality—even if not prostitution. And yet we are taunted with “where is you God?” Go figure...
Let’s make all this more stark in a Doestoevskian way by focusing on what is committed over and over again, day after day, against the most innocent and defenseless amidst us. I focus on abortion and “mercy” killing for one simple reason: as contemporaries of this war on the unborn and the infirm, we will be held responsible for it. The classic excuse of not being there to help women in need or not taking part in the “procedure” personally, or hiding behind “I’m personally opposed but…” won’t work.
Maybe we should face the blinding light of that cross to free ourselves from the cynicism and worrying to the point of idolization in seeking “answers” to the mystery of evil. Look upon and ponder what occurred (and by extension occurs every day among us) on the Cross. Ultimately, theodicy won’t replace taking up our own crosses. The Cross makes Love existentially real, and it is the only means by which evil is conquered, and it is the only path to resting in Him… and having all our questions “answered.” Will that satisfy those who are looking for black-and-white “scientific answers”? Probably not. But that’s because their focus is on the questions rather than on Him.
Will that satisfy those who are looking for black-and-white “scientific answers”? Probably not. But that’s because their focus is on the questions rather than on Him.If only we believed... then we would believe.
It's the same thing again and again. When we ask why God is burying us in ash, we're told that it's our fault that there was a volcanic eruption. Where were we? Gimme a break.
And if we dare to think for ourselves, and say that no good god would do this, we're accused of arrogance. Arrogance? Sure. Knowing a thing requires the arrogance to judge that thing.
In trying to make sense of the tragic death of Kelly, Frank says:
It boggles my mind to imagine the people of Israel singing a chorus of “Why do you hide Yourself in times of trouble?” every year, century after century, millennium after millennium.Amen.
DL:
On what concrete and verifiable basis are you claiming that “God is burying us in ash” whenever a volcano-related tragedy occurs? A related question: as a moral relativist on what objective basis are you complaining that God (per your personal, subjective criteria) is allegedly not “good”? If Dawkins claims there is no such a thing as “good” or “evil” in the first place, what possible reason could you have to complain? Even if you don’t follow Dawkins on this, since you believe that following your death there is nothing, what possible reason could you have for thinking fortune or tragedy have any ultimate meaning? I’m interesting in knowing which of the MESs (and let’s not forget math) will help you resolve these questions… or are these questions out-of-hand meaningless?
Even as a moral relativist, you absolutely support homosexuality, abortion, embryonic stem cell research, etc., etc... in a word, suffering. And yet you ask us where is God?
Oh Lord, we work so hard to fit troubling events that test our beliefs and shape our lives into our narratives of faith. Jones corrected Haggard's flock and set them straight and God was surely there on Mt. Hood. How could it be otherwise? Surely God has not abandoned us. Surely our prayers are not for naught. Alas, God was there all along--He had to be there. Our troubles are fixed and we faithful pilgrims continue onward--believing, believing, believing...
H,
Nice attempt to widen the debate to everything under the Sun. Not biting, thanks.
DL:
"Everything under the sun" when the questions apply precisely to your assertions? I think the operative term here is "evasiveness."
We could take this discussion in the direction of the materialist problem of evil, or the problem of relativity--and those are indeed problems, as SteveK pointed out again in an email to me, linking to this. But how about if, for now, we recognize that there are differing opinions on this, and stay with the post topic, which was the challenge of faith in the face of difficulties?
I think Holo's first post here on that topic was right on the mark.
doctor(logic), I see that you find it unbelievable that God could have any reality in light of these things. I encourage you to look at the way the people who are actually involved in it as Christians view it. They have a place from which to speak, to say what it's really like--what it's like to face the death of a brother, or to face the one who exposed a leader's shame. I think there's a lot of integrity and courage there, and it's attractive. It speaks of some underlying strength.
You can, if you wish, just brush aside the possibility that God may have a plan to redeem what is painful or damaging. It doesn't make sense within your view of what's right, your worldview, your sense of reality. But consider what the theist says, which is that within the parameters of belief in God, it can make sense, because God may have morally adequate reasons to allow it. Those morally adequate reasons may include things like allowing freedom, building persons' character, not interfering willy-nilly with the natural course of the world he created, not interfering with human free will, etc.
The two examples linked in this post provide demonstrations of God doing things like that.
To evaluate God on that kind of basis, you must not say, "Based on my worldview God does not make sense." That's trivially obvious: God will not make sense within an atheist worldview. It's the wrong way to look at the question.
Tom,
I think you hit the nail on the head when you suggested that an atheist's worldview makes these stories of God unintelligible.
But, I think you misstep when you say that a theist's or a Christian's worldview allows them to speak about "what it's really like."
Neither an atheist nor a theist speak about "what it's really like." They both speak from and through their worldviews. I would bet that a God-less world is probably as unintelligible to you, as a God-filled world is unintelligible to doctor(logic).
I meant something more than I wrote: they can speak of what it's really like to have your Christian faith tested by, and speak to, an experience like this.
To a great extent you're right, in terms of experience. In terms of argument, it should be possible for a person to take a worldview on its own terms, not judging it by its contrary.
If we theists want to show problems with atheism, for example, we can't do it by saying it denies Genesis 1--unless somehow independent of theism we can find a way to demonstrate Genesis 1, which I don't expect to happen in any strong way very soon. We have to show it by reference to common experience and by the internal consistencies or inconsistencies of atheism. The philosophical arguments for theism are mostly of the form:
a) Consider this set of beliefs or experiences within atheism
b) Consider this logical outworking of those beliefs within the parameters of experience
c) a and b are inconsistent with each other, so atheism is internally contradictory.
The converse can be said of some arguments against theism, especially the problem of evil.
The way I think doctor(logic) may have been presenting the problem of evil just now was not quite that, however. (And I welcome him to correct this if I misunderstood, because he did not state this fully; I'm also borrowing some from what I think he has said before). It seemed to me he was saying that he cannot conceive of God being morally justified in allowing evil on the scale we see. But he was, I think, judging this on the basis of moral justifications that apply in his own, non-theistic system. God would not be too distressed to find he does not meet doctor(logic)'s moral standards.
Discussion on this level should be possible for theists or non-theists; we should be able to evaluate others' arguments on their own terms, even if we cannot share others' set of experiences.
Tom,
Basically, it sounds like you are saying that we should be able to evaluage the internal logic of an argument.
An internally consistent logic should be circular--in other words, there is no outside a strictly consistent worldview. It is all encompassing and it enables the believer to interpret and explain vastly different experiences and empirics according to their own worldview.
A strong theist should be able to account for and incorporate tragic events and even evil into their worldview. Similarly, a strong atheist can explain the same events and apparent evils according to their worldview.
If the worldviews' are internally consistent, then they should offer paradigmatically different perspectives on the world. Sure, a theist can judge an atheist's logic, but it doesn't seem to be an internal critique. If it is consistent, the critique is across logical divides.
Perhaps we would benefit more if we stopped worrying about what atheists were doing and focused more attention on fleshing on the logic of our own worldviews more fully. What does a theistic worldview bear? What is its fruit?
Tom,
I'll try to clarify my argument.
We each have a personal and cultural definition of what is good. For the most part, you and I share the same definitions of good and evil. I'm sure we disagree in some areas, especially when a moral situation is complicated by competing moral principles (e.g., abortion). However, we're pretty much going to agree on theft, murder, etc. We also in many cases agree on what would be considered criminal negligence.
At first blush, God is guilty of evil or of criminal negligence. You have argued before that this is not logical proof that God does not exist or logical proof that he is not good, or omniscient, etc. This is true. In the same way, it is conceivable that Osama bin Laden was framed, or that Stalin was fed false reports, or that Hitler's plan would have worked for the common good if we hadn't stopped him. We do not have logical proof that any of these three were evil. However, there is certainly enough evidence to convict beyond a reasonable doubt.
Yet you are not willing to convict God because your prior belief in who or what he is forbids you from consideration of the possibility that he is guilty. Because of this impediment, any evil could happen and you would still say that God was good. Now, you can answer this by saying that God is unlike other persons, and one of his special powers is that he cannot by definition be found guilty of evil, no matter what the evidence from experience. However, this makes a mockery of the definition of what is good. Why should I care to be good if it doesn't mean what I always thought it meant?
Here's something that might put you into my frame of thinking for an instant. Suppose it was suggested that Hitler had special powers, and that he was both good and omniscient. Most of us see his actions as horrifically evil, but believers would claim that Hitler knew his actions would lead to the birth of the UN, Israel, American hegemony, the eventual fall of communism, etc. Who knows? It's possible that Hitler saved more people than he killed. How can we be so arrogant as to convict the divine Hitler when we don't have the absolute knowledge that he was actually evil?
Again, call me arrogant. Apparent evil was committed, and that's good enough for conviction unless an alibi is produced.
Yet for the theist, God can never be convicted. So the theist looks for God's excuse within himself, within humanity, or within the good that men do in response to evil. The theist believes the excuse has to be there even if it is never found. The theist thinks by a set of rules where the conclusion is forgone.
Jacob, that's a good summary. I wouldn't follow it all the way into a coherentist theory of truth (which says, simplified, that all we can ask in our pursuit of truth is to come up with something that meets the kind of conditions Jacob wrote here). But if a system can do this, it has an awful lot going for it evidentially.
What does a theistic worldview bear? What is its fruit? Big questions. I think that a person who wanted to take questions like that seriously, depending on his or her turn of mind, there would be several options for response:
"I'd love to sit down and talk with you a few hours about that."
"I think I'll write a series of articles, or a book."
"I think I'll start a blog."
In other words, on one level I'm not going to try to answer that because it's too large. On another level, answering that kind of question is what I've been trying to do here for over two years.
doctor(logic), that's one of the best statements of the evidential problem of evil I've seen. I'll be back in a while.
A much better way to frame the question would have been "Where was God during the holocaust?" Same question, FAR larger scale.
To me, this is one of the thornier problems the Christian has to come to terms with. If you believe in a God that is involved with his creation--as Christians do--and if you hold up examples such as somebody surviving a horrific car wreck as examples of his love in action--again, as Christians do-- then you have to explain how he could sit idly by and allow camp guards to sic their dogs on crying, cowering children for their own sick sport.
In fact, Tom, when you think about it, if I were to watch videos of scenes like that, I might be accused of being a sick pup.
What should you then think of any God who watches as the scene is actually occuring, has total power to miraculously intervene, and still lets it happen?
It all has disturbing implications for the Christian idea of God.
God already drowned an entire whole world of innocent children, by choice, if all the stories are to be believed.
Also, if it was the Christian God watching the holocaust and not the original Jewish god, they were all doomed to hell as well for not accepting Jesus. A little "pre-torture" on earth, before he starts burning them in hell seems like a minor thing, from a God viewpoint.
Even the holocaust is minor is scale when we are talking about the creator of eternal torture.
Sadly true, Eric.
In fact, if God has foreknowledge and cannot be wrong, merely by allowing these souls to be born is an act of barbarity.
Eric,
If the stories are to be believed then God wiped the wicked off the face of the earth and saved the righteous, faithful and obedient.
Holopupenko wrote: Perhaps we should first consider God’s prior questions to us: Where were you when Love itself was nailed to the Cross? Where were you when I permitted my own creatures to commit the greatest crime of history—deicide—because of that Love?
I didn't even exist when Jesus was crucified, so I don't see how I can be held remotely accountable.
Tom wrote: You can, if you wish, just brush aside the possibility that God may have a plan to redeem what is painful or damaging.
I can't speak for DL, but the reason I brush aside the idea that God allows evil for the sake of his "plan" is that, if he's omnipotent, he can directly (sans evil) effect whichever part of the plan would otherwise have been brought to fruition via evil. That is, if a volcano is able to, in some round-a-about way, bring about a desirable state of affairs, then God is even more able to do so just by snapping his fingers (metaphorically speaking). Why bring volcanoes, earthquakes, tsunamis, etc. into it?
Those morally adequate reasons may include things like allowing freedom,
I assume you intend the free will theodicy to apply to "moral evil" rather than "natural evil," so let's look at a moral evil scenario: You want to murder someone. Now, God could prevent you from doing so, but he doesn't. Why? Because, according to the free will theodicy, he doesn't want to hamper your free will, and that's just what he'd be doing if he were to prevent you from committing murder. Is that an accurate portrayal of your view? If so, there are two problems I have with it:
1) What about the free will of your victim? Clearly, by refusing to interfere with your free will, God has allowed you to interfere with your victim's free will. So it seems to me that moral evil turns out to be a zero sum game.
2) There are obviously many things we can't do. For example, I'm not able to leap tall buildings in a single bound, nor am I faster than a speeding locomotive. From these kinds of facts, we can conclude that, if free will exists, it must be compatible with constraints on our actions. So why doesn't God further constrain our actions in such a way that we can't physically harm each other?
building persons' character,
This character-building theodicy is intended as an answer to "natural evil," correct? If so, color me unconvinced. Here's why:
1) If God created humans, then he is responsible for the way human character changes in a given context. So why didn't he create us in such a way that sufficient character-building could occur entirely outside the context of natural evil?
2) If a natural evil is capable of building our character, then surely God (sans natural evil) is even more capable. So why would he choose to build our character by such horrible proxy?
not interfering willy-nilly with the natural course of the world he created,
How do you distinguish willy-nilly interference from the non-willy-nilly kind? I smell a question being begged.
not interfering with human free will, etc.
Again, our actions are already constrained, so, if free will exists, it must be compatible with constraints on our actions. God could thus further constrain our actions, without violating our free will, in such a way as to prevent suffering. Right?
Tom:
You state wrt to DL’s remarks, “that’s one of the best statements of the evidential problem of evil I’ve seen.” That may be true with respect to your personal observations and experiences, but it’s not true in the broader context. However, that’s not my concern with DL’s position. The fundamental issue with DL posing the issue the way he does is that it’s incoherent within the framework of his clearly stated and strongly-defended moral relativism, and it is hypocrisy to try to defend moral relativism in absolute terms..
Please don’t misunderstand me: I’m not saying the question of evil itself isn’t a good question—it IS a very good question, and honest attempts must be made to address the question… even if we never, in this life, obtain an “answer.” I’m not even saying the concrete examples DL provides are poor—they’re not: they’re well-focused on the issue at hand. However, the approach DL takes (as well as Ron, and Eric and Atheists ’Я Us, etc.) is truly incoherent (in the full sense of that word), for at the core of his worldview he understands “good” and “evil” subjectively—often times in a fuzzy pragmatist approach where agreement among parties defines “good,” sometimes in evolutionary terms (which are for him purely materialist). DL knows very well that based on his materialistic worldview, it is impossible to jump the is-to-ought gap: there is no way he can convince anyone within the framework of his worldview that even the most complex arrangements of material entities can be properly characterized as “good” or “evil.”
Digression: Richard Dawkins understands this very, very well. But his approach is to eliminate the very concepts of “good” and “evil,” and hence Dawkins tries to justify not judging heinous crimes but rather “fixing” the perpetrator as one would fix a car. If you doubt me, read Dawkin’s absolutely frightening vision in this respect here (Can Richard Dawkins truly claim credit for his brilliant book, The God Delusion? If he is right, it’s as silly as Basil Fawlty blaming his car for not starting.), while the following, in his own words, is the elimination of the moral categories “good” and “evil”:
“In a universe of blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won’t find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference.” [Richard Dawkins, River Out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, (Phoenix: London, 1996), pp. 154-155.]
I suspect DL cringes when he reads this kind of stuff from Dawkins… and DL is correct to do so. But (to repeat), DL’s own position is not much better—notwithstanding his trying to avoid the implications of Dawkins’ position. Knowing that Dawkins’ position simply attempts to get rid of these moral categories, and yet with DL still constrained by his own materialist worldview (again: making it impossible to jump the is-to-ought gap), DL is left with nothing but relativism. Exaggerating a bit to draw out the point: DL’s position is highly unconvincing (in fact, quite repulsive in certain areas of application) because he believes a group-hug “come to an agreement”-style morality will best serve the group interests. But why should this be the case, and why should anyone be convinced by something that is subjective by its very nature? There is no reason, in fact.
Having laid that out, I think you can see the incoherence of judging God (or anyone one, for that matter) in absolute terms based on personal, subjective moral categories. This comes back around to the very good point you made earlier: God will always appear “evil” to DL given the limited worldview within which he operates. (My take was: if all DL permits himself is a hammer, then all problems begin to look like nails.) Even if an “answer” to the question of evil were provided, he would never accept it because by definition the “answer” to the question of evil cannot be captured within materialist and moral relativist constraints. Now, to expand upon your earlier point (and I believe you hint at this): given the Christian vision of reality, not only is the question of evil a very good question, but it is a question that can be coherently understood and addressed. DL’s worldview gives no chance in Hell even to begin to address the question. He can’t address the evil that occur among humans because he’s set up a shifting-sands scenario that addresses his immediate personal needs but doesn’t address the fundamental issue of what “good” and “evil” are apart from his subjectivist thinking on the matter and apart from “group agreements” on the matter.
And then there’s this whopper:
Yet for the theist, God can never be convicted. So the theist looks for God’s excuse within himself, within humanity, or within the good that men do in response to evil. The theist believes the excuse has to be there even if it is never found. The theist thinks by a set of rules where the conclusion is forgone.This is difficult to accept from someone who has already reached his own conclusions about God. Be that as it may, it is such a false caricature of what DL believes Christian moral philosophy and moral theological thinking is on the issue that there is no other way to describe it other than absurd—really absurd.
DL may come back (as he has done previously) to falsely complain about straw man caricatures of his position, and to complain that I and others “don’t understand what moral relativism is about” simply because we don’t find his arguments convincing and hence because we don’t agree with him. That, of course, is fallacious reasoning: it’s an appeal to pity and to ignorance. But it is all the more sad given that he, as a physicist with no philosophical or theological bona fides (not to forget his discounting the latter out of hand), feels nonetheless that he has an upper hand over literally thousands of years of intellectual development in these areas, against me as a trained scientist and philosopher, and against Christians who apparently—in his eyes—don’t understand their own faith. That’s arrogance… which is what DL requested in his 02.03.07 - 6:37 pm comment, isn’t it?
Good word, Holopupenko.
Additionally, dl says,
Yet you are not willing to convict God because your prior belief in who or what he is forbids you from consideration of the possibility that he is guilty. Because of this impediment, any evil could happen and you would still say that God was good. Now, you can answer this by saying that God is unlike other persons, and one of his special powers is that he cannot by definition be found guilty of evil, no matter what the evidence from experience. However, this makes a mockery of the definition of what is good. Why should I care to be good if it doesn't mean what I always thought it meant?
This sounds like a charge that there are numerous ad hoc qualifiers and even excuses tacked on to the God hypothesis to save it in the face of charges like his. In fact, the central teaching about God that underlies all our responses is that he is holy, loving, and just. There is nothing ad hoc there.
His holiness and justice is expressed in the requirement that rebellion among persons receive a recompense. His love is expressed in his desire for free persons to love him freely (and Jordan, even his omnipotence does not give him the ability to do what is logically contradictory, so it's not true that his power can create just any outcome). His love also led him to provide a solution to be free from the penalty for our rebellion. His love also leads him to the person-building, soul-building intent of his dealings with humans. And so on. So doctor(logic), these are central facets of God, not ad hoc save-the-theory additions.
The Cross makes Love existentially real, and it is the only means by which evil is conquered, and it is the only path to resting in Him… and having all our questions “answered.”
H, these are serious questions that speak to the fundamental issue of whether this God should even be worshipped in the first place. They deserve better than 'If you want answers you'll have to become a Christian first.' (At least, I think that's what you meant).
God as depicted has directly killed millions of innocent children in a global flood just as dead as if they had been aborted. He watched while Pol Pot decimated a third of the entire population of Cambodia like one of us might watch a snuff film. If you witness some savage act and don't lift a finger to help when you in fact could have stopped it, the rest of society might hold you responsible for your failure to render aid. But God gets a pass? I don't think so. Just because we can't put him in jail doesn't mean we can't see his responsibility when he fails to render aid, so to speak.
Christianity is offering to me a version of God that sat and watched while nasty things like I alluded to earlier happen to some pretty innocent people, all while he could have prevented such sadism with an "I Dream of Jeannie" blink had he chosen to. The question is 'Will I worship a God that is so seemingly indifferent to human suffering as to allow it to occur daily?' My reply to the question would have to be: Not even if he was real.
Will that satisfy those who are looking for black-and-white “scientific answers”? Probably not.
You're right, it doesn't.
Tom, DL's point about an ad hoc definition really rests on the idea that the definition of good as practiced by God (which can include *anything,* including the mass killing in the Flood) and the definition of good as we understand and use the word separate from God's actions are incompatible. When words and their meanings are confused in this way, the thinking behind them is usually confused, too.
Tom,
This sounds like a charge that there are numerous ad hoc qualifiers and even excuses tacked on to the God hypothesis to save it in the face of charges like his.No, that's not what I mean.
What I mean is that you're not doing your duty as a member of the jury. Someone told you that God is good and loving, and you trust that word from authority over every experience or piece of evidence you will have or could possibly have. Doesn't that strike you as problematic?
Suppose my sister were on trial for murder. I would have years of experience that would tell me about her honest character. However, it is possible that enough evidence could be presented to change my opinion. It would have to be a mountain of evidence, but it would still be possible. It makes no sense for me to say that I have total faith in her, and that not even another lifetime's worth of experience could show that she murdered the victim. In principle, finite evidence could convince me that she committed the crime. I would have evidence beyond reasonable doubt. I would effectively know she did it. Of course, whether I vote to convict her is another question! I might remain committed to her well-being, but I would not deny reality.
So, it makes no more sense to me to define God as being perfectly good than it does to define my sister as being innocent. I have accumulated evidence and reasons why I regard her as innocent, but that accumulation is finite.
The term 'innocent' isn't defined by my sister. Innocent is a term defined by a relation between persons and actions. When we see persons act in certain ways, we call that innocence. When they act contrary to that we call it guilt. If we are to disregard evidence of actions, the word will lose all the meaning it ever had.
Paul,
Yes, I think you've got it.
Ron:
I am NOT your or anyone else’s savior, nor am I trying to convince you to accede to the Christian faith—and over the past half year or so I’ve stated that quite explicitly on this blog… which means indeed you’ve misunderstood. In fact, I believe you’re being selectively inattentive to my most recent comments. My intent is clear and openly stated: to show just how incoherent claims against God are when the claims themselves are vacuous, and to show there are other ways of addressing this problem. Is it so hard to understand that DL (and by extension others that hold the same worldview) cannot rationally, coherently judge God if the very basis (self-admitted) for such judgments is relative, subjective, unpredictable, anecdotal, materialistic, unobservable, etc. ad nauseum? Holy hemorrhoids, Batman, it’s as it were a crime to hold DL to his own criterion by applying them against his own assertions and criticisms. How many times do Tom and I have to repeat that the question of evil is a very good one (or that St. Thomas holds it up as the most difficult problem facing Christians—read it yourself in the Summa)? How many times does it have to be stated that Christians have struggled with the problem for near 2,000 years?
I’ll try again.
(1) If I understand you correctly, you’re looking at the problem from the same perspective as DL, namely, he’s judging God based on subjectivist, relativist criteria. Don’t you find that in the least bit strange? It is, in fact, incoherent. I proclaim openly and loudly that from a materialist perspective God WILL appear evil, strange, mysterious, etc., etc. I have no argument with that if the limitations are understood and accepted. The question is, of course, whether those self-imposed limitations are valid.
(2) Assuming God is the Infinite (not in the numerical sense but in the sense of unbounded perfection) Creator, then there are certain aspects of God that will not be understood in this lifetime… and some not ever… in an analogous way that a single drop of rain water will never be able to understand the infinite ocean into which it falls. That may sound evasive, but given 2,000-odd years of reflection, debate, prayer, etc., etc. upon this question (not to mention what the Ancient Hebrew tribes believed and reflected upon), this long, hard effort reflects anything BUT evasiveness.
(3) I return to the example of the deicide on the Cross which I provided in the first comment to this post’s string. Let’s say I don’t tie the crucifixion to the concept of Original Sin (per Jordan’s missing that point at 02.04.07 - 2:38 am) or of sin in general—that’s wrong, but in the interests of proceeding I will momentarily grant that. Go ahead and heap all the crimes and “spectator” accusations against God throughout human history that you want. Do you really think that compares to the crime of deicide at the hands of His own creatures? If he is indeed our Infinite Creator, His own Death for our sake blasts away any possible criticism you might lay against Him. It’s not that He doesn’t know or care about the suffering of innocent children: He knows better than you or I will EVER know what it means for an infinite being to suffer innocently. He entered into our world to suffer with us—He did not abandon us to suffer alone. If an infinite being was put to death by his own creatures, don’t you believe that this—on common sense alone—demands infinite retribution, justice, anger, condemnation? Yet, here we are… loved even as we continue to pound nails into the Cross. You’re so fixated on the crimes that you can’t see the much, much bigger criminal act against Love 2,000 years ago carried out to save us from our own crimes. DL simply refuses to listen to Tom, and as such DL continues to try to fit God into an incomprehensible box and to try God in the dock of his own personal, subjectivist court. Thank goodness that is not the God to whom I’ve dedicated every fiber of my being to (and worship)… my continuous multiple faults and weakness notwithstanding.
(By the way, don’t you find it odd that when the historical witness of the Bible is uncomfortable, then it is viewed as inaccurate—a bunch of fables (like the Flood); but when convenient the Bible is used as an historically accurate document (again, the example of the Flood) in the vain attempt to convict God… subjectively, relatively? Go figure…)
H,
You said:
Having laid that out, I think you can see the incoherence of judging God (or anyone one, for that matter) in absolute terms based on personal, subjective moral categories.We never have absolute anything, do we? We have experiences, and from these and reason we try to determine the principles on which the world appears to operate.
I subjectively know what good and evil are to me and to the culture in which I live (and the two are mostly, but not always in agreement). By that standard God seems evil.
You can argue that God, being unlike other folk, cannot be judged by this standard. Sort of like the way mathematical proofs are morally neutral. In principle, that is fair.
However, it then seems senseless to go ahead and say that God is perfectly good anyway. What exactly does that say about God?
And where is your objective absolute basis for this claim?
Not even if he was real.
Well said, Ron. It is like kissing the ring of a planet-killing mobster for showing mercy on you. If you don't find Planet-killer ego-maniac based morality "moral", then you are labeled as immoral, right Tom? I guess you said we "could" be moral, just not to you or God.
When they act contrary to that we call it guilt. If we are to disregard evidence of actions, the word will lose all the meaning it ever had.
Ditto, DL.
Good thing God's number one rule is don't judge God. The Jesus re-write toned him down quite a bit, but he is still a monster. If he didn't have the power (err, said he has the power) to move mountains and prevent death (only invisibly) why would we even want to associate with the being?
Getting back to the Colorado story, I would like to hear what Tom and H think would be a good outcome, and why.
DL:
Sorry, I inadvertently attached the comment below to the wrong post.
You’re confused: the onus is on you, not on me. You are the one making absolute moral claims against the infinite God based on your own personal subjectivist/relativist principles. That’s incoherent. Your discomfort in my pointing it out doesn’t magically permit you to turn the tables in order to evade that incoherence.
If the Flood or any of God's atrocities are ultimately good by a logic that is incomprehensible to us, we still can't call those actions of God's good, exactly because that logic is incomprehensible. We have to call it unimagineable, or beyond us, or the infinite. But we can't call it good. Good must mean what we can imagine good to mean (uh, just like any word). Otherwise, a word can mean anything, but therefore nothing.
H,
You’re confused: the onus is on you, not on me. You are the one making absolute moral claims against the infinite God based on your own personal subjectivist/relativist principles.Sorry, where was my absolute moral claim? I said this:
I subjectively know what good and evil are to me and to the culture in which I live (and the two are mostly, but not always in agreement). By that standard God seems evil.What am I to do with what I subjectively know as the good? Either God is evil, or my good is a completely different animal from good as applied to God.
Good(1) is my subjective, personal cultural good. Good(2) is the good which applies to God. Since Good(1) is a definition based on experience, and Good(2) is independent of experience, you have a serious problem on your hands.
Moreover, why should I even care about being Good(2)? This is why moral realism is so incoherent. The ostensible reason to be Good(2) is to promote Good(1). However, Good(2) can only be shown conducive to Good(1) by experience because Good(1) is defined by experience. Yet Good(2) is said to be consistent with avoidable death and suffering. So why should I support Good(2) instead of Good(1)? And don't say that Good(1) and Good(2) are really consistent. They manifestly are not. If they were consistent, God would step in like a mother steps in for her children. We would see with our own experience that God was Good(1). We don't see that. We see that, if he exists, God is Evil(1).
DL:
Come on, DL... you keep on missing the point: First, if your moral claims are indeed subjectivist (as you assert), what possible reason could anyone have to care what your claims are... and why are you bothering us with subjectivism... because they're "convincing"? Sorry, they're anything but convincing. Second, what adds the absolutist tone to your claims is that you impose them as if they were indeed objective (and you do so with a self-righteous indignation, I might add) against an infinite God. Apart from the obvious inconsistency in your approach, tell me that makes sense...
I am NOT your or anyone else’s savior, nor am I trying to convince you to accede to the Christian faith—and over the past half year or so I’ve stated that quite explicitly on this blog… which means indeed you’ve misunderstood. In fact, I believe you’re being selectively inattentive to my most recent comments.
I'm new to this blog, so I don't have the 3 weeks it would take to read everything you've posted. It's not my intent to summarize your views, but rather to address some concerns I have about your post I quoted from. In that quote, you did in fact say:
The Cross makes Love existentially real, and it is the only means by which evil is conquered, and it is the only path to resting in Him… and having all our questions “answered.”
...which seems (on its face at least) to suggest that if those of us who are outside your religion want answers to troubling questions about it we have to join up first. Now that's what I would call "incoherent."
My intent is clear and openly stated: to show just how incoherent claims against God are when the claims themselves are vacuous...
Of course, if the claims against God are as "vacuous" as you say they are, it makes me wonder why, as you yourself stated in this very same post:
How many times do Tom and I have to repeat that the question of evil is a very good one (or that St. Thomas holds it up as the most difficult problem facing Christians—read it yourself in the Summa)? How many times does it have to be stated that Christians have struggled with the problem for near 2,000 years?
You know, maybe you guys wouldn't have to state it as often if you didn't spend so much time trying to dismiss it as "vacuous" and "incoherent." Make up your mind. It can't be "the question of evil is a very good one" and "vacuous and incoherent" at the same time now, can it?
Is it so hard to understand that DL (and by extension others that hold the same worldview) cannot rationally, coherently judge God if the very basis (self-admitted) for such judgments is relative, subjective, unpredictable, anecdotal, materialistic, unobservable, etc. ad nauseum?
That's a dodge, pure and simple. If you cannot use basic reasoning skills to determine the nature of God, you cannot form any kind of informed opinion as to whether or not to believe in him. Some muslims call Allah "the compassionate, the merciful" while they're sawing off the heads of people they don't like. I don't think it's unreasonable to ask how any God can be compassionate when he demands so much human suffering. That's pretty straightforward, and I don't think you would be any happier when the muslim answers your question with "Who are you to judge Allah" than I am when you give the same kind of answer.
I’ll try again.
(1) If I understand you correctly, you’re looking at the problem from the same perspective as DL, namely, he’s judging God based on subjectivist, relativist criteria. Don’t you find that in the least bit strange? It is, in fact, incoherent.
Thomas Aquinas didn't seem to think so. According to you,
St. Thomas holds it up as the most difficult problem facing Christians.
Next--
I proclaim openly and loudly that from a materialist perspective God WILL appear evil, strange, mysterious, etc., etc.
Then you should understand why it is that so many of us cannot believe in or follow Christianity.
(2) Assuming God is the Infinite (not in the numerical sense but in the sense of unbounded perfection) Creator, then there are certain aspects of God that will not be understood in this lifetime…
And to expand on that, if we assume he is not the Infinite, there will be lots and lots of aspects of God that will not be understood, either.
Go ahead and heap all the crimes and “spectator” accusations against God throughout human history that you want. Do you really think that compares to the crime of deicide at the hands of His own creatures?
Please. According to the Bible, Jesus was crucified because that's what he was put on earth for--in other words, he was there voluntarily. I don't think too many of those Jewish children went to the gas chambers of Auschwitz by choice, so when viewed in that light, the crimes God watches on a daily basis but does nothing to stop are far worse. And since you touched on original sin, that's one of the worst things about Christianity--it makes it a crime against God just to be human.
He entered into our world to suffer with us—He did not abandon us to suffer alone. If an infinite being was put to death by his own creatures, don’t you believe that this—on common sense alone—demands infinite retribution, justice, anger, condemnation?
Not if that were his divine plan in the first place--to be sent to earth for that express purpose. In that case, those that crucified him were merely furthering his divine will and should be rewarded, not punished.
Yet, here we are… loved even as we continue to pound nails into the Cross.
The one recurring theme of Christianity seems to be that humans are inherently evil. "We" didn't pound nails into the cross. "We" weren't born yet. But according to Christianity, "we" are guilty nonetheless. Saddam Hussein used a similar rationale when a few people in a certain village tried to assassinate him. He had the entire village gassed--if a few are guilty, the entire village is guilty too, you see. When Saddam did it, we call it murder. When God does it, it's called 'Love'. Sorry, H--no sale.
(By the way, don’t you find it odd that when the historical witness of the Bible is uncomfortable, then it is viewed as inaccurate—a bunch of fables (like the Flood); but when convenient the Bible is used as an historically accurate document (again, the example of the Flood) in the vain attempt to convict God…
Those of us who alluded to the flood did so to point out that your own holy book says that God personally drowned an entire planetful of children. This does not imply that we buy into the Genesis account. Surely you can do better than that. Oh, and for what it's worth, there is no scientific evidence that a global flood has ever occured; at least according to the National Academy of Science.
Ron,
Just to clear up a point: Holopupenko says that DL's approach is vacuous because he is holding God to some absolute standard that DL seems to think God is accountable to; while DL also says there is no such absolute standard. That's an empty charge: "God doesn't live up to my non-existent standards, so I can't believe in him." (I overstated that; hold on for a moment and I'll come back to it.)
Aquinas took the more difficult and serious route. Not just Aquinas, by the way, but many Christian theologicans and philosophers before and since him. He asked whether God's actions stand up, not to any human's standards, but God's own revealed standards of goodness.
Now, this is both much more stringent than DL's kind of standards--because God being holy has no "wiggle room" around his ethics--and more feasible, because God's standard is something deeper and more genuine than we humans can easily fathom. If his moral purposes are good (already outlined here.
You may disagree that those moral purposes are good. But if there is reason under Christian thinking to think they can be good, and there is, then Christianity is not inconsistent to hold that God is good.
Now, back to my over-simplified version of DL's charge against God. It's not that DL's standards are non-existent as I said there, admittedly to put it in a quick and strong expression. It's that they are entirely subjective and therefore have no binding force on anyone else, especially God.
Tom,
It's not that DL's standards are non-existent as I said there, admittedly to put it in a quick and strong expression. It's that they are entirely subjective and therefore have no binding force on anyone else, especially God.Why do you think binding force is being applied to God here? I'm not attempting to persuade God to be good by my criteria. If God can happily put humans through meat grinders, he's not going to lose any sleep over a comfortable lad with a little bit of angst.
The binding force here is on me and my rational picture of the world. The definitions of good and evil are fixed by subjective measures. As I see them, they are not consistent with an omniscient, omnipotent, good God coexisting with the evil I see in the world. If good means killing innocent children with tsunami, I'd rather be evil, thank you very much.
That's refreshingly clear, doctor(logic). I'd like to take it one step further in that direction:
You don't like God.
Now, just to make sure we're clear on one other thing you're saying: you're not saying that God fails to live up to standards of theological or philosophical consistency, or that there's anything incoherent about believing in God. You're just saying you don't like him.
I think that on those terms, we can agree to disagree.
Hey Tom--
Haven't heard from you in awhile. You're posing interesting questions, and they're getting a lot of interesting replies. Good job!
It's not that DL's standards are non-existent as I said there, admittedly to put it in a quick and strong expression. It's that they are entirely subjective and therefore have no binding force on anyone else, especially God.
Seems to me it's perfectly appropriate to hold God to an objective standard; I tend to view claims to the opposite more as disclaimers. Rather than rattle off some definition, let me provide an example. I believe in the OT there are accounts of JHWH ordering the Israelites to really sack the living daylights out of enemy cities. My understanding is that God ordered the Jews to put absolutely everybody--men, women, children to the sword. However, I'll pause to ask you if my understanding is correct. (A reasonable person could rightly conclude that if any nation were to do that to enemy civilians that an act of ethnic cleansing had occured, and an act of ethnic cleansing--because of the enormity of innocent suffering--is an evil act. Does God get a pass when he orders what is certainly an act of ethnic cleansing? No.
That's a reasonable standard (for one specific case) to judge God on--Is it ever right for any God to order the sacking of a city & the murder of the vanquished civilians?
No. But he did. God fails a reasonable test in a particular case.
Tom,
You don't like God.Well, I would have thought that was obvious.
To me, the God of Judaism, Christianity and Islaam is a monster. I think that's the point of the problem of evil, isn't it?Now, just to make sure we're clear on one other thing you're saying: you're not saying that God fails to live up to standards of theological or philosophical consistency, or that there's anything incoherent about believing in God. You're just saying you don't like him.No, you've got me wrong, here.
I'm saying that either the problem of evil is fatal to Christian theism, or else theists are being so sloppy with their definition of "good" that their statements about the goodness of God are meaningless.
The question of the existence of God is independent of whether God is "good" or not. The problem of evil has nothing to say about the existence of an evil God. The philosophical question of Evil God's existence is answered by other means.
But we're not being sloppy about our definition of good. Maybe I haven't written about it clearly enough here. The good is a category epitomized by God. He expresses it in relationship with his creation through things like:
1. Giving free will opportunity to know genuine love.
2. Giving free will opportunity to be free (a tautology that needed to be said for its own emphasis)
3. Building souls for eternity, not just for day-to-day comfort
4. Jesus Christ's life in a human body, his shared suffering with us, his redemptive death, his resurrection
5. Love and joy, and intimate relationship with God, experienced in good experiences and even more profoundly in bad.
6. Demonstration of his holiness, which includes providing justice to unrepentant rebellious persons.
7. Answering prayer.
8. Building communities of people who love one another in need
9 The rain falling on the just and the unjust.
I could go on. God's goodness is not about today's peace and comfort, it's far deeper and it takes a far longer view.
And, I guess my oversimplification was oversimplified 
. What I see in your recent words about evil is not just that you don't like God, but that you aren't communicating anything substantial as a complaint against God except you don't like him. He doesn't measure up to your moral preferences. That seems to be your statement of the problem of evil. That's just another way of saying you don't like his morality. You don't like God, and that's your objection to him.
Ron:
Yes, indeed you missed much of what I said--primarily because your presuppositions were being overlaid, producing some lovely straw men. Step away from those and try again. Also, "three weeks to read" is a non-starter complaint: it is not a logical reason for misunderstanding or not being able to follow my points... apart from being a silly exaggeration.
DL:
Indeed there is little of substance in what you say, and Tom could not have better summarized it: "You don't like God, and that's your objection to him." That's deep, man.
You are so wrapped around the axle of your presuppositions and hatred of God, that you can't seem to stay focused. You still want it both ways, don't you? Wanting to condemn God with subjective personal criteria (animated by your relativism), but you want to do it in absolute terms against an Inifinite God. This is also, by the way, a nice example of what happens when you (openly) state First Principles are "meaningless."
Holo,
[to dl] You are so wrapped around the axle of your presuppositions and hatred of God, that you can't seem to stay focused
You do understand that Atheist don't believe in God, correct? We "hate" God about as much as we hate "Dr. Evil". God is fictional, so we are not getting worked up the same way as those of you who are defending your invisible (but real) super friend.
When people made up your God, they had a chance to make him truly good, but they went with the monster of the bible. Now if you want to defend his character, you are stuck with your version to some extent. You claim to not just like your Planet-drowning, baby slaughtering, monster, but love it.
If somebody truly hated God, they must think he is real, so they are not a Atheist. We don't object to him the way we might object to you. It will never be personal, because there isn't anything real to object to.
You could make up a God that we don't object to as "evil", and we might say yeah, that is a good God, or even agree that you have done all the mental twists it takes to explain how baby killing might be a good thing, but it is always make-believe talk. No need for actual emotion at all when it comes to gods. We might have passion for the argument perhaps, and aggravation with the Theist, but no real feelings for the supernatural defendants.
Any presuppositions we might have about God can't be personal, they only come from believers statements or books they have written, and he sounds like a egotistical bully. Try describing his actions as a real human in any society and see how he would be judged, without the "god exception" to the rules.
Again, emphasized, not real, so let go of the personal motivation arguments when you are talking to us. Or not, but then you are talking to the theists.
Don't forget the posts Tom wrote on these subjects over a year ago, or some of the comments from the moral relativists at that time.
Eric,
Well said. I agree that all this talk of holding God to account and of hating God are nonsense. I would have to believe he existed for that to be the case. This is all about the contradictions and confusions in theism.
But I disagree with this:
When people made up your God, they had a chance to make him truly good, but they went with the monster of the bible.Obviously, they didn't have that choice. The world is a nasty place. They had to redefine the good to be whatever God does to us, given that he's good and omni*. Redefine natural disasters, disease, death by psychopathic killer as necessarily good (not simply necessary). Like you, my definition of "good" is not that flexible.
I did something wrong with that link.
Here it is again.
DL,
Like you, my definition of "good" is not that flexible.
Have you a new definition of "good"?
I remember when it was "what I feel".
And since 'what you feel' is either physically predetermined or random any correlation it may have with reality is accidental.
This may not be flexible, but neither is it very compelling to those who do not feel the same as you do.
Charlie,
You are missing the point. If you say that God exists and is good, then every good I am familiar with is incorrect. At that point, I must conclude that either you're completely incorrect, or you're using the word 'good' in a sense I am unfamiliar with. Your good doesn't mean the same thing that I have always known it to mean.
If I said "Hitler is good," you have to say that either, "no, he isn't," or else ask me "what do you mean by good?" Now, if we're using the word in the same sense, your denial that Hitler is good still isn't binding on Hitler. It's binding only on you (and people who share your values). And in Hitler's view, you are evil. Just because we're talking about God doesn't change the subjectivity of both sides.
If I am to start doubting that my good is really good, then I have to doubt that murder, rape, war, theft and causing the suffering of others is evil. But I don't doubt that, and, frankly, I'm not going to be programmed into doing so. Religion is dangerous because adherents are prohibited by religious authorities from doubting dogma, so they must instead doubt their own moral instincts. I'm sure you've heard the quote from Steven Weinberg.
Charlie, the point isn't a moral relativist's definition of good (although that's a good discussion, eh?). Here, it's a theist's definition of good, especially whether God is good. What DL and I are saying is that God's behavior, as written in the Bible, requires a contradicttory definition of good. It winds up to be nonsense (bad is good). Now, if you want to claim that an infinite being's good is beyond us, that's fine, but you can't use the same word, "good," (tm) for God's good and our good (especially when God's good turns out to be evil and bad sometimes).
Eric:
You guys just don’t get it, do you? If a mathematician told you addition is relative to one’s culture, and then that mathematician in absolutist terms asserted that to him 2+2=5, it would be on the level of the incoherence of your complaints against God.
That you may not accept an objective basis for morality is your affair. But to then make objective moral claims against an infinite God is incoherent... in addition to hypocrisy. You may, if you wish, call God evil and then explain why... but if your relativist worldview undermines the very basis for you to provide an explanation, then why oh why should anyone listen to you? After all, it’s subjective personal opinion, so who gives a flying spaghetti monster what you so unconvincingly think about God?
And this one gave me a great laugh: on the one hand you complain (relatively!) that you don’t hate God because He’s allegedly not there... and yet you spend enormous vitriolic energy leveling moral claims against Him—calling Him evil. LOLOLOLOL! Well then, is He or isn’t He there for you: what are you labeling as “evil” and yet “not hating” ? No wonder so few people are atheists… it’s just too embarrassing.
And this one gave me a great laugh: on the one hand you complain (relatively!) that you don’t hate God because He’s allegedly not there... and yet you spend enormous vitriolic energy leveling moral claims against Him—calling Him evil. LOLOLOLOL! Well then, is He or isn’t He there for you: what are you labeling as “evil” and yet “not hating” ? No wonder so few people are atheists… it’s just too embarrassing.
Enormous vitriolic energy? 5 minutes and a paragraph, but you flatter me. Those people who decide Hitler was evil must be embarrassing to the skin heads as well. Personally, I would be embarrassed to say I have invisible friends, but that is just me.
I have been known to spend much more time debating the moral issues on Battlestar G, with the Mono-theistic robots vrs. the many-gods humans, but I don't think (or pretend) that it is real.
Here is some math... Baby killing(a) = (b)evil. God(c) = baby killer(a). Does C = A?
DL,
Good point on "omni". I think that is why many of the founding fathers might have been deist and not theist. Powerful, but missing or passive. I do hold that many modern Theist re-define their respective gods to make them more palatable, and there was more room even for the ancients to tone things down a bit if they chose to. But, they went with the Bully, "every knee will bend" version, and it still seems effective on many people. I think people like the idea of a god that lets bad things happen, and tortures people for all time. Love and peace would be too whimpy, when people want to have the power to "whip" the world into shape, when the children get too uppity.
Eric:
Why, no: the equality C = A doesn't always hold in your world of moral relativism. The equality could hold tomorrow... or not. If a culture on the Indian sub-continent believed only one of either A, B, or C were evil, then they would have an issue with "your" morality. Or, if an island in the Baffin Sea put it to a vote they might not vote in your favor. Peter Singer certainly doesn't hold killing babies is evil. You are confused to the point of cognitively-dissonant goofiness: "I AM a moral relativist BUT killing babies is ALWAYS wrong!" ?!?!? LOLOLOL! Can you imagine an alcoholic standing up at an AA meeting and saying, "I AM an alcoholic BUT binge drinking is ALWAYS right!"?
Paul,
What DL and I are saying is that God's behavior, as written in the Bible, requires a contradicttory definition of good.
Contradictory of what?
Stay tuned.
DL,
You are missing the point. If you say that God exists and is good, then every good I am familiar with is incorrect. At that point, I must conclude that either you're completely incorrect, or you're using the word 'good' in a sense I am unfamiliar with. Your good doesn't mean the same thing that I have always known it to mean.
Although your examples are misleading your point here is correct.
Good is not what you are familiar with, and it does contradict Paul's idea of what is good.
Good is not "what I feel", "what my society says" or "what evolution programmed us to believe". It is not never suffering or having everything we desire.
I certainly am using it the sense that it is not 'what DL's molecules tell him'.
Funny that the relativist still can't help but conclude that I am "completely incorrect", however. But then, I guess by that you just mean we don't happen to have been predetermined to agree, not that I am actually wrong.
Charlie, I think what you're leading up to is the idea that good is whatever god says it is, whether the same action done by a human is evil or not. Is that correct? If not, how is your idea different?
The Good should remain ambiguous, as a kind of general category.
When you try to get specific in defining The Good, thats when you really run into problems. Because, first of all, not everyone will agree on the specifics. And two, because not all people will agree on The Good, there is a historical tendency to wage war against those that are getting The Good wrong.
Jacob:
I think I understand: like the officially-atheistic communist regimes of the 20th century who murdered over 100 million people... and pro-abortionists waging war against the most innocent and helpless members of society, n'est pas? Or, am I being too concrete when I should be ambiguous about the dignity (a clear good) of those human beings?
Hi Paul,
I am getting at what I got at in the link I posted.
Imposing this absolute morality on God would seem a difficult task, since you have previously argued for differing standards of morality for different people, in different circumstances, in different times, and in different cultures.
And:
Previously some here have argued that such an absolute morality definitely does not exist (as atheistic philosophers have noted, such an objective morality would be proof of God). They have valiantly asserted that all morality is relative and dependent upon time, place and perspective.
The first thing to note is that God is eternal and omnipresent ie; outside of time and place. Such localized concepts of morality do not apply to Him.
While we human's ponder the colour of one side of the cube-of-many-colours, God sees all sides at once, in all possible lights. He sees when those colours fade into nothing, and when that cube disintegrates in a landfill.
I am not saying that any view of morality can necessarily be applied by humans to God, who is the very source of morality and goodness, but certainly subjective/relativistic ethicists have abdicated any position from which to challenge. If a person can only determine good or bad for himself, in his time, in his place, influenced by his culture, then his asking if God is bad is like asking if God's feet are cold because my refrigerator is open.
All that said, a case can still be made that God’s actions are good not just by definition but also by looking at those actions in their context.
And:
My point, very simply, was that a relativistic/subjective ethic has no grounding from which to judge the morality of God.
And:
Paul:
I've already mentioned the purchase and strength of relative moralty: it *distinguishes* between right and wrong for members of that society.
Charlie:
And again, God is not a member of that society.
You also expressed that your moral position against slavery would equally be immoral if you were to have held it in a slavery-endorsing society. Can one who views all morality in this way have an opinion regarding God's goodness? Of course he can. But it is already on the table that "good" and "bad" mean nothing to the relativist outside of a specific culture at a specific time. God is obviously not a member of any society or culture of humans so "right and wrong for members of that society" are irrelevant.
But you can see how that all played out in October 2005.
To include DL, my point is also that to judge God as good or bad requires that good and bad transcend not only our societies, fashions, and epochs, but also our existential realm as well.
This is a tall order for someone who equates good to aesthetic and gastronomic taste and defines it as "what I feel".
Holopupenko,
Yes, I think you do understand. Each of those groups you mentioned had a vision of The Good that they concretely put into practice. The consequence was a lot of dead folks that didn't fit within their vision of The Good. The Nazis serve as a great example. They espoused a vision of The Good that excluded Jews.
Jacob:
But doesn't your asserting "The Nazis... espoused a vision of The Good that excluded Jews" itself a judgment that presupposes a basis which you understand as objectively good? If not, then you have no real basis upon which to judge the Nazis. If so, then your vision of "good" cannot be "ambiguous" despite your calls for the good to be ambiguous.
Just trying to understand...
Charlie, was my characterization of your idea about morality accurate or not? I'd like a direct, short, simple answer. I don't want my question evaded. A direct answer is possible, please give it to me. There may be subtle points that need to amplify a short, direct answer, and that's fine too as long as the short, direct answer is included.
Some of your response was irrelevant to my question. For instance: "My point, very simply, was that a relativistic/subjective ethic has no grounding from which to judge the morality of God." But it's not a question of judging the morality of God, it's a question (first) of what words mean when you use them.
Holopupenko,
Do assertions presuppose an objective good? Not necessarily.
That the Nazis espoused a vision of The Good that excluded Jews is an analytical claim about the social and political construction of boundaries that are empirically informed by Nazis texts and statements that refer to Jews in dehumanizing terms and by Nazis actions to kill them all.
I judge the Nazis based on commonly agreed upon ideas. Are agreements objective? Not as far as I know.
Charlie,
To include DL, my point is also that to judge God as good or bad requires that good and bad transcend not only our societies, fashions, and epochs, but also our existential realm as well.Ah, but good and bad do not do that in any way we can comprehend. We can only comprehend good and bad from our frame. If you want to argue that God is good in some incomprehensible way, well, go right ahead. You can also say that he's pink in some incomprehensible way, or that he has a sweet tooth in some incomprehensible way. But you don't get to say all this stuff and still pretend you know anything about God, nor can you connect these incomprehensible attributes to construct a rationale for belief or worship. In other words, you can cut off your head to escape the noose of the problem of evil, but that doesn't really help your cause.
Charlie, I think what you're leading up to is the idea that good is whatever god says it is, whether the same action done by a human is evil or not. Is that correct? If not, how is your idea different?
I'm no expert on this subject but it seems to me that God and goodness are inseperably linked much the same way a particular grouping of molecules and treeness are inseperably linked. So it's not what God does that defines good, it's what God is. God is good just as you are Paul. God is also sovereign and just and a lot of other things. It's character traits.
Ron:
Yes, indeed you missed much of what I said--primarily because your presuppositions were being overlaid, producing some lovely straw men
None of which come to mind, I guess?
I don't need straw man arguments to deal with this huge guilt trip you're trying to unload.
Look at it like this: You know how you view other peoples' religions? I'm that way with your religion, too. Sorry.
SteveK, if good and God and inseparably linked, then my and DL's point remains:
The actions of God that we would call evil (the Flood, commanding others to kill, etc.) if done by a human, are either
1. good in some incomprehensible way, in which case we can't call it good, meaning the same good we ordinarily mean, or
2. evil, in which case God isn't perfectly good.
One or the other, eh? You choose.
Paul,
I'd like a direct, short, simple answer. I don't want my question evaded. A direct answer is possible, please give it to me. There may be subtle points that need to amplify a short, direct answer, and that's fine too as long as the short, direct answer is included.
No you mischaracterize my point.
And though I do endeavour to answer you in exactly the manner you require (give me examples, ok, now summarize, how about a restatement, all right now as a syllogism, just one short answer now, and this time with feeling ...) I will first refer you back to what I posted last time around, and reminded you of here:
The first thing to note is that God is eternal and omnipresent ie; outside of time and place. Such localized concepts of morality [the moral good is what my society says is good, and is determined by the strictures on members, it is what helps us survive, it is that in which I've been inculcated, it is what I feel it is, it is my biochemical impulses, etc.] do not apply to Him.
So, to your characterization:
Charlie, I think what you're leading up to is the idea that good is whatever god says it is, whether the same action done by a human is evil or not. Is that correct? If not, how is your idea different?
No, good is not whatever God (capital "G") says it is.
SteveK answered this just fine, but there you have it from me as well.
You responded to SteveK:
The actions of God that we would call evil (the Flood, commanding others to kill, etc.) if done by a human, are either
1. good in some incomprehensible way, in which case we can't call it good, meaning the same good we ordinarily mean, or
2. evil, in which case God isn't perfectly good.
But ignore many salient points, points which we've discussed before.
First, please remember that morality and goodness encompass behaviour but are not limited to it.
Holopupenko has mentioned several times the elements necessary to make an act good, including motivation, ends, and appropriateness of circumstances.
If it is possible that God's actions have a good end, are motivated by His goodness and are appropriate to the circumstance then you have no logical case against His being good.
At the same time is impossible that any man has the same relationship to anything that God, the Creator, has.
God created man, and knows everything about each man. We talked before about your misguided presumption that the sovereign creator of something can be judged in his actions toward his creation in
the same way that another can be.
If I create a statue and it does not please me their is no violation of any reason or ethic in my destruction of it.
There is such a violation in my neighbor's destruction of my creation.
But is it true that God's goodness is necessarily inscrutable to us?
No, not at all. Select your supposed bad act and read some theology on it and you will find the many ways that your Ockhamist charge is falsified.
Another little reminder here. As you tried to define "good" you said:
If something (material, emotional, hypothetical, monetary, whatever) is owed to me for a certain reason, then it stands to reason that another in the same circumstance is owed the same, even if it is me that is doing the owing to this other person.
And I added, without response from you:
I will concede that for you this could be a way to determine what is 'good'.
It is 'good' that people get what they deserve or have earned - what they have coming to them. If a person has done something that warrants a payment the one who pays what is owed is 'good' to do so.
When people disobey God - when they sin and will not repent - God is faithful and just, and good, to judge them. This is what they are owed in the circumstance.
I think we now can agree that God's moral obligation to execute judgment is consistent with His being good. I guess all that's left you is to second-guess His ability to determine to whom He owes such judgment, or whether or not you think such wages of sin are fair.
DL,
I said:
To include DL, my point is also that to judge God as good or bad requires that good and bad transcend not only our societies, fashions, and epochs, but also our existential realm as well.
And you replied:
Ah, but good and bad do not do that in any way we can comprehend. We can only comprehend good and bad from our frame.
Then you admit that you've abdicated the ability to judge God.
If good and bad only work from our reference frame then they, as has been observed, do not apply from one human to the other in the same society (as you've said you are not bad or good but merely in disagreement with me, so I will reason with you on our shared principles or apply force, etc.) let alone to other societies, let alone those distanced from us by millennia, let alone to God.
Charlie,
Then you admit that you've abdicated the ability to judge God.Nice try, but that's not what I said at all. What I said is that we judge an agent's actions according to familiar standards of good and evil. By those standards, by the conventions that define good and evil, God is evil. So if you want to claim "God is good", go get another word because, given standard meanings of the word, your statement is obviously false.
If I create a statue and it does not please me their is no violation of any reason or ethic in my destruction of it.And if the statue is a living, thinking, feeling being?
This is an interesting resolution to the problem of evil. Just redefine good to encompass the torture and destruction of a people by their creator.
Charlie, thank you for your response.
I don't see this as question about absolute vs. relative morality. It's merely a question of whether the Christian god can be called good, and what good means.
No, good is not whatever God (capital "G") says it is.I must say, that is a clear and unambiguous answer to my question, thank you, but it's hard to believe that you said it. How could the infinite creator of space and time not be obeyed completely and how could one not accept what such an infinite being defined as good?
If it is possible that God's actions have a good end, are motivated by His goodness and are appropriate to the circumstance then you have no logical case against His being good.Do you really think it could be possible that the Flood, on balance, had an ultimately "good end," and was appropriate to the circumstance? Do you know how many innocent children suffered horribly as they drowned? Ever think what drowning must be like? What sort of monster would doom thousands or millions of innocent children to such a horrible death? How can you possibly say that such an action could have, ultimately, a "good end?!" I'd love for you to make such a case, taking in account the horrific nature of the deaths that *the entire planet* suffered.
We talked before about your misguided presumption that the sovereign creator of something can be judged in his actions toward his creation inGeez, I'm tired of this one. It's not about judging God, I have no desire to judge God. I only want the word "good" applied consistently. Then, once that happens, the chips can fall where they may, I don't care which way.
the same way that another can be.
Also, whenever anyone says that God is good, they are judging God, too. Why isn't that type of judgment prohibited?
Select your supposed bad act and read some theology on it and you will find the many ways that your Ockhamist charge is falsified.Please enlighten me. That's what a conversation is. I didn't come here for homework, I came here to talk with you.
For the rest of you post, I'll respond by saying that I don't see this issue as being about competing definitions of good at all.
Paul:
I only want the word "good" applied consistently. Then, once that happens, the chips can fall where they may, I don't care which way.
It's not so simple. Consider what Charlie said above:
First, please remember that morality and goodness encompass behaviour but are not limited to it.
Holopupenko has mentioned several times the elements necessary to make an act good, including motivation, ends, and appropriateness of circumstances.
I don't see how you can boil this down any further. One thing to keep in mind is that God is not concerned as much with time whereas we are. As parents, I see my kids are much more impatient than I am. I imagine God sees me the same way - an impatient kid wanting a quick fix instead of wanting to work toward something better, something more good than before.
There's also the economy of goodness, meaning that all acts/intentions don't carry the same weight. Can a certain amount of goodness wash away/rectify a certain amount of evil? I don't know for certain but I'm inclined to say yes.
It's complicated indeed, but there is a sense that time and economy play into the definition of good.
We hear all the time that "the end doesn't justify the means". That is not a true statement. If that were true then nothing would be justified. Healing a person of a disease (the end) would not be justified by cutting them open (the means). Clearly there are situations where the end is justified by the means to get there.
In the economy of goodness I think there are situations where God is justified by the end. Consider the various means God can use to sanctify a person who has the free will to resist/reject what is good for that person.
Paul,
Is this a joke?
You asked a specific question:
Charlie, I think what you're leading up to is the idea that good is whatever god says it is, whether the same action done by a human is evil or not. Is that correct? If not, how is your idea different?
And received a specific answer to that question:
No, good is not whatever God (capital "G") says it is.
And then you misrepresent that answer as such:
I must say, that is a clear and unambiguous answer to my question, thank you, but it's hard to believe that you said it. How could the infinite creator of space and time not be obeyed completely and how could one not accept what such an infinite being defined as good?
What did this question/answer have to do with obedience or acceptance?
You lecture me about answering your questions and about how one is to engage in conversation and you treat replies like this?
For shame.
Do you really think it could be possible that the Flood, on balance, had an ultimately "good end," and was appropriate to the circumstance?
Yes.
Do you know how many innocent children suffered horribly as they drowned?
Zero.
Ever think what drowning must be like?
I have. It terrifies me.
How can you possibly say that such an action could have, ultimately, a "good end?!" I'd love for you to make such a case, taking in account the horrific nature of the deaths that *the entire planet* suffered.
Would you?
Read the account first yourself then and perhaps reconsider arguing from emotion and personal indignation.
Geez, I'm tired of this one. It's not about judging God, I have no desire to judge God.
You don't judge God?
Who was the monster in your previous paragraph then?
Also, whenever anyone says that God is good, they are judging God, too. Why isn't that type of judgment prohibited?
I didn't say anything was prohibited.
I said your relativistic, subjective, culture-specific, here's-what-I-feel-due-to-inculcation, evolution-told-me-so, morality does not and cannot apply to anyone who lives outside your culture, is not a biological derivative, or or will not submit to your whims.
Please enlighten me. That's what a conversation is. I didn't come here for homework, I came here to talk with you.
If this is a conversation you should treat it like one.
You should be prepared to do at least a minimal amount of homework if you are going to question the logical consistency of Christianity.
For the rest of you post, I'll respond by saying that I don't see this issue as being about competing definitions of good at all.
Aside from the fact that you chose to discuss the definition of "good" in your first paragraph and then say that you want it applied consistently.
Of course, I show that by one of your many attempts at defining "good" ("good" is getting what you deserve - in additions to your a couple of your other ones, "good is what my society says is good", and "good is what helps us survive") we are not competing at all when it comes to God's judgment.
DL,
By those standards, by the conventions that define good and evil, God is evil. So if you want to claim "God is good", go get another word because, given standard meanings of the word, your statement is obviously false.
The word works just fine as is.
Is my statement obviously false, as you say?
By all standards of good and evil that I know of God is good, not evil.
And if the statue is a living, thinking, feeling being?
So what if it is?
Do you view living, thinking, feeling beings as having intrinsic worth, value or dignity?
By what process was this bestowed upon them?
This is an interesting resolution to the problem of evil. Just redefine good to encompass the torture and destruction of a people by their creator.
Again with the claims of redefinition.
What is the definition of "good" which must be redefined in order to make it applicable to God?
Paul already worked one definition out for me - getting what you deserve.
Is there a problem with this one?
Charlie, OK, the obeying part of my point is irrelevant (but I don't feel shame for making a mistake like that). But the other part, the definition of good by God still holds:
how could one not accept what such an infinite being defined as good?That is not a rhetorical question. And part of that must be God's behavior, too. How can we not conclude that all of God's behvaior must be good, given his infiniteness, his love, etc.?
Do you know how many innocent children suffered horribly as they drowned?Is you answer dependent on my qualifier "innocent," or are you saying that no children died in the Flood. This conversation will go more quickly if you can flesh things out a bit more, unless you really like one-word answers that take days to get through a discussion.Zero.
You should be prepared to do at least a minimal amount of homework if you are going to question the logical consistency of Christianity.No, thank you.
You don't judge God?Separate parts of the argument. One argument is about the definition of the word good and whether god's actions are good. If, and only if, we conclude that god's actions are not good, then we can say he's a monster. At one point in the argument, the judgment is irrelevant.
Who was the monster in your previous paragraph then?
Aside from the fact that you chose to discuss the definition of "good" in your first paragraph and then say that you want it applied consistently.No, I don't want to discuss differing definitions of good, I just want to discuss an assumed definition of good being applied consistently. That's the diff.
Just to clarify:
What is the definition of "good" which must be redefined in order to make it applicable to God?Wasn't this my definition of justice, not (and as distinct from) good?
Paul already worked one definition out for me - getting what you deserve.
Paul,
Is you answer dependent on my qualifier "innocent," or are you saying that no children died in the Flood. This conversation will go more quickly if you can flesh things out a bit more, unless you really like one-word answers that take days to get through a discussion.
Make up your mind.
Do you want " direct, short, simple answer(s)" or not?
Do you think I am contending that there were no children in the world at the time of the flood?
Of course the answer is dependent upon the word "innocent".
And what is this appeal to "innocence" anyway? Using the word "innocent" betrays a knowledge of guilt. The question then is guilty of what and judged by Whom?
If, and only if, we conclude that god's actions are not good, then we can say he's a monster. At one point in the argument, the judgment is irrelevant.
Oh, I see, you haven't decided yet. My mistake.
Wasn't this my definition of justice, not (and as distinct from) good?
I don't think so, let me go have a look.
Paul:
Ah, Charlie, thanks for helping to define good. That spurs me on to some tentative thoughts.
Absent a god to provide absolute morality, "good" means that which we would do if we paid attention to how we would relate to other people when considering, dare I say, the logic of the mutual interconnectedness of human relations. If something (material, emotional, hypothetical, monetary, whatever) is owed to me for a certain reason, then it stands to reason that another in the same circumstance is owed the same, even if it is me that is doing the owing to this other person. Contrary to the selfishness on which "might makes right" is based, the idea of good says that one should give the other what they are owed for the same reason that one can demand what is owed to oneself. It is really the logic of the parallel situations that drives giving someone what they are owed in conflict with one's selfish wishes.
Getting a little closer to defining good without god?
Charlie:
Paul,
I don't know that this is very helpful:
"If something (material, emotional, hypothetical, monetary, whatever) is owed to me for a certain reason, then it stands to reason that another in the same circumstance is owed the same, even if it is me that is doing the owing to this other person."
What is that certain reason? Did you do something, or is because you are something, or is the reason assessed by God? Why does it stand to reason that another person deserves the same as you? Are you created equal? Is this thing that is owed you owed a member of another tribe, or another race? Is it owed to an animal of another species?
If, as a defensive move, you are going to limit it tightly to "the same circumstance" then you will eliminate everyone and everything else, as only you may experience that one circumstance.
Charlie | 11.01.05 - 12:58 pm | #
Paul:
Charlie, while I've got a quick moment:
The similar circumstance, as a reason, still looks good to me. It is not *every* circumstance that is required for (partial) similarity, only those aspects that help determine the outcome. That is, if person A owes me something because, for instance, there was an agreement that I would receive this something, then, if the same situation happens, except that A and I have changed roles, then I owe A for the same reasons that A owed me. Isn't that the essence of morality? You do what's called for, even if it goes against your selfish interest. If it's called for that you receive some benefit, for X reason, then X reason may be used to against your (selfish) benefit when your role changes to the other side.
Paul | 11.01.05 - 4:50 pm | #
Charlie:
My first option, the wise one, is to ignore it and go on with life.
We all know I can't do that.
My second is to pick it apart, provide all the examples I can think of to show why I don't think that your system of 'owing', coupled with atheism, will produce any real good or morality. The questions that come to mind are endless: Who is to determine what is owed in each situation? Who is to determine to whom such a thing is owed? If it is about the inter-relatedness of human interactions how does morality extend beyond our race? Or does it? If it is only that you provide to a person what you said you would then you are talking about contracts, not morality. etc.
That would take a lot of words and much more quibbling.
I have chosen option three.
I will concede that for you this could be a way to determine what is 'good'.
It is 'good' that people get what they deserve or have earned - what they have coming to them. If a person has done something that warrants a payment the one who pays what is owed is 'good' to do so.
When people disobey God - when they sin and will not repent - God is faithful and just, and good, to judge them. This is what they are owed in the circumstance.
I think we now can agree that God's moral obligation to execute judgment is consistent with His being good. I guess all that's left you is to second-guess His ability to determine to whom He owes such judgment, or whether or not you think such wages of sin are fair.
Charlie | 11.02.05 - 12:58 pm | #
Make up your mind.Sometimes helping the conversation requires short answers, and sometimes it requires fleshing things out more. A good conversationalist knows when to do both. I'm only trying to help things along, and will accept others' advice on how I can help things along.
Do you want " direct, short, simple answer(s)" or not?
And what is this appeal to "innocence" anyway? Using the word "innocent" betrays a knowledge of guilt. The question then is guilty of what and judged by Whom?You tell me, you're the one who says that the children in the Flood were not innocent. I can't imagine what a 6-month-old baby could do that would require the torture of a drowning death. What were they guilty of that required a horrible death and which (at least some) other children in later generations weren't guilty of? Or, if all children are equally guilty, why aren't all children made to suffer drowning?
If, and only if, we conclude that god's actions are not good, then we can say he's a monster. At one point in the argument, the judgment is irrelevant.Do you have an actual point in response here?
Oh, I see, you haven't decided yet. My mistake.
Paul,
Do you have an actual point in response here?
Yes.
Let me line them up again.
You referred to goodness and asked whether an action that God takes can be considered good even if a man taking that same action would be considered bad.
But a man cannot take that same action because he cannot have the same relationship to the creation that God has.
So to judge whether God's actions are good or bad you have to judge them with respect to God, not man (and your system admits defeat to this task).
But you claim that you want only to judge the action and that, after having done so, you will judge God (to be a monster).
So how do you judge the action of God without judging God?
To help clarify I presented a somewhat more analogous situation with which to compare and well, geez, that tires you out.
You tell me, you're the one who says that the children in the Flood were not innocent. I can't imagine what a 6-month-old baby could do that would require the torture of a drowning death. What were they guilty of that required a horrible death and which (at least some) other children in later generations weren't guilty of? Or, if all children are equally guilty, why aren't all children made to suffer drowning?
So neither you nor I can assess the guilt and neither you nor I can pass judgment (but don't bother loading your language before passing judgment anything).
But God can, and what did He say about the world - including those babies?
Also note that we are all now fallen human beings, that we are all going to suffer a physical death and that death itself is not a punishment for any accumulation of an individual's personal earthly sins (ie: it's not about what those babies, or you and I "have done"). Only God knows the eternal spirit and the fate of any who die, and only God can pass a judgment.
At any rate, the Flood was not primarily a judgment on individuals but a continuing act of the salvation of mankind.
You referred to goodness and asked whether an action that God takes can be considered good even if a man taking that same action would be considered bad.Not quite. It's not so much the comparison between man and God, is it is the consistency of the concept of goodness. If X is good, it should be good no matter who, God or no, does it. If X is evil, it's evil even if God does it (not counting X as a mixed behavior, including good and bad elements, which sum is good overall).
But you claim that you want only to judge the actionFrst, I only want the word "good" to be applied consistently. That's the starting point that we haven't resolved yet.
At any rate, the Flood was not primarily a judgment on individuals but a continuing act of the salvation of mankind.That view of the Flood would argue for an even greater barbarism by God: "You (the babies) didn't really do anything wrong, you're not being punished as an individual, you're just in the way of a Larger Plan." As if God couldn't have figured out some other way to accomplish his goals without killing babies who are not being punished invidually, and who therefore are, actually, *innocent* in regards to the evil that befell them. Yikes!
And you didn't address my other point that, if somehow it wasn't wrong for babies to suffer an agonizing death, how can it be right for other babies, born after the Flood, to *not* suffer an agonizing death? How can it be fair that one six-month-old suffers like that at the direct hand of God and another doesn't?
Charlie,
So to judge whether God's actions are good or bad you have to judge them with respect to God, not man (and your system admits defeat to this task).Not our claim. Our claim is a conditional.
1) IF God can be judged by our standard, THEN he is evil.
2) IF God cannot be judged by our standard, but is purely good, THEN the claim that God is good is simply tautological.
In (2), God's good has no bearing on the experience of man. God is good by your definition, no matter what he does, and no matter how evil it seems to us (and it seems pretty horrific). None of the moral principles we live by even apply to God.
Of course, under (2) your claim that God is good is an empty one. It says nothing about God or his behavior at all. It says "God's behavior is what it is, and we'll call it good by definition." You might just as well have called God pure evil, for all the knowledge you convey.
Paul,
If X is good, it should be good no matter who, God or no, does it. If X is evil, it's evil even if God does it (not counting X as a mixed behavior, including good and bad elements, which sum is good overall).
Christianity does not make this claim. Charlie stated it this way:
But a man cannot take that same action because he cannot have the same relationship to the creation that God has.
IF God cannot be judged by our standard, but is purely good, THEN the claim that God is good is simply tautological.
What is the standard for judging if the rules of math are correct? The standard is the rules of math. Tautological. Are you going to invoke the rule of prediction again? How do we judge the rules of prediction? More prediction and definitions to suit your theory of prediction. How do we judge those rules and definitions? More rules and more definitions. And so on...and so on....
You might just as well have called God pure evil, for all the knowledge you convey.
Some people do. Some also think animals deserve the same rights as humans.
It says "God's behavior is what it is, and we'll call it good by definition."
You make it sound like the definition of good is made via the flip of the coin. "I don't know so heads God is good, tails he's evil." Nothing could be further from the truth, but maybe this is how you approach these things.
How do you know "love" is not "hate" or "stealing" is not "borrowing" or "the day after tomorrow" is not "yesterday"?
Steve,
The standard is the rules of math. Tautological.Sure. If you define rules and procedures a certain way, you get certain theorems.
We define good to mean that a thinking agent is merciful, helpful, avoids inflicting pain on others, is considerate of the feelings of others, is non-negligent, etc., whether those "others" are the same race or not. That's how good is defined.
By this definition, God is evil.
The only way you can avoid this theorem is by using a different definition of 'good'. For God, good doesn't mean merciful, or considerate of feelings, or loving or any of the things we think the good ought to mean. So why are you using the same word?
If you want to say that 2#2=5, that's fine, but it's just misleading to say that 2+2=5.
Actually, what you are saying is worse than 2+2=5. At least if you think that 2+2=5, you will think it's 5 every time. God can act inconsistently from our perspective, and you would still claim that God is good. One innocent child survives a tsunami, and his younger sister doesn't. Christians say one was "saved" by the mercy of God. The other was "taken" by God. Yet both children are terrorized, and God knows they're terrorized. So your statement that God is good is simply devoid of meaning.
Contrast this with the meaning as applied to a human. If I say that my sister is a good person, that alters your expectations about her behavior. She is expected to be honest, helpful, considerate, inoffensive, non-violent and so forth. Likewise, if I say she is evil, you might expect her to be deceptive, cruel, negligent, and dangerous.
Try that with God. God is good? Will he be helpful? Um, no. Non-violent? Nope. Non-negligent? Nope. Then what am I to take from your statement that he's good? What more do I know given this information? Nada.
doctor(logic),
IF God cannot be judged by our standard, but is purely good, THEN the claim that God is good is simply tautological.
Be careful what you mean by "tautology," doctor(logic). There are analytic statements, such as those in math; for instance, 1+1=2. That seems tautological. But as Lewis said (using another arithmetical operation I can't recall), the equation (10^0) + (10^0) = 2 is hardly tautological to the uninitiated. In this case, although it is a necessary truth, it is not tautological because there is information in one side of the equation that is not in the other, viz., a law of exponents.
To say that God is good, even if it is necessarily the case, is not tautological either. It adds knowledge regarding both words. One learns that there is a relationship between a person, God, and a moral category, goodness. One learns that goodness is instantiated in a person. One learns that there is a description of the character of God. One learns something of the character of goodness by the way it is instantiated in God; for instance, that immediate peace and pleasure is not necessary to goodness.
Your claim that it adds "nada" to your knowledge is empty. Your examples regarding non-negligence and non-violence are very shallow; try digging a bit deeper. I know you can do it: you can learn something if you'll try
.
So, SteveK, does the circumstances surrounding God's action that you claim is good but I would call evil (i.e. the Flood) help make it good, or does the mere fact that God does it make it good? If the latter, you have set up a mere semantic definition, a tautology, and you should use another word to prevent confusion. But if the former, then I'd love to hear why, for instance, the Flood is ultimately good, why those it was ultimately good that those 6-month old children suffered, why all 6-month-olds shouldn't suffer the same way as those that died in the Flood. For instance, it seems like the Flood solved nothing. We're still fallen, aren't we? Why kill everyone just to give Noah's ancestors another chance? And couldn't God have found some other way besides killing everyone and making 6-month olds suffer horribly? I think you're not fully appreciated the horror of the deaths that happened in the Flood.
Tom, by your idea of tautology, 1+1 = 2 is also tautological (the idea of addition is present on one side of the equation and not on the other). By your idea, nothing but A = A would be a tautology.
Moreover, wouldn't an equality, not a tautology, serve DL's point just as well? I think your tautology point is an (unintended) red herring.
Tom,
Whether it is a formal tautology or not probably depends on how the question is posed. But I'm not going to quibble over this formality because whether it's an informal tautology or a formal one doesn't make any difference.
Look at what I am saying:
1) "Goodness" purports to say something about the actions, A, of God.
2) God only performs good actions. (For all A, A is Good.)
3) (2) is true no matter what actions, A, God appears to take. At any time that action A is good, so is any action ~A.
So what's the deal? Saying God is good says nothing about his actions. Another way to see this is to ask what action would show God is not purely good. You can name no such action.
One learns that goodness is instantiated in a person.What does this mean? What would I conclude from this claim if it were true? If it were false?
One learns that there is a description of the character of God.No, it's not a characterization of God. To the extent that you can even say what God does, it's a simple restatement of things God does. Tsumami are allowed by God, so his allowing them is good. Earthquakes that safely dissipate in the deep ocean are allowed by God, so his allowing them is also good. Calling God good is empty nonsense because it's consistent with everything you will ever experience.
for instance, that immediate peace and pleasure is not necessary to goodness.Where is all this necessity coming from? It sounds to me that you are saying that, because we don't have immediate peace and pleasure due to limitations imposed by God, therefore, those limitations must be "good" by definition.
Again, here is a case in which God's actions (whatever they may be) are simply defined to be good. You're not discovering that immediate peace and pleasure are not necessary, you're retroactively defining them that way. If we later find we can provide ourselves with immediate peace and pleasure through technology, then that too must be "good" because God allows it. It's a statement that says that the boundaries God establishes between the possible and impossible are "good", no matter where those boundaries turn out to be.
"God is good" isn't profound. Quite the contrary.
Hi Paul,
And you didn't address my other point that, if somehow it wasn't wrong for babies to suffer an agonizing death, how can it be right for other babies, born after the Flood, to *not* suffer an agonizing death? How can it be fair that one six-month-old suffers like that at the direct hand of God and another doesn't?
We are a fallen race and each of has death coming. It is fair that we each die, and we each will. The manner of our death is rarely of our choosing.
What is not fair is that God offers us, by His Grace, the free gift of salvation and forgiveness for our sins.
If X is good, it should be good no matter who, God or no, does it. If X is evil, it's evil even if God does it (not counting X as a mixed behavior, including good and bad elements, which sum is good overall).
This from our great moral relativist.
I presume you mean that, assuming the Christian viewpoint, X is good or bad regardless of the actor.
And of course it’s not. If I have sexual relations with my wife it is good, if my neighbor does, it is bad.
Frst, I only want the word "good" to be applied consistently. That's the starting point that we haven't resolved yet.
It is being applied consistently.
Especially the version you offered.
While we’re reminding each other about unanswered points, you never responded to my analysis of your use of the word “good”in the original thread in question, in this thread when I introduced it, or when you asked that I clarify what you had meant when you said it.
My reply:
I think we now can agree that God's moral obligation to execute judgment is consistent with His being good. I guess all that's left you is to second-guess His ability to determine to whom He owes such judgment, or whether or not you think such wages of sin are fair.
According to your oft-repeated rules of discussion that must mean you agree with me.
Here are a couple of other points I would like for you to address, which you haven't:
re: "innocence":
1) The question then is guilty of what and judged by Whom?
2) But God can [judge], and what did He say about the world - including those babies?
As if God couldn't have figured out some other way to accomplish his goals without killing babies who are not being punished invidually, and who therefore are, actually, *innocent* in regards to the evil that befell them. Yikes!
You reassert their innocence without answering my query on this. Of what guilt and as assessed by whom, are they innocent?
You did find out what God had said about the world at the time, right?
Paul, to SteveK:
But if the former, then I'd love to hear why, for instance, the Flood is ultimately good, why those it was ultimately good that those 6-month old children suffered, why all 6-month-olds shouldn't suffer the same way as those that died in the Flood. For instance, it seems like the Flood solved nothing. We're still fallen, aren't we? Why kill everyone just to give Noah's ancestors another chance? And couldn't God have found some other way besides killing everyone and making 6-month olds suffer horribly? I think you're not fully appreciated the horror of the deaths that happened in the Flood.
What was the situation before the Flood, Paul?
Don’t you need to do some homework before you start asserting what it did or did not accomplish?
I see you are an expert on the horror, torture, agony, suffering, etc. of death by drowning (never did reconsider your arguments from emotion and outrage, I see). What would the situation have been like without this action?
DL,
1) IF God can be judged by our standard, THEN he is evil.
Whose standard again? Yours, the “good is what I feel standard”?
I reject this standard and I have faith that God is good.
Oh, here you offer a standard, derived by some mysterious process, but which is pretty good as far as it goes.
We define good to mean that a thinking agent is merciful, helpful, avoids inflicting pain on others, is considerate of the feelings of others, is non-negligent, etc., whether those "others" are the same race or not. That's how good is defined.
This is a pretty authoritative list, coming from a moral relativist.
I wonder if we can apply it consistently and without prejudice?
Was it good that the allies went to war against Hitler?
Did they inflict pain? Were they considerate of Nazi feelings? Were they helpful to Hitler?
SteveK already addressed doctors and dentists inflicting pain.
But, all said, other than the blatant inconsistency of a moral relativist giving an objective list of what is good and bad, and the failure of this “theorem” to properly do what it is designed to do, I don’t really mind it all that much, and, judged by this, God is good.
Charlie:
I hadn’t thought of it from such a perspective. At a bare, bare and quite-unfair-to-God minimum, He is good because moral relativism as an idea IS evil. Of course, God’s goodness is not contingent upon the evil of moral relativism—I only say this to draw out a point. From a cold-calculating, academic perspective, which world would you rather live in: a moral relativist’s world where even Hitler’s actions cannot ever be objectively condemned (i.e., at any time, location, and cultural setting) as evil, or in a world in which at least some actions can be objectively judged evil and some good? Seems like a straightforward choice to me…
In truth, moral relativists just don’t care. They are happy to use logic against philosophers and people of faith who take logic seriously, but they are not bound by any criteria of meaning or truth or morality themselves, since they actually reject, for reasons that cannot be held up to logical rigor, any such criteria. They demand fairness wrt their ideas, while relegating fairness to subjectivity.
Moral relativism is evil—more evil than Nazism or Communism—for it fully denigrates the humanity of those who accede to its poison. Nazism is objectively evil because it views other humans as sub-human and therefore exploitable to achieve a dystopia of ethnically-superior beings (quite akin to the currently in-vogue transhumanism—what a stupid idea). Communism is objectively evil because its disordered anthropology views all humans as economic cogs driven by unseen historic forces toward a communist utopia, and nothing can stand in the way or it will be removed. Moral relativism is worse because it permits no objective condemnation of either Nazism or Communism or female circumcision or any other evil, while also permitting no praise of courage, temperance, modesty, love, fidelity, etc., etc.
The only thing that matters at the end of the day is power (either in evolutionary terms for the survival of the species or through a caricature of democracy where numbers define what is right), for whether Caesar exercises his despotic power himself, or whether a body of people replaces Caesar to “decide” what is right or what is wrong, the outcome is eventually the same: death for the weak… and who is to say who is “strong” and who is “weak.” Nazism and Communism (which is, at its core, atheistic) continue to this day to increase the body count attributable to them. Moral relativism eliminates any possibility of stopping either of these or any other evil… and also eliminates the possibility of supporting and promoting what is good. Why? Because there IS NO evil or good… as atheist Richard Dawkins confirms.
Absurdity. Self-centeredness. Sophism. Culture of death. There’s no other way categorizing such ideas. For Paul "it's all neurons" anyway. For DL is not predictable and therefore meaningless. For Jacob it's a pragmatic word-game that has no truth content, yet his assertion of this must (for him) be true. For Eric, it's animated by hatred of God.
Charlie,
First, enough with the tu quoque already.
Second, good in the sense I am using it is an attempt to minimize pain and suffering. So wars can be justified when the alternatives are worse.
However, God has far better alternatives, but fails to apply them.
What I see here is that you think the world actually is good, for all its horror.
You don't see a problem of evil because you have programmed yourself to see God's actions as good. You have already said that you think it is acceptable to create intelligent life to be tortured. You appear to condone the punishment of the unborn for the sins of their parents/ancestors. And you appear to believe that the creation of conscious, thinking, emotional people (with "free will") for use as (less than) livestock is acceptable.
Congratulations. You are impervious to the problem of evil. No moral argument can hold sway over you because your values accept God's actions as good no matter what they are.
DL:
You're hypocrisy knows no bounds: You judge God in absolute terms as "evil" while at the same time caracterizing "evil" as a subjective moral term (as animated by your absolute moral relativism). Your hatred of God is objective and absolute because of His alleged "evil" as you understand it; your moral relativism is objective and absolute. And yet, you'd like us to take you seriously and consider your ideas "convincing"? Absolutist, heal thyself!
Once again, folks, this is the face of the deadly viral meme known as atheism...
Holo,
I know your standing with your last comments.
But, what am I saying that leads you to infer that I am an atheist?
I find you claim fascinating and I would love to know concretely what it is.
H,
Moral relativism is evil—more evil than Nazism or Communism—for it fully denigrates the humanity of those who accede to its poison.Dude. You have issues.
Your entire philosophy is driven by the world you want to live in. Not by truth.
If two people disagree on some moral issue, it doesn't matter whether they are both realists, both relativists, or one of each. Nothing changes. So it is ludicrous to claim that relativism is the cause of evil.
What you really mean is that the world would be a nicer place for you if everyone had the same morality as you. Well, duh! But that's not going to happen just by making people moral realists. The Muslims and Hindus aren't going to believe the Bible just because they're realists.
Nazism and Communism (which is, at its core, atheistic) continue to this day to increase the body count attributable to them. Moral relativism eliminates any possibility of stopping either of these or any other evil… and also eliminates the possibility of supporting and promoting what is good.Okay, this is getting old.
1) Hitler and his regime self-identified as Christian.
2) The ascendancy of German National Socialism was far more reflective of the people's will than was the ascendancy of the Soviets. In Russia, the liberals were defeated militarily. In Germany, hardly a shot was fired.
3) It's rich for you to create a link between fascism and atheism when dogmatic religion is itself a kind of proto-fascism. Just look at a list of identifying traits of fascism, and check off all the parallels (substitute Religion for Nation where appropriate). Conservatively, I count 7 parallels with the 14 traits.
Fascist regimes tend to make constant use of patriotic mottos, slogans, symbols, songs, and other paraphernalia. Flags are seen everywhere, as are flag symbols on clothing and in public displays.I'm sure you're eager to disclaim these positions, but don't pretend you don't see the parallels. "God bless our troops!" "God hates fags!" "Separation of Church and State is not in the Constitution!" "No money for the unholy National Endowment of the Arts!" "In God we Trust!" "God in the Pledge!"
...
The people are rallied into a unifying patriotic frenzy over the need to eliminate a perceived common threat or foe: racial, ethnic or religious minorities; liberals; communists; socialists, terrorists, etc.
...
The governments of fascist nations tend to be almost exclusively male-dominated. Under fascist regimes, traditional gender roles are made more rigid. Opposition to abortion is high, as is homophobia and anti-gay legislation and national policy.
...
Fear is used as a motivational tool by the government over the masses.
...
Governments in fascist nations tend to use the most common religion in the nation as a tool to manipulate public opinion. Religious rhetoric and terminology is common from government leaders, even when the major tenets of the religion are diametrically opposed to the government’s policies or actions.
...
Fascist nations tend to promote and tolerate open hostility to higher education, and academia. It is not uncommon for professors and other academics to be censored or even arrested. Free expression in the arts is openly attacked, and governments often refuse to fund the arts.
...
Obsession with Crime and Punishment
And look! Atheism and moral relativism have NO parallels with the 14 traits.
Do you really expect me to believe that a microcosm of fascism is our best hope for avoiding the real thing?
Face it. Nazism had no more in common with the alleged loving attitudes of Jesus, than Communism has in common with the ethics of Peter Singer. Moral relativism isn't your problem, H. Authoritarianism and dogma are your problem. So why not give them up?
"Religion Is Child Abuse"
"Religion Is A Brain Virus"
"More People Have Died For God Than For Anything Else"
"What Kind Of A God Would Allow Such Suffering"
"I Have Faith In Myself"
"I Only Believe What I See"
"I'm A Man Of Science"
And you didn't address my other point that, if somehow it wasn't wrong for babies to suffer an agonizing death, how can it be right for other babies, born after the Flood, to *not* suffer an agonizing death? How can it be fair that one six-month-old suffers like that at the direct hand of God and another doesn't?That is *so* not an answer to my question. The goodness or fairness is not about our *eventual* death, but about the particular death of babies in the flood compared to other babies. Now, of course, life isn't fair, but the point here is that the babies who died in the flood died at the direct hand of God. And you call that Good?!
We are a fallen race and each of has death coming. It is fair that we each die, and we each will. The manner of our death is rarely of our choosing.
What is not fair is that God offers us, by His Grace, the free gift of salvation and forgiveness for our sins.
I presume you mean that, assuming the Christian viewpoint, X is good or bad regardless of the actor.It should be obvious to all that any act can be good or bad with different circumstances, as Charlie's point about sex makes clear. But my point is that, once you finally get down to defining the context for behavior X, once that is finally and completely done, *then* I claim that
And of course it’s not. If I have sexual relations with my wife it is good, if my neighbor does, it is bad.
If X is good, it should be good no matter who, God or no, does it. If X is evil, it's evil even if God does it (not counting X as a mixed behavior, including good and bad elements, which sum is good overall).This point is prior to the question of moral absolutism and relativism, by the way.
Good is not being applied consistently, because God can get away with absolutely *anything* and you'd call it good. That is not consistent, it's the ultimate cop-out for God. Which is part of the problem of trying to make sense of an infinite being. It makes no sense. Go ahead and posit an infinite being, that's fine, but don't pretend it makes sense.
I think we now can agree that God's moral obligation to execute judgment is consistent with His being good. I guess all that's left you is to second-guess His ability to determine to whom He owes such judgment, or whether or not you think such wages of sin are fair.If you grant (in a loose sense) God the right to make any judgment and have it be perfect, then you're right, but don't pretend to try to make sense of it. That's why God could do *exactly* what a homocidal maniac would do, for no apparent reason that we can glean, and you'd have to call it Perfect and Good. That's why those words can't be used consistently if God is granted his usual perfectness.
1) The question then is guilty of what and judged by Whom?1. Huh? What's the question, what's the point?
2) But God can [judge], and what did He say about the world - including those babies?
2. I've covered this above. God can kill some babies and not others, and you call this good. Why should one group of babies, equally fallen as others, escape the horror of direct action by God as in the flood?
You reassert their innocence without answering my query on this. Of what guilt and as assessed by whom, are they innocent?I'm aware of no "crime" they committed. Was the world any less fallen at the time of the Flood? How do we measure that?
What was the situation before the Flood, Paul?Fallen.
Don’t you need to do some homework before you start asserting what it did or did not accomplish?Enlighten me.
I see you are an expert on the horror, torture, agony, suffering, etc. of death by drowning (never did reconsider your arguments from emotion and outrage, I see). What would the situation have been like without this action?Huh? I don't get this.
DL wrote:
Calling God good is empty nonsense because it's consistent with everything you will ever experience.That's it in a nutshell. All my other points with Charlie in this thread flow from this one.
DL,
Second, good in the sense I am using it is an attempt to minimize pain and suffering. So wars can be justified when the alternatives are worse.
I agree. This is how I think of good as well. So does Paul See above.
However, God has far better alternatives, but fails to apply them.
We differ here. I have faith in God's omniscience, but not in yours.
What I see here is that you think the world actually is good, for all its horror.
Yes.
Yes, I think the world is good (not in the same measure, or quite the same sense, or as a substitute for the goodness of God, however, but in its continued and limited reflection of Him).
Of course it can, and will, become almost infinitely better, but it is not in comparison to paradise that I view it.
I am neither blind to, nor unmoved by, the grievous suffering around me but I think there is something frightening and, to tell you the truth, somewhat neurotic, about a view such as yours where the world evinces our enduring the maximum amount of suffering possible. I think there is something wrong, in the truest sense, with a worldview that results in the opinion that things are as bad as they can be (from Americans, yet) and, aside from its falsity, I see no utility in it.
Empirically-speaking, a worldview which yields such results is not working.
I'm sure I've said this before, but that highlights to me that we do actually have different worldviews - we do not see the same world.
Come to that, I've started to think that perhaps the atheist is right and that it is not a matter of convincing one another. The more I talk with you guys the more I come to think that God may really not exist in your experience (this may be the actual result of a sentence such as the one He passed on Cain), that you really don't have free will, and that there really is no Good and Evil from your perspective.
It may not be that one of us is mistaken in our assessment but that we are each accurately assessing what is presented to us.
I'm starting to wonder if it's not possible that we do have not only different outlooks, but are actually seeing different things.
Perhaps the beauty and goodness I see and the free will I employ are denied you when God is not revealed to you.
But of course you've also claimed to see a world where things are getting better and better and have estimated yourself much more optimistic than the rest of us, so who knows what you really think?
Paul,
That is *so* not an answer to my question. The goodness or fairness is not about our *eventual* death, but about the particular death of babies in the flood compared to other babies. Now, of course, life isn't fair, but the point here is that the babies who died in the flood died at the direct hand of God. And you call that Good?!
Rather than rage incessantly in an emotional pique why not demonstrate that it's not?
It should be obvious to all that any act can be good or bad with different circumstances, as Charlie's point about sex makes clear.
The point isn't merely about circumstance, but that of relationship.
Good is not being applied consistently, because God can get away with absolutely *anything* and you'd call it good. That is not consistent, it's the ultimate cop-out for God. Which is part of the problem of trying to make sense of an infinite being. It makes no sense. Go ahead and posit an infinite being, that's fine, but don't pretend it makes sense.
I haven't posited God, He has revealed Himself.
And His goodness is both in His revelation and the only thing that does make sense.
Charlie:
I think we now can agree that God's moral obligation to execute judgment is consistent with His being good. I guess all that's left you is to second-guess His ability to determine to whom He owes such judgment, or whether or not you think such wages of sin are fair.
A:
If you grant (in a loose sense) God the right to make any judgment and have it be perfect, then you're right, but don't pretend to try to make sense of it.
This is not an honest response.
The point stands without the condescending qualification.
We don't grant God anything and we don't need pretend bad is good.
What we need to do is take your definition as a logical point and deal with it.
If it is good, which we all agree, that one get what they deserve then if God gives people what they deserve, you have to allow that this is "good".
Your problem is you think you know what it is people deserve and won't allow yourself the first step of the proper logic.
A:
The question then is guilty of what and judged by Whom?
Q:
1. Huh? What's the question, what's the point?
Why can't you ever remember context and previous statements and then act like everything is some baffling enigma?
If you continue to assert "innocence" you then accept the concept of "guilt".
If you accept that there is a guilt, for which people can be liable, then there must be someone who has been wronged and who has judged the guilt.
This is a grander question than "did babies do anything bad?" but is rather "is there something bad?". And "who can judge that?"
By throwing the word "innocent" around like some kind of white-wash you ignore the truth of the word.
Q:
2) But God can [judge], and what did He say about the world - including those babies?
A:
2. I've covered this above. God can kill some babies and not others, and you call this good. Why should one group of babies, equally fallen as others, escape the horror of direct action by God as in the flood?
No, you haven't touched the question.
What did God tell us about the world at the time of the Flood?
I'm aware of no "crime" they committed. Was the world any less fallen at the time of the Flood? How do we measure that?
In terms of wickedness, actions and desires.
Q: What was the situation before the Flood, Paul?
A: Fallen.
Care to flesh this out at all? You aren't moving the conversation along.
Q:
I see you are an expert on the horror, torture, agony, suffering, etc. of death by drowning (never did reconsider your arguments from emotion and outrage, I see). What would the situation have been like without this action?
A: Huh? I don't get this.
We've agree that the good can be the mitigation of a greater evil.
What would have occurred had there been no Flood?
Go ahead, join DL in omniscience.
Paul:
Now, of course, life isn't fair, but the point here is that the babies who died in the flood died at the direct hand of God. And you call that Good?!
Charlie mentioned omniscience above and that is the key here. God knows if he should intervene directly or let the things continue on it's natural course.
Being omniscient, there's a case to be made for God letting a few die "before their time" in order to save many more people. God, as "omniscient surgeon", knows when to intervine directly by operating on the patient (mankind) and when to let things work itself out. I trust that God was working within that scenario.
SteveK,
What does omnisicnence imply about free will?
If God knows what choice you will make before you make it, then ultimately your choices aren't really choices at all, they are part of the pre-determined plan of things that God already knows.
There seems to be a real tension between a belief in free will and a belief that God is all knowing.
Jacob,
You sure are beating that drum in a lot of parades.
Have you read Augustine on free will?
You might remember that he was the one writing, anachronistically about free will almost 1700 years ago.
Jacob:
Does knowledge of what will happen cause it to happen, or does it just mean you know the outcome of the choices made along the way? I say the latter.
I've yet to figure out how to equate "all knowing" with "all causing". It's like trying to equate "north" with "sleepy". Now, "all intending" might work but omniscience doesn't have anything to do with God's intentions.
Charlie,
A lot of people wrote and continue to write about free will. And there has been and continues to be much disagreement and debate. A lot of folks are beating that drum in a lot of different parades.
Of all the people writing and talking about free will over the course of history, Jesus was not one of them. Thus, it is anachrocistic to claim that he was. Unless, of course, you qualify your claim and make the point that you are inferring that Jesus talked about free will.
There is a bit of a distance between saying Jesus talked about free will and saying 'I infer' that Jesus talked about free will.
SteveK,
I'm not suggesting that knowlege of what will happen causes it to happen.
I'm suggesting that if God is all knowing, then any decision that you make, is already known by Him.
The cause of the decision is superflous.
The decision (whatever the cause) is already known by God before you ever make it.
It just seems to me that talking about free will and an all knowing God creates a tension.
Jacob,
That's true, a lot of people have discussed it (including why foreknowledge is not a negation of free will).
One of them was Augustine, but you dismissed that reference without even looking at it.
I understand that from your point of view, since you don't believe we can know anything and that there is no truth out there.
How, then, is there a possible difference to you between saying "Jesus said" or "I infer that Jesus said"?
Or do you only bring this subject up on subsequent threads to thumb your nose at Tom's admonition and maybe take on the role of the poor oppressed?
Hi SteveK,
I didn't see you there.
I've enjoyed your comments and demeanor on this thread.
Charlie I have an idea. How about you and me (and SteveK, too, if he wants) go over to www.honestargument.com and continue (restart, actually) the discussion (with Tom's blessings, I'll bet) in a more organized fashion?
What do you say?
It just seems to me that talking about free will and an all knowing God creates a tension.
Since you agree that knowing doesn't mean causing, what exactly is the tension? Does it make you uncomfortable that God knows these things, or is there a real conflict here that should cause me to rethink my beliefs?
Charlie,
Unequivocally, I know how to drive a car and I know how to type. I think people in general know how to do a lot of things.
It is therefore incorrect to say that I 'don't believe we can know anything.'
But you are right, I don't believe that truth is out there.
One of the differences between you and me is this: I don't conflate truth with knowledge of how to do things.
The difference between you saying Jesus talked about free will and saying that 'I infer' Jesus talked aboutfree will, is twofold.
1) Empirically, you cannot show me in the Bible where Jesus talked about 'free will.' But you can show me the verse that leads you to infer that Jesus talked about free will.
2) For the sake of clarity and rigor of argumentation, it is better to have something empirical to refer to than not.
SteveK,
Personally, I don't think you should ever stop thinking and rethinking your beliefs. To me, it is akin to the difference between a spring that continues to pour out fresh water and a stagnant pond that sits unmoving.
One gathers scum and one doesn't.
How does that relate to free will and an all knowing God? It all depends on how and what you think about these topics.
Without trying to start a controversy on the blog, I personally don't concern myself with the problems of free will and an all knowing God. Apart from, of course, needling people on this blog about these deeply complex issues and hopefully pushing people to think otherwise.
Personally, I am amazed at the philosophical and theological baggage that people weigh their faith down with. For me, God is a living God that manifests Himself everyday before our eyes. We need not be concerned with these onto-theological debates. In the end, its all word play. Either you have faith or you don't. I find no good reason to sit and justify in philosophical or theological terms why I have faith in God. We will never reason ourselves to God. We make the leap or we don't.
Charlie, SteveK, and Tom:
Your internal antennas should be picking up lots of danger signs when reading Jacob's last paragraph... and it fits quite well with his eclectic mix of anti-truth, postmodernism, and pragmatism.
First, the easy-to-see contradiction: "God is a living God that manifests Himself everyday before our eyes... we will never reason ourselves to God." Note well: without your capacity to reason as a human being, you will never be able to interpret signs "everyday before our eyes." Moreover, Jacob keeps on insisting there is no truth, and yet makes categorical assertions like this as if they were truth. Tsk-tsk.
Second, he says, "We need not be concerned with these onto-theological debates. In the end, its all word play." Again, a categorical assertion that we must accept as true... all while he has already eliminated the possiblity of truth. Moreover, applying his own criterion back upon itself: isn't it also a word game? Tsk-tsk.
Third, and most important, this mimics Gould's superficially-attractive yet unworkable notion of NOMA. Note what Jacob is saying: no need to think and certainly it can't be reasoned to--just have faith! It sounds so reasonable, doesn't it? And, yet it's in fact deadly to faith--apart from trying to undermine the very reason why this blog exists, i.e., to think. It also mimicks medieval Moslem fideism, AND it plays into DL's and Paul's disordered scientism. The upshot of Jacob's claim is: believe but don't reason and demonstrate... which leaves the MESs with the entire realm of reasoning and demonstration. Bad news, guys.
Finally, it is an utter lie to claim that "we will never reason ourselves to God" which is another way of saying, "we will never know God." Jacob's message is "faith" only (on his terms), but no reason. DL's message is "reason" only (on his terms), but no faith. Christianity witness to the Author of all--including faith and reason.
Please don't fall for this stunt...
Holo,
My internal antenna was raised by Jacobs last post. That last paragraph is a doozy if ever there was one! I picked up on all the points you made about word play, faith and reason however you missed one...
First Jacob says we should think (reason) and rethink (reason) my beliefs lest they become stagnant, then he says I can't ever reason my way to God.
In the spirit of Bill Clinton, it depends on what he means by think, rethink, reason, belief, faith, God, stagnant, is, scum, etc, etc.
Jacob,
Sorry for jumping in here, but how in the world is knowing THAT Jesus didn't talk about free will in any way similar to knowing HOW to drive a car? The coherence of your rejoinder depends on a similarity that, for the life of me, I just can't see. Especially when you reject the ability to know THAT any particular thing is the case - you say that "I don't believe that truth is out there", you claim not to conflate truth with knowledge of how to do things, and then say that you know THAT Jesus didn't talk directly about free will. Please understand, at this point I'm not arguing with your claim (I may even lean more towards your view, I'm not sure); I am arguing against your ability to make the kind of claim you are making. This seems patently obvious to me, unless I'm just missing something here.
Would you say that you know HOW to empirically weigh data and come to reliable conclusions - say on the matter of examining texts to see if Jesus said something or not - but that this process, this way of knowing, is devoid of any element that necessitates knowing THAT something is so? As I see it, you must know THAT certain things are so before you can know HOW to do anything.
I'm sure Charlie can speak for himself, but I don't think he meant that you thought you couldn't know HOW to do something, only that you couldn't know THAT something was so; the latter is pertinent to your discussion, the former not so much.
We will never reason ourselves to God.
I used to think this, too. Then I met people who had reasoned their way to God. What do I make of that? Could not God use - has He not used, both in scripture and in our own experience - a reasoned process to bring someone to faith in Him? Why would Paul reason with the Jews in the synagogues to rationally convince them of the truth of his claims, if this is not a valid way to get to faith?
Sorry, Tom - I know this is far afield of the original topic. Thanks for your indulgence.
Holo,
I thought that you were letting your comments stand. I thought that you called me an atheist. Now my statement of faith is a stunt. Maybe next time I'll perform some tricks, like a head stand or maybe I'll pull a rabbit out of my hat.
Nowhere did I claim that I was speaking the truth. The truth is your hang up, not mine.
How do you *know* that it is an 'utter lie' that we can't reason our way to God? You seem to have more faith in reason than you do in God.
When you say that I said not to think, you are pulling a few stunts of your own. And, you are selectively reading what I wrote. I get paid to think, my friend. Thinking is what I do for a living.
We can reason together. You give your reasons and I'll give mine. But you are foolishly overconfident of yourself if you believe that I must justify my faith to you by using the standards that you believe I must. Worse than being foolish, your visceral response suggests to me that you are very insecure about your faith in God.
Aaron,
I didn't claim that there was a similarity between Jesus not speaking about free will and knowing how to drive a car. I said that you can't empirically show me where Jesus talked about 'free will.'
My comment about driving a car was in response to Charlie. Charlie mischaracterized my view of knowledge, or, more precisely, CHarlie said that I belived we coulnd't know anthing. And I said that I know how to drive a car. My basic point: I think that people know how to do lots of things.
My understanding of knowledge is more akin to the Greek concept of metis, which is a situated knowledge pertaining to the doing of things (e.g. driving a car, hunting, typing, etc.) From as far as I can tell, many people on this blog are working under the presupposition that there is one and only one understanding of knowledge--the modern correspondence theory of truth. But I hate to break it to them, there are multiple understandings of knowlege--or multiple epistemological perspectives that one can assume.
I'm not so sure that we must know THAT certain things are so before we can know HOW to do something. I would be more inclined to say that our doings rest on sets of presuppositions about the world. My knowledge of how to drive a car, presupposes the invention of the car. My knowledge of how to hunt and forage for food, presupposes that there are animals to hunt and food to find. For me, the language of 'must' is too functionalist.
I think we have to be careful about the destinction between reason and rationality. Sure, we can reason together. You give your reasons and I'll give mine. Paul did that. But I am skeptical of the metaphysical claim that humans have a special faculty called rationality. Just because people give reasons, doesn't logically imply that they have a special power called rationality. Reason-giving is an activity that we can empirically see people do, not a metaphysical attribute of humans.
Holo,
Again, what did I say that lead you to infer that I am an atheist?
Before you launch off onto another of your tirades, how about you answer that one question. And once you answer it, then we will have a fine empirical demonstration of how inference can lead us astray. Sort of like when many well meaning Christians inferred that the Soviet Union was somewhere in the Bible or that Vlad Putin is the antichrist. Please, Holo, wax philsophically for us and show the spectators how tricky and dangerous I am and warn them of my stunts.
Jacob,
Do you reject the notion of faculties altogether, or just rationality?
But I am skeptical of the metaphysical claim that humans have a special faculty called rationality. Just because people give reasons, doesn't logically imply that they have a special power called rationality. Reason-giving is an activity that we can empirically see people do, not a metaphysical attribute of humans.
People do more that just reason-giving; they are able to consider reasons, go through some sort of process, and form beliefs based on those considerations. I don't know why you're appealing to empiricism here - a moment's reflection will tell you something about this that empiricism never could. So what logically implies that people have a special power called rationality is not merely that we can give reasons; it is what we are capable of doing with the reasons that necessitates this faculty.
I would be more inclined to say that our doings rest on sets of presuppositions about the world. My knowledge of how to drive a car, presupposes the invention of the car.
Again, I think there's more to it than your characterization here. Your knowledge of how to drive a car presupposes more than just the invention of the car - at the very least, it presupposes prior (shall I say the word?) propositional knowledgde. For example, let's say you have never driven before, but you know THAT, if you turn the steering wheel to the right, you will turn the car to the right, and that if you depress the accelerator with your right foot, the car will move (say you read it in a training manual or something). In fact, let's say you read the manual in its entirety, had memorized it, and had a complete grasp theoretically of how to drive a car. Once you got behind the wheel, and you had never done this before, could someone say you knew how to drive a car? Certainly no one would say you experientially knew how to drive a car, but you one could not deny that you possessed some sort of knowledge about driving a car. What would you call this other kind of knowledge that was not gained experientially?
Jcoab:
Yep its imlsposbie to ifner ainhyntg in the Blbie or ehsrelwee. You can olny tsurt the eaxct words as slleped out on the pgae and ntihnog mroe. The fcat taht you are raniedg tihs right now pevros taht yuor cailm is bgous.
link
Oh, and while I thank you for your response, the main point of my original post was never addressed: how can you claim that it is so that Jesus never spoke directly about free will if you deny that you can claim that anything is "so"? Or have I totally misunderstood your position? For someone who said, "Nowhere did I claim that I was speaking the truth," it sure seems to me that you think your above claim is actually the case. If you tell me that you are saying what sounds like a truth claim but is not (oh, and by the way, you're trying to convince me that THAT's actually the case), I may be at a total loss of how to communicate with you.
Aaron,
What is that we do with reasons? We give them to other people as a means of justifying our actions. If the reasons aren't good enough, then we are held accountable. What is so controversial about that?
Of course car-driving presupposes more than the car. It presupposes a road to drive the car on. It presupposes some kind of fuel to help propel the car. And so on.
Theoretical knowledge is standardized knowledge. Metis is situated knowledge. Regardless of what theory you have about driving the car, whether you know how to drive the car or not is an emmpirical matter. Can you keep it on the road? Between the lines? Are you rearending people? And so on.
I might have the stork theory of child birth that I believe with all of my heart applies to all cases everywhere. But when the nitty gritty activity of delivering a baby is before us, that theoretical knowledge is useless. The practical knowledge of birth is what is most important.
SteveK,
People infer stuff all the time. I didn't claim otherwise. My point is taht inferences can lead one astray. I prime example is Holo's inference that I am an atheist.
I didn't mean to claim that Jesus never spoke of 'free will.' I meant to say that in the Gospels, Jesus does not refer to 'free will.' And empirically, that is the case. We might well infer from something in the Gospels that Jesus was talking about free will, but we cannot point to an empirical example of him speaking about 'free will.'
Edited By Siteowner: Author's identity corrected per these two comments.
Jacob,
But I am skeptical of the metaphysical claim that humans have a special faculty called rationality. Just because people give reasons, doesn't logically imply that they have a special power called rationality. Reason-giving is an activity that we can empirically see people do, not a metaphysical attribute of humans.
Jacob, do we see anything empirically, like people "reason-giving," without some rational inference involved in our "seeing" it?
Can we say that we see this without using our rational faculties as part of such "seeing"?
Can we have any discourse at all while maintaining skepticism that there is such a thing as rationality?
Doesn't a denial of rationality require rational processes to arrive at that denial? And is it not therefore self-defeating?
Tom,
People see lots of things. And they infer from what they see. But are inferences rational? Yes, insofar as people give reasons for their inferences. I'm sure that you can give me any number of reasons why you infer that Jesus meant free will.
Why presuppose that we have rational faculties upon which "seeing" is necessary?
I would say, yes, we can have discourse without presupposing rational faculties. It is the reason-giving that enables us to be intelligible to those people around us. And when the reasons given are not adequate to explain behavior or the reasons make no sense to us, then we usually hold that person accountable.
The denial of rationality takes reason-giving. Either I can convicne you of the intelligibility of my argument or I can't. But I will continue to try, I will continue to explain by giving you reasons. Either way, you understand enough of what I am saying to make a counter argument.
I'm trying to uphold a dstinction beteen reason giving and rationality as a faculty. WHy? Because rationality is a universalist claim. Reason-giving is a situated mode of interaction that can't be removed from its context. The reasons given in one time and place may not (probably not) be acceptable or intelligible in other times and places.
Since the USSR is no longer in existence, the argument that the Soviet Union can be inferred from the Bible makes no sense to us. Yet, it did make sense to a lot of people twenty years ago and people gave a lot of reasons to support their claims. If I started making that argument today, people might say that I was being "irrational because the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990."
Charlie,
I am neither blind to, nor unmoved by, the grievous suffering around me but I think there is something frightening and, to tell you the truth, somewhat neurotic, about a view such as yours where the world evinces our enduring the maximum amount of suffering possible.This isn't my view. My view is that Nature demonstrates what Dawkins calls pitiless indifference. The world could be more evil, but it would have to care to do so.
Come to that, I've started to think that perhaps the atheist is right and that it is not a matter of convincing one another. The more I talk with you guys the more I come to think that God may really not exist in your experience (this may be the actual result of a sentence such as the one He passed on Cain), that you really don't have free will, and that there really is no Good and Evil from your perspective.Reminds me of a Muslim view of infidels. Some sects believe that infidels are not real people. They're like the walking dead. Is that how you see me?
I'm starting to wonder if it's not possible that we do have not only different outlooks, but are actually seeing different things.Uh-Oh. Sounds like something Jacob would say.
I don't know if this helps, but I understand a lot of what you guys are saying at a fuzzy, emotional, intuitive level. I am quite familiar with the thought that if the world is deterministic, I might as well do nothing because everything has already been determined. As a child, I would have said that good was objective and absolute. I recall hearing the story of Abraham and Isaac and thinking that it all made sense. I remember thinking of God as intuitively infinite and omni*.
Yet whenever I analyze these ideas with any rigor or precision, I return to my present position. Ideas that once made sense to 9-year-old me are exposed as delusions. So, from my perspective, your positions are familiar intuitions, but those intuitions turn out to be wrong.
The more I live life, the more my childhood intuitions are replaced with ones that reflect my rational inquiries. I didn't look at the story of Abraham for many years. When I looked at it again a few years ago, it was a story of such evil that it was shocking to me that I had once thought it morally reasonable.
DL,
This isn't my view. My view is that Nature demonstrates what Dawkins calls pitiless indifference. The world could be more evil, but it would have to care to do so.
Here’s what you said before:
Yet, there appears to be no pain threshold above which God intervenes. Indeed, the entire scheme of life on this planet is inherently evil if we could be better off.
Not only is the entire scheme of life evil, but in your point about the pain threshold this can only be the appearance if you know 1) that God is not alleviating any suffering and 2) that there is no increase in suffering possible, at which level God may yet step in to alleviate it.
2) can only hold if we are already at that threshold of all suffering.
They're like the walking dead. Is that how you see me?
Of course not ... I don't know that you can walk.
See what I did there?
Relax, that's an excellent joke.
The last half of your comment is a cute, and not-nearly-subtle enough attempt to imply that belief is childish and naive so, no, it doesn't help very much.
You have not demonstrated with any rigour that the Flood logically entails evil nor will you be able to do so in the case of Abraham and Isaac. I am the furthest thing from an expert and don't pretend to have more answers than questions but I do know this.
By the way, I had the exact opposite experience with Genesis 22. I didn't appreciate the point at all and found nothing morally redeeming about the story as a child. It has only been upon adult reflection, seeing such things as God’s message of salvation entering the world through a few select individual men, and recognizing the typological presentation and forshadowing of Christ's sacrifice throughout the Old Testament that I recognize the goodness in stories which are not intuitively warm and fuzzy.
Paul,
Unless I’ve worn out my welcome with Tom on this thread I am quite content here.
I expect honest discourse at all times and find it in abundance at this blog. I don’t believe we are here to score points but to realize truth and I see no reason to start afresh. This is why I tend to remind people, at least so far as I can recall, of what they’ve said previously; when we submit our comments we should beware that we are leaving a record that we can’t just walk away from in the next thread. If positions have changed I want to know. If points have been advanced with no interest in veracity I’d like to know that as well. If concessions have been made previously which are being ignored now that ought to be demonstrated as well.
Charlie,
Not only is the entire scheme of life evil, but in your point about the pain threshold this can only be the appearance if you know 1) that God is not alleviating any suffering and 2) that there is no increase in suffering possible, at which level God may yet step in to alleviate it.There's no evidence God alleviates suffering. Not a shred. No matter how much people are suffering, God is never observed to intervene. Everything we see is consistent with chance/indifference.
2) can only hold if we are already at that threshold of all suffering.
I guess I don't have enough faith to believe an omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent being couldn't do better than chance. After all, benevolent humans alleviate suffering better than chance with vaccines, hospitals, roads, water systems, electricity, entertainment, love, etc.
doctor(logic),
Your standard of evidence here seems to be to discount all reports that contradict your opinion. I, and countless other Christians, can attest to multiple situations in which God has alleviated suffering. When my mother died suddenly last August, our family was at peace because of our faith in Christ. Hospital staff noted the difference it made. I could tell story after story like that. That's evidence. But not to you.
(In other cases it's a matter of what you are equipped to see: where suffering is alleviated, those who know how God works in the world will recognize that God is there. I grant that this does not count as evidence because it cannot be discriminated from a hypothetical situation where God is not at work. I bring it up just to point out that just because you don't see God at work does not mean that he is not.)
Anyway, what kind of evidence would you accept? What would God have to do in order for you to count it as evidence?
Just for the record, the post on 02.07.07 - 8:24 pm with my name attached to it was not from me; it looks like it was from Jacob, and he mistakenly put my name.
Aaron,
That was my post. I'm not sure why the name mix up happend.
Steve:
Thanks for pointing that out in your 02.07.07 - 5:58 pm comments the following: “First Jacob says we should think (reason) and rethink (reason) my beliefs lest they become stagnant, then he says I can’t ever reason my way to God.” To add to this, don’t forget he claims to be paid to think. So were the Sophists of Ancient Greece: they intentionally presented sophisticated yet flawed counter-arguments to any comers... to make money. “Follow the money” always works… My guess is he’s using power and greed to have it both ways, for truth and logic matter not.
Jacob:
You said: “…what did I say that lead you to infer that I am an atheist?” Your criterion for any possible response: “Nowhere did I claim that I was speaking the truth. The truth is your hang up, not mine.” My response: “’Twas brillig, and the slithy toves / Did gyre and gimble in the wabe; / All mimsy were the borogoves, And the mome raths outgrabe.”
Frankly, I don’t care what you do for a living… although per your own words, speaking the truth is not one of them… which kind of puts the lie to your claim that you’re “paid to think.” Thinking to intentionally mislead to satisfy some “needling” power trip? Quite possible. Thinking in order to reason to truth? Per your own words, no way. You’ve painted yourself into a corner: no matter what you say now will not be believed because, yep… I’ll repeat your words again: “the truth is your hang up, not mine.” If your not speaking the truth, you’re speaking lies.
I have experienced blog trolls similar to you at other sites, and I’m actually wondering whether you’re not one of them. Your last woozy of a paragraph (which I commented upon at 02.07.07 - 5:27 pm) seems to hint at that as well: what we may have on our hands is an atheist trying to disguise himself as a “believer” promulgating a “faith” no reasonable person would accept in the vain attempt to discredit faith. But that is deception, isn’t it? And isn’t deception a synonym for “lying”? But, again, that makes sense since (one more time): “the truth is your hang up, not mine.”
Tom,
I know you were talking to DL, but I might speak to God alleviating suffering. I think the effect is real for you, your family, and others. Allah is just as comforting to some, and so on.
It gets awkward when I have genuine sympathy, and sometimes empathy, for a difficult situation, and then the victim takes the most personal of experiences and offers it as evidence.
If someone were to say they took comfort in the idea that their loved one was with Allah, I would honestly be glad for them. I don't think their loved one is "anywhere", but I wouldn't be helping them with their grief to say anything like that. They could be with Allah, as far as anyone can say.
Personal experience is just that. Asking what God would have to do to prove himself to us, is like asking what God would have to do to disprove himself to you. For us, anything at all, and for you, literally nothing. I feel I have a easy threshold. I think you exist, and I have only second hand evidence. You experience God the same way I experience Tom, except that you play both parts. God is personal to you, just as gods are personal to every other theist. I don't need to tell others about Tom for Tom, he can do that himself. God needs help.
How do you approach other theistic beliefs if you don't want to offend? Would a Islamic find comfort in telling them that their parents aren't actually with Allah, but in hell? I can honestly say "they could be with Allah", and just as honestly say what I think doesn't matter.
Keeping the personal personal is good for everyone.
Holo,
Friend, I'm in no corner. And I don't need hyperbole, or to launch into a tirade, or to respond to you in a vicerale way. Those are your weapons of choice. And they aren't becoming of a Christian, as you claim yourself to be. You seem less the Christian and more the rationalist.
Why don't you point to what I said to make you infer that I am an atheist? Go ahead, point it out. Back up your claims with some empirics. Or would you rather continue to make wild claims without any empirics--that seems to be your syle as a metaphysician.
HOw about you point to some piece of evidence to support your claim that I am an atheist posing as a Christian? You seem to pull these claims from thin air. Instead of calling me an atheist, why not call me a "rabbit," since you have about as much empirics to support one as the other.
If I were atheist, I would be loud a clear about it. Whether you think I am an atheist, pagan, Christian or Hindu, makes little difference to me. I have nothing to prove to you. I just think you're are funny.
Have you heard of "false dichotomies"? You seem live in between them. Perhaps you are the one caught in the corner. And the only way you can respond is to respond with hyperbole and name-calling.
Tom:
Eric’s position is similar to Jacob’s implied NOMA: as long as you keep it personal, it’s okay (wink-wink)... let us scientists get on with “real” and allegedly purelyobjective knowledge while you go off in your own personal, subjective corner on your own. Don’t bother us, we won’t bother you.
First reason Eric is wrong is that personal experiences happen all the time that will never be directly shared with others: dreams, pain, pleasure, happiness, etc. But it is a non sequitur to go from this understanding to the assertion that such experiences are purely subjective just because they’re personal. If such experiences were purely subjective, then doctors could never do their job: they should not believe a patient who can’t “prove” they have lower back pain.
Religious faith expresses some of the deepest, most important yearnings and experiences that man can have. So important, in fact, that real lives are really changed—at the personal and society and global levels. This alone should cast huge doubt upon any claim that religious faith is purely personal. Francis of Assisi, Martin Luther, tent revivals, etc., etc., etc., all started important faith phenomena that could never have had any cohesion or coherence if what was experienced was purely personal. No one denies that views diverge and by the very nature of these views some have more and some have less truth content. But that content can be objectively reasoned about and even demonstrated as being true or false. Moreover, C.S. Lewis explanation of the Tao is a great example of shared, objective experiences by all people of faith. The Catholic understanding of the Natural Law is another wrt to morality. There are other examples.
Finally, this approach is indeed a tactic for relegating religious faith to the purely subjective. Once you swallow that false bait, there’s no way to explain, defend, and promote your faith with others. This tactic tries to neuter religious faith from the get-go by falsely characterizing it as (per DL) non-verifiable, non-predictable, subjective, non-experiential, etc., etc… with, of course, the test conditions and criteria only being those of the MESs? Why? Well, because allegedly they just established that scientific criterion are the only objective criterion.
Much more can be said on this, of course… just wanted to make the point that this is not a stunt for which one should fall.
Jacob:
You are not my friend for you are explicitly, openly, concretely and forcefully against truth. You do not speak the truth per your own words. Sophism is to be avoided like the plague. You don't know how happy and humbled I am for you to judge me as being "hung up on the truth." Thank you. Thank you very much.
Holo,
Friend, you are most welcome.
Jacob,
This is anachronistic:
Friend, I'm in no corner. And I don't need hyperbole, or to launch into a tirade, or to respond to you in a vicerale way. Those are your weapons of choice. And they aren't becoming of a Christian, as you claim yourself to be. You seem less the Christian and more the rationalist.
Where did Jesus say not to use hyperbole, tirades or visceral (I presume) arguments?
Why would you draw a line like this to exclude other Christians from your club?
Holo,
You infer incorrectly from something I wrote, if you believe that I argued that lines shall not be drawn. I just am not blind to the fact that line drawing is an excercise in power. We all draw lines, even the most tolerant among us. There is always some point, some differcen that will separate one interpretation from another, one group of people from another. As Jesus said in the Gospels, 'I did not come here to bring peace, but a sword' that will divide father from son and daughter from mother (Matthew 10:34)
Jacob,
You incorrectly inferred that I am Holopupenko.
Did Jesus really say that, or must we infer that he really said that?
By "sword" did he mean what we mean, in the 21st century by sword? What about "divide"?
Since I have to leave let me finish this.
Jacob:
What's your point?
Charlie:
Exactly!
Charlie,
My point is in response to you: line drawing is fine. Dividing is fine. But let us not pretend it is an innocent activity with no concrete consequences for people. Let us not pretend that we are not engaged in an exercise of power when we draw boundaries. That is my point, exactly.
Do you, Charlie, like to believe that your interpreation is both Right and powerfree? Do you, Charlie, like to have your cake and eat it too?
Jacob:
You assert powerfully, "You infer incorrectly from something I wrote..." Yet, by your own words, since you don't speak the truth, I must have mildly and meekly inferred correctly. Thank you for proving my point... but I really think you need to come back from lunch.
Charlie:
You are TOO funny... and I mean that in the best possible sense.
Holo,
It wasn't a "tactic". I am just honestly talking to Tom. Not everything is a attack. I have no use for gods, but I am sympathetic to people and their suffering.
At one level, we agree don't we? Personal experience is the "deepest" experience for the person. It is most convincing to yourself, and least convincing to others. The reason I would ask to leave personal experience out, is that any response is taken as personal as well. When I say that I have no reason to believe your thoughts go on after your brain dies, I "kill" the idea that dead friends are still alive in a magic kingdom waiting for you.
It is just as hard to not take it personally when people come here to say Mathew Shepard is in hell. The Christians don't think they are making a choice in how to see god, anymore that I think I have a choice in thinking that he is just dead, but we do have a choice in expressing it or not at a bad time.
I would hope you would have empathy for the family of a dead atheist, wiccan or a jew for their loss, and lay off the debate for a while. Coping is personal, and confrontation just isn't always necessary even on the behalf of a god.
Jacob:
My point is in response to you: line drawing is fine. Dividing is fine. But let us not pretend it is an innocent activity with no concrete consequences for people. Let us not pretend that we are not engaged in an exercise of power when we draw boundaries. That is my point, exactly.
Let us not pretend that you have drawn the line at the correct place because it certainly could be an innocent activity and we certainly might not be engaged in a exercise of power.
Do you, Charlie, like to believe that your interpreation is both Right and powerfree? Do you, Charlie, like to have your cake and eat it too?
It depends on where you draw the lines. The truth that results from your line drawing is your hang up, not mine.
Eric:
My comment stands until I see more convincing evidence to the contrary.
However, I am quite sympathetic with most of the rest of your comment. Briefly: if anyone--Christian or otherwise--claims Matthew Shepard is in hell, they are sinning... pure and simple. The response to your last paragraph is, "of course"... but what animates your saying so from my saying so makes all the difference in the world.
Holopupenko,
Thanks much.
I have to take care not to be too flippant or to undermine real dialogue but a guy has to have a little fun as well.
SteveK,
With Holopupenko your latest to Jacob are excellent.
Jacob,
What they said, plus yes, when I come to hold a belief I think it is true. I also hold that belief tentatively, knowing full well that it can be mistaken to any degree, and very likely is mistaken to at least some degree.
Do I believe that it is powerfree?
Yes, whatever that question is supposed to mean.
I believe that the sky appears blue.
I believe this belief is powerfree.
As for having and eating my cake you'll have to show me how my beliefs in this instance come anywhere near the demands of the cliche.
Another line of thought I'm curious about:
Jacob has repeatedly contrasted power with innocence. Are they necessarily opposed? Is there never such a thing as an innocent use of power?
(If God uses power, does it taint him?)
Another line of thought I'm curious about:
Jacob has repeatedly contrasted power with innocence. Are they necessarily opposed? Is there never such a thing as an innocent use of power?
(If God uses power, does it taint him?)
DL,
I said:
I think there is something wrong, in the truest sense, with a worldview that results in the opinion that things are as bad as they can be (from Americans, yet) and, aside from its falsity, I see no utility in it.
Empirically-speaking, a worldview which yields such results is not working.
And you responded:
This isn't my view. My view is that Nature demonstrates what Dawkins calls pitiless indifference. The world could be more evil, but it would have to care to do so.
But had previously said:
Yet, there appears to be no pain threshold above which God intervenes. Indeed, the entire scheme of life on this planet is inherently evil if we could be better off.
And now agree with your former self (demonstration of agreement below):
There's no evidence God alleviates suffering. Not a shred. No matter how much people are suffering, God is never observed to intervene. Everything we see is consistent with chance/indifference.
Of course this begs the question all the way around.
You can only say that there is no evidence that God alleviates suffering if 1) there is no God or 2) we are suffering the maximum amount of pain.
If 1) you are using your conclusion to argue for your conclusion. You claim that suffering is evidence that there is no God. But if it is possible that we could be suffering more, which I certainly believe (having recovered from colds, cramps, headaches, sprains, abrasions, loneliness, grief, saddness, etc.) then it is certainly a live possibility that God is limiting our suffering - if we haven't already ruled out His existence a priori.
I know that I, for one, am not in constant pain or despair. I thank God daily for this.
But it is possible that you are not merely saying "there is no evidence of God so there is no evidence that God alleviates suffering", as entailed by 1).
If so, I conclude (not withstanding your diluted claim in the Dawkins reference) that you are saying 2).
Here you are claiming to know what the maximum amount of suffering is, and that we continue at that threshold. Here you are not overtly presuming 'no God' as a condition of your concluding 'no God', but you are presuming your own omniscience with regards to the amount of human suffering and the possibility of its decrease.
Of course you choose a slightly tamer characterization than my 'maximum suffering'. You call it 'identical to chance and indifference' but are entirely too modest about what your conclusion requires.
Either way, you are trying to demonstrate that there is no God (or an evil/indifferent God) on the basis of the existence of not some but the maximum (or consistent with chance) amount of evil. But you have to roll the required level of evil necessary into your presuppositions in order to come to your conclusion. In reality, you can't really know if we are suffering the maximum amount (and, in fact, you deny this - illegitimately so ) or if we are suffering the chance/indifference amount, or that we are not, in fact, suffering below these levels. You merely presume what is required, based upon your disbelief in God, in order to bolster your disbelief in God.
No matter which of the questions you are begging, I reiterate my comment that this horribly jaded view of the world seems unhealthy and does not speak well of your belief system.
To whatever degree that we measure beliefs by results this is a massive strike against yours.
Good question, Tom.
I find "innocence" is a funny word, but I would say that there are certainly beneficent and noble uses of power (add many more positive adjectives).
DL,
ps.
Yet whenever I analyze these ideas with any rigor or precision, I return to my present position. Ideas that once made sense to 9-year-old me are exposed as delusions. So, from my perspective, your positions are familiar intuitions, but those intuitions turn out to be wrong.
The more I live life, the more my childhood intuitions are replaced with ones that reflect my rational inquiries. I didn't look at the story of Abraham for many years. When I looked at it again a few years ago, it was a story of such evil that it was shocking to me that I had once thought it morally reasonable.
Don't forget that we have explored your ability to differentiate rational from irrational and have found both your rigour and precision wanting (as well as your Biblical exegesis).
You do not apply your definitions dispassionately and consistently and when you think you are formalizing your points you are often doing nothing of the sort.
If nothing else I would love for you to admit what I am sure everyone else here sees - that there is nothing about your positions or arguments that make them stand out as especially rational, rigorous or precise than the ones you are dismissing as childish and delusional.
I meant to say drop the pretense that they are especially more rational, etc....
Charlie,
Re: your commentary about God's intervention, you are not reading me correctly.
When I said "there appears to be no pain threshold above which God intervenes" I meant this at the level of individuals. I wasn't saying that life on Earth could be no worse. I meant that someone can be dying of natural causes, utterly tormented by intermittent physical pain and by extreme mental anguish, and God will not intervene in that worst case.
Obviously the world could be worse than it is because we could all find ourselves in that same sad situation, yet we don't. But to say that the fact that we're not all in a worst case scenario is due to the grace of an invisible God... that's just absurd.
It's really very simple to see. If there were no God, and we got here through evolution, what would be the difference? Would more people die in pain and anguish than do today? Or did 2000 years ago? Or 4000 years ago? I don't see it. In a natural world, some people will live well, and others will not. That's what we see. People who are better off today are better off due to the acts of men of material, not acts of gods.
More in my response to Tom after this comment.
As to your most recent comment...
Sorry to disappoint, but I truly think my positions are far more rational and dispassionate than yours.
DL,
As to your most recent comment...
Sorry to disappoint, but I truly think my positions are far more rational and dispassionate than yours.
doctor(logic) | Homepage | 02.08.07 - 11:48 pm | #
I know that's what you think.
You have never come close to demonstrating this rationally and dispassionately.
DL,
Continued question-begging:
I wasn't saying that life on Earth could be no worse. I meant that someone can be dying of natural causes, utterly tormented by intermittent physical pain and by extreme mental anguish, and God will not intervene in that worst case.
You have no way to assess what the maximum suffering is nor whether or not God is intervening - unless you are omniscient with regards to pain or have already ruled out God's existence.
But to say that the fact that we're not all in a worst case scenario is due to the grace of an invisible God... that's just absurd.
Why is that?
Do you have anything to back this up?
It's really very simple to see. If there were no God, and we got here through evolution, what would be the difference?
Let's adjourn to an alternate universe to find out.
Would more people die in pain and anguish than do today? Or did 2000 years ago? Or 4000 years ago? I don't see it.
Your perception and credulity is not an argument.
In a natural world, some people will live well, and others will not. That's what we see. People who are better off today are better off due to the acts of men of material, not acts of gods.
More question-begging.
You don't know why people are better off. You don't know why some people get cancer and others don't, why some get hit by lightning, why one has a stroke and another a heart attack. You don't know why my 93 year old grandfather can smoke a pack a day with no discernible health effects and a fifty year old man is having surgery for lymphatic cancer.
We know that we progress and advance and that lifespans are increasing, but also that we suffer setbacks. We know that there are material reasons involved but certainly do not know that there are not immaterial reasons as well (slow down, this is not an argument from ignorance, this is a refutation of your argument from ignorance).
We know that we can credit advances in science and our rational exploration of the universe for much of the advances we see. And we've discussed Christianity's role in the former and naturalism's weaknesses in the latter case.
What did Flemming and Pasteur have to say about their life-saving advances?
Nonetheless, my entire point still holds.
You can only know that God is not intervening if you know there is no God, and that even one person is suffering the maximum possible evil if you claim to know what that maximum is.
You can only claim that we are suffering the natural amount of evil in a chance universe if you know what you are comparing it to.
You know none of these things.
Therefore, you are providing no argument against God or His goodness. You are merely restating your hypothesis.
Tom,
You said:
When my mother died suddenly last August, our family was at peace because of our faith in Christ. Hospital staff noted the difference it made. I could tell story after story like that. That's evidence. But not to you.Tom, I believe you 100% when you say that your family was at peace due to your faith. But do you really think this is evidence for God's work?
How can your feelings about the conclusion of a proposition be a test of its truth?
Suppose Christianity is correct (I expect you can manage this
). Does God need to magically tamper with your feelings to ease your pain in tragic situations? Or would it be enough for you to simply believe that your loved one is alive and well in the afterlife? Clearly, God can merely rely on the feelings that stem from your belief in the outcome of the events in question. He doesn't need to act upon you.So, whether God exists or not, people can be soothed by the mere belief in a particular outcome. It's a placebo effect either way. Even if God exists, he may well be using a placebo effect to his advantage. How can you reasonably claim this is evidence for God's existence and intervention?
Another example. Suppose I believe that I'm going to discover buried treasure in my back yard. This belief gets me out of bed in the morning, keeps me off drugs, and gives me a feeling of self-worth. Are my feelings of self-esteem, my joi de vivre, and my healthy lifestyle evidence for the buried treasure?
In other cases it's a matter of what you are equipped to see: where suffering is alleviated, those who know how God works in the world will recognize that God is there. I grant that this does not count as evidence because it cannot be discriminated from a hypothetical situation where God is not at work.They will falsely recognize that God is there. If I were religious, and someone near to me recovers from a disease, I may ascribe that recovery to the action of God. Especially if that person's recovery was better than the mean.
However, that would not be valid evidence even for myself. It is a self-reinforcing delusion because it only admits evidence in favor of the hypothesis. The game is rigged by my own desires; I'm playing a game in which there can never be evidence against the hypothesis. Let me emphasize: it's not that the evidence falls in line with the hypothesis because the hypothesis happens to be true. It falls in line with the hypothesis because it is logically impossible for it not to do so. It's not a proper hypothesis. It boils down to the hypothesis that "stuff will happen". It doesn't even matter what stuff happens.
Look at the case of the person with an illness. In any time segment, there are five possibilities. The patient's condition could 1) be cured, 2) be better, 3) be unchanged, 4) be worse, 5) be dead. As a believer, I would be praying for the patient. If the patient gets better, the prayers are answered. If the patient is unchanged or the disease progresses, the prayers are not answered for the moment (God is testing us, perhaps). Near death, the patient's condition and suffering are so bad that death seems like a blessing. In that case, even death counts as the prayer being answered. So, whether the patient recovers or dies, the prayers are answered and God has intervened!!!
Okay, so, what outcome would count as evidence against the hypothesis that God intervenes? Eternal convalescence, perhaps? Not if the patient lives to see little Richie graduate from high school, or little Joanie get married. In that case God has intervened to keep the patient alive long enough to witness these blessed events.
Hmmm. What if the patient lives in pain, and gets to see tragic events, but still doesn't recover or die? In that case, the patient is learning God's lessons of humility and life in the face of adversity. And if the patient loses faith in God? Then no wonder God doesn't relieve his suffering!
Anyway, what kind of evidence would you accept? What would God have to do in order for you to count it as evidence?First of all, I would need evidence of God's existence. Repeatable, verifiable proof. Just like I have repeatable verifiable proof of your existence. Something I can slap a label on and say "that's God."
Then I would need evidence that this God has the power to alleviate suffering.
Then I would need evidence that he uses this power to alleviate suffering.
What evidence would you need to assess the truth of the proposition that "The United Nations alleviates suffering"?
You would need to know what the U.N. was. The U.N. is defined by what you label as "the U.N."
Then you would need evidence that the U.N. had the power to alleviate suffering. Let's stipulate that any reasoning entity that identify sufferers, predict the outcome of the application of resources will alleviate suffering, and then apply those resources is capable of alleviating suffering.
Finally, you would need evidence that the entity in question does all those things. There is a paper trail. There is a flow of information about suffering that passes into the U.N. The U.N. applies reason to identify needs and available resources. It locates and procures resources. It applies them to reduce suffering.
DL,
First of all, I would need evidence of God's existence. Repeatable, verifiable proof. Just like I have repeatable verifiable proof of your existence. Something I can slap a label on and say "that's God."
Thank you for this admission, as per my claims.
Your views on the so-called problem of pain are contingent upon your pre-existing views on the existence of God, not vice-versa.
You are merely using this issue to confirm your bias on the greater issue, but are acting as though it stands as evidence in that issue.
There is no logical demand that the existence of evil, in whatever amount you have weighed it, is inconsistent with the existence of a good and loving God.
Charlie,
You have no way to assess what the maximum suffering is nor whether or not God is intervening - unless you are omniscient with regards to pain or have already ruled out God's existence.What amount of individual human suffering would convince you that God will only tolerate a limited amount of suffering in a human?
Surely, if you have any point at all, you can say, "we'll never see a guy suffer through this... God wouldn't allow it!"
But you won't do this. You are impervious to the evidence. God can do no wrong because nothing you can possibly observe would count as evidence to the contrary.
As I said in my last comment to Tom, it's not a genuine hypothesis unless you can state what would count as evidence against the hypothesis if it were false. It doesn't matter if you think it's true, or if it's actually true. What matters is that you know what experience would be indicative of it being false if it were actually false. If you can't state what could possibly count as evidence against the claim, then your hypothesis is equivalent to "stuff happens." I don't think "stuff happens" is profound just because no evidence can be found to contradict it.
Yet "stuff happens" is the foundation of your faith. For all the whining by Holo about the Principle of Verifiability, this point remains. If one's propositions aren't falsifiable, not even in principle, then one's proposition is empty. God exists? Empty. God is good? Empty. All because you refuse to state what would count as evidence against any of these claims were they actually false. No matter what happens, history will always count as evidence for your claim. "Stuff happens."
DL,
As I said in my last comment to Tom, it's not a genuine hypothesis unless you can state what would count as evidence against the hypothesis if it were false.
As I said, I do not posit God as an answer nor an hypothesis.
I am arguing against your claim and demonstrating that you have no logical case.
Neither the Flood, nor the near-sacrifice, nor human suffering is logically inconsistent with a good and loving God.
I don't think "stuff happens" is profound just because no evidence can be found to contradict it.
I claim no profundity.
"God is good" is not something I invented.
I think I read it somewhere.
This thread was not about testing a God hypothesis, but about putting tests and expressions of faith.
My responses have been to show why you are not presenting your case.
If you want to see my case you will have to read some of our earlier discussions on such things as justice, morality, rationality, abiogenesis, the Kalam argument, the finetuning of the universe and of the planet, etc.
For my personal evidence (ie: not for you) there is also my relationship with God, my sense of the numinous, and my answered prayers.
Oh yes, and there is also the dismal and inaccurate impression you have of the world and universe your theory has forced upon you.
Aiee!
Imagine I remembered to delete the word "putting" from this sentence:
This thread was not about testing a God hypothesis, but about putting tests and expressions of faith.
And maybe that I inserted "that" in my last sentence.
Oh well, post-haste, I guess.
Perhaps a little C.S. Lewis:
Christianity is not the conclusion of a philosophical debate on the origins of the universe: it is a catastrophic historical event following on the long spiritual preparation of humanity which I have described. It is not a system into which we have to fit the awkward fact of pain: it is itself one of the awkward facts which have to be fitted into any system we make. In a sense, it creates, rather than solves, the problem of pain, for pain would be no problem unless, side by side with our daily experience of this painful world, we had received what we think a good assurance that ultimate reality is righteous and loving. [p. 14]
...
It does not amount to a logical compulsion. At every stage of religious development man may rebel, if not without violence to his own nature, yet without absurdity. He can close his eyes against the Numinous, if he is prepared to part company with half the great poets and prophets of his race, with his own childhood, with the richness and depth of uninhibited experience. He can regard the moral law as an illusion, and so cut himself off from that common ground of humanity. He can refuse to identify the Numinous with the righteous, and remain a barbarian, worshipping sexuality, or the dead, or the lifeforce, or the future. But the cost is heavy. And when we come to the last step of all, the historical Incarnation, the assurance is strongest of all. The story is strangely like other myths which have haunted religion from the first, and yet it is not like them. It is not transparent to the reason: we could not have invented it ourselves. It has not the suspicious a priori lucidity of Pantheism or Newtonian physics. It has the seeming arbitrary and idiosyncratic character which modern science is slowly teaching us to put up with in this wilful universe, where energy is made up in little parcels of a quantity no one could predict, where speed is not unlimited, where irreversible entropy gives time a real direction and the cosmos, no longer static or cyclic, moves like a drama from a real beginning to a real end.
Pages 14-15 The Problem Of Pain
I'm not blind to the problem of evil/pain/suffering. DL has some good points, but Charlie has countered well to the point that it's nearly a stalemate. Nearly.
The problem of evil/suffering is a problem for everyone, but more of a problem for the atheist I think. The atheist worldview has no basis for moral grounding. No basis for making an "is" turn into the power of an "ought". That grounding is required in order solve the problem of evil and remove God from the universe in favor of the indifference of materialism and naturalistic evolution. But that poses a new problem - the grounding.
Explain this.
Said another way...the atheist has to borrow from 'supernaturalism' in order to explain naturalism. That borrowing destroys the argument before it even gets off the ground, and that's why the problem of evil is a bigger problem for the atheist.
DL:
On the falsification of God and the supernatural:
"It is sometimes said that supernatural claims are unfalsifiable, while naturalistic ones are falsifiable. I don't see how this argument can be defended. First of all, we need to have a clear idea of what it is that makes a thesis supernatural. What is the supernatural?
But suppose we have such an idea. What does it take to falsify something? If what we mean is that the evidence logically entails the falsity of the thesis. That's a standard that would make every claim unfalsifiable. It's always possible to "fix" a disconfirmed theory to fit the evidence.
Falsification occurs, according to another definition, when all well-informed adherents of the thesis admit that the thesis is false. That is more plausible. But it seems to me that we could reach a situation where all well-informed defenders of a claim give up, whether the thesis is supernatural or natural.
It may be the case the well-informed people may find it harder to give up when religious beliefs are at stake. But how does supernaturalism render claims unfalsifiable?"
(from Victor Reppert's blog)
Steve,
The problem of evil/suffering is a problem for everyone, but more of a problem for the atheist I think. The atheist worldview has no basis for moral grounding.This claim comes up all the time, so I guess I should put it out of its misery.
First, the problem of evil is a problem for the theistic position, not for the atheist. The goodness of God isn't a claim of the atheist, it's a claim of the theist. The atheist argues that, by the theist's own standards, the claim is unsupportable.
Second, the problem of evil can be discussed whether or not one believes that morality is absolute. We start in agreement that a certain class of acts are morally wrong. The difference is that you think that those acts are wrong by some absolute law of the universe, whereas I just think that they go against my preferences, and against the preferences of the overwhelming majority of others. But that difference doesn't matter. When you say God is good, you presumably mean that he ought not murder people, or be deliberately negligent in cases where extreme suffering is avoidable. It is stipulated by both sides that such acts are evil and not good, whether those acts are absolutely so or not. And yet God causes avoidable suffering, thereby creating a problem of evil.
The problem of evil is a problem because it is next to impossible to reconcile evil with Christian claims. If someone who rejects Christianity points out the inconsistency, it's no use arguing that Christian claims don't make sense outside of Christianity. The point is that God's goodness doesn't make sense within Christianity.
Finally, you still seem to misunderstand relativism. Relativism doesn't say that there is no good or evil. It says that good and evil are relative to one's culture, history, biology and personality. I don't need to borrow from the supernatural in order to determine the moral preferences of me and my culture. There's nothing supernatural about that.
Steve,
As for falsifiability, what you really need is to be able to say that it is possible for evidence to count against a hypothesis. Otherwise we end up back in self-delusion-land.
My definition of the supernatural is different from Reppert's. I think Reppert means non-physical. I don't have a problem with the non-physical, at least not in principle. I have a problem with the non-explanatory. By my definition, a proposition about the supernatural is one that doesn't predict any future experience, in the sense that no future experience could ever count as evidence against the proposition.
"God is good" is just such a proposition because those who utter this proposition would say that no possible experience they could have would count as evidence against it. God could torture and kill 99% of the world's population, and still they would not argue with the claim that God was good.
The atheist argues that, by the theist's own standards, the claim is unsupportable.
The "theist's own standards" explain how and why evil exists in this world. It's one of the major themes throughout the Bible. We know it and accept it. How do you take what we know and accept and turn it into a problem for us? Atheists do it by making a claim about God that the Bible doesn't teach, specifically that God is acting immorally.
Sorry, but you've just gone beyond the "theist's own standards" and formulated your own standards.
Second, the problem of evil can be discussed whether or not one believes that morality is absolute.
This would be "The opinions of evil". No problem of evil here. Good for discussion groups, but hardly a problem for anyone - including Christians.
Finally, you still seem to misunderstand relativism. Relativism doesn't say that there is no good or evil. It says that good and evil are relative to one's culture, history, biology and personality.
I'm betting if God were a relativist you'd still find a way to complain. In the case of absolutism it's "Heads you win", in the case of relativism it's "Tails God loses".
SteveK:
The problem of evil/suffering is a problem for everyone, but more of a problem for the atheist I think. The atheist worldview has no basis for moral grounding.
DL responds:
This claim comes up all the time, so I guess I should put it out of its misery.
This robust claim is suffering no misery and won't be dispatched so easily.
The atheist argues that, by the theist's own standards, the claim is unsupportable.
And as such the atheist fails, as you have above. You fail to even engage the very standards by which you claim to be able to defeat the claim.
Second, the problem of evil can be discussed whether or not one believes that morality is absolute. We start in agreement that a certain class of acts are morally wrong. The difference is that you think that those acts are wrong by some absolute law of the universe, whereas I just think that they go against my preferences, and against the preferences of the overwhelming majority of others.
The Problem Of Doctor(logic)'s Preferences is no worry for Christianity. Any agreement we have concerning morally wrong acts is an agreement concerning human agents.
And yet God causes avoidable suffering, thereby creating a problem of evil.
Continued question-begging coupled with the presumed omniscience of DL.
Again, failure to engage the theist's standards.
The problem of evil is a problem because it is next to impossible to reconcile evil with Christian claims. If someone who rejects Christianity points out the inconsistency, it's no use arguing that Christian claims don't make sense outside of Christianity.
It is a challenge to be sure, but not impossible, nor next to impossible.
The atheist fails to demonstrate the so-called inconsistency.
Relativism doesn't say that there is no good or evil. It says that good and evil are relative to one's culture, history, biology and personality.
This is not a description of evil. And God is not bound by your culture, history biology or personality. God transcends all of these, and so must morality if you are even to discuss it in reference to God.
You can't, and the atheist problem of evil fails again.
But we still may choose to address what is then a problem of pain, or a problem of suffering, as it still deserves an answer, but it is no problem of evil.
But in order to question God the atheist must step into the theist's worldview at least for a while: as you said, he must use the theist's own standards.
In so doing it should become immediately apparent that the theist sees God as good and loving and sees this as being consistent with our suffering. As the atheist idles his own worldview for that moment he must also accept the theist's view of this suffering. You refuse to do this. You want to challenge our vision of God, but you want to do it with your own worldly vision of goodness, righteousness and suffering. But you don't get to demand of the theist what these entail within a theistic perspective. Yes, God is good. Yes, God allows pain. Yes, pain hurts, that's why it's called pain (thanks C.S.). But these are not in irreconcilable conflict and this can readily be seen by ( a limited and necessarily incomplete) analogy to our human relationships. A parent does not cease being good because he allows his son, in trying to walk, to fall. He allows this else his son will never learn and he allows this out of love. Moreover, a good parent corrects and does not condone that his child might be improved and that he might be well-regarded in the parent's eyes. This is love, as apart from mere kindness in the form of tolerating anything so long as we are contented and think ourselves happy.
Additionally, if you are going to presume to judge God's goodness against the acts He takes specific responsibility for as accounted in the Bible then you have to take the Bible's entire account, as well as the social and historic circumstances at the time. But the atheist cannot do this, he has to import his own ideas into the theist's worldview, or, as SteveK has said, export theist ideas into his.
On the other hand, if you wish to judge God by your standards of evil and allowable suffering and not the theist's you must do so with your morality and worldview as well.
And there you are hamstrung by the inability to judge an agent outside of your culture, society, etc.
Even in earthly conflict you admit that all you have is the power to convince by reason and shared perspective or compel by force. You have no ultimate right and wrong upon which to stand. But God does not share your perspective and, well, what need be said about force?
All that said, if the atheists were truly willing to honestly and consistently apply the own standards they would have to admit that God is good.
For, as we have agreed, it is good that one administer that which we deserve (Paul) and suffering can be justified when the alternatives are worse (DL).
And I haven't even touched SteveK's point about the is/ought distinction and grounding of morality.
Hi Steve.
This really has been a day for cross-posting.
Goodnight, and see you all tomorrow.
"God is good" is just such a proposition because those who utter this proposition would say that no possible experience they could have would count as evidence against it. God could torture and kill 99% of the world's population, and still they would not argue with the claim that God was good.
Again you go outside the "theist's own standards" to make your claim that God is evil.
Hi Charlie
And I haven't even touched SteveK's point about the is/ought distinction and grounding of morality.
Excellent point to bring up again. If DL wants to use the "theist's own standards" then let's start with the standard of is/ought as taught in the church from the beginning of Christianity. Heck, from the beginning of Judaism.
Charlie, Steve,
Let's make this simple.
1) Is there anything you could see that would count as evidence that God is not good? Anything at all?
2) Is there any distinction to be made between your God and an evil God, as far as human experience is concerned? If not, what distinction are you making?
Furthermore, Charlie's analogy with human parenting is... well, I dare not even use the appropriate word.
Humans don't torture their toddlers for mistakes they're expected to make, let alone torture them forever. You want the real analogy?
Take human babies and let them live out a Lord of the Flies existence on some tropical island somewhere. If the kids grow up believing we exist, then, at the instant before their death, beam them off the island, and give them psychological counseling, a comfortable home, etc. If they are skeptical, then beam them off before death and torture them in a pain amplifier forever. Now tell me again why this is a better educational system than the typical family home?
DL,
1) Is there anything you could see that would count as evidence that God is not good? Anything at all?
I don't know.
SteveK and Charlie, I lost this thread, and that's why I haven't responded for a while. Now, today and tomorrow, I'm busy all day, so I hope the thread hasn't died or moved on before I can respond.
DL,
Your thinking in this last comment is utterly pitiful.
There, I used the word.
You really do begin to stoop after a hundred or so comments when your arguments have failed you at every turn.
In your LOTF scenario do we send our servants to the island to teach the boys? After they kill our servants do we send our own offspring to enlighten them?
Do we provide them with evidence that declares our existence and our abilities?
Are any of these Piggys and Ralphs rational enough to wonder how they came to even have lives if we don't exist?
Do we ask them repeatedly if they'd like to come and live with us in comfort and in our love, and do many of them refuse, even to the very end, preferring instead their own power and understanding?
Did we put them on the island or did they disobey us, exercise their free will and choose their separation?
Then once again you are not addressing Christianity.
You ought to try some time.
DL,
Your question #2 posits an evil God, which is irrational.
I'll flesh this out when I have more time if you insist but evil does not exist for its own sake and can not exist on its own. It is an absence or corruption of goodness.
So yes, the distinction would be that we actually exist, that we can love and attain a measure of goodness, that we can reason, that we can choose, etc.
Thanks Paul,
I can wait for your answers.
Take care.
DL:
1) Is there anything you could see that would count as evidence that God is not good? Anything at all?
If I had the mind of God then I could answer the question. I am not omniscient. You presume to have omniscience and so you jump to a conclusion of guilt. Based on what? Certainly not the "thiest's own standards".
Let me put it in words you are familiar with: "God's goodness is the default position. It is up to you to show that God is not good."
But you can't show this because you have no moral grounding on which to base your argument.
Even if I grant you moral grounding, you still have to deal with the fact that (per Charlie) "it is good that one administer that which we deserve and suffering can be justified when the alternatives are worse."
So now you've got two major problems to overcome before the problem of evil gets resolved in your favor:
1) moral grounding,
2) the goodness of deserved judgement and justified suffering.
Charlie, Steve,
So neither of you can even imagine an experience that would count as evidence that God is evil. That means your statement that God is good is meaningless and empty. God can take actions that would be evil for humans to take, and that would still not count as evidence for God not being perfectly good? Then what is the point of your statement? It tells me nothing about God whatsoever. For that matter, it tells you nothing about God.
However, it does tell me something about you. It tells me that even you yourselves don't really know the meaning of what you are saying.
Charlie,
In your LOTF scenario do we send our servants to the island to teach the boys?In the form of other boys, and uttering words that are commonplace among the boys? Sure, let's do that.
After they kill our servants do we send our own offspring to enlighten them?Offspring who have the appearance of a regular boy? Let's try that.
Do we provide them with evidence that declares our existence and our abilities?Evidence that falls below the background level for detection? Mundane evidence for an extraordinary claims? Sure.
Are any of these Piggys and Ralphs rational enough to wonder how they came to even have lives if we don't exist?Um, they're far less rational and knowledgeable than the adults.
Do we ask them repeatedly if they'd like to come and live with us in comfort and in our love, and do many of them refuse, even to the very end, preferring instead their own power and understanding?Shall we tell them this in scribbles that look like the writings of kids on the island? And tell them that they have to die before getting their reward? Okay, that works too.
Did we put them on the island or did they disobey us, exercise their free will and choose their separation?Oh, yeah, there's the flaw in my analogy. I forgot that toddlers never disobey their parents. When that happens, we are justified in throwing toddlers on the island, and punishing their descendants in the same way.
Please!
Steve,
Even if I grant you moral grounding, you still have to deal with the fact that (per Charlie) "it is good that one administer that which we deserve and suffering can be justified when the alternatives are worse."I think that this might be Paul's definition of the good. I disagree with it.
Though I would agree that suffering can be justified when the alternatives are worse, I don't agree that people "deserve" punishment. For me, what is right is what leads to the best outcome as I see it (which is not necessarily the best outcome for me personally). If administering punishment causes more damage in the grand scheme, then such administration merely amplifies the original crime.
And what do you mean when you say I have to deal with it? What is there to deal with?
DL,
Your counterfactual hypothesis (God is evil) cannot be evaluated as you wish.
I don't know what would be evidence of God's being evil because it is an irrational postulate.
If God were evil we could not have knowledge, not only of good and evil, but of anything.
If the word 'good', when applied to God, can mean anything, evil, or cruelty, for instance, then we can know nothing. If good isn't what we think it is then God could also be a liar, and reality would not exist. When we go to Heaven we could find it is Hell, if He threatens Hell He may not deliver it.
C.S. Lewis again:
Finally, if reality at its root is so meaningless to us - or, putting it the other way round, if we are such total imbeciles - what is the point of trying to think either about God or about anything else?
The thesis of an evil God is self-refuting. If it is true then we can know nothing else, not even that.
On the other hand, we know what good is (to our limited human degree - as you and Paul have given us some sense of it) and we know that this applies to God.
We have evidence of this goodness throughout the Bible and throughout our experiences.
We are created to enjoy. Food tastes good, friendship is rewarding, music soothes, sex is pleasurable, sleep is refreshing, accomplishment is gratifying, thinking is exciting, helping others is enjoyable, etc.
If none of these, and a virtual infinity of other examples, were not true then I presume God might be evil. But we would not be here to know it.
DL,
In your attempt to further your LOTF analogy you continue to avoid using the Christian standard which you admit you must use.
Your analogy is falling apart because of this.
God created us, he spoke directly to Adam, and Moses, and was incarnated in the form of Jesus.
He wrote on our hearts knowledge of Himself and His creation bears witness to Him. He welcomes us back if we accept the free gift, by Grace, of His sacrifice and salvation.
Man, as a creature, is in sinful separation from God, and by his fallen nature continues in sin.
Apply these back into your analogy if you can.
If you can't then you are not doing your job.
I think that this might be Paul's definition of the good. I disagree with it.
Steve put them both in the same sentence, but the second is yours - as you affirm below.
For me, what is right is what leads to the best outcome as I see it (which is not necessarily the best outcome for me personally).
Still on the same track. As you see it is not as God sees it.
If administering punishment causes more damage in the grand scheme, then such administration merely amplifies the original crime.
We agree. We can roll this into your definition of good.
Though I would agree that suffering can be justified when the alternatives are worse, I don't agree that people "deserve" punishment.
Whether you want to call it "punishment" or not, it is called justice, and God is just.
If you eat poison you die, if you consume too many calories you gain weight, if you cut off your hand you don't have the use of it. If you violate the rules of society you are ... what ... if not punished?
Charlie,
Your question #2 posits an evil God, which is irrational.But any person can argue that evil is the absence of his personal good. So that kind of definition doesn't help.
I'll flesh this out when I have more time if you insist but evil does not exist for its own sake and can not exist on its own. It is an absence or corruption of goodness.
If you mean to say God is good by definition, independent of anything he does, then, again, what's the point of saying he's good when it has nothing to do with how he appears to act?
So yes, the distinction would be that we actually exist, that we can love and attain a measure of goodness, that we can reason, that we can choose, etc.I'm baffled. Are you saying an evil God can't create creatures that love, that seek their own goodness, that reason, that choose? I would think that an evil deity would desire to torment people whose opinions differed from his own. You can't tell me this isn't a logical or metaphysical possibility.
Your last comment,and mine above it, answer your own question.
DL,
As I said before, the outlook foisted upon you by your world view is evidence by itself that your system is not working.
To you, by your analogy, we are abandoned children, adrift, unloved, unguided and without nurture.
If the evidence given the children is not from us then from whom?
Did they make it up?
If the offspring is just a regular boy where did he get his misinformation, and why would he spread it?
If the universe is as bad as you seem to think, or even half as bad, why would we look at it and say "would you look at that, the result of a good and loving God"?
Neither the Numinous nor the experience that the is right and wrong (your protestations that you defined them notwithstanding) can be gleaned from such a bad universe. These evidences of God are not elements of a cold and impersonal universe.
Lewis calls this an "inference of black from white" and admits that though man may be foolish he was never this foolish.
And what do you mean when you say I have to deal with it? What is there to deal with?
Because you agree that "suffering can be justified when the alternatives are worse" (your words) your job will be to determine which is the better route to take - the suffering or the alternative. And the only way to know that is to know how both scenarios would play out into the future.
Good luck with that.
I've read most of the comments here and must admit that it has been very enlightening. I've concluded that debating 'good' or 'evil' seems like the wrong tack. We didn't ask for any of this. God decided to create this for His reasons (some of which He has revealed to us) and He decided to make the rules. He also told us that we were to follow the rules and that there were consequences for not doing so. Again, we didn't ask to be in the game and we aren't being asked to reach a consensus view with Him. I suppose some of us can choose to hold our breathe until we turn blue in rebellion; but, that really doesn't matter. He remains the potter; and it matters not that we think we are so much more than just clay (although we did just rise up on our own from the muck!)
There was a lot of talk here about ends justifying means and innocent children suffering horrendous deaths as victims of God's evil deeds. Well, again He made the rules and He said that He would visit the iniquities of the fathers on the children to the third and fourth generations. Do any of us have the capacity to truly understand this? Well, not I; but, I trust Him that He does.
David, the point is that if God's rules allow for apparent evils, and even if we don't have the capacity to understand God's higher purpose, it still makes no sense to call God and his actions good, because, in any sense we can imagine, some of his actions are evil; the word "good," is meaningless because it can mean evil.
Unless, I suppose, you want to believe in the goodness of God on pure, blind faith, which you are welcome to do, but then I wish you'd come into my used car lot.
It's not blind faith because it's based in evidence, especially (but not only) the self-sacrifice of Jesus Christ for us on the cross.
David,
Do any of us have the capacity to truly understand this? Well, not I; but, I trust Him that He does.There's nothing to trust. If God renegged on this trust, would you know the difference? I don't think you would.
That's what makes this whole idea of trust so inane. You can't even say what it is you're trusting in.
Paul,
My analysis of the Bible is that there is more than enough evidence in it to believe what I believe. So, blind faith makes no sense to me, except as an ad hominem. Nowhere that I know of does God advocate blind faith.
I believe it was Jesus who called God good. In fact, He said that there was nobody else who deserved to be called this. So now you put me in the position of accepting the views of atheists (no disrespect intended) versus God incarnate. Then you talk about 'apparent evils.' Well, are they or aren't they and how would you know? God defined what 'good' meant for humans. Let's call that (A). What is evil for humans? (A'). Now we humans think that we can do the same for Him or that the things He told us to do also apply to Him? It seems to me to be a non sequitur to think that we can reverse roles and define good and evil for Him. Also, somewhat arrogant?
Paul,
God's actions do not appear to be evil to those of us who maintain His goodness.
While you were lost, and then too busy, the conversation continued and covered your concerns.
Have you returned with an answer as to what the conditions of the pre-Flood world were?
Or what God said of those infants you are concerned about?
Or either an affirmation or denial that we can apply even your definition of 'good', and even without your disingenuous qualifiers?
Or, since we've agree that the good can be the mitigation of a greater evil, what would have occurred had there been no Flood?
Or this, on innocent babies:
You reassert their innocence without answering my query on this. Of what guilt are they innocent, and who determines this?
Or this on your assertion that the Flood was not good:
Rather than rage incessantly in an emotional pique why not demonstrate that it's not?
Just wondering, since you have more time now.
Nicely said, David ... both comments.
David, it's blind to the extent that one admits that one can't understand why God would behave in a way that would otherwise be called evil. We are blind to God's ultimate purpose we he acts in an apparently contrary way, yet you trust him. *To that extent,* it's blind trust.
It seems to me to be a non sequitur to think that we can reverse roles and define good and evil for Him. Also, somewhat arrogant?If we can't define good and evil for God, how can we call him good? We don't even have a definition of that word for him. Unless it can mean anything, in which case DL's main point holds (it means nothing).
Charlie: tell me your answers to your questions for me. That'll be much quicker. Those answers are your points, anyway, so why not make them? I'm not interested in making your points for you, I have a hard enough time making mine.
DL,
"You can't even say what it is you're trusting in."
Excuse me, how do you know this? Have we met before? From what I have read here you are much too bright to be resorting to a stereotypical attack. So, how do you know this?
"There's nothing to trust."
I assume you mean there is no God. Well, I spent 43 years as a very convinced atheist; so I think I know what that's all about. As a result of that experience, I am fairly sure that there is no way I can disavow you of that view. No human could have ever changed my view either.
"If God renegged on this trust, would you know the difference?"
You do bring up an interesting point about Him reneging. I must admit that this possibility never occurred to me! Based on what He says, He thinks that He has already given me what He has promised me. I suppose He could be wrong; but, based on the evidence, I don't think so. Alternatively, He could be a liar; but from what I know Him to be, that is not reality.
Paul,
Blind Trust/Blind Faith: My simple definition for this is believing something/somebody without having a reasonable weight of evidence. God possibly doing something for which I would be accused of being evil if I were to do that same thing is not about blind trust. Moreover, whether one can or can not understand God's motives or ultimate purposes also seems to have little to do with blind faith. He has told me all I need to know to be sure that He is trustworthy and able to deliver on His promises. Needless to say, He has not told you enough (yet).
If we can't define good and evil for God, how can we call him good?
Again, Jesus is the one who called God good. That is sufficient for me; probably not you. By the way, the Greek word that Jesus used was just the ordinary run of the mill word for 'good.' Nothing esoteric. It also doesn't seem as if any of those who heard this statement started to debate the meaning of 'good' with Jesus. They knew exactly what He meant. And, they knew all about the 'evil atrocities' that I believe you would say that God had committed in their past.
David,
You do bring up an interesting point about Him reneging. I must admit that this possibility never occurred to me! Based on what He says, He thinks that He has already given me what He has promised me.Again, there is nothing in which to trust.
Suppose I lend you $50 and trust you to pay it back. What does this trust mean? It means that, despite my having no guarantee you will pay me back, I either 1) believe that you will pay me back, or 2) have no option, and hope that you will pay me back. In either case, I anticipate that I will have an experience in the not too distant future in which you will hand me $50. (If there were no time limit, it would be a gift, not a loan.) If you don't pay me back in the timeframe, I will think you have betrayed the trust. If I couldn't say what constituted verification of your trust, then I wouldn't be trusting you at all, would I?
You trust that God is good. What experiences are inconsistent with that claim? Any at all? If not, what does your trust mean other than you'll do what you think God wants you to do? Isn't that your unconditional gift to God? And if it is, it seems quite independent of God's goodness or evilness.
You trust that God is good. What experiences are inconsistent with that claim? Any at all? If not, what does your trust mean other than you'll do what you think God wants you to do? Isn't that your unconditional gift to God? And if it is, it seems quite independent of God's goodness or evilness.
What experiences are inconsistent with that claim? That brings up that interesting and yet unanswerable kind of question like, if I'd been born in a different country, would I still be me?
In the case of God, for those of us who trust in him, it translates as this: let's posit there's a God who created all of reality and is all good. What kind of experiences would negate that view? It would have to be an experience that cannot happen--for this good God has ordered all of experience.
I know you want Popperian falsifiability in order to be satisfied with God; but God is not the result of a scientific experiment. And if we're going to entertain the existence of God, we have to entertain that possibility in proper terms. Those terms include his being entirely in control of reality, such that there is no conceivable "experiment" to prove him nonexistent or to prove him not good. You can't get outside of the God space to perform that test.
So is this a weakness in our knowledge of God? Remember, this non-falsifiability is inherent in the nature of God. If you want a falsifiable theory of God, it would have to be some other kind of God. We'll let you falsify that other kind of God all day long; it's okay with me and I'm sure it would be okay with David et al.
Popperian falsifiability is philosophically non-applicable to the question.
So how do we have confidence that we know God? By personal experience, by historical record, by the internal witness of the Holy Spirit, by the experiences of many millions of others, and by the absurdity of the alternative views, which have often been discussed here.
It may not satisfy you, but again, as the eminent philosopher Alvin Plantinga showed in Warranted Christian Belief, that's okay. Like David, I have a satisfied mind.
I should add--there are things that could falsify the Christian faith, like some kind of highly credible proof that the historical record was false.
But in the category of imagining some level of evil that would disprove God: if God is a necessary being, then any conceptualization of a reality contrary to God would be a conceptualization of something that would contradict what is necessary. No non-absurd conceptualization of that sort thus could be made.
If God is posited as a non-necessary being, then as I said, you can knock down that theory all you like. That's not the God we believe in, either.
Tom,
It almost seems absurd to say that faith can be falsified. I mean, one might loose their faith or their faith my change in some fundamental way. But, to say that faith can be falsified implies that faith can be proven. Proving faith and falsifying faith seems to be the superimposition of scientific jargon on something that is beyond the work of science. But more than that, the claim that faith can be falsified or proven seems to elevate science as the final arbiter. Maybe it is better to keep proof and falsification as one paradigm and faith in another.
Ooh, there's blood in the water!
In the case of God, for those of us who trust in him, it translates as this: let's posit there's a God who created all of reality and is all good. What kind of experiences would negate that view? It would have to be an experience that cannot happen--for this good God has ordered all of experience.Ah, but we're not looking for outright falsification. We're merely looking for evidence against the proposition.
Those terms include his being entirely in control of reality, such that there is no conceivable "experiment" to prove him nonexistent or to prove him not good. You can't get outside of the God space to perform that test.Then you don't know what good means in this context. You know what good means in the context of your family or humanity, but you have no idea whatsoever what it means as applied to God.
So how do we have confidence that we know God? By personal experience...Please consider this carefully.
There is some proposition, P. Suppose that experience E counts as evidence for P. This must be because P implies or favors E over the alternatives. So ~P favors ~E. If there is no experience ~E that counts as evidence for ~P, then E is no confirmation of P either.
So you cannot have it both ways. If the presence of a given experience is evidence for the goodness of God, then its absence is evidence against the goodness of God.
if God is a necessary being, then any conceptualization of a reality contrary to God would be a conceptualization of something that would contradict what is necessary.Necessary for what?
Compare this with rationality. Rationality is necessary for rational argumentation and for knowledge. No rationality, no justification.
On the other hand, God's goodness is only necessary to make God's commandments absolutely moral. You don't like the ambiguity in subjective morality, but that doesn't constitute a basis for necessity. You can still live a good life by any experiential standard without absolute morality.
You might challenge by saying that one ought to demand absolute morality, but that is in itself a moral claim. And when you look at why such a claim is made, you'll find it is based on our subjective moral feelings. "We need absolute morality or else murder could be good." Well, if you feel that murder can't be good, then simply avoid murder. There's no necessity to say that murder is absolutely wrong in order to 1) justify the claim that you feel it is always wrong, or 2) to avoid it.
Tom,
Ooh, there's blood in the water!
In the case of God, for those of us who trust in him, it translates as this: let's posit there's a God who created all of reality and is all good. What kind of experiences would negate that view? It would have to be an experience that cannot happen--for this good God has ordered all of experience.Ah, but we're not looking for outright falsification. We're merely looking for evidence against the proposition.
Those terms include his being entirely in control of reality, such that there is no conceivable "experiment" to prove him nonexistent or to prove him not good. You can't get outside of the God space to perform that test.Then you don't know what good means in this context. You know what good means in the context of your family or humanity, but you have no idea whatsoever what it means as applied to God.
So how do we have confidence that we know God? By personal experience...Please consider this carefully.
There is some proposition, P. Suppose that experience E counts as evidence for P. This must be because P implies or favors E over the alternatives. So ~P favors ~E. If there is no experience ~E that counts as evidence for ~P, then E is no confirmation of P either.
So you cannot have it both ways. If the presence of a given experience is evidence for the goodness of God, then its absence is evidence against the goodness of God.
if God is a necessary being, then any conceptualization of a reality contrary to God would be a conceptualization of something that would contradict what is necessary.Necessary for what?
Compare this with rationality. Rationality is necessary for rational argumentation and for knowledge. No rationality, no justification.
On the other hand, God's goodness is only necessary to make God's commandments absolutely moral. You don't like the ambiguity in subjective morality, but that doesn't constitute a basis for necessity. You can still live a good life by any experiential standard without absolute morality.
You might challenge by saying that one ought to demand absolute morality, but that is in itself a moral claim. And when you look at why such a claim is made, you'll find it is based on our subjective moral feelings. "We need absolute morality or else murder could be good." Well, if you feel that murder can't be good, then simply avoid murder. There's no necessity to say that murder is absolutely wrong in order to 1) justify the claim that you feel it is always wrong, or 2) to avoid it.
Sorry Paul, but if you want to enter a discussion and lecture me as to how to converse I'm going to expect you to pull your own weight.
The questions are entirely relevant to the points you have tried to advance and your points fail without answers.
In your reply to David you again claim that God acts in an apparently contrary way. This reminds me of another unanswered question to you: contrary to what?
You reassert:
If we can't define good and evil for God, how can we call him good?
What's wrong with your definition of good?
"We get what we have coming to us".
We don't even have a definition of that word for him. Unless it can mean anything, in which case DL's main point holds (it means nothing).
Once again, we do not hold to this Ockhamist view, and this was my first answer to you, as per your demands.
If you can't answer the questions you can't offer any evidence that this view is required.
You said in the other thread on this subject that Christianity required that we redefine "good" in order to apply it to God.
In order to show us that we would have to do so we needed to know what your definition would be, the one that would require this redefining.
After some hedging you came up with one, see above.
And it applies to God.
So perhaps you can answer the questions or quit making the assertions that depend upon them.
If you have no answers and want to change your unilateral and oft-repeated conditions you might want to consider exercising a little more humility when you crow that an unanswered question equates to a defeat.
What does it mean to say that God is good?
In part it means good as we all understand it:
Exodus 34:6
Compassionate, gracious, slow to anger, abounding in love and faithfulness,
Deuteronomy 32:4
his works are perfect, and all his ways are just.
does no wrong, upright and just is he.
1 Samuel 15: 29
does not lie
Psalm 25:10
loving and faithful
Deuteronomy 10:17
shows no partiality and accepts no bribes
Romans 2:6
God "will give to each person according to what he has done." [a]
1 Chronicles 16:34
he is good; his love endures forever.
James 5:11
The Lord is full of compassion and mercy.
1 Peter 1:25
the word of the Lord stands forever."
Peter:
10 now you have received mercy.
22 "He [Jesus] committed no sin, and no deceit was found in his mouth." [e]23 When they hurled their insults at him, he did not retaliate; when he suffered, he made no threats. Instead, he entrusted himself to him who judges justly.
2 Peter 1:1
righteous
3 has given us everything we need for life and godliness through our knowledge of him who called us by his own glory and goodness.
4Through these he has given us his very great and precious promises, so that through them you may participate in the divine nature and escape the corruption in the world caused by evil desires.
15 our Lord's patience means salvation
I John:9
If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just and will forgive us our sins and purify us from all unrighteousness.
Is this a redefinition of 'good' or a calling of 'evil' good?
Good seems pretty consistent to me.
Sorry Paul, but if you want to enter a discussion and lecture me as to how to converse I'm going to expect you to pull your own weight.I already said that you're wanting me to pull *your* weight, actually. (By the way, without quotes, I hope we're talking about the same thing.)
In your reply to David you again claim that God acts in an apparently contrary way. This reminds me of another unanswered question to you: contrary to what?Appropriate question. Answer: Contrary to any understanding of the word "good."
What's wrong with your definition of good?It's not *my* definition, it's *your* definition of good which, for God, will include absolutely anything, which makes it not a definition at all. *That's* the problem.
That's it in a nutshell. Refute that idea *on its own terms* and you will win me over.
We don't even have a definition of that word for him. Unless it can mean anything, in which case DL's main point holds (it means nothing).If you don't feel the need to use words consistently when talking, then our conversation is over. That's all I'm asking for, is for you to use the word "good" consistently, to have it actually mean something, instead of anything.Once again, we do not hold to this Ockhamist view, and this was my first answer to you, as per your demands.
If you can't answer the questions you can't offer any evidence that this view is required.
You lost me.
You said in the other thread on this subject that Christianity required that we redefine "good" in order to apply it to God.
In order to show us that we would have to do so we needed to know what your definition would be, the one that would require this redefining.
After some hedging you came up with one, see above.
And it applies to God.
So perhaps you can answer the questions or quit making the assertions that depend upon them.
If you have no answers and want to change your unilateral and oft-repeated conditions you might want to consider exercising a little more humility when you crow that an unanswered question equates to a defeat.
Again, Jesus is the one who called God good. That is sufficient for me; probably not you.At least this is a tacit admission that saying that God is good is nonsensical (and yet David still holds to it merely because Jesus said it). At least that is intellectually honest. However, if you want to discuss whether the idea that God is good makes any kind of sense, then what matters is the logic that can be demonstrated.
By the way, the Greek word that Jesus used was just the ordinary run of the mill word for 'good.' Nothing esoteric.So what? Our discussion isn't esoteric, it's just difficult. I'm making my arguments based on the everyday understanding of the word "good."
It also doesn't seem as if any of those who heard this statement started to debate the meaning of 'good' with Jesus. They knew exactly what He meant.I'm not debating the meaning of the word "good" in order to offer some other definition, merely to show that it is nonsensical when applied to the Christian god.
DL,
Suppose I lend you $50 and trust you to pay it back. What does this trust mean? ... despite my having no guarantee ...
Well of course you have no guarantee; is there anything (besides the obvious) for which you have a guarantee? But, that's not your main point... You seem to be looking for something, like the fulfillment of the promise, as a verification that the promise was genuine. So, you say that I have no reason to trust since you don't see that fulfillment has yet happened.
Trust is a decision; indeed a 'blind' one if it is not based on evidence. (Of course, even with evidence it can be a poor one if I am too limited to be able to make the particular decision.) An immaculately dressed person steps out of a shiny new limosine and asks to borrow $50; A filthy decrepit person gets up from the gutter and asks to borrow $50. There are no guarantees; but, there is evidence. Whoever I may decide to 'trust,' it is based on whatever evidence I (not you or anybody else) decide is sufficient for me. Of course, there is an assumption here that getting the $50 back is important to me in this decision.
So now we get to timeframe. Actually, I've gotten my $50 back many times over, so there is really no risk on that account. However, if I am wrong (and I'm not) then I'll never know that. On the other hand, if you are wrong (and you are) then you will definitely know that! Please, this is not meant as a threat; just a little look at logical consequences.
You trust that God is good. What experiences are inconsistent with that claim? Any at all? If not, what does your trust mean other than you'll do what you think God wants you to do? Isn't that your unconditional gift to God? And if it is, it seems quite independent of God's goodness or evilness.
I think we are sort of in agreement here. My trust in God has little, if anything, to do with good or evil. I made a decision a long time ago to trust Him. Since it had nothing to do with His goodness or evilness; the apparent arrival of evil on the scene does not affect that faith. Now, the loss of a loved one is clearly terrifically painful. Only if I make this a condition of my 'faith' is it a problem for me with regard to God. The more I have learned of Him, the more I, in fact, expect to see evil. NOT, that He is evil.
Paul,
You lost me.
Perhaps you will find yourself in this follow-up.
You have presented lots of huff and pretense here, Paul, and not a single substantial thought.
I already said that you're wanting me to pull *your* weight, actually.
Sure you did, and I've demonstrated throughout, and again in the same comment, why this is not so.
You're an expert on moving conversations along so you should have noticed that.
Appropriate question. Answer: Contrary to any understanding of the word "good."
Demonstrated to be false again.
Show me why God's actions aren't good. We have your definition of good ( we get what we have coming to us), DL's ( greater good can mitigate lesser), and now a laundry list from the Bible.
Contrary to any of these?
It's not *my* definition, it's *your* definition of good which, for God, will include absolutely anything, which makes it not a definition at all. *That's* the problem.
Demonstrated false again.
'Good' has been shown to have meaning for you, me and the writers of the Bible.
Show me why the word seems undefined.
That's it in a nutshell. Refute that idea *on its own terms* and you will win me over.
The idea refutes itself.
By all standards of the word 'good', God is good. Present an argument and I'll respond.
If you don't feel the need to use words consistently when talking, then our conversation is over. That's all I'm asking for, is for you to use the word "good" consistently, to have it actually mean something, instead of anything.
Show me my inconsistency. I have maintained throughout that I am being consistent. From comment to comment, thread to thread and month to month.
If you want to walk away from this conversation without answering the questions feel free - it won't be the first time.
But perhaps you might try to remember this failure the next time you fell the urge to accuse your conversation partners of conceding because one of your questions didn't warrant a response.
You said to David:
However, if you want to discuss whether the idea that God is good makes any kind of sense, then what matters is the logic that can be demonstrated.
Demonstrate why it is illogical to call God good.
I'm making my arguments based on the everyday understanding of the word "good."
No, you've made no argument.
Make one.
Show why God is not good, using the everyday understanding of the word.
I'm not debating the meaning of the word "good" in order to offer some other definition, merely to show that it is nonsensical when applied to the Christian god.
You are not debating anything and you have not shown anything.
Why do you say the Flood was not good? Based upon what? Have you done your homework or are you still just making an emotional appeal?
I already said that you're wanting me to pull *your* weight, actually.I disagree. Now what?
Sure you did, and I've demonstrated throughout, and again in the same comment, why this is not so.
You're an expert on moving conversations along so you should have noticed that.
Show me why God's actions aren't good.The actual question is why God's actions aren't good in our common understanding of the term. The killing of 6-month old babies in the flood, while not killing 6-month-olds after the flood, is a good example for me.
My response to nearly all of you responses to me can be distilled into the flood example above.
Our common understanding of the term is the problem. "Good" is not primarily about comfort, peace, wealth, etc. It's primarily about developing virtue, and coming into conformity with God's purity.
Paul,
The actual question is why God's actions aren't good in our common understanding of the term. The killing of 6-month old babies in the flood, while not killing 6-month-olds after the flood, is a good example for me.
But you didn't answer any of the questions that allow you to say this. You didn't tell me what God said about those babies, what conditions they were being born into, or what the results of the Flood were in comparison to the pre-Flood world. You just don't know if this was a good or a bad thing or if, as per DL, the judgment can be logically good because of the greater good of the outcome. You make no case.
To help move things along I'll give you one of the answers..
Save for Noah and his family all flesh was wicked.
Tom,
An excellent point that must be kept before us.
Paul,
I chopped my comment a little.
I disagree. Now what?
Address the points. Make your case. Show me why my questions are my responsibility and not yours.
Another point is this.
Why do you think it is bad that God shows mercy to the human race?
Why do you want Him to smite the entire race?
The actual question is why God's actions aren't good in our common understanding of the term. The killing of 6-month old babies in the flood, while not killing 6-month-olds after the flood, is a good example for me.
It's the same reason cutting a 6-month old baby in the house with a razor blade is immoral while cutting a 6-month-old baby in the operating room with a scalpel is moral.
But....
my conclusions above are based on the assumption that I know the whole story. Complete knowledge of the situation is the key to determining the complete context which then determines the morality.
To demonstrate the truth of the above statement, consider the short story below.
"A child is diagnosed with an illness and an operation is recommended by the doctor in order to prevent further complications. The same doctor performs the surgery and the child is declared healthy several months after the surgery."
Sounds like the doctor's actions were morally good. It's a good assumption based on the knowledge we have, but to those who have complete knowledge of the situation (like God) that is the wrong conclusion.
Below is the rest of the story. You never get to hear this part of the story because the doctor took this information to his grave. Only God knows this part of the story.
"The fact is the baby was perfectly healthy and didn't need any operation. Lab test/reports were falsified and the doctor performed the surgery so he could get the insurance money."
God's omniscience trumps the limited knowedge we have about any given situation. There is one answer to the question of morality, it's just that we may be wrong about the answer because we don't have all the information required.
If Jesus says God is good, I trust that because he is God. If he says all things work together for the good of those who are called according to his purpose, I trust that too - because God knows more than I do about the situation. Same with the Flood, same with the Amalekites, same with Sodom & Gomorrah.
But Charlie, is flesh any less wicked now? Why the difference in God's behavior toward us?
I never said it was bad for God to show mercy, I'm merely trying to make sense of why he shows mercy to some but not to others (like babies in the flood).
SteveK, I don't disagree with what you say, only that, we either define "good" as merely being that which God does, which is no definition because it can mean anything, or we define good as that which we can understand to be good, which excludes some of God's actions in which our incomplete knowledge is what prevents us from calling it good, as you have brought up.
Paul, on another thread:
Yeah, Tom, nice post. We strengthen our arguments by trying to make the opposition's argument for them (fairly and honestly, checkng it out with them as we go), and if our ideas them stand up to that, we can ber very sure of them. Some scientist or philospher has said this better than I have, anyone know who it was? Dennet? Popper?
Paul | 02.14.07 - 1:07 pm | #
But yesterday on this thread:
Charlie: tell me your answers to your questions for me. That'll be much quicker. Those answers are your points, anyway, so why not make them? I'm not interested in making your points for you, I have a hard enough time making mine.
Paul | 02.13.07 - 4:34 pm | #
Paul,
But Charlie, is flesh any less wicked now? Why the difference in God's behavior toward us?
I never said it was bad for God to show mercy, I'm merely trying to make sense of why he shows mercy to some but not to others (like babies in the flood).
Paul | 02.14.07 - 3:26 pm | #
I'm not omniscient but given the description in Genesis I'd say "yes".
But that's not actually relevant because all flesh was wicked, so your innocents were not innocents.
We know that all have sinned, and that the wages of sin is death. So we know that all of us will die, and deserve to. Physical bodily death is not an option for us, not even for Noah and his family.
If God allows an environment in which some will live to 100 and some won't that doesn't change that fact. Whatever mercy God chooses to show, and for whatever reason He chooses it, this does not impact the justice and mercy He showed previously.
He is impartial, shows no favouritism, is just and merciful, but He does have purposes.
I never said it was bad for God to show mercy, I'm merely trying to make sense of why he shows mercy to some but not to others (like babies in the flood).
He did show them mercy.
PLease don't make me coax a definition of 'mercy' out of you.
we either define "good" as merely being that which God does
No we don't.
Never have we, and you've been shown this countless times.
we define good as that which we can understand to be good
We have your definition, and by it, God is good.
in which our incomplete knowledge is what prevents us from calling it good, as you have brought up.
But you refuse to expand your knowledge.
Charlie, I can't restate your ideas to see if I got them correct unless you SAY THEM FIRST.
But that's not actually relevant because all flesh was wicked, so your innocents were not innocents.No, No, No. I'm not saying god is bad because he punished innocents. I'm saying that its inconsistent to use the word good to describe God punishing babies in the flood as good and to describe God *not* punishing babies nowadays as good. That makes *anything* good.
The question of what mercy is not relevant. My point is the difference in treatment that God metes out to babies, which is impenetrable unless you first conclude that anything that God does is good. But that makes the definition of the word "good" useless.
And, Charlie, you refuse to expand my knowledge, too. When you don't have to go on a search, like I would, to do so. When you could do so far more quickly and easily.
Paul:
SteveK, I don't disagree with what you say, only that, we either define "good" as merely being that which God does, which is no definition because it can mean anything, or we define good as that which we can understand to be good, which excludes some of God's actions in which our incomplete knowledge is what prevents us from calling it good, as you have brought up.
The same problem of incomplete knowledge comes into play here. If you and I had the mind of God, the omniscience of God, we wouldn't be having this discussion because we would know the answers we seek. At that time we could objectively - to quote you - "define good as that which we can understand to be good". There would be no conflict between what we perceive as good/evil and that which is objectively good/evil.
Christians have evidence of God's goodness in overflowing abundance. God has demonstrated his trustworthiness in this area and so we trust that it will continue.
Paul,
Charlie, I can't restate your ideas to see if I got them correct unless you SAY THEM FIRST.
Aw Paul, don't yell.
You didn't say "restate" you said "make their argument".
And, Charlie, you refuse to expand my knowledge, too. When you don't have to go on a search, like I would, to do so. When you could do so far more quickly and easily.
What search?
You claim knowledge of the Flood, of the innocents killed and of the evil of the action. This presumes having read, at minimum, the Flood account.
All of my relevant questions were based upon simple knowledge of the very thing you were critiquing.
My other questions didn't require any search whatsoever.
?No, No, No. I'm not saying god is bad because he punished innocents. I'm saying that its inconsistent to use the word good to describe God punishing babies in the flood as good and to describe God *not* punishing babies nowadays as good. That makes *anything* good.
The question of what mercy is not relevant. My point is the difference in treatment that God metes out to babies, which is impenetrable unless you first conclude that anything that God does is good. But that makes the definition of the word "good" useless.
Here's your chance. Make my argument for me.
Hint: think about the good acts of a court of law, the serving of justice, and the possibility of greater leniency and a different demonstration of mercy in different cases.
This shouldn't be too hard, especially if you do so fairly and honestly, as you stated above.
Besides, I did expand your knowledge.
I told you that no innocents were killed, and that the righteous were saved.
Here's another tip for you to explore for your case about different people receiving different rewards in the interest of justice.
In presenting my argument you could look up this story:
Matthew 20
The Parable of the Workers in the Vineyard
1"For the kingdom of heaven is like a landowner who went out early in the morning to hire men to work in his vineyard.
Paul,
Charlie, I can't restate your ideas to see if I got them correct unless you SAY THEM FIRST.
Aw Paul, don't yell.
You caught me in a weak moment.
You didn't say "restate" you said "make their argument".OK, I retract that and change "make" to "restate."
You claim knowledge of the FloodI didn't claim any knowledge of the flood other than what I explicitly wrote, did !? If I did, can you quote it?
===========
Justice needs to be applied fairly. Why one justice for flood babies and another for 18th century babies?
===========
I've already said I don't want homework, I want discussion. Make your own points and I'll make sure that I understand them.
David, Charlie and Steve ask us to believe that there's no problem of evil at all. I guess all those theologians were wrong!
Sorry, not buying it.
Paul is right on target. The problem is that the theists here are not being consistent and rigorous with their definitions.
So maybe we can clear things up by using different terms.
There's subjective good that's personal and/or cultural. Such a standard specifies what is appropriate behavior for humans and what is appropriate for God. There could be as many subjective goods as there are people.
There's absolute good that's postulated by theists. Like the subjective good, absolute good specifies what constitutes appropriate behavior for humans and what constitutes appropriate behavior for God. Though different sects will accept this one concept, their interpretation of what specific behaviors are appropriate for man or God will differ. So while each adherent will believe that there is just one absolute good, there's no concensus on what that means.
For either type of good, a behavior inappropriate for man may or may not be appropriate for God. For example, you might personally feel that God can torture people, and yet you could turn out to be wrong in thinking that absolute good would allow it. In principle, there is no requirement that any tenet of a person's subjective good match the tenets of absolute good. It doesn't matter what you think God ought to do, you have no clue.
So it is suggested in this forum that the only good we can know that applies to God is our own subjective good. We can know how we feel about God taking some action. Of course, that's not worth a hill of beans because we cannot see the absolute good that would supposedly apply to him.
Now, let's be clear. We're saying that God can do anything, and it's not your place to judge him as right or wrong. He can kill, torture, and lie for ANY reason, and you have no way to claim he isn't being good by doing so.
(On what basis will you claim God doesn't lie? Surely not because he says so.)
So, please. If the ONLY good we can know (as it applies to God) is our subjective good, on what basis are you claiming that there is no problem of evil?
It seems you have three options:
1) God doesn't do anything that appears wrong to you.
2) The good cannot be properly defined in reference to God.
If you claim #2, then you admit that you don't know the meaning of the claim that "God is good." God could be a murdering, lying, rapist and the statement would still stand because (for all we can know) it's okay for infinite beings to murder, lie and rape their creations.
If you claim #1, then... well, I sure hope this isn't the case.
When did any of the theists say that God could do these things for ANY reason?
Paul,
I've considered asking many of you previously if you would consider arguing from my point of view once in awhile. I think it would be a great way to really test your own challenges.
This fair and honest approach you mentioned seemed to open the door for such an exchange, but alas, I was mistaken.
So let me begin on your latest.
No, No, No. I'm not saying god is bad because he punished innocents.
Well there's my first mistake, I was sure you were.
Your first two comments mentioned the Flood, but nothing about 18th century babies.
Paul |02.04.07 - 11:03 am | #
Paul | 02.04.07 - 4:15 pm | #
Your third presents your assessment of what's written in the Bible:
What DL and I are saying is that God's behavior, as written in the Bible, requires a contradicttory definition of good. Paul | 02.05.07 - 12:05 pm | #
Of course, as per your challenge above, this is not really a claim to have read the passages or to have any knowledge about the matter.
Then you went a few comments without referring to the Flood, but did again here:
Paul | 02.05.07 - 10:41 pm | #
And presented your strongest argument:
Do you really think it could be possible that the Flood, on balance, had an ultimately "good end," and was appropriate to the circumstance? Do you know how many innocent children suffered horribly as they drowned? Ever think what drowning must be like? What sort of monster would doom thousands or millions of innocent children to such a horrible death? How can you possibly say that such an action could have, ultimately, a "good end?!" I'd love for you to make such a case, taking in account the horrific nature of the deaths that *the entire planet* suffered.
Paul | 02.06.07 - 9:52 am | #
This sounds like you think it was bad, and still no mention of 18th century (or any other non-Flood) babies.
Nor was there in your next comment where you discuss the Flood:
Paul | 02.06.07 - 12:26 pm |
Finally, after many comments you finally compare those who perished in the Flood to those who subsequently have not.
Paul | 02.06.07 - 1:56 pm | #
But along the way, and prior to this idea, you allowed that God might just be a monster because of the Flood itself.
But I guess I misread all that.
Here you finally did find the iteration you now allude to:
How can it be fair that one six-month-old suffers like that at the direct hand of God and another doesn't?
Paul | 02.06.07 - 4:33 pm | #
I guess you didn't like my answer:
We are a fallen race and each of has death coming. It is fair that we each die, and we each will. The manner of our death is rarely of our choosing.
What is not fair is that God offers us, by His Grace, the free gift of salvation and forgiveness for our sins.
In fact you said so:
That is *so* not an answer to my question. The goodness or fairness is not about our *eventual* death, but about the particular death of babies in the flood compared to other babies. Now, of course, life isn't fair, but the point here is that the babies who died in the flood died at the direct hand of God. And you call that Good?!
And never did answer the question which I asked you to answer in order to qualify your challenge:
Rather than rage incessantly in an emotional pique why not demonstrate that it's not?
Three days later you returned to say you would return, but didn't answer the question.
After six days you repeated your idea to David that "good" isn't well defined enough with respect to God, and made a few jabs at 'blind faith' but didn't answer the questions which would indicate you had a reason to say this. You didn't answer when I explicitly reminded you either.
You mentioned to David your point about God's actions being the same as those we'd call evil if it weren't that God was the one doing them, but did so with no comparison to 18th century babies.
In fact, you put your point in a nutshell for me:
It's not *my* definition, it's *your* definition of good which, for God, will include absolutely anything, which makes it not a definition at all. *That's* the problem.
That's it in a nutshell. Refute that idea *on its own terms* and you will win me over.
No comparison there either.
But soon the difference between "Flood and nonFlood -babies"was the actual question.
The actual question is why God's actions aren't good in our common understanding of the term. The killing of 6-month old babies in the flood, while not killing 6-month-olds after the flood, is a good example for me.
Bringing my response, and reminder about unanswered questions:
But you didn't answer any of the questions that allow you to say this. You didn't tell me what God said about those babies, what conditions they were being born into, or what the results of the Flood were in comparison to the pre-Flood world. You just don't know if this was a good or a bad thing or if, as per DL, the judgment can be logically good because of the greater good of the outcome. You make no case.
You asked a follow-up to my reply about all flesh being wicked:
But Charlie, is flesh any less wicked now? Why the difference in God's behavior toward us?
I never said it was bad for God to show mercy, I'm merely trying to make sense of why he shows mercy to some but not to others (like babies in the flood).
Paul | 02.14.07 - 3:26 pm | #
And demonstrated that now your goal is merely trying to find out why God's actions may differ from one time to another.
Which I answered:
I'm not omniscient but given the description in Genesis I'd say "yes" [re:wickedness].
But that's not actually relevant because all flesh was wicked, so your innocents were not innocents.
We know that all have sinned, and that the wages of sin is death. So we know that all of us will die, and deserve to. Physical bodily death is not an option for us, not even for Noah and his family.
If God allows an environment in which some will live to 100 and some won't that doesn't change that fact. Whatever mercy God chooses to show, and for whatever reason He chooses it, this does not impact the justice and mercy He showed previously.
He is impartial, shows no favouritism, is just and merciful, but He does have purposes.
Which brings us to your adamant:No, No, No. I'm not saying god is bad because he punished innocents. I'm saying that its inconsistent to use the word good to describe God punishing babies in the flood as good and to describe God *not* punishing babies nowadays as good. That makes *anything* good.
The question of what mercy is not relevant. My point is the difference in treatment that God metes out to babies, which is impenetrable unless you first conclude that anything that God does is good. But that makes the definition of the word "good" useless.
So we've established that it was not bad, in your eyes, for God to have caused the Flood and to have destroyed all of the corrupt and wicked people of the Earth, sparing the righteous Noah and his family, and selecting them to repopulate the planet.
This is good.
This is progress (to me - apparently you were never contending that this was bad.)
And now you ignore my answers that we know the situation pre-Flood (all flesh was corrupt, men were wicked) and that is why God acted as He did, while we do not know that all flesh is equally corrupted now.
You just presume that God should be killing babies forever because He once caused the Flood. Of course you also balk when I ask you why you think He should not be merciful and should wipe out our entire species.
So I told you how I was going to answer (vis-a-vis the legal system and the parable of the workers) and you still demand that
Justice needs to be applied fairly. Why one justice for flood babies and another for 18th century babies?
So let's see what I know that you don't.
First of all, there is not “one justice” and “another”. It is merely justice.
Second, there is no reason that justice cannot be applied fairly and mete out different penalties/rewards.
Say a lifetime reprobate with a record a mile long steals a cell phone and the judge throws the book at him. Justice was served.
An expectant mother with another baby at home also steals a cell phone. It is her first offense and the same judge sentences her to probation.
Justice is again served.
Two different sentences for the same crime.
Somewhat as an aside, remember also, being a relativist, that previously you finally had to admit that justice can be served by the repayment of a debt by an innocent second party and that justice can be served even where the crimes of a father are passed onto his family.
You have no leg to stand on now demanding an unswerving duplication of identical consequences as a requirement for justice.
Your demand that everybody be treated the exact same in different circumstances is illogical on its face and dismal upon even a cursory second look.
So what about the parable?
Jesus tells us about a man who hired different labourers to work in his field at different intervals throughout the day.
Each man he hired he offered the same wage, one denarius for the day. At the end of the day he paid up and each man received the wage he had agreed upon, even though they had not all worked the same amount of time. Some had worked as little as an hour.
The man replied to the grumblers:
'Friend, I am not being unfair to you. Didn't you agree to work for a denarius? 14 Take your pay and go. I want to give the man who was hired last the same as I gave you. 15 Don't I have the right to do what I want with my own money? Or are you envious because I am generous?'
This was just and good.
I said it before and will repeat it here, we are all sinners, we are all fallen, we are all going to die. God has no obligation to remove all of us just because He did so once (in fact, He explicitly promised that that was the one time that all life would be cut off by a worldwide flood).
There is no demand of goodness or justice that He take everyone at the same age, just as there was no obligation for the vineyard owner to pay each the same hourly wage. He only had to pay them what they had coming to them (as per your idea of good).
If we die at 6 months or 60 years, if we die by drowning, heart attack, or auto accident Jesus' question to the disciples applies here:
"What is that to you?"
DL,
David, Charlie and Steve ask us to believe that there's no problem of evil at all.
No I don't. I just think the problem has a solution.
Paul is right on target.
I would beg to differ. See above.
The problem is that the theists here are not being consistent and rigorous with their definitions.
You are welcome to demonstrate this as well.
So, please. If the ONLY good we can know (as it applies to God) is our subjective good, on what basis are you claiming that there is no problem of evil?
I'm not.
God could be a murdering, lying, rapist and the statement would still stand because (for all we can know) it's okay for infinite beings to murder, lie and rape their creations.
Once again, your evil God scenario is illogical.
It is as self-refuting as would be any claim that we cannot reason or that we cannot have knowledge about our environment.
I showed you many of the attributes which we accept as being good and that they apply as well to God. There is no problem in our knowing what 'good' is, in defining it, or in being consistent with it. If we cannot know that rape, torture and lying for ANY reason are bad then we are imbeciles and can't know anything. If we can't know anything we can't know that there is an evil god, a good God, or no God at all.
If an evil being is running the universe, and lying to us about it, then we can only believe the truth if this wicked and incomprehensible being wills us to. As Victor Reppert says in analysis of Lewis "If they are true [Ockhamism or the evil god thesis] then no one could know this or anything else."
Where the problem does lie is in our presuming, as limited and finite human creatures, as though we can know all of the circumstances behind every action.
Where we do have some knowledge of the circumstances we can point to the good in God's actions. You have had many days to demonstrate the evil and have yet to do so.
Charlie,
So it is conceivably okay for God to rape or torture a human? Even given the fact that he's omnipotent and always has better alternatives? God has justifies rape by his need for what?
I said it before and will repeat it here, we are all sinners, we are all fallen, we are all going to die. God has no obligation to remove all of us just because He did so once (in fact, He explicitly promised that that was the one time that all life would be cut off by a worldwide flood).Ah, there is no Hell? Well, we have agreement there. You should probably tell everyone you know that there is no Hell, because I think every Christian I know is pretty sure there is one.
Every toddler is a sinner by our own subjective good. Should we let them die, if we love them? Let them stick a fork in an electrical outlet? Deny them the drugs they need to survive because they threw a tantrum? Should we withdraw our love if they want nothing to do with us?
What you are saying is that, for God, love is conditional.
Reminds me of the Monty Python Mosquito Hunter sketch: "I love animals. That's why I like to kill 'em."
Charlie, you're trying to win your argument by overwhelming me. Should I respond to every single point your bring up? Isn't there a way to summarize all that? It's too much, and all of it isn't necessary.
So, short of responding to every single point you just brought up, I'm not sure how to respond.
DL,
None of your points follow from or address anything I wrote.
You didn't get a single thing right - unless the Python quote is accurate.
Paul,
Charlie, you're trying to win your argument by overwhelming me.
And I suppose you know what I really believe as well?
Your commitment to fairness and honesty only lasts long enough to post a platitude?
Should I respond to every single point your bring up?
No, it's not meant for point-by-point response.
Isn't there a way to summarize all that?
That is a summary (in part).
It's too much, and all of it isn't necessary.
You might be right. I'm not an expert.
So, short of responding to every single point you just brought up, I'm not sure how to respond.
How about you read it and respond to that which is necessary and requires a response?
Oh gosh, let me help you out.
There is no response required for:
1) my personal hope that you might sometime try to argue from my point of view
2) the summary of how I came to think you were trying to say the Flood itself was bad, and not, as you now claim, that it is merely God's failure to treat each and every child to the exact same fate that you want to call bad
3) my noting that you appeared to be claiming some Biblical knowledge when you had none
That covers the first comment.
The second is mostly a summary of questions and answers from each of us - it already demonstrates your responses, so no further is required.
You could respond to paragraph 3 in the third comment, where I conclude that we agree that you have no case, and, in fact, never intended to make one, that the Flood evinces any wrong-doing on God's part.
Having your affirmation there would hit my ear just swell.
In paragraph 6 I make the point about justice, which I think you should have seen coming a mile away. You could agree with me on that point, if you'd like.
The last is a summary of my answers to you and you could just confirm that they defeat your claim.
That's how I think you should respond.
You'll have to make your own decision, though.
DL,
David, Charlie and Steve ask us to believe that there's no problem of evil at all. I guess all those theologians were wrong!
First, thank you for grouping me with those other gentlemen. It is clearly undeserved; but, thank you anyway. As to all those 'theologians' . . . Well, as an example, I assume you would group Augustine in there. (I certainly don't belong in a group with him either.) Nevertheless, he did get some pretty important things wrong. So, great theologians are still not omniscient and general appeals to their wisdom may not always be a good tactic.
Now, do I actually "believe that there's no problem of evil at all" -- not at all. I can not parse that problem to my own satisfaction. And, this is the part that must just drive you up a wall; I trust God. He doesn't owe me an explanation. I must admit that I am curious; but, that's not the same as having a problem with it.
(On what basis will you claim God doesn't lie? Surely not because he says so.)
Actually, that's exactly the reason. And, yes, if He is some 'evil' being, He certainly has the power to deceive me. So, He could have manipulated all of the writers of the Bible to write a fiction and make Him out to be just the opposite of who He really is. I can't get behind that; I'm locked into this physical existence (for now). However, if He really is that evil monster, what difference could it make for me to figure that out? I'm cooked and helpless to do anything about it.
There's subjective good that's personal and/or cultural. Such a standard specifies what is appropriate behavior for humans and what is appropriate for God.
Specification or definition would not seem to be the problem. God (in the Bible) has defined 'good' for us. Some may have a problem with interpreting this; but, the definition is there. Now, as it turns out the definition of good for me and for you and for God is exactly the same thing. 'Good' for me is to love others (including God); God is described as love; it's His very nature. Now, definitions are really important here. The best definition of love (Greek agape; not eros nor storge nor phileo) that I have come across is 'the unselfish seeking of the true welfare of the other.' So, when I do this I am doing 'good' and when God does anything in line with His very nature (which is the only thing He can do) then He too is 'good.' So, the problem is not a 'problem of evil' it is that I want to be omniscient and I'm not; but, I make decisions (e.g., God is evil) as if I am. I think a better question is 'who did it? The answer to that question tells us whether or not it was 'good.' By the way, when Jesus said that only God was good He was saying the same thing. NO human can love; only when God loves through them do they appear to be loving. But, that's probably another thread . . .
There is no demand of goodness or justice that He take everyone at the same age, just as there was no obligation for the vineyard owner to pay each the same hourly wage. He only had to pay them what they had coming to them (as per your idea of good).
If we die at 6 months or 60 years, if we die by drowning, heart attack, or auto accident Jesus' question to the disciples applies here:
"What is that to you?"
This sums it up pretty well, Charlie. Your example of justice via the stolen cell phone was also good. Justice is applied differently, but applied nonetheless. Mercy is applied differently, but applied nonetheless.
The complaints from Paul and DL about 'unequal justice' are really complaints about 'unequal mercy'. They take a good thing and complain that it isn't applied equally. That, they say, is God being evil.
Charlie, thanks for the suggestion on how to respond, I was serious when I asked it, and you answered it seriously, too.
But, The third paragraph in the third comment is, I think,
So we've established that it was not bad, in your eyes, for God to have caused the Flood and to have destroyed all of the corrupt and wicked people of the Earth, sparing the righteous Noah and his family, and selecting them to repopulate the planet.and now I'm not sure to what in that I should be responding.
This is good.
This is progress (to me - apparently you were never contending that this was bad.)
Paul and DL:
First DL:
So it is conceivably okay for God to rape or torture a human? Even given the fact that he's omnipotent and always has better alternatives? God has justifies rape by his need for what?
No it's not OK to rape or torture. Those concepts imply that the person is undeserving of the action. The evilness is built into the definition of the word. Rape and torture are done to people undeserving of such treatment.
Now Paul & DL:
Getting what you deserve is called justice. Immediate justice is good because you deserved it according to the law. Delayed justice is good because mercy has been extended. No justice is evil. Hopefully you agree with all of this.
So let's start from the beginning. Let's boil this down as much as possible by looking at the "theist's own standards" in it's most basic form.
God said the a) penalty of sin is death, and b) justice is required. If getting what you deserve is good, if immediate justice is good and if delayed justice (mercy) is good, then where is the evil?
I could be wrong, but my guess is you both think it's in the way the justice is carried out. If not, then tell me your complaint in the most concise way possible.
That's the one, Paul.
My conclusion is that, by our shared standard, you do not think it was bad for God to have caused the Flood.
I draw this conclusion from your position that you merely question God's goodness on the basis that He does not drown all children as He did in the Flood and no longer (or never did, if I was so mistaken) on the basis of the killing of those you had previously termed 'innocent'.
Do you dispute my findings?
If so, why?
David,
I can not parse that problem to my own satisfaction. And, this is the part that must just drive you up a wall; I trust God. He doesn't owe me an explanation. I must admit that I am curious; but, that's not the same as having a problem with it...So, let's analyze this.
And, yes, if He is some 'evil' being, He certainly has the power to deceive me. So, He could have manipulated all of the writers of the Bible to write a fiction and make Him out to be just the opposite of who He really is....
However, if He really is that evil monster, what difference could it make for me to figure that out? I'm cooked and helpless to do anything about it.
1) There is an apparent problem of evil. It remains a mystery how the subjective evil we see can be reconciled with an all good God.
2) You agree that God could be subjectively evil, and we would be unable to tell the difference based on our experiences.
3) You claim that if God were subjectively evil, it would make no difference to you to know about this. This can be interpreted in multiple ways.
3a) You could mean that your life experiences would be no different whether or not God is evil (recapitulating #2). That is, whether God is subjectively good or evil, he seems to like life on Earth the way it is.
3b) Alternatively, #3 could mean that you cannot "win the game of life" were God subjectively evil. You would be "cooked" as you put it.
In light of #2, a belief that God is good is blind faith. Worse, it is a blind faith that admits no confirmation or falsification. You could find yourself in Hell, not know where you went wrong, and still not have confirmation or falsification of the claim that "God is good".
You seem to suggest that how you feel about a conclusion dictates whether it ought to be considered. You do not like the idea that God is evil, so it merits no consideration from you. I find this rather interesting. Do you think I should consider the possibility that the Christian God exists given that I find such a God evil and unpleasant?
Finally, it seems far from obvious to me that you are cooked if God isn't completely good in a subjective way. A non-good God may demand you perform some act in order not to be cooked, or he may arbitrarily spare you. In that case, it seems to me that a non-good God is as worthy of consideration as an all good one. (BTW, to me, the Christian God is not all good, and he demands action from me that will save me from being cooked.)
Steve,
No it's not OK to rape or torture. Those concepts imply that the person is undeserving of the action.So, no torture takes place in Hell. Okay.
Would torment be an appropriate word? Can I torment another person (to the point they would wish they were dead) if they "deserve" it? Would I be good if I did that?
Getting what you deserve is called justice. Immediate justice is good because you deserved it according to the law. Delayed justice is good because mercy has been extended. No justice is evil. Hopefully you agree with all of this.I don't agree with it. Justice is not about deserving things. It's about right action. It's about what leads to the best outcome for all involved, even for the bad guy.
So, if mercy is good, then why not extend it indefinitely?
DL:
Apart from all the other failings of moral relativism, apart from general question begging, and apart from being quite unconvincing, you're in no position to objectively claim justice is "about right action. It's about what leads to the best outcome for all involved, even for the bad guy." You wear the mask of a moral relativist, but there are certain absolutist elements lurking just under the surface—as witnessed by your use of the terms "right," "best," and "bad." When you can consistently apply your moral relativism, then maybe there will be something worth considering in what you assert. Otherwise, few if any will purchase what you're peddling. And please don't impose the tired, old assertion that I, as a trained philosopher, don't know what moral relativism is about; while you (as a mere physicist) apparently do... inconsistently, of course.
DL,
In your haste to dispute everything a theist says you have once again answered your own question and exposed the chink in your thinking.
Q:
So, if mercy is good, then why not extend it indefinitely?
A:
Justice is ... about what leads to the best outcome for all involved, even for the bad guy.
And using your definition of justice, just what is the best outcome for the bad-guy.
Surely it's more than mashing together every combination of positive goods we can think of ie. condoning mercifully, tolerating patiently, or kindly comforting?
Is it ever sternly correcting?
ps. By saying you disagree with SteveK on what justice is I'm sure you meant to say that you have a different opinion of what it is as far as what you feel about it. You certainly aren't disputing, a la relativism, that SteveK's opinion is as he claimed.
Ditto Holopupenko.
We've seen the lurker many times.
On that subject it makes your one-time claim that justice can NEVER be served by the payment by a third party of the debt of another.
While I'm away you can chew on this.
John owes me $50 but threatens to smash my face in if I try to collect.
Not wanting my face smashed in I decide it is best for all involved that I just let it go.
Was justice served?
How far are you going to regress along the line of "best for all involved" in order to support your claim? All the way to cosmic and eternal consequences?
Paul, I'm seeing a one-dimensionality in your approach. Here's one example:
Justice needs to be applied fairly. Why one justice for flood babies and another for 18th century babies?
If the only relevant fact was that they lived a certain length of time and then died, then justice might be hard to explain. But God allows for justice in other ways, including beyond death.
doctor(logic),
So it is conceivably okay for God to rape or torture a human? Even given the fact that he's omnipotent and always has better alternatives? God has justifies rape by his need for what?
God's omnipotence, by Christian theology, is limited by what is logically possible, so that would limit his range of "better alternatives." There are apparently facets of person-growth that don't happen without pain. This is well known, by the way; it's not just a theistic belief. It's entirely conceivable that a world without pain would be bland and flat; more importantly, that persons without the experience of pain would be bland, weak, and flabby in character. Further: it's not just conceivable, but it's philosophically likely, that a world where persons were incapable of making choices, both right and wrong, would be a world where persons don't even exist in any way that we think of the term. And if persons can make wrong choices, it's not much of a stretch to think those wrong choices would be followed by unpleasant results.
Now, if your charge is that God's goodness is logically contradicted by the fact of evil in the world, the burden of proof is on you to show that what I've suggested here is logically incoherent. Is that your charge?
Can I torment another person (to the point they would wish they were dead) if they "deserve" it? Would I be good if I did that?
Yes. Before a kneejerk reaction kicks in, consider the person sentenced to death for the murder of a innocent child. In the quietness of their mind, with the Light of Truth shining on that which was done, it becomes clear that what they did was evil. That realization then creates a torment, or torture, from within. It's called guilt/shame/regret and yes it's a good thing.
Justice is not about deserving things. It's about right action. It's about what leads to the best outcome for all involved, even for the bad guy.
Charlie and Holo covered this pretty well.
So, if mercy is good, then why not extend it indefinitely?
That's called 'no justice'. I thought you would agree that it's not good. Think about how that would play out on earth. No courts, no police, no guilty verdicts with or without mercy. I fail to see how that can be good.
Justice: one of the four cardinal virtues; defined as the strong and firm will to give to each his due, but this does not imply that each be given exactly the same due because an equality of proportion is demanded (not all are equal in rational capacities, talents, social status, experience, age, maturity, virtues and vices, etc., etc., but all humans are equal in dignity in the eyes of God.) In a broader context this also includes the objective right that is owed to each person and community, on the basis of either natural law or the just legislation of the state, and, sometimes, the laws or statues in which consequent obligations are expressed. The precise role of the virtue of justice is to facilitiate the unbiased search for objective right and so to determine the will to acknowledge and fulfill that right as known.
But God allows for justice in other ways, including beyond death.
Boy, that's handy.
Gives me hope that some of those wicked babies he drowned might have a chance to change their evil ways.
Plus, death is no escape for people that think he is the sickest idea ever dreamed up by man, and would rather just take a dirt nap.
Are there no people in the God story who just get to die? Like lambs or bacteria? Your idea is that God created us as immortal just so he could keep pounding us over the head with how good he is, until we agree? And if say drowning babies is wrong, we can't even get away from the sicko explanations about how we don't "understand" wrong even after we die?
I have a simple research project. How many evil deeds did the devil do in the bible? How may people did he ever kill? Drown? "Smite"? Any at all, directly? Have to get to work, otherwise I would have time to look into it.
DL,
I sincerely tried to clarify my views in the last message. Based on your response, I didn't do well. I really am sorry since I have been giving your responses a great deal of thought. Although I must admit to a mild headache from trying to follow all of the if . . then . . elses. But, I am not complaining.
It remains a mystery how the subjective evil we see can be reconciled with an all good God.
I hope you are not including me in the 'we.' I believe you described subjective good/evil as "Such a standard specifies what is appropriate behavior for humans and what is appropriate for God. There could be as many subjective goods as there are people." I agree with the last sentence but I am not one of those in the first sentence. Deciding what is appropriate behavior for God is well above my paygrade. Remember I said I trust Him. Also, if what He says about Himself is true then He is incapable of perpetrating evil. It isn't logical; it's definitional. And, with our free-will we can choose to not believe Him. We can even call Him a foolish myth.
You claim that if God were subjectively evil . . .
Here's where I really must have misled you. I was not in any way talking about subjective evil as you seem to be using it here. What I was postulating was the hypothetical that God has intentionally lied to us and fabricated a 'loving god' myth. That in reality He actually is an evil monster. Not according to my personal opinion; but, in real truth. If that were to be our lot (and it is NOT) then nothing would really matter and you and I and all the other humans would be 'cooked.' BTW, I wasn't thinking of hell when I used the word 'cooked.'
In light of #2, a belief that God is good is blind faith. Worse, it is a blind faith that admits no confirmation or falsification. You could find yourself in Hell, not know where you went wrong, and still not have confirmation or falsification of the claim that "God is good".
Sorry to repeat but God as described in the Bible is good. There is simply no question in my mind on that score. He is love and having Him taking care of me is the most secure place in which I can imagine being. NOW, if that were to all be a lie (intentionally perpetrated on all of us by God) then there is no way for us to find that out. He is just too smart to be caught. So, please forgive me for introducing this ridiculous hypothetical. It must have been too obtuse.
You do not like the idea that God is evil, so it merits no consideration from you.
In truth, I don't have a problem with you or anybody else holding that God is evil. I have simply come to a different conclusion.
Do you think I should consider the possibility that the Christian God exists given that I find such a God evil and unpleasant?
I assume you know most of the arguments for and against God's existence. You may even know more of what is in the Bible than I do. Also, I'm probably on firm ground in saying that you have already reached your own conclusion on this point. All I might add is that the question of His goodness or evilness is really not a meaningful input to that decision. What He asks and has always asked is for each of us to decide to believe Him. We can do that whether He is good or evil. It just so happens He is good, very good.
H,
Shooting the messenger again?
I didn't use the words "absolute" or "objective" in my claims, so there's not a lot of point in whining about the fact that I can't show they are objective. I'm relying on our respective subjective senses of right and wrong. If those senses don't agree, then there's truly no problem of evil for you, and our respective positions aren't persuasive to each other.
P.S. If I am a mere physicist, you are a mere theologian.
Good thoughts David. I was reminded of something after reading your last thought:
All I might add is that the question of His goodness or evilness is really not a meaningful input to that decision. What He asks and has always asked is for each of us to decide to believe Him. We can do that whether He is good or evil. It just so happens He is good, very good.
This is something I've thought about for some time now. I don't buy into the idea that "might makes right", but your point is well taken. God will do what he will do, regardless of what we humans think about it. Our ongoing debate about good and evil won't change any of that. God is who he is.
Can you imagine God deviating from what he says is good, however you want to define the term, just because people call it evil? I can't either.
People can define 'good' in absolute terms or relativistic terms and the result is the same - God will do what is good according to him. Some will call this "might makes right", however I prefer to call it "reality".
I'm sure many will stand before God and shout "You're an evil bastard". I'm pretty sure the response will be something like "I'm sorry you think that way, but it's a fact that I'm loving and good and that fact trumps your opinion of me."
Tom, what are the other relevant facts?
If the only relevant fact was that they lived a certain length of time and then died, then justice might be hard to explain. But God allows for justice in other ways, including beyond death.And what other type of justice might justify killing Flood babies and not other babies? I'd like to hear this *fully* fleshed out (Charlie, wanna try?).
Sorry to stray off-topic, but
God's omnipotence, by Christian theology, is limited by what is logically possibleSo why didn't God create logic such that he wouldn't be limited by it, and if God didn't create logic, where did it come from?
Tom,
Are you saying that you think that the world is as good as it can be? I don't buy that. You're working in reverse. God is absolutely good, so his negligence and any harm he does to such puny creatures as ourselves must be the right thing for him to do.
Again, I have to bring up the analogy with the Lord of the Flies. Where is our parent? Shouldn't God be as visible and protective as a mother? I have incontrovertible, objective evidence for my mother and her actions. None for God.
God's direct, continuous, objective intervention does not impact our free will anymore than physics does. It does not stop us throwing tantrums occasionally. That's what children do.
And do you mean to suggest that if a child misbehaves, you don't love them and protect them anymore? Is torture and death the best thing for their well-being? That doesn't sound right to me (subjectively, y'all).
If God's moral law is too inconvenient and demanding, there's always this.
Eric, you responded to me this way:
But God allows for justice in other ways, including beyond death.
Boy, that's handy.
That remark is pertinent when criticizing a theory that doesn't survive without ad hoc additions to save the theory. It brings to mind what what was said of logical positivism: "it died the death of a thousand qualifications"--handy, as you call it, additions that kept getting piled on top of what was originally supposed to be a simple theory, until it became apparent that they were just multiple jury-rigged repairs, attempting to fix a failed system.
But justice after death is not ad hoc. It's at the heart of our belief, and it has been for millenia. It's at the core of what we believe about God, about his creation, about humans, and about our relationship with God. We didn't just toss it in as a fudge factor.
In other words, if you find it strange that various portions of our belief system really fit together in a strikingly convenient way, maybe you could also consider that they fit together because the system actually works.
Steve,
God will do what he will do, regardless of what we humans think about it. Our ongoing debate about good and evil won't change any of that. God is who he is.If we humans are not rationally, reliably capable of concluding that God exists and is good, then that's our own fault? If honest people can conclude that morality is relative, that God doesn't exist, and that there is a problem of evil, then I think that this in itself is part of the problem of evil, isn't it?
Again, the toddler analogy. If a 5-year-old fails to be disciplined and fails to understand the nuances of ethics, what is the appropriate course of action for we who are far superior? Hold the 5-year-old accountable with infinite torture?
doctor(logic), it would help if you would clarify what your charge is, as I asked earlier today.
Are you saying that the concept of God is logically contradictory or incoherent on account of this problem? Or are you trying to understand theism better? Or something else?
Paul,
And what other type of justice might justify killing Flood babies and not other babies? I'd like to hear this *fully* fleshed out (Charlie, wanna try?).
Paul | 02.15.07 - 7:18 pm | #
I'd love to answer you.
Can you make a coherent question out of this that respects the fact of what justice is, and acknowledges that you've read one word I've said in response to your previous iterations of this complaint?
Tom,
Excellent last paragraph:
In other words, if you find it strange that various portions of our belief system really fit together in a strikingly convenient way, maybe you could also consider that they fit together because the system actually works.
Tom Gilson | Homepage | 02.15.07 - 8:56 pm | #
Tom,
You said that "because the system actually works"--works at what? What does our beliefs system work at? Giving us meaning? Making us feel secure in our time here on earth? What exactly does our belief system do? Could you be more specific? Saying that our belief system works is open ended and begs for specificity. Or have I missed something further up the blog line.
If we humans are not rationally, reliably capable of concluding that God exists and is good, then that's our own fault?
But we are capable. Something like 90% + of us throughout history have demonstrated this fact.
If honest people can conclude that morality is relative,
Then you won't have a problem if God actually turns out to be a relativist like you - or will you?.
that God doesn't exist,
Covered this above. Some people also conclude the earth is flat. As the saying goes: You can lead a horse to water...
and that there is a problem of evil, then I think that this in itself is part of the problem of evil, isn't it?
Nobody casually brushes off the presence of evil. We've dealt with this objection many times.
Again, the toddler analogy. If a 5-year-old fails to be disciplined and fails to understand the nuances of ethics, what is the appropriate course of action for we who are far superior? Hold the 5-year-old accountable with infinite torture?
You should know, I hope, that God deals with individuals according their ability to understand. We know by experience that justice is served in many different ways. A 5-year old child will be judged fairly just as you and I will be judged fairly. God promises that. I wonder how God will judge babies and young children, but I don't fear they will be judged unfairly.
Jacob, what I meant this time is that it holds together coherently or consistently. That was the context of that part of the discussion.
Tom,
Are you saying that the concept of God is logically contradictory or incoherent on account of this problem? Or are you trying to understand theism better? Or something else?Ultimately, I think that the concept of God is neither consistent nor meaningful, but I don't want to broaden the issue unnecessarily. I'll stick to the "God is good" claim.
My claim relates to how "goodness" is grounded. Goodness among humans is grounded in our experience. Based on experiences of actions, consequences and our emotions, we have are able to grade actions as being good or bad. Needless to say, this grade is subjective.
You claim God is absolutely good by definition. However, you can only defend this position when the goodness of God is perfectly isolated from his apparent actions.
How do we know it is isolated? When I can ask whether there is anything we could see in the world that would count as evidence against the existence of such a God, I am told by theists that no such evidence is possible, i.e.:
P(Good God|anything at all) = P(Good God)
Now, if the theists were saying that there is indeed dramatic evidence that no such good God exists, but that they put their faith in such a God anyway, that would be different.
Suppose a man is diagnosed with a terminal illness. Thanks to statistics, he has dramatic evidence that he will likely die very soon. Consequently, he chooses to put his faith in medicine because he might be one of the lucky ones. However, he would be delusional if his faith translated into a belief that his disease was not deadly. For the deadliness of the disease is grounded in statistics and experience. It is a confusion to redefine the term deadly outside of this grounding.
Suppose the man recovers. Does his recovery imply that the disease is not deadly? It does not. To say that his disease was not deadly would be to redefine the term deadly.
So let's apply this back to the question of God and the good.
(continued...)
Good is defined relative to human experience, i.e., we see a person act in a certain way, and can subjectively regard that act as evil. We then see things in the universe that suggest that God is evil. That is, we expect that:
P(Good God|evil) < P(Good God)
Since we value the concept of God and the afterlife and absolute morality, we prefer to believe that God is good no matter how low the probability appears to be.
So far so good. We can recognize that
P(Good God|evil) < (much less than) 1
and yet have faith that God is good anyway.
However, once we start claiming that
P(Good God|anything) = P(Good God)
we've lost the meaning of goodness altogether. The grounding for the word has vanished.
Our experience says that God should not allow good people to die by tsunami, but he does, so our experiential grounding says God is evil. But when we are committed to the proposition that God is good that we are willing to revise our definition of the good, then we're deluding ourselves.
Just to anticipate an objection: I don't deny that you think preventable tsunami are evil. I think you're letting faith (=assumption) turn into faith (=redefinition).
One more thing.
You have argued that the goodness of God might frame the Christian perspective, and that goodness is defined differently in your worldview. For example, you may argue that
P(Good God|anything) = P(Good God) = 1
in the same way that
P(1=1|anything) = P(1=1) = 1
There may well be questions that are meaningless, like
P(1=1|1=2) = ?
So, then we might expect that there is some comparable question
P(Good God|X) = ?
which is meaningless because X, while being relevant to the goodness of God, is logically impossible. For example, since the goodness of God is axiomatic, it would be meaningless to ask
P(Good God|God is evil) = ?
I expect you can see a number of familiar theist points appearing in this analysis. The problem now is connecting the axiom to experience.
If nothing counts as evidence that God is not good, then nothing counts as evidence that he is good either:
P(Good God|therapeutic prayer study) = P(Good God) = 1
No matter how the study turns out. So you cannot have it both ways. If God is axiomatically good, then there's no experiential evidence for that goodness. The goodness of God has nothing whatsoever to do with any experience we will ever have.
DL,
You've wrapped your mathiness around some very tenuous assertions which seem almost to hide amidst your equations. But these are assertions which have been answered many times which answers you continue to ignore in favour of your own preferences.
However, you can only defend this position when the goodness of God is perfectly isolated from his apparent actions.
Incorrect.
We can look at God's actions and locate the goodness.
This is not, however, how we discovered His goodness.
When I can ask whether there is anything we could see in the world that would count as evidence against the existence of such a God, I am told by theists that no such evidence is possible, i.e.:
Show that it is.
Demonstrate (logically, of course) that an Ultimate Evil can exist. Can 'evil' create?
The ordering of the universe, the proper functioning of nature, the life cycle, natural law - these are necessarily good ('Good' is defined in terms of absolutes and ultimates - when God said that His creation was good he wasn't making an aesthetic judgment, but was relating to us its purpose and correspondence to His will ). These are part of our standards.
We couldn't even have a universe with an evil-Ultimate, and as mentioned twice before, we couldn't know anything in such a universe - if it could survive the physical chaos in the first place.
But we can know things, can't we?
And ethically, as before, you can't even have evil without the logical priority of goodness.
Evil does not exist as a thing unto itself.
We then see things in the universe that suggest that God is evil.
Bold but refuted assertion.
Some of us do not see things that suggest God is evil.
Since we value the concept of God and the afterlife and absolute morality, we prefer to believe that God is good no matter how low the probability appears to be.
I see no reason to accept that the probability of God's goodness is low although, unfortunately, I am not properly versed in probability equations so as to gain anything from your mathy demonstrations.
Then again, neither was anything convincing demonstrated to me by those cheesy TV commercials showing the cartoon effects of a pill entering a cartoon man's stomach.
Our experience says that God should not allow good people to die by tsunami, but he does, so our experiential grounding says God is evil.
To whose experience are we referring here?
If nothing counts as evidence that God is not good, then nothing counts as evidence that he is good either:
I'm not certain it was claimed we needed evidence (the kind you are talking about) to know that God is good.
Nonetheless we do know that God is good and we can demonstrate so against your objections, via His actions as well as His words.
doctor(logic),
I'm glad I asked what your charge is, because it's not what I thought it was. I thought you were trying to say that the goodness of God is an incoherent or inconsistent concept. In your comments at 11:52 last night (EST, that is ) and following, what you really said was that if God is good by definition, and no experience could count against that assertion, then we don't have a testable definition of good by which to assess whether God is in fact good.
This is very different from saying, as some do in this kind of discussion, that God is impossible due to the problem of evil. You're saying instead, I think, that if we posit God, we don't know and can't assess what his goodness is.
You may have been saying that all along, and I have missed it up until now.
It's a definitional problem, and it's a testing problem, as you see it (I think):
A. Theism leads to a definition of good that is at best hard to understand, and at worst hard to swallow.
B. Theism also leaves no room for double-checking, to make sure that the claim, "God is good," can reliably be tested.
Am I right on this? I'm going to hope that I am and move on as if that's correct. I think that's what you've been saying, now that I look at it again.
If that's a fair statement of your view, let us note that neither the definitional problem nor the testing problem is much of problem for theism.
First, you cannot apply your own definition of good to theism:
Good is defined relative to human experience, i.e., we see a person act in a certain way, and can subjectively regard that act as evil. We then see things in the universe that suggest that God is evil.
If we're going to posit theism, then we cannot posit it with your definition of good. Under theism, good is not defined relative to human experience. It's defined relative to the character of God. If there is a system in which good is defined relative to human experience, it is something other than theism. And if God fails to live up to the expectations of a theory in which he does not exist, I don't think that counts very heavily against him living up to a theory in which he does.
This is a crux issue. Holopupenko has been trying (and his last post was short--he may be despairing of it) to help you see that you can't have it both ways. You can't use your relativistic definition of good against God, because as soon as you do, you're moving out of a discussion of actual theism.
Do you see that it's not up to us to make you comfortable with this definition of good or to agree with it? (I would like to do that, so that you could know God and his goodness personally, but for the sake of a defense of theism it's not necessary.) You have a view, perhaps also a feeling about good that is, I'm afraid to say, irrelevant to the question of God. You can say that if God exists under the theistic definition of good, you don't like him. Or you can say, "my conception of goodness makes the existence of God unlikely." But you can't say that the theists' conception of goodness makes the existence of God unlikely (as we're about to see further). And as I hope I showed two paragraphs above, it's the theistic conception that counts in this discussion.
Second, theism has an adequate definition of good; we are not lacking in that area. It has been defined variously in just this thread as love, desiring the best for the other (with an eternal, not a temporal view in mind), person-growing, something greater than mere comfort and peace; the manifestation of the glory of God; persons' conformity to the character of God as revealed especially in Jesus Christ, including his justice, righteousness, holiness, purity, wisdom, and so forth, especially his love. It is specifically not defined as that which feels or appears pleasant or desirable in the temporal scale, because it takes an eternal view. So we have a definition that has some reliability to it, and of course by definition good meets that criterion of good. So this cannot count against the coherence of theism.
Third, you presented this proposition, which I think is the best short statement of your concern about testability:
P(Good God|anything at all) = P(Good God)
(Translation for those who don't know the symbols: the probability of a Good God, given the fact of anything at all, is equivalent to the probability of a Good God, period, no matter what.)
I could agree with that, given the knowledge that "anything at all" is conditioned by the fact that God exists, he rules, he orders all of reality, and therefore all reality is good, but not all reality appears good in the limited view we have of eternity and all the possible contingencies. "Anything at all" does not include the possibility of something that is ultimately evil; but God works through contingencies and through the long time scale of eternal to preclude that happening. So "anything at all" is conditioned by theism to include "anything at all that God can permit." In the world of reality, that does indeed translate to "anything at all that we might possibly experience." So be it. Testability of God's goodness isn't something we can accomplish.
Fourth, the lack of such a test means that in terms of God's goodness, the evidence of common experience is neutral toward the question of God. We can't test it in those terms, so if that's all we have to go on, we have to say, "We don't know."
Fifth, theists say we have evidence of God's reality provided through many other means. Though it's not an everyday experience for anyone today, God has in fact dramatically intervened in history to provide both an explanation and many demonstrations of his goodness. We can thus say that God's goodness is demonstrated clearly in Scripture. I can also say I see it borne out in personal experience through my relationship with God through faith. Millions of others would agree with that. There's much more I could and probably should say about that. Christian believers find through experience that the truth, "God is good," holds up even when we are going through the most painfully difficult circumstances. We find it to be true under the test of personal experience.
That may not have evidential value to you. I don't think I have to worry about that--at the least, you can't say it counts against theism. For us, who actually put faith to the test, it holds up. I could say more on this topic, but this is long enough already.
Therefore, if my understanding of your charge is correct--if you're saying the problem of evil is a problem of definition and of testability--then the charge does not count against the probability of God. Our answer to the charge, in terms of everyday experience, also does not count in favor of the probability of God. But we look to other evidences and other sources.
Or, to put this whole long post in much shorter terms, I'm going to echo Charlie's last paragraphs in his last comment:
Our experience says that God should not allow good people to die by tsunami, but he does, so our experiential grounding says God is evil.
To whose experience are we referring here?
If nothing counts as evidence that God is not good, then nothing counts as evidence that he is good either
I'm not certain it was claimed we needed evidence (the kind you are talking about) to know that God is good.
Nonetheless we do know that God is good and we can demonstrate so against your objections, via His actions as well as His words.
You have covered it all Tom. There is no room for argument, because the theist as you have described them leave no room for argument. It leads right back to anything and everything being proof of God, which says nothing to anyone else.
It is all proof that you don't need no stinkin proof.
Isn't that handy. The system does work, but a system that only has the function of keeping the system going doesn't do anything... unless you ask the system. Someone asked what a working Theism does earlier. Would you agree that it's main "job" is keeping itself going? And in the case of Christianity, sucking others in as well?
Thanks for the gracious reference to my comment, Tom.
I was feeling quite embarrassed by it as I read yours and was going to ask for its deletion.
Charlie, we've both expressed frustration (a little, at least) with each other not following up on the other's points. That's why I invited everyone over to honestargument.com so that all the points could be tracked and not lost. But no one took me up on it.
To fully flesh out the question of the flood babies, it seems necessary to go over to honestargument, because we're running in circles here, partially (only) because of how blog comments are organized (which is, to say, only chronologically, not logically).
DL,
Good is defined relative to human experience, i.e., we see a person act in a certain way, and can subjectively regard that act as evil. We then see things in the universe that suggest that God is evil.
Just out of curiosity, do you also see any acts that add to the 'God is good' evidence pile? My guess is that your presuppositions preclude such observations. So, have you really concluded that God doesn't exist and that if He did, He is evil based on logical, objective, weighing of a valid sample set of data? Or do you simply say, there is no evidence that He is good?
Eric,
As Tom said, it's not as though this was made up yesterday as a defence.
Words are defined by their usage and by the things to which they refer. As we have said in all our discussions, 'good' does not mean merely 'what I prefer' or 'what I think', or 'what my culture endorses at this time and place', but has a greater meaning. We didn't spring this on you out of the blue.
In the beginning God told us how 'good' is defined.
His creation of light is/was good, the division of land from sea is/was good, the existence and natural sustenance of plant life is/was good, etc.
Creation, existence, order, expression of purpose - these are representative of good.
As are love, faithfulness, justice, mercy, charity, etc.
Even evil is but a twisted and depraved attempt at achieving these goods. We have no experience of an agent acting for the sake of evil itself but rather of them seeking corrupted good.
You get the point.
You do accept the propriety of theists referring to the actual God of the Bible, in Whom they have faith, when discussing their faith in Him, right?
I have no such problem. Paul.
Say what you want to say, ask your question and I'll answer it.
Tom,
What a great post (02.16.07 - 6:44 am)! Although, in truth, it is not better than most of your posts.
What I have seen here (maybe I need new glasses) is one more piece of evidence that God exists and that we should have faith in Him no matter what. There are several really bright non-theists honestly struggling to get their views across and to show 'us' where we have veered off course. They come at 'us' from all angles and 'we' are just too 'fill in your favorite term' to get it. 'We' sort of respond in kind. But this is exactly what the Bible said would happen. The natural man can not . . . It is all foolishness to him. And, but, for the grace of God . . .
Eric,
You have covered it all Tom. There is no room for argument, because the theist as you have described them leave no room for argument. It leads right back to anything and everything being proof of God, which says nothing to anyone else.
Boy do I wish that were true! (Except the last few words, of course.)
I tried to cover the ground thoroughly. But the ground I was covering wasn't, as you said here, an attempted proof for God. It would be nice for us theists if it were that simple, but we all know better than that.
No, all I was doing was addressing a specific set of arguments against God, and hoping to show that they don't carry enough freight to be successful for that. I was trying to counter a counterargument against theism. Now, here I actually do have some hope that this was successful. I really do believe that if I understood DL correctly (he hasn't confirmed that yet), then his argument doesn't refute theism at all. That's all I was hoping to accomplish, though, and I know it's a far distance from there to proving theism.
So, apparent from the *sarcasm* tags around your comment, what do you think?
Charlie, even if you say
I have no such problem. Paul.it remains that I *do* have such a problem, which makes me reluctant to circle back again over ground I think we've covered before, even if you're willing to answer a question I pose to you (which willingness is not unappreciated, don't get me wrong, but it may not be sufficient).
Say what you want to say, ask your question and I'll answer it,
So, apparent from the *sarcasm* tags around your comment, what do you think?
You were completely successful in showing how the theist doesn't see the argument against God. I'm saying that your counter-argument was successful (you win, in a theist context) but then I am asking what you have won in a larger context. You see your "side" as the largest context, so someone asking for human reasoning is a sub-set. Why argue in human terms?
Because you are arguing with humans, not sitting in heaven bathed in God's brilliance. God, and Theists, will appreciate your argument, and I already said you win. A theist will have no problem with God's actions, no matter what. So why discuss "matter"? What do you think we are talking about?
And, most aggravating, why should I listen to you at all about actions, especially mine! You associated atheist with immorality because we don't align ourselves with Biblical morality... then you tell us we can't critique biblical morality, not because it is so consistent,logical and convincing, but because we don't buy into it ahead of time. It is a self-contained feedback loop, with no way to correct itself.
Humanistic standards are too high for God. Baby drowning is reserved for monsters, IMHO, but I am just a human.
That's fine, Paul.
I think the ground is well-covered at this point anyway.
Eric,
You've had ample opportunity to discuss this in human and rational terms.
Again you rage that God is a monster because of the Flood but you have not addressed the issue rationally but only with anger and sarcasm.
Have you followed what has been said, in humanistic terms, about justice and what your fellow atheists here believe it entails?
If you really want to discuss these things you can drop the pretense that you have the fatal bullet against theism and ask serious questions. Of course I'm sure you already know the answers but just don't like them.
Eric, please now. You said,
You were completely successful in showing how the theist doesn't see the argument against God.
I don't know what you mean about me not seeing the argument against God. I was extremely careful to limit my discussion to a specific argument raised by a specific person on a specific blog discussion thread. In fact, I asked him to let me know if I misunderstood his argument, and he hasn't apparently had a chance to say yet.
I'm sorry if I upset you, and it seems like you might be upset, based on what you wrote. I'm still thinking, though, that if you, doctor(logic), and others want to raise some kind of logical objection against God, it will have to be a different one than what he has been using (if I interpreted him correctly).
If you don't like what you know about the Biblical God, that's a different matter. You're certainly entitled to that. But it's an opinion, not an argument.
There was an argument in this portion of what you wrote, though:
And, most aggravating, why should I listen to you at all about actions, especially mine! You associated atheist with immorality because we don't align ourselves with Biblical morality... then you tell us we can't critique biblical morality, not because it is so consistent,logical and convincing, but because we don't buy into it ahead of time. It is a self-contained feedback loop, with no way to correct itself.
What doctor(logic) was doing may or may not have been to critique Biblical morality. That's a viable subject for discussion, and I'm not saying you can't do it. What I was saying is that if you adopt a non-Biblical morality, you can't use it to assess the probability of the Biblical God. That's a different subject, a different argument, and it's logically subject to different constraints.
Tom,
No, I'm not aiming to disprove theism by showing that the claim "God is good" is meaningless. It's rather like my showing that "God is square" is a meaningless claim. Were I to do this, I'm sure that Christianity would survive the loss of divine squareness.
I'll briefly refer back to your points:
1) You essentially argue that my (presumably any mortal's) moral feelings are irrelevant to God's morality. I'm in total agreement here.
2) You say that theism has an adequate definition of the good. I strongly dispute this. I'm sure that any given Christian sect has pretty clear rules about certain behaviors that humans ought to carry out. However, what God ought to do (and presumably always does) is FAPP undefined.
You claim that God is loving, yet he insists on justice in a way we would not relative to our children (who have similarly limited relative capacity). So God's love doesn't mean the same thing as human love. You claim that God wants the best for us, yet he hides himself, and punishes us with infinite torture for failure to believe in him. Charlie claims that it's appropriate for a parent to apply corrective action to a child, but I fail to see in what way infinite torment or death could be corrective.
However, you can always argue that these puzzles could conceivably be resolved at some non-temporal level. For example, it could be the case that God will send everyone to Hell, and that any misunderstandings you have about the afterlife are intentional on God's part, and all for our own well-being in the grand scheme. This is not that far fetched when you consider that Charlie asks us to consider that the drowning of children in the flood (or perhaps worse, having children watch their parents drown before them in the flood) was the best thing for them in the grand scheme.
If feelings and interpretations can be wrong to infinite degree, what's left?
3) I'll quote you...
In the world of reality, that does indeed translate to "anything at all that we might possibly experience." So be it. Testability of God's goodness isn't something we can accomplish.I think this is fatal to the whole Christian concept of God's goodness. It means that you wouldn't know a good God from a non-good one.
If we applied this standard to to humans, you would be unable to judge whether Hitler was good or evil, not just because you have not seen how the world turns out, but because you have failed to specify what particular outcomes would render Hitler's actions good or evil. I realize that you advocate different standards for humans and deities, but I'm debating whether there's a knowable standard for God at all.
4, 5)
Fourth, the lack of such a test means that in terms of God's goodness, the evidence of common experience is neutral toward the question of God.and then
God has in fact dramatically intervened in history to provide both an explanation and many demonstrations of his goodness.How can both of these be true at the same time?
Overall, doctor(logic), what it seems that you're saying is that you agree, there is no test in these things that logically rules out the possibility of God. Except this, that you also think (as stated in (3)), the inadequacy of that particular form of testing is fatal to the concept of God's goodness.
It can't be fatal in the sense of completely contradictory, because there's no logical contradiction in there anywhere. The worst you can say is that because of a lack of testability, we can't be sure that God is good, or that his goodness is not a definable concept. You cannot say that it proves God is impossible.
But even your point (3) is a bit out of context. Later in the post I dealt with how we can have confidence in God's goodness. Just because one route to knowledge is inadequate doesn't mean all are.
The answer to the Hitler objection is not difficult: Hitler can't engineer all of the contingencies for time and eternity to cause his acts to have ultimately good outcomes. God can. There actually is a knowable standard for God: it's right there in black and white in God's word. We have his word as to what particular outcomes (already repeated several times above) are considered good.
4) and 5) can both be true at the same time because of the distinction between "common experience" and "dramatically intervened in history."
I would also remind you that there is common experience shared by Christian believers, that God is good. That was near the end of the post.
I failed to save most of my last response to DL and lost it.
This part remains, which I address to DL, Eric and Paul, as you are all quick to call God a monster and DL has introduced Hitler.
Let's develop a baseline to see what you mean by "monster".
Which of the following would be monsters:
1) Hitler
2) An hypothetical assassin who killed Hitler
3) The Allies for opposing Hitler
4) Abortion doctors
5) Peter Singer (or a hypothetical someone acting in accord with his advocacy)
6) Eric Pianka (or a hypothetical someone who shares the views attributed to him)
7) Jack Kevorkian
A bereaved family member taking a loved one off of life support
9) A welfare agent removing a child from its abusive home
10) A couple deciding not to have children because of a high risk of passing on a genetic disorder
11) A rescue worker necessarily choosing to save only one of two people from death rather than let them both, and perhaps himself die
12) A nation determining international aid decisions based upon human rights compliance
A little serendipity here; AIG has a short response today to this very question.
Before you respond beware the genetic fallacy.
OK, I'll bite.
1. monster
2. not monster
3. not monster
4. not monster
5. not familiar enough
6. not familiar enough
7. not monster
8. possibly, need more details
9. not monster
10. not monster
11. not monster
12. huh?
I'm waiting for the big payoff here, one that couldn't have been delivered more plainly.
Paul,
Thanks for biting and for your patience in awaiting the payoff; even though I don't meet your high standards of plain and straightforward communication..
Clarification on #12 -
Sorry about the wording.
Is a rich nation (oh, say, like the U.S.) a monster if it ties some of its foreign aid to the human rights records of the nations seeking that aid?
Is such a nation monstrous for making this moral judgment?
A little further information on what I am implying in #5 and #6.
5) A doctor who kills live born children who are severely handicapped, may have unpleasant lives, and may impact their parents badly.
6) Someone who advocates killing mass numbers of human beings (through ebola) for the benefit of the planet as a whole.
Yeah! a quiz...
M - 1) Hitler
NM - 2) An hypothetical assassin who killed Hitler
NM - 3) The Allies for opposing Hitler
NM - 4) Abortion doctors
NM - 5) Peter Singer (or a hypothetical someone acting in accord with his advocacy)
I had to look this one up. Never heard of him before. A hypothetical someone acting on his discussion (or he) might be a monster, but discussing the issues does not make him a Monster. A nice grey area.
6) NM- Eric Pianka (or a hypothetical someone who shares the views attributed to him)
Again, had to look him up, then remembered the DI freak-out.
7) NM - Jack Kevorkian
8 - NM with consent - A bereaved family member taking a loved one off of life support
9) NM - A welfare agent removing a child from its abusive home
10) NM - A couple deciding not to have children because of a high risk of passing on a genetic disorder
11) NM - A rescue worker necessarily choosing to save only one of two people from death rather than let them both, and perhaps himself die
12) NM - A nation determining international aid decisions based upon human rights compliance
I wish we (America) would be a bit more consistent on that last one.
I hope we get to compare these people against a being that has no necessary decisions, limitations, or lake of information.
My turn:
1)Eric Rudolph
2)Timothy Mcveigh
3)Fred Phelps
4)Teri shivos's (sp?) husband.
5)God
6)Allah
7)Bigfoot
8-Man who flips lever on electric chair
9)Man who votes for death penalty
10)Man who was ordered to nail Jesus to cross
11)President who decided to drop atomic bomb
12)Doctor who cures patient against their religious objections.
Tom,
I would also remind you that there is common experience shared by Christian believers, that God is good. That was near the end of the post.I don't think this issue has been resolved. If you are saying that theists have evidence from experience that God is good, then they ought also to be able to have evidence against the claim. Again, you cannot have it both ways.
Note that this is a separate issue from the axiomatic nature of God's goodness. If God's goodness is axiomatic to theists such that everything they see is interpreted as subordinate to this axiom, then there is no evidence for God's goodness either way. The axiom neutralizes the evidence a priori.
Analogy: no matter what I do in Euclidean geometry, I'm going to find that two points always determine a line. However, I can't take such conclusions as evidence that two points determine a line in Euclidean geometry because it's already an assumption that I built in from the start. Theorems are not evidence for the axiom that was used to prove them in the first place.
This is in contrast to facts of experience which we might choose to model by selecting our axioms. Since the shortest distance between two points in my local world is a straight line, I might propose that the axioms of Euclidean geometry rule the world of space because their theorems correlate (predict) facts in my experience. Those axioms are "about" space.
As it happens, space isn't flat everywhere, and non-Euclidean geometry is better at modeling experience about celestial objects. However, this experience of celestial objects does not invalidate the axioms of Euclidean geometry themselves. It just means that Euclidean geometry is not applicable to experience of space in the general case (they're not "about actual space"). It matters not a jot that the axioms of the two geometries contradict one another. It would only matter if I tried to create a single system using the axioms of the two, which we wouldn't do. (e.g., we wouldn't say that space is governed by both sets of axioms at once.)
Just to reiterate, we can devise numerous independently consistent systems, that would contradict each other if they shared axioms. How we choose our axioms depends on utility to us. Those systems that aren't useful to us (because they don't relate to experience) aren't false or inconsistent just because they're not useful. Neither are they false because they are inconsistent with the useful systems. We are deciding the "aboutness" of the axioms to experience.
By analogy, your axiomatic claim that God is good might as well be some abstract axiom in useless mathematics. It doesn't have any burden to meet in experience (no predictions). God can apparently do anything and the claim remains true. The claim isn't about God's behavior at all.
I could propose an alternative evil-God theology that fits God's behavior just as well as yours (i.e., it has no burden to do so), and my axioms would be as consistent as yours.
We have his word as to what particular outcomes (already repeated several times above) are considered good.I don't think you have been specific, or else I missed these.
Paul and Eric, thanks for your answers.
We have a consensus on several points among the participating 'judges of monstrosity'.
By your answers we know that you consider Hitler to be a monster. You have wondered, or directly charged, that God is also a monster.
-----------
Reviewing the criteria and applying the applicable ones to God's judgment, as per the Flood, we find that you are not considered a monster based upon your act of:
2) killing somebody who is wicked - God is not a monster (killed only the wicked)
3) killing even tens of millions, including good people, heroes and innocents, if your goal is stopping someone who is wicked - God is not a monster (even if you don't believe He killed only the wicked in the Flood)
4) killing even tens of millions of innocent babies - God is not a monster (even if you don't believe He killed only the wicked in the Flood)
5) no consensus - Eric thinks this person, who kills the innocent because they may suffer or their parents may suffer is not a monster, but admits a gray area. Paul does not have enough information to decide - nonetheless, this answer does not allow the judgment that God is a monster
6) no consensus - Eric thinks advocating for the death of billions if there is an environmental benefit does not warrant the title of "monster", but Paul needs more information - not particularly applicable, but still affirms God is not a monster
7) killing those who choose to die - not particularly applicable to God, but He does allow people to choose their own deaths - not a monster
allowing somebody to die whom you could save (Paul is undecided) - God is not a monster
9) acting to prevent future abuse - God is not a monster
10) deciding against giving/allowing life when that life is likely to suffer - God is not a monster
11) deciding between who lives and dies (who receives your mercy) - God is not a monster
12) deciding the same based upon morality - God saved the righteous while destroying the wicked
There you have it, by your human, relativistic and subjective standards, applying the judgments consistently, God is not a monster. You are not a monster just because you kill, kill innocents, kill many, save some and not others, judge morality, act with greater good as a goal, etc.
We also have determined, via Paul, that the judgment call can't be made (monster/not monster) by somebody with insufficient information, who has not researched the matter thoroughly, or does not have sufficient details.
Eric, because I am not a 'judge of monstrosity' and am not privy to the necessary definition I have to say 'not monster' to all your questions with a possible definitional challenge on #7.
Commenting by HaloScan
