Thinking Christian Comments
Original Post: "Is there anything wrong with 'God of the gaps' reasoning?"
Tom,
Haven't read the article yet, but can you point me to an official peer-reviewed article in a scientific journal that dismisses another scientific theory on the basis that it is a 'god of the gaps' explanation?
Or do you know of any scientist who uses the god-of-the-gaps argument in support of her theory?
The answer to the first question is no; but that's a gap that might be fillable 
by someone who knows the literature. The answer to the second question is yes. The first one I read was Richard Dawkins, in The Blind Watchmaker. He used it against what "creationism," thus in a negative sense using the argument to support his evolutionism. This is how it is typically used.
The article in question did appear in a peer-reviewed philosophy journal, and it's not a Christian journal either.
I've enjoyed and utilized this essay for a long time.
Two very good points:
1) GoG is not a fallacy. The implied fallacy is an appeal to ignorance. When the charge is properly understood it is much more easily defended.
2) Science relies upon Gap arguments.
Another useful essay on the subject is Snoke's:
http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/200...F9-
01Snoke.html
Christians used to argue for the existence of God on the basis of apparent design and religious experience, and they still argue for the existence of God on the basis of apparent design and religious experience. In other words, part of the appeal of the AGOG [Anti-God-Of-The-Gaps] position is the sense of progress marching on, removing one Christian evidential apologetic argument after another. Present gaps in evolutionary or Freudian theory can be ignored in light of this track record of success. However, this past history does not exist. Atheistic filling of gaps begins and ends with its attempts to explain apparent design and religious experience in the context of Darwinism and psychology.
Within the framework of Darwinism, has there been that long, steady march of reducing gaps?
...
Yet if a reason to reject a gaps argument is the past track record of a steady closing of gaps, it stands to reason to ask when that steady closing of gaps has occurred. In the most notable examples of apparent filling of gaps, the discovery of DNA and the nuclear theory, the new gaps created by their filling are actually worse than the previous gaps.
...
The design of the universe is just as apparent now as it was in the sixteenth century, or in the first, when Paul wrote: "For since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities--his eternal power and divine nature--have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made" (Rom. 1:20). Design is obvious at a glance to anyone, and detailed scientific analysis has not changed that fact.
...
My last objection to the AGOG position is that it implicitly relies on a naive optimism about the future of science. It reeks of nineteenth-century rationalism and postmillennialism in assuming that the onward steady march of science explains and solves everything. If the twentieth century has taught us anything, it is to be suspicious of those who put all their hope in science as the explainer of everything.
etc.
As some have said before, if God is the reason why something is the way it is, then "God did it" is completely valid.
I highly recommend Del Ratzsch's discussion of god of the gaps arguments in his Nature, Design, and Science.
"... there is nothing in principle suspicious about the existence of gaps in nature. There are all sorts of things nature cannot do - and indeed, such perfectly respectable scientific projects as SETI depend upon that fact. There is nothing whatever problematic or even unusual about scientific cases for gaps. In fact, every scientific case for some general principle or law is simultaneously a scientific case for nature's inability to do things contravening such principles and laws."
He goes on to say that god of the gaps arguments are not only logically valid but also are empirical arguments. For example, if we had empirical, scientific reasons for thinking that neither nature, nor human agents, nor alien agents could produce some phenomenon and yet we observed that phenomenon, that would be a valid, empirical god of the gaps argument.
Reppert, commenting about an article on Tom's blog, had this to say about "God did it" responses.
Keith Parsons, in his debate with William Lane Craig, says that if that were to happen he would be on the front row of the church. I once asked Keith this question: Suppose I were God, and I decided to do everything I could to convince you that I existed. What would I have to do? (Keith had sent me a paper defending a broadly Humean position on miracles). He said "If the sky were to spell out the words "TURN OR BURN THIS MEANS YOU PARSONS" he said, he would turn. In fact examples like these are often used as a basis for challenging believers to provide evidence for belief in God. But why demand that theists provide evidence, if, whatever the circumstances, there couldn't be enough evidence. If "God did it" explanations are really verboten, then it hardly makes sense to complain that theists haven't provided evidence for their position. By definition, that's the one thing they can't do.
My emphasis added
So, according to the critics, it seems "God did it" is both forbidden and required as an answer. I know this is true because I hear it all the time.
Another way of putting it is that scientific laws tell us all the time about what can't happen (e.g., we know that perpetual motion is impossible because of scientific laws). If we ever discovered scientific laws that implied that, say, living things couldn't arise from non-living things, then the very existence of living things would be evidence of a "gap" in nature.
Hi Macht,
Further to that - Larmer references that Del Ratzsch piece:
As Ratzsch notes,
"there is nothing inherently unscientific in the idea of gaps in nature-of things that nature cannot do. Science, in fact, is littered with impossibility claims. Perpetual motion is impossible, acceleration across the light-speed barrier is impossible, simultaneous determination of energy and position of certain particles to arbitrary degrees of precision is impossible. Every conservation principle is a claim that permanent unbalanced changes in specified parameters are impossible. In fact, every statement of a natural law is logically equivalent to a claim that nature cannot produce certain (contranomic) phenomena. Thus scientific justification for the claim that nature does not or cannot produce some specific phenomenon turns out to be a routine, unproblematic aspect of scientific activity.18
Tom,
"The answer to the second question is yes. The first one I read was Richard Dawkins, in The Blind Watchmaker. He used it against what "creationism," thus in a negative sense using the argument to support his evolutionism. This is how it is typically used."
Perhaps I should have been clearer in my question. I wouldn't consider your example as a case of a scientist actually using god-of-the-gaps as part of the evidence to show that her theory should be accepted by other scientists.
You are right that it is often used outside of science when discussing philosophical or theological issues.
My point here is that it really has no part in the practice of science.
So in reality it has no bearing on whether or not the current theory of evolution is or is not correct.
"The article in question did appear in a peer-reviewed philosophy journal, and it's not a Christian journal either."
A philosophy journal ain't a science journal.
Randy, three responses:
One, you're right. God-of-the-gaps doesn't belong in the question of origins, for the reasons Larmer wrote. It's a false charge, the way it's typically leveled at ID people.
Two, I don't think the reason that you said it doesn't belong is actually valid. I agree with your conclusion but not your reason. That's because science and philosophy are inextricably intertwined. If there is a question about how things came to be, they should be addressed both scientifically and philosophically. In many cases in science, the philosophical questions have already been addressed and dealt with in a way that most everybody is satisfied with, but that doesn't mean they're not there in the background. For example, there's the issue of whether answers can be obtained just through reflection, as Aristotle leaned toward, or whether experimentation is needed.
In a case like God-of-the-Gaps, the philosophical question isn't settled to everyone's satisfaction. It has both scientific and philosophical ramifications, so it's appropriate to work the question from both angles.
Finally, you wrote,
I wouldn't consider your example as a case of a scientist actually using god-of-the-gaps as part of the evidence to show that her theory should be accepted by other scientists.
Dawkins would. That's exactly how he used it. Unfortunately for him, and for those who think it's a valid argument.
Yes, there is a problem with GoG arguments.
The distinguishing feature of these arguments is not that they fill some gap in scientific knowledge, but that they are mere placeholders, and usually fine-tuned ones at that.
Suppose we again look at a murder case in which a suspect has just been found guilty. His fingerprints were on the murder weapon, victim's blood on his shirt, means, motive, opportunity, all present. A man stands up in the courtroom and argues that the suspect was framed by a supervillain with unlimited magical powers to act between the gaps in our evidence. The supervillain is unseen because he also uses his super powers to hide himself. Do we believe the objector? No. The objector can make this same case for any suspect in any case, no matter how much evidence is acquired. The supervillain in question can be used to "explain" any apparent act of criminality by anyone (even in cases in which there is a confession). Such a supervillain acts in the gaps of any case, no matter how large the gaps.
Does this mean that we have proven the supervillain not to exist? No, but we can say that such a supervillain isn't worth thinking about. The supervillain is a form of solipsism. It's the idea that the world we see around us is manipulated by an invisible agent, and no action we take will make the agent visible.
The thing that makes the supervillain not worthy of our mental efforts is the fact that nothing about the supervillain is predictive. If we could show a clear pattern of action or strategy, we might be able to say that there is a force that behaves like said supervillain. However, if the supervillain is always said to act in mysterious ways so as to preserve our illusion of free will in legal matters, no such pattern will ever be seen.
A GoG is a supervillain. Not predictive of anything at all. When we claim a GoG, we don't reduce our ignorance by one jot.
If you ever have a probabilistic argument that the GoG is more probable than a natural cause, then you would escape being a GoG. However, you will never ever do that if you don't make a prediction.
Your version of the argument here is a caricature, doctor(logic). If any proposal of God's action were like this, it would be invalid. But serious proposals don't look at all like this. They involve independent reasons to know that God exists, for example. (If you had independent reasons to know the supervillain exists, it wouldn't be such a strange solution to propose, would it?) They involve demonstrations that natural processes are incapable of doing what is proposed of them. (If your crime were one that no person could humanly do, and if there were even hints that this supervillain actually existed, that crime would count as evidence in favor of that supervillain's existing.)
Your epistemology of prediction is an old story. We've talked about how explanation need not be equivalent to prediction. I'm reluctant to kick-start that discussion again, because it got us nowhere last time. But I'll say it again:
If God does exist, and if God really did create anything by processed beyond natural processes, then the explanation for how those things were created is just that God did it--even if there is nothing predictive in that explanation. Therefore explanation can at least conceivably take place apart from prediction, unless you define God out of the picture a priori, which is clearly circular.
Finally, speaking of evidence of the gaps, there is a gap in what you wrote here: you haven't addressed Larmer's paper at all. It's evidence that leads me to wonder if you read it.
This portion applies to your epistemological problem:
On what non-arbitrary grounds is it possible to insist that it would never be legitimate to explain such phenomena as having a supernatural cause? If no matter what the physical phenomena and no matter how they resist explanation in terms of physical causes or non-supernatural agency, it is never admissible to posit a supernatural cause then it seems that we have moved to a position that is unfalsifiable in the worst possible sense. There seems no scientific reason to think that it is inconceivable that science, in considering whether a naturalistic explanation can be given for a certain phenomenon, might come to the conclusion that the phenomenon would never have occurred were nature left to its own devices. Ratzsch is thus correct in his observation that “any stipulation that it would be scientifically illegitimate to accept the inability of nature to produce life, no matter what the empirical and theoretical evidence, has, obviously, long since departed deep into the philosophical and worldview realms.”
Tom,
"One, you're right. God-of-the-gaps doesn't belong in the question of origins, for the reasons Larmer wrote. It's a false charge, the way it's typically leveled at ID people."
And its not used by scientists in establishing the validity of the theory of evoluton or in any of the hypothesis of the origin of life. So it seems to me that this discussion is irrelevant as to whether or not those theories and hypotheses are correct.
You may be completely correct that god of the gaps is not a philosophical fallacy. But the question seems totally irrelevant to how scientists are actually substantiating their theory of evolution.
"Two, I don't think the reason that you said it doesn't belong is actually valid. I agree with your conclusion but not your reason. That's because science and philosophy are inextricably intertwined. If there is a question about how things came to be, they should be addressed both scientifically and philosophically. In many cases in science, the philosophical questions have already been addressed and dealt with in a way that most everybody is satisfied with, but that doesn't mean they're not there in the background. For example, there's the issue of whether answers can be obtained just through reflection, as Aristotle leaned toward, or whether experimentation is needed.
In a case like God-of-the-Gaps, the philosophical question isn't settled to everyone's satisfaction. It has both scientific and philosophical ramifications, so it's appropriate to work the question from both angles."
One can, of course, address any issue from a philosophical perspective. And I would agree with you that the methods of science have been established over centuries of practice. But you've so far failed to esablish that this is anything more than non-scientists trying to tell scientists how to practice their science. If you can show evidence from the peer reviewed articles that appear in the journals that are devoted to the biological sciences that this god-in-the-gaps argument is actually playing any role in the devolopement or understanding of the current theory of evolution, I would be very interested in seeing it.
"Finally, you wrote,
I wouldn't consider your example as a case of a scientist actually using god-of-the-gaps as part of the evidence to show that her theory should be accepted by other scientists.
Dawkins would. That's exactly how he used it. Unfortunately for him, and for those who think it's a valid argument."
His book was not published in a peer reviewed journal of the biological sciences. You are free to speculate about his motives, but I see absolutely no evidence that he was attempting to use a popular science book in order to persuade other biological scientists that they should accept the theory of evolution.
Randy, if this isn't an issue to you, fine. If you don't know of it being used in the scientific literature, that's okay too. Those of us who know of the ways it's being used in the debate can continue to work the problem.
Tom,
All I'm really doing here is asking for some evidence that this issue is relevant to the developement of the current scientific theory of evolution.
Sure it is used a lot in theist-atheistic discussions.
But unless scientists in developing the theory of evolution actually depend on it for the validity of that theory, it seems to me to be irrelevant to the actual practice of those scientists.
If you have any such evidence, I'll try to make a response, but, as you suggest, until then I'll drop out of active participation on this particular thread.
Randy,
I personally have never heard/read a researcher using God of the gaps reasoning to explain their findings. Mike Gene, however, links to a researcher using "evolution of the gaps" reasoning to explain why girls prefer pink. Is this kind of reasoning OK with you in this particular case?
SteveK,
The reasoning doesn't look very persuasive to me. Thanks for the link.
There is a place for what is called just so stories, I think. But they have to be better crafted than this one.
A lot of evolutionary explanations for human behavior come across as fallacious to me because they often fail to take into account one of the remarkable evolutionary changes that make us human: the ability of non-genetic learning.
Tom,
Your version of the argument here is a caricature, doctor(logic). If any proposal of God's action were like this, it would be invalid. But serious proposals don't look at all like this. They involve independent reasons to know that God exists, for example.It's no caricature, Tom. This is what ID does. In an effort to pretend to be science, ID eschews discussion of the designer, the designer's capabilities, needs, etc. The designer becomes the supervillain that no one has seen, and for whom no evidence can be found (or at least, about whom none will be discussed).
Even if ID had found some proof that a particular scientific model failed to explain our observations (it hasn't), it still would not constitute evidence that there is a supervillain. In the trial analogy, should the ID folk find that the suspect had an alibi, that's not a proof that the unseen supervillain was the guilty party. There are countless other human suspects still to investigate.
If the complaint is made that we cannot yet produce another good suspect, that is not an argument for the supervillain. That's precisely the type of argumentum ad ignorantiam that Larmer is referring to. (I did actually read the article :P)
If God does exist, and if God really did create anything by processed beyond natural processes, then the explanation for how those things were created is just that God did it--even if there is nothing predictive in that explanation. Therefore explanation can at least conceivably take place apart from prediction, unless you define God out of the picture a priori, which is clearly circular.This won't work. God is something for which we have no predictive explanation, right?
Well, the same is true of the fundamental laws of the universe in a naturalistic picture. We might explain electricity in terms of electroweak field theory, and electroweak theory in terms of string theory, but at some point we're left with laws of the universe that don't reduce down to anything more fundamental. And there's no guarantee that those laws are ultimately simple (although they seem to be, in this neck of the woods). The fundamental laws of physics are supernatural in the same way God is, i.e., in the sense that they cannot be predicted, not even in principle.
So, suppose we make some observations. Though I cannot perceive any particular mechanism that predicts these (or future) observations, would it be explanatory to say that "some ultimate theory of nature did it"? Would our observations be explained if I said that "there is some unknown law of physics (that may well apply only to this one time and place), and that law is what led to the observations we just made"?
I think you would reject that I have explanations for my observations. This is what I mean by emptiness and triviality of explanation. If you say that there is some unknown agency or law that causes what we observe, whatever we observe, we're just restating our observations, not explaining them. We ought not be content with having given a name to the unknown thing that caused what we see.
Furthermore, my definition of naturalism overlaps with your definition of a supernatural god. Since ultimate laws of nature are supernatural (they are basic and have no explanation), I'm perfectly happy (a priori) to accept that there might be intelligent agents in the universe that are similarly basic in some respects. However, I reject the idea that such agents have any explanatory power if they don't non-trivially predict the thing they are said to explain. The same goes for generic, unknown laws of physics that predict nothing. Such unknown laws cannot be explanatory.
Once again, if I believed that everything was presently explained by ultimate laws of physics that I had not yet discovered, I would either be a fool or I would be employing a special meaning for the word "explain." It's not good enough to extrapolate from the fact that "some known laws of physics explain some stuff" to "all things are presently explained by ultimate laws of physics that we do not presently know."
Gaps as evidence?
This organ has no known use so it is useless, which we will call vestigial, which is evidence of evolution.
This DNA has no known use, so it is useless, which we will call Junk, which is evidence for evolution.
This fossil record does not support gradualistic evolution, but it is imperfect and incomplete, and if it were complete it would support gradualistic evolution, therefore, as it stands, it is evidence of evolution.
DL: we have no ability to test every possible past environment and condition and thereby rule out unintelligent abiogenesis, therefore, naturalism is evidenced.
We can not know all of the possible molecular arrangements and their possible functions, but some of those could have been precursors to the bacterial flagellum, therefore, its evolution is evidenced.
Darwin: the eye could have evolved from a light-sensitive pigment. Where that light-sensitive pigment came from is a pointless question, we might as well ask where life and matter came from - evidence for evolution.
We don't know how immaterial mind could interact with matter, therefore it doesn't, therefore there is only matter.
Weisel 38: we do not know that evolution is guided or planned, therefore it is unguided and unplanned, and this is a finding of science.
doctor(logic),
I'm going to have to confess some confusion. I think in my last post I said you are arguing in a circular fashion if you say God cannot be explanatory. You said I was wrong. Then, I think you went on to say that God and unknown laws of physics have the same explanatory potential. In other words, I think you disagreed and then want to argue that you agreed.
My line applied to God, "even if there is nothing predictive in that explanation," is a worst-case scenario. If the argument holds in that case, then it holds in what I would actually consider to be the actual case, which is that there are things we know about God that make his action predictive in some ways.
Anyway, could you explain again what you're trying to say? And let me know your response to what I wrote on predictiveness and explanation.
Now, as to this:
It's no caricature, Tom. This is what ID does. In an effort to pretend to be science, ID eschews discussion of the designer, the designer's capabilities, needs, etc. The designer becomes the supervillain that no one has seen, and for whom no evidence can be found (or at least, about whom none will be discussed).
Even if ID had found some proof that a particular scientific model failed to explain our observations (it hasn't), it still would not constitute evidence that there is a supervillain. In the trial analogy, should the ID folk find that the suspect had an alibi, that's not a proof that the unseen supervillain was the guilty party. There are countless other human suspects still to investigate.
I love how people excoriate ID for naming a designer on the one hand, and rip it up one side and down the other for not naming a designer on the other hand. Convenient.
Anyway, you continue to caricature. ID does stay within the realm of science by being minimalistic in the conclusion it draws regarding the designer. But it does not say nothing about the designer, as you claim. It says the designer is powerful enough to accomplish design, is intelligent, and so forth.
Further, ID has not just "found some proof that a particular scientific model has failed to explain our observations." It has found strong evidence that the only realistically possible naturalistic explanation for life's origins (not to mention cosmology) has problems that make it untenable in principle. (I know you disagree with that, but stay with me for a couple paragraphs, we're going to address that.)
In light of that, the supervillain trial analogy fails. Actually, you changed the rules on it. You said "there are countless other human suspects still to investigate." I earlier said, "If your crime were one that no person could humanly do, and if there were even hints that this supervillain actually existed, that crime would count as evidence in favor of that supervillain's existing." This is the correct analogy; for ID says that the situation is such that no natural process could conceivably, in principle, account for what we observe.
Let's keep this in proper context, and remember what we're trying to resolve, okay? You might say that ID has not succeeded in showing that there are any biological or cosmological phenomena that cannot be explained naturally. That's not the issue under discussion now. The issue is whether you are correct in your criticism of so-called "God of the gaps" theorizing.
I maintain--in fact, it is obvious--that there is no flaw in the logic used here. (Don't forget--we're not discussing whether there are flaws in the evidence trail leading up to this logical step!) If there are natural phenomena that are in principle unexplainable just by natural processes, then proposing a Designer is not at all unreasonable or illogical. It's a great alternative explanation--the only one on the table, as far as I know. And (to go beyond the science of ID), if we have other reason to suppose that there is a God (as I think we do), then it's really not unreasonable, irrational, or faulty logic to suppose that God has had (at least!) a part in designing the world we see.
Charlie:
Your last comment was better than good. It was fantastic!
Tom,
Then, I think you went on to say that God and unknown laws of physics have the same explanatory potential.No, I'm not talking about explanatory potential. I'm talking about present explanatory power.
What I am doing is describing certain trivial versions of naturalistic belief that are non-explanatory. My claim is that you and I would both reject these naturalistic claims, and that, if we both do so, we must both reject similar claims about the supernatural.
Suppose Bob were to propose that dark energy is predicted by the naturalistic theory of everything, but that Bob doesn't yet know what that theory of everything actually is. Would Bob have explained dark energy?
You and I would both agree that merely referring to a theory that could explain dark energy, a theory merely compatible with it, is not the same thing as explaining dark energy. Bob's naturalistic theory of everything is just a placeholder for the real solution Bob hopes to one day find.
Similarly, what if Bob proposed that as-yet-undiscovered laws of biochemical evolution precisely describe the origin of life on Earth (abiogenesis). Not that Bob knows what these laws are, but merely that such laws could explain OOL. By this proposal, has Bob explained OOL?
Again, you and I would both agree that such a proposal has no merit as an explanation.
There are variations on this theme. For example, Bob could propose that some events are natural laws unto themselves. For example, if a stable bridge suddenly collapses, Bob could propose that it happened because the laws of physics were different at that particular point in time and space. Under such a system of "localized" laws, we could "explain" any observation, without requiring predictions about the future. After all, the laws of physics for future events could be different than they are now.
Again, you and I would be in full agreement that such a theory doesn't merit the label "explanation." Bob has no case.
Ah! But Bob would counter that his theories are not mere restatements. If we accept his theories we would know something more about the universe - we would know that it was natural!!!!
Sound familiar? This is exactly what you do with God. You say that theistic accounts of creation or OOL are explanatory when they're not predictive, and you claim that prediction doesn't matter because we would know something new about the universe, namely, that it was created by God.
If you're going to get away with that, you have no cause to criticize people who believe that everything is already explained by theories we don't yet have.
However, I think you should join me in condemning the explanatory bankruptcy of non-predictive theories.
A theistic model could be explanatory if it wanted to, but it cannot do it without making any predictions. It's not enough to say that a god could have created life. That's as trivial as saying that there's possibly an undiscovered law that accounts of OOL. You need to say why the god created life, and why he did it the way he did. And once you know that, you can make predictions.
A model of ID has to talk about the designer or it's not explanatory. Generically, design is not a default exlpanation any more than "as-yet-undiscovered naturalistic theory".
As for ID, I would agree that if it showed that a natural theory was impossible, but that design was possible, then it would have a case. That has not happened. Instead, ID focuses on what it perceives to be gaps in knowledge. They criticise gaps in the fossil record (and when you fill a gap, you get two new gaps!). They criticise a lack of an explanation for a specific system, like blood clotting, etc. These are GoG arguments. They are not ironclad exclusionary arguments of the sort to which you refer.
http://www.uncommondescent.com/i...-gaps/
#comments
DL:
You need to say why the god created life, and why he did it the way he did. And once you know that, you can make predictions.
Why require this level of detail, what does it gain you?
Using your argument, it follows that segments of naturalism have no explanatory power because they can't answer the questions below. Without answers there can be no predictions. So what good is naturalism?
- Why is there a universe rather than nothing?
- Why are life forms carbon-based and not silicone-based?
- Why did evolution take as long as it did? As a follow-up question, why don't humans have 12 eyes?
SteveK,
You need that level of detail or else you're just restating observations. There's a universe because God wanted it. There's Niagara Falls because God wanted it. Pulsar emissions are the way they are because God wanted it. Why do we have love? Because God wanted it. Why was there a Holocaust? Because God wanted it. God wanted it is not an explanation. It's just being used to state what we already know. It never tells us what will happen tomorrow. It never connects pulsars emissions to anything else. "God wanted it" never connects the existence of love to the Holocaust. "God wanted it" is merely a way to make some people feel better about not knowing the answers.
Using your argument, it follows that segments of naturalism have no explanatory power because they can't answer the questions below. Without answers there can be no predictions. So what good is naturalism?Well, as I said, naturalism by itself explains nothing. It is the predictive theories within naturalism that are explanatory.
So you are correct. Naturalism doesn't explain (yet) all sorts of things. I think there are already explanations for the number of eyes we have, and for why we're carbon-based and not silicon-based.
However, there is no explanation for why there is something rather than nothing. There can never be such an explanation. In your world, that's like asking "why is there a God in the first place?" The typical response is that God is a necessary being. But why is God necessary? Because if he weren't there, we would not be here to ask the question. Well, that's pretty lame. You can say the same thing about the universe. The universe is a necessary being. Make you feel better? Probably not. Me neither. Unfortunately, that's the way it's gotta be. The sum of all there is cannot be explained because that would demand something outside the sum of all there is (which is a contradiction).
Well, as I said, naturalism by itself explains nothing. It is the predictive theories within naturalism that are explanatory.
I agree. However naturalism and theism differ in that theism doesn't claim to work in a completely deterministic or random way. You are trying to shoehorn theism into naturalism and you can't do that. The "theories" within theism are explanatory in that they explain certain things in life that we know about our mind, purpose in life, morality, etc.
Naturalism tries to explain these things via evolutionary psychology and physics and looks rather foolish in its attempt. If you want a good chuckle, just pick up an evolutionary psychology paper.
Steve,
You just restated your claim that theism is explanatory, but that doesn't address anything I said. What are your reasons for thinking theism is explanatory? What are the criteria for an explanation? It's clearly not enough for something to "feel" explanatory, or else crazy multiverse models are explanatory. There are surely other requirements for something to be an explanation.
I'm saying that if generic theism is explanatory, then 1) lots of other trivialities must be explanatory, and 2) everything is trivially explained.
For example, if generic, non-predictive theism explains anything you want, so does generic, non-predictive naturalism.
Tom:
DL asserts: “There is no explanation for why there is something rather than nothing.”
Intellectual cowardice or laziness? Likely both. Sweeping such questions under the carpet is so easy: out of sight, out of mind. It doesn’t reflect a commitment to intellectual rigor or to logic: there is no science or philosophy there. There is no attempt to doubt his own assertion (at least once in his life—per DL’s own masthead). The irony is palpable: “there is no ultimate explanation because I believe it to be that way, i.e., it is ‘just so’.” It is a faith in an empty, unprogressive, conversation-stopping, unsupported and narrow-minded dogmatism. There is nothing predictable about this personal and subjective assertion of DL’s—hence failing his own test of valid knowledge. There is nothing observable by the five senses that can lead DL to support such an assertion. DL raises it to the status of his own “first principle”—a metaphysical truth—at the same time he decries validity and even existence of metaphysics. It is bankrupt of meaning, in fact, for to claim that the universe (which is a “something”) needs no explanation for why it exists (which means he asserts the universe needs no cause) is to “explain away” all subsets of the universe as not needing an explanation for why they exist. The ultimate irony is that it’s a show-stopper for the MES: if “there is no explanation for why there is something rather than nothing” then on what rational basis is DL pursing the study of physics? What good is naturalism as an alleged explanatory matrix if nothing can ultimately be explained?
DL takes SteveK to task for not providing explanatory “reasons” (that fit within the confines of DL’s personal criteria, of course), yet did DL provide reasons for why his assertion above is true? No, of course not: he descended to “it’s like saying… yadda, yadda…” Why is DL dictating to us what reality is all about—again, without explanation? Why does DL feel he has special dispensation to not provide an explanation for the existence of the universe, when everyone else must explain everything else to him… and only according to his rules of the game?
And how about DL’s claim that the existence of the universe is unquestionably necessary? I know he’ll have a cow… but I’m into inducing such stillbirth-ideas to expose them to the light of reason (and exposing DL’s ignorance of history as well as the development of the MESs): There was a magisterial statement at the local level, enunciated by Bishop Stephen Tempier of Paris who, on March 7, 1277, condemned 219 Aristotelian propositions, so outlawing the deterministic and necessitarian views of creation. It would be way too much time and effort to explain the backdrop to this, but one thing this did do is free up important precursor thinking for the MESs to develop. Imagine that: the 13th century Church—of all organizations—supporting the development of thinking necessary for the modern empirical sciences to arise! Preposterous! Sacrilege! Off with their theist heads! Yet, oh so true.
Fr. Stanley Jaki (a physicist at Rutgers!) notes, “… the very createdness [of the world] would caution man to guard against the ever-present temptation to dictate to nature what it ought to be. The eventual rise of the experimental method owes much to that Christian matrix.” The world is, in fact, non-necessary—which at once frees us and yet at the same time compels us to tackle the perfectly valid question: why does the world exist rather than not? Aristotle believed this to be an absurd question (imagine: DL, burdened by his crude historicism, agreeing with a pagan Aristotle!), but this is understandable because not only did his natural philosophy state, for example, that a heavy object will fall faster than a light one, a vacuum is impossible, the universe is eternal, and the earth is at its center, but he went so far as to claim that these things had to be so—just like DL is asserting the universe has to be necessary. As such, Aristotle saw no need to experiment, and this proved to be a hindrance in the development of the experimental sciences in the West until the Middle Ages when the Scholastics debated God’s ability to create alternate worlds (Aristotle would assert categorically “no,” while the Catholic Church said “yes”)—a highly significant precursor to the birth of modern science.
This is worth re-emphasizing: It is vitally important to determine precisely what kind of universe God created to avoid abstract thinking about how the universe must be—a point that should be lost on no one. The world was created by and is contingent upon God rather than being understood as necessary in and of itself. As a result, the universe has to be approached by a posteriori investigation, i.e., by observation and experimentation rather than by assuming a priori (DL-diktat style) how the universe “has” to be.
It’s so tempting not to submerge back into my work…
DL:
Well, as I said, naturalism by itself explains nothing. It is the predictive theories within naturalism that are explanatory.
I missed this before. I specifically said segments of naturalism - meaning certain theories within naturalism - lack explanatory power according to your own statement which I will rephrase below in naturalistic terms.
You need to say why the laws of nature created life, and why the laws did it the way they did. And once you know that, you can make predictions.
Your blanket statement about naturalistic theories being predictive are not entirely true per your own requirements.
Redirecting your other questions back to your own naturalistic theories:
1) What are your reasons for thinking these naturalistic theories are explanatory?
2) What are the criteria for an explanation?
Want to bet that your answers will be entirely philosophical in nature?
Holo:
The ultimate irony is that it’s a show-stopper for the MES: if “there is no explanation for why there is something rather than nothing” then on what rational basis is DL pursing the study of physics? What good is naturalism as an alleged explanatory matrix if nothing can ultimately be explained?
I think my previous comment asks DL to deal with these questions. If, according to DL, we are required to explain why God did such-and-such, then non-theists should be held to the same standard.
SteveK,
Maybe my writing has not been as clear as it should have been. I'll give it another go.
What I am saying is that a mere restatement of observations cannot explain those observations. You have to be able to interpolate or extrapolate from the observations to claim an explanation. If all you can do is draw dots over your existing data points, you're not explaining anything. If that counted as explanation, everything would be trivially explained.
Consequently, it is not enough to propose some unspecific, unspecified force that allegedly accounts for the observations. If I were to say that my observations were caused by force F which has unmeasurable property P, and F makes no predictions, would F be an explanation of the observations? I don't think so.
For example, I cannot explain my observations by saying
F1 = some law of physics
P1 = unguided by intelligence
and F1 accounts for what we observed, but we can't say anything at all about the next experiment (except that F1 will account for it, whatever the results).
NOR can I explain them with
F2 = some supernatural being
P2 = guided by intelligence
and F2 accounts for what we observed, but we can't say anything at all about the next experiment (except that F1 will account for it, whatever the results).
Both of these candidates are impotent. I would be as foolish to believe all my observations are presently explained by non-predictive laws as I would be to believe that my observations were explained by non-predictive deities.
Moreover, anything Thor can do, law can do. It's not an issue of whether Thor or law can potentially be part of an explanation. It's trivial that both can. The question is whether we actually do have an explanation involving them. And we only have a true candidate for an explanation when we have a predictive model.
Here's another "naturalistic" "explanation" I would find ridiculous:
E1 = Our experimental data set (X) is caused by the Theory of Everything through its power of natural causation, but no future experimental result can be predicted..
If this counts as an explanation, then everything is trivially explained because I can substitute any data set for X and it would still work just as well. We know that sufficiently complex laws can explain anything in principle. The fact that we have seen predictive examples of natural causation in the past, doesn't make E1 an explanation in the absence of prediction.
So if the above is a non-explanation, so is this:
E2 = Our experimental data set X is caused by God through his power of will, but no future experimental result can be predicted.
Again, we can substitute anything for X. And, yes, any god can will any event for any reason, and we needn't know about it. But just because a deity can be part of an explanation doesn't mean a deity (in generic form) is explanatory by itself. And just because we have seen predictive examples of the will of intelligent agents in the past doesn't mean that we have an explanation just by citing "will to effect exactly what is observed, no strings attached."
The main problem with God as a tool for explanation is that theists eschew prediction.
If theists had a case, I would expect theists to create predictive theories of God's will, e.g., "God wants X, so he did Y to effect X, therefore, we can expect God would also do Z" and then go and measure Z. However, theists will say that you cannot test God or subject his will to predictions. This shoots their explanatory power to, um, the abyss.
In contrast, naturalists demand prediction, and consequently they obtain explanations where theists do not. In fact, my personal definition of a naturalist is someone who demands predictive explanations.
As for the non-existence of explanations for the sum of all laws, I stand by that. There are lots of predictive explanations for phenomena in terms of laws. There are even predictive explanations for some laws (e.g., electricity in terms of electroweak forces). However, at some point you regress back to the ultimate law (say, a theory of everything), and you cannot regress any further. In that case, there will be no explanation for the theory of everything. I hope this makes my position clearer.
SteveK:
Some thoughts regarding DL’s absolutist imposition of “predictability” as the epistemological means for validating knowledge as objective.
The fact that we can predict eclipses (phenomena that are in the realism of the MESs) does not provide a valid reason for expecting we can apply prediction to, say, historical studies, psychology, free will, etc. To assert otherwise without demonstration is a leap of faith. DL’s repeated mistake (among others noted below) is he fails (intentionally, I might add) to account for differences in ontological orders (recall his “rigorous” approach in dismissing ontological considerations: “ontology-smontology”): the order of material entities and physical phenomena (whose objects are properly studied by the MESs and against which the predictive efficacy of theories should be tested) is different from the order of, say, meaning, the capacity to reason, causality as such, free will (including morality), faith, etc., which are objects studied by natural philosophy, metaphysics, and theology.
DL is a scientistic reductionist through and through: although he tries to mask this by claiming “emergent” laws or properties cannot be reducible to physics, he inevitably does come back to describing the world in terms of his training as a physicist and employing symbolic logic to abstract away those things which do not fit within his own personal epistemological constraints. Regarding the latter (and perhaps more importantly), DL illicitly applies a subset of the epistemic cycle (that subset being the more limited yet varied scientific methods) to all fields of inquiry, when in fact they don’t apply. (Nor, for that matter, does his approach work when turned back upon itself… something DL has failed to explain.) Example: children learn at a young age that repeatedly taking things that belong to others will bring sanction. Is the child employing the scientific method? No… except for those who would try to usurp the set under the subset.
The imposition of the test of predictability to validate a theory is largely a consequence of positivist baggage—and we are all aware that DL pays a lot of excess baggage fees in these discussions. Yet even Positivists admit that making correct predictions is not the same as having true understanding of the observed phenomenon—let alone the underlying essence in which observable accident inhere. Predicting that something will happen (usually done through the descriptive and abstract efficacy of mathematics) is not the same thing as explaining why that something occurred/came into being. But, as we know, DL has summarily dismissed the “why?” question as “irrelevant” and dismissed “why is there something rather than nothing” as meaningless.
Digression—an unfairly brief treatment of why and when positivism failed: the Anglo-American tradition of Enlightenment empiricism (initiated by the demonstrably false ideas of Hume) eventually morphed into positivism (the reduction of all valid knowledge to sense knowledge abstracted to symbolic logic), which started with advances in modern logic by Frege and Russell (including the work of the Vienna Circle—primarily with Ayer). The positivist project soon showed major cracks (not least of which was its self-stultifying nature), with even Ayer abandoning it. The nails were pounded into the coffin and positivism was ultimately buried (except among reductionist-minded and philosophically untrained scientists) at the hands of Hanson, Feyerabend, Quine, and Kuhn throughout the 50’s, 60’s, and 70’s. DL is either ignorant of these developments or (based on these discussions) ignores them. End digression.
Consider the following: how would one predict whether George Washington died and the exact moment of his death? If one is a healthy thinker unencumbered by positivist baggage, one immediately notices the question is posed incorrectly for verifying whether George Washington died and determining the exact moment of death is not given to prediction—nor should it be. Yet, we accept without a hint of uncertainty, that indeed, George Washington did die—even if we cannot pinpoint the exact moment of death 200 or so years on. Now, does this lack of a character of predictability in obtaining knowledge about the death of George Washington imply that knowledge is invalid? Of course not. Why? Because historical studies do not use the tool of predictability, nor do they need to in order to be productive of knowledge. Moreover, what this further implies is that to obtain confirmation of the death of Washington (to obtain valid knowledge of his death) one does not need to exhume the body of George Washington and drop him in a container of water to see whether he floats like a bar of soap. Nor does one sniff the corpse, nor does one measure the length of the corpse, nor does one taste the corpse, nor does one listen to what the corpse has to say (or to any sounds emanating from the corpse), nor does one measure the frequency of light reflected from the skull, nor does one touch the dry bones, etc., etc.
Prediction is, to a great extent, the sine qua non of the MESs—even though philosophy of science since the middle of the past century (mainly with Popper) abandoned this as an absolute criterion for validating knowledge as MES-knowledge. (Popper’s favorite example was the inanity of applying MESs prediction as a test to knowledge gained by historians—some who tried to predict revolutions or other human population-scale phenomena.) As an example, consider current neo-Darwinian theories. Can they predict anything? No: not at the microbiological level, nor at the level of populations of species, nor anywhere in between. (Yes, I’ve read about certain “predictions” allegedly made by Darwinism… that upon being unpacked leave much to be desired.) To claim that “descent with modification will occur” is correctly predictive is a tautology because “descent with modification” was the observed phenomenon which Darwin interpreted in order to base his theory. Can Darwinism explain anything? Well, at a certain rudimentary level, yes. It is the best (albeit weak and full of holes) scientific candidate currently on the block and so it does, in fact, qualify as a MES because it is NOT a fact per se but a reasoned to fact. What about the forensic sciences? They predict nothing but recreate past events/phenomena. And let’s not forget historical studies noted above. When you move to philosophy, very different approaches must be taken. Etc., etc.
What’s the bottom line? DL continually imposes (his words: “… naturalists demand prediction…”) —dictates in an absolutist fashion, in fact—his own personal criterion (predictability) on what he permits to count as scientific knowledge. At the end of the day, it’s a lot of self-serving bravado. Consider his latest arrogant claim: The main problem with God as a tool for explanation is that theists eschew prediction. Well, that’s bunk because of the reductionism he’s sneaking in: he personally believes the only valid explanation is explanation presented in physical/material terms (for all the reasons I provided above), he fails to understand the analogous nature of the term “cause” (so he tries to “measure” God’s actions—when DL can’t even measure the effect of love on a lover), and he fails to ontologically distinguish God from His creation. (All those errors in one dogmatic assertion!) “If it can’t be measured, it isn’t valid knowledge” is DL’s slogan. If you don’t believe me: read it in his own words… and then ask him whether he can “measure” his assertion. He can’t… and this shoots his explanatory power to, umm, the abyss.
His last point to you on infinite regress is so confused (and we’ve covered those mistakes so often here) it simply doesn’t merit a response. Just contrast and dwell on these comments of his for a moment: (1) “… you cannot regress any further. In that case, there will be no explanation for the theory of everything” [in support of his personal vision of reality that is not productive of explanation] with (2) “… naturalists… obtain explanations where theists do not” [the vain attempt to subsume all explanations under his scientistic vision]. As a result, DL’s position is not clear but, in fact, more muddled than ever.
SteveK:
Here’s some context for further understanding DL’s errors.
More than 2,500 years ago, Aristotle showed us the correct way to study knowledge. Arguably the greatest epistemological error made since roughly the time of Descartes is grounded in the desire to talk about the highest kind of knowledge right away, as though the first question one asked could be about whether beliefs are justified, or whether something can be verified in all possible worlds. To do this is to start with the kind of knowledge that we least know, and which is the hardest for us to know (we don’t know atoms first, we first know the table composed of atoms; we don’t know epistemological theories first, we first know the things around us, and that we know something in the first place). The desire is understandable, because people are starting with what most truly deserves to be called knowledge. This would be a fine thing to start with, except for the odd truth that the first thing we grasp is almost never what most fully has the reality we grasped first.
In this context, DL’s mistakes are two: he tries to validate what counts as knowledge before trying to understand what he’s trying to know (hence his choosing positivism over a hearty realism); his reductionism is based to a large extent on the backward approach to understanding the world around us… which is what I’ll address here.
DL, as a physicist, is particularly prone to this error, for modern physics studies “little” things—primarily those things not immediately observable to the five primary senses. It does so through sophisticated instruments, years of training, and highly-refined methodological approaches (including higher mathematics) not applicable to other modes of intellectual inquiry. Physicists deal with, say, sub-atomic particles, and then try to work up to higher realities physicists become very prone to mistakenly assuming the lower-level ontological order with which they deal naturally and seamlessly translates to higher ontological orders… and never is this justified by them, it is an unquestioned presupposition. In effect, the beingness of a table is usurped under the epistemological and ontological limits of the objects of study of physics: if a physicist asserts (incorrectly!) that an atom is mostly empty space, and then (even more incorrectly!) concludes that a table is mostly empty space, he has committed the classic mistake of extending his limitations upon all of reality. This is reductionism in all its ugly glory.
Aristotle, on the other hand, looks at a table and knows, without any need to refer to physics, that the table is a substance. (A substance, by the way, is not merely the sum total of all its properties—if for no other reason than the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.) He also knows that breaking down the table may round out his knowledge of the existence of the table (first showing it is held together by nails, then made of wood, the wood coming from trees, the cells of the wood being a constituent part of the superstructure making up the wood, the biochemistry of plants relating how trees develop, and physics describing the constituent parts of chemicals, etc.) In other words, to explain why a table came into existence, Aristotle must know much more than the physicist has access to (he must know the material, formal, efficient, and final causes of the table), and of course Aristotle would never (in a bassakwards way) subsume the beingness of the table to the beingness of the wood… or chemical… or atoms. To take apart a table and place the constituent parts in a cyclotron would be to place the table in a pathological state—to destroy the table and to examine its parts not in within and influenced by the table as a whole, but as separate entities following their own immediate “rules of the game.”
Even something as simple as salt brings this point home: the salt molecule is composed of sodium (a highly reactive and dangerous metal) and chlorine (a highly reactive and poisonous gas). Yet, the beingness of the salt molecule as a molecule is different from the two separate atoms, and its properties don’t even come close. This is where DL makes his mistake: he may agree with my description, but then declare the properties of sodium to have “emerged” (through the chemical reaction). First, isn’t that (contra Ockham) adding unnecessary entities to the explanation? Second, those properties haven’t really “emerged” (he’s using the term “emerged” univocally and hence incorrectly)—they are nonetheless physical principles that operate around us all the time. Third, emerged from what to what? Properties inhere in thing, they don’t exist in and of themselves: there’s no “salty taste” out there without the being-ness of salt in which to inhere. There’s no brownish-green color and acidic smell of chlorine without an “it-ness” in which to inhere. The what-ness, the being-ness, the ontology of the things is left fully out of the picture by DL. Well, of course, because physics doesn’t (nor can it) study substance as substance: it can only study (measure, correlate, hypothesize, predict, theorize on) properties—which are accidents of the being in which they inhere.
To be fair, modern day physics very nicely complements, rounds out, and enriches the “wholistic” (I hate that word because of the New Age baggage attached to it) approach natural philosophy takes. Modern-day physicists must be permitted to pursue knowledge of the natural world from their perspective unencumbered by extraneous information, irrelevant influences, and other methodologies. It does an effective job of uncovering many of the natural world’s secrets. But note the character of the physicist’s work: he doesn’t so much “listen” to what nature has to say as he “interrogates” her through experimentation while trying to isolate other physical influences—he is more of prosecuting lawyer who makes demands than a child who listens. The typical physicist is prone to dive into details rather than step back to see the bigger picture. And when he does step back, the physicist is also prone to extending the tools and methodologies of physics to bigger questions outside his own realm and competence. If pursued in absolutist terms, the prosecuting lawyer becomes a jailer… in Plato’s cave, no less. The natural philosopher must be content with listening to nature—a more passive approach that is required when studying the “bigger picture.”
Bottom line: we know a table before we know the atoms that constitute the table, and that is the way the reality of the word must be pursued and understood. DL’s (and Paul’s) approach turns this upside down: understand the atom and you will fully (perhaps eventually) understand the table; understand the atom and you will fully understand the human; understand the celluloid tape in the projector and you will fully understand the moral of the film’s story; understand the epistemological theory first, and then explain the world in terms of it. Such an approach to understanding reality is unnatural and hence disordered, for it goes against the way we come to know and understand things.
DL:
Your last comment doesn't mention any requirement for answering these "why?" questions. Here is what you said earlier:
A theistic model could be explanatory if it wanted to, but it cannot do it without making any predictions. It's not enough to say that a god could have created life. That's as trivial as saying that there's possibly an undiscovered law that accounts of OOL. You need to say why the god created life, and why he did it the way he did. And once you know that, you can make predictions.
Do I still need to know why God did something in order to make a prediction?
SteveK,
1) What are your reasons for thinking these naturalistic theories are explanatory?The criteria for explanations are conventional.
2) What are the criteria for an explanation?
If someone wanted to believe that generic god or generic theory of everything were explanatory, that's their choice, but they would then be saying that there's no such thing as the unexplained. Your pizza contains $500 baked into the crust? God somehow arranged for the money to appear in your pizza crust! Explained!! Your iPod never runs out of power? The theory of everything and initial conditions were somehow arranged so that your battery is everlasting! Explained!!
Not.
Alternatively, if someone thinks that we know an explanation when we see it, then that also has unpleasant consequences. At a gut level, people disagree about whether a theory is explanatory. Where does that leave us?
I happen to think criteria for explanations ought to:
1) reflect our intuition that some things are still unexplained (i.e., they should not trivially explain everything),
2) reflect our intuition that restating observations is distinct from explaining them,
3) provide a potential way to infer that the explanation is the correct one.
Prediction achieves these goals because it enables the explanation to say something about observations we have yet to make, and thereby provides an opportunity to infer that we have the correct explanation.
Do you agree that explanations should have criteria that meet 1,2 and 3?
Do I still need to know why God did something in order to make a prediction?Yes.
There's means, motive and opportunity. God always has means and opportunity, and there are no witnesses. The only constraint on what you might see in the future (including in evidence of past events) is God's motive.
But if you disregard motive, you have no constraints whatsoever. Anything can happen and still be consistent with your so-called explanation. Everything comes pre-explained by the God who will do anything, anytime for any reason.
For example, if God wants to reduce human suffering, his actions will be consistent with that goal. That means no tsunami. If God wants to let people know he exists, he will make himself obvious instead of appearing in the shape of the Virgin Mary on a grilled cheese sandwich, etc. But these little inconvenient aspects of our experience are always brushed under the rug. Instead, theists argue that God's motives are to be trusted, not verified.
Naturalistic explanations also have constraints. There has to be some initial state and some law that describes how the initial state ends up at the final state. That way, you can test that the laws exist and search for the initial conditions. However, if we declared that the initial state was inaccessible and that the laws were not detectable, would we be able to reasonably say that the observations had been explained by the naturalistic theory of everything? No. That would be similar to the theistic case. It's not enough for me to say "trust in the theory of everything, but don't verify it."
[BTW, explanations of past history also make predictions. Suppose I said that the explanation for the increased monthly mileage on my car was that I took extra trips to the health club this month. Doesn't this explanation make predictions that you could test, in principle? For example, you could look at the distances between work, home and the club, and examine my attendance record at the club.
How about the claim that the success of the Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor can be explained by a lack of radar on the island? Seems like there's lots of research I can do, lots of future experiences I will have that will alter my confidence in the explanation being correct. I could create a WWII-class radar installation and simulate the approaching Japanese fleet. I could look at historical records to see whether radar was operating at that time, etc.]
SteveK:
"The criteria for explanations are conventional."
DL's trying to sneak a fast one in. He echoes almost verbatim W.V.O. Quine's scientistic understanding of "explanation." While Quine did have some interesting things to say, much of his philosophy is naturalist/scientistic to the core—which Quine himself admits to unabashedly.
(Quine's ultimate influence is a bit like Rorty's: one should thank Quine for showing us how not to philosophize.)
Moreover, if the truth of explanation is by convention, then surely DL cannot adhere to the idea (say, explanation of why something is or came to be) in one's mind corresponding to the object (either mental or extra-mental) under consideration, can he? DL is (roughly-speaking) adopting a group-think approach rather than a truth-of-the-reality approach.
Much of this is explained by DL's earlier Idealistic insistance that the ONLY things we can know are the ideas/patterns in our minds... err, for him, brains. This approach also animates his moral relativism, for convention is relativistic by its nature. Interestingly, while adopting the "conventionalist" approach to explanation, DL takes a kind of modified "coherence" approach to truth as such: a statement is true for DL if it is logically consistent with other beliefs that are held to be true (with DL imposing a priori which are true according to him). This is clear from his last comments: consider the list of criteria he provides as to what explanation should be (for him, of course, for the lead-in part of his justification is "I happen to think...")
Don't buy it.
DL:
The criteria for explanations are conventional.
I'm a little disappointed here. Is your theory of explanation conventional just as, according to you, morality is conventional? Beyond your personal preference/intuition, how do you know 'Convention A' leads to a meaningful explanation and 'Convention B' leads to a trivial explanation?
SteveK,
Do you not agree that we start from an intuition about the relationship between a proposition and a phenomenon?
For example, regarding the phenomenon "car crash." We notice a pattern in which the proposition "the driver was drunk" relates to the car crash phenomenon in a way that "apple pie was in the trunk" does not.
Another example. Regarding the phenomenon that the "floor is slippery." We notice that "floor is brown" does not relate to the slippery floor phenomenon in the same way as "floor is wet."
We call this relation "explanation." This is our starting point.
The next step is to try to understand what explanation is with a formal definition. Our formal definition should account for why "drunk driver" explains "car crash", but "pie in trunk" does not.
However, if we're going to go and devise a formal definition of explanation based on intuition, there are more constraints from other intuitions.
First, it is intuitive that not everything is explained. If everything were explained, we wouldn't need or notice or search-for explanations. There is a distinction to be made.
Second, I think it is intuitive that "car crash" does not explain "car crash". Restating the phenomenon does not make an explanation.
These intuitions can come into conflict.
Our initial gut reaction might be that "X explains Y, where X is defined as that which explains Y." However, this gut instinct would contradict the other intuition that trivialities are not explanatory.
This is why we want formal definitions of explanation. The idea is that we can at least classify explanations into types according to their conformance with our intuitions.
My claim is that the triviality intuition is more important than the classifier intuition.
If we accept trivial explanations, we are saying that everything is at least a little bit explained automatically just by restating what it is we're explaining. I think we would be fooling ourselves if we accepted trivialities as explanations.
"Explanation" is a dictionary word, and all such words are conventional, so please don't act surprised. If you want to go beyond convention, you have to stake out your convention for what explanation is. Some people will refer only to the one, initial gut reaction (whether paradoxical or not). Others (like me) will prefer to define explanation in a formal way because we think some intuitive explanations are delusions.
Beyond your personal preference/intuition, how do you know 'Convention A' leads to a meaningful explanation and 'Convention B' leads to a trivial explanation?Of course it comes down to intuition. If you intuitively think trivial restatements of the facts to be explained are explanatory, then we will disagree.
Don't have much time to comment now so let me just say this.
Others (like me) will prefer to define explanation in a formal way because we think some intuitive explanations are delusions.
This just begs the question. Your formal definition is intuitive so how can you know if it's delusional (or not)? More intuition?
SteveK,
Your formal definition is intuitive so how can you know if it's delusional (or not)? More intuition?The formal definition is not "intuitive". It may have been inspired by intuition, but that's not the same thing as saying that the formal definition itself is intuitive. The formal definition does not rely on your gut to tell you whether something is explanatory. My definition could be executed by a computer without a gut. All the computer has to do is determine whether the theory interpolates and extrapolates from observations to get predictions.
I'm sorry, DL, but "inspired by intuition" sounds rather mystic, especially coming from someone such as yourself. The fact that the formal definition is rigidly defined such that a computer can execute the rules doesn't matter one bit if the premise for the definition (the intuition) is incorrect. Garbage in, garbage out, right?
SteveK:
As someone once wisely quipped, we don’t need a scientific explanation of God: what we do need is a psychological explanation for atheism. The more I read DL’s responses, the more he continues to amaze me. Am I “out of line” to repeatedly wonder (out loud) that desperation may be creeping into DL’s assertions… and step-by-step to expose the errors of his ideas? (Well, according to DL’s moral relativism, there’s no such thing as an objective “wrong” or “right”… so I guess I’m okay.) From my perspective, what we’re seeing here is the last refuge of the approach adolescents often take: defiance. An attitude of “Oh yeah?!” I’ll fix you by repeating myself… over and over and over again.
Anyway, I posted here an interview of Alister McGrath by To The Source commenting on Richard Dawkins’ self-delusional atheism. What amazed me is just how closely it captures the underlying mannerisms and errors that animate DL’s assertions in these discussions. Surely it is the inevitable result of scientistic dogma that enjoins people to believe impossible—even incoherent, nonsensical—things, and then makes them feel guilty when their innate reason rebels. (This, of course, explains why so many people accept theism and reject atheism and theophobia.) Hence, your disappointment with DL’s response is perfectly natural and correct. One’s common sense should produce a deep-seated revulsion when confronted by scientism and reductionism—just as most of us feel a deep-seated revulsion over Jacob’s rejection of any truth. Philosophy (which is common-sense thinking applied formally) merely helps put intellectual flesh on the bones of that fully-justified revulsion.
I read the other day a great excerpt from Peter Kreeft that captures another perspective on the reductionism and scientism DL promotes in these discussions: “Strange how the mind fixates on physical details in order to handle the unhandleable. When we can’t handle truth we handle facts. We miniaturize; we find some small objective correlative to associate with the unhandleably enormous subjective feeling.” Kreeft was reflecting on his thoughts after finding out his daughter was diagnosed with a large growth in her brain, and that as an (irrational) defense mechanism he started focusing on the physical make-up of the chairs in the waiting room because that knowledge was allegedly more “valid” or “true” than the existential possibility of the death of his daughter looming before him.
Here’s another [slightly paraphrased] that captures yet another perspective of these discussions: “For the modern world will accept no dogmas upon any authority; but it will accept any dogmas on no authority. Say that a thing is so, according to the Pope or the Bible, and it will be dismissed as a superstition without examination. But preface your remark merely with ‘[scientists] say’ or ‘don’t you know that [scientists have proved]?’ or try (and fail) to remember the name of some [scientist] mentioned in some newspaper; and the keen rationalism of the modern mind will accept every word you say.” (G.K. Chesterton, The Superstition of Divorce, 1920)
SteveK,
I'm sorry, DL, but "inspired by intuition" sounds rather mystic, especially coming from someone such as yourself. The fact that the formal definition is rigidly defined such that a computer can execute the rules doesn't matter one bit if the premise for the definition (the intuition) is incorrect. Garbage in, garbage out, right?Really?
So formal arithmetic is intuitive in the same way, right? It was inspired by our intuitive experiences with counting stuff. Garbage in, garbage out?
All of formal science? Clearly inspired by intuition. Garbage in, garbage out.
History? Law? Medicine? Inspired by intuitions.
Everything is intuitive by your standard. Okay, fine. Do you have a point? Because your responses are inane. It's as if you're objecting to everything I say just because I say it.
Do formalizations inspired by intuitions have value or not? If not, we can all quit with the formal argumentation while we're behind.
DL:
I'm not objecting to everything you say just because you say it. I apologize if it appears that way. I have been selectively picking out statements to question you about. I really do want to understand how you think and in some ways I agree with what you have said. For example I agree that intuition plays a role to some degree in all of this.
I do think you hold a rather "thin" (as JP Moreland would say) view of the universe. Your views on prediction/verification are extreme to the point where much of the richness/knowledge of life is stripped away.
Perhaps what gets under my skin the most is when you call Christianity (or anyone) delusional, irrational and superstitious. That sets off my pot-kettle-black alarm, which then leads me into discussions like this. Smugness, no matter who it comes from, is highly unbecoming.
I imagine this discussion would go a lot smoother if we had it face to face.
DL:
So formal arithmetic is intuitive in the same way, right? It was inspired by our intuitive experiences with counting stuff. Garbage in, garbage out?
All of formal science? Clearly inspired by intuition. Garbage in, garbage out.
I never said all intuition leads to untruth. Clearly intuition can, and does, lead to the truth. The fact is neither you, nor I, fully and completely understand how to differentiate one from the other.
We both have gaps in our understanding, which means we both use "gap reasoning". So I hope you can understand why my pot-kettle-black alarm goes off when Christians are derided for using gap arguments.
Stevek:
“Thin” is a good characterization of DL’s worldview… it has been called “unidimensional” as well. Note what he says: “… we start from an intuition about the relationship between a proposition and a phenomenon… We call this relation ‘explanation.’ This is our starting point.”
He should speak for himself and address his own epistemological confines.
As explained earlier, DL’s Idealism forces him to focus on trying to figure out how we know before admitting there are extra-mental things out there to know in the first place. (Above, he again makes the text-book Idealist mistake—believing that it’s the idea that we know rather than the idea being the thing by which we know.) In fact, ontology precedes epistemology: there must be a thing to know before we can know it—the object must “object” to our capacity to reason. DL has it backwards: he starts with abstractions (definitions, intuitions, explanations, patterns, etc.) he knows less about than the real extra-mental things around him, i.e., before first getting straight there are things, then getting straight the epistemology. This is not a chicken-or-the-egg thing: it’s the way reality works.
DL literally operates inside his head rather than coming out to humbly listen to what reality has to share with us. He’s so wrapped around the axel of trying to first figure out how we know that, as a result, DL never gets around to knowing much at all—leaving most of reality (that doesn’t agree with his personal scientistic epistemology) behind and arrogantly characterized as “irrelevant” or “delusional” or “superstitious.”
For example, notice how his physics drives this: for DL movement is defined by the way it is measured rather than by a common sense definition based on the fact of movement existing (meaning it’s some kind of “it”) in the first place before it can be measured. But does this mean that it can never be anything but irrelevant to ask what movement is, apart from an operational way of defining it? (Physics is famous for its plethora of operational definitions… and infamous for trying to extend operational definitions [laden with mathematical formalisms] to things beyond its ken.) Why do you think DL is so enamored with symobolic logic and mathematics—abstractions away from reality rather than concepts drawing us to reality?
Then he says, “ ‘Explanation’ is a dictionary word, and all such words are conventional, so please don’t act surprised.” That’s bordering on Nominalism—that we only know the names of things rather than the things themselves… which makes perfect sense given his continued (earlier) assertion that “the ONLY things we know are our ideas/patterns” rather than extra-mental objects, as well as what was mentioned above. Sigh…
To employ his “logic,” I disagree a bit with you, SteveK: DL’s view of knowledge and explanation is not so much mystical… as it is superstitious in the sense that he fears things he cannot (or will not) understand.
I really do want to understand how you think and in some ways I agree with what you have said.Thank you, Steve. I appreciate the sentiment.
I do think you hold a rather "thin" (as JP Moreland would say) view of the universe. Your views on prediction/verification are extreme to the point where much of the richness/knowledge of life is stripped away.My first instinct was to dismiss this as an aesthetic complaint (and one I would dispute), but when it's taken as a technical objection, it could be made quite valid with specifics.
Perhaps what gets under my skin the most is when you call Christianity (or anyone) delusional, irrational and superstitious.Then I shall endeavor to be more diplomatic.
I don't mean to use these terms in an ad hominem fashion. I'm not trying to say that Christians are irrational people because they are irrational about one thing. Everybody is irrational about at least one thing, without necessarily earning the label "irrational person." Similarly, we can be foolish about something without being fools. However, I acknowledge that this technicality doesn't make it okay.I imagine this discussion would go a lot smoother if we had it face to face.Agreed. When this happens, the first round is on me, Steve.
I haven't forgotten something I wrote a few months ago, which is that at some point soon I'm going to take up this issue of "delusion, irrational, superstitious." I'm sure we'll have a lot more to talk about then, too.
And I sure wish we could all gather at some good coffee shop in the middle of all our home locations, for a long talk. doctor(logic) I'll arm-wrestle you for the right to buy the first round!
We both have gaps in our understanding, which means we both use "gap reasoning". So I hope you can understand why my pot-kettle-black alarm goes off when Christians are derided for using gap arguments.This isn't what people mean when they refer to God of the Gaps (GOG) arguments. What they mean is this. We start with two theories:
1) X will be found to explain Z.
2) Y will be found to explain Z.
Initially, everything is gaps, so either theory is acceptable.
Suppose that, after some period of investigation, theory #1 obtains positive evidence, and no evidence is found for theory #2.
There's still potential that, in time, evidence will be found that will discredit theory #1. There's still potential that, in time, evidence will be found to support theory #2. That is, some gaps remain.
However, is it reasonable to reject theory #1 and embrace theory #2 on the grounds that gaps remain?
I (and most people) would maintain that it would be unreasonable to think theory #2 is more (or equally) probable as theory #1 under such circumstances.
Here are some examples:
EXAMPLE 1
#1: Suspect has been apprehended near the scene of the crime, implicated by witnesses and DNA evidence. The weapon has not been found.
#2: Suspect has been framed by an unspecified party. No evidence found to date.
RESULT: We reasonably conclude that the suspect is likely to be the culprit.
It is possible the suspect was framed, but this theory is less likely than the theory that the suspect committed the crime.
EXAMPLE 2
#1: AIDS is caused by HIV. Positive evidence for this includes the beneficial effect of antiretroviral drugs.
#2: AIDS is caused by recreational drugs, not by HIV.
RESULT: We reasonably conclude that HIV is very likely to be the cause of AIDS.
There's no certainty in either example because there are always enough gaps to make any conclusion provisional. However, certainty isn't necessary. Probability is all we need.
In each case, arguing for greater or equal likelihood of theory #2 is GoG reasoning:
#1: Natural selection and mutation account for speciation on Earth. Positive evidence includes (but is not limited to) common descent, common architecture, genetic similarity and the general structure of the fossil record. There are gaps in the record, and gaps in our understanding of the detailed mechanisms (e.g., speciation rates).
#2: An unseen designer created the species. No positive evidence has been found to support this.
RESULT: It is reasonable to conclude that theory #1 is probably the case.
If you argue that #2 is more likely merely in light of the gaps in our knowledge, then you are making a GoG argument.
When ID advocates say "evolution hasn't explained X, so design is more likely" that's a GoG argument. If IDists have proof that evolution can never explain X, that would not be a GoG argument (alas, they don't have any surviving arguments like that).
Another GoG argument:
#1: Phenomena are explained by natural laws and chance. Lots of natural laws have been found, and this is uncontroversial. Gaps remain as some things lack natural explanations.
#2: Phenomena are explained by the will of an intelligence with a consistent and good personality. No consistency has been found apart from natural law.
RESULT: It is likely that theory #1 is correct.
There are sufficient gaps in our knowledge that #2 could possibly be correct. For example, the controlling intelligence may wish to hide in the gaps in our knowledge. However, it is not reasonable to think it likely that #2 is correct. Thinking that #2 is more (or equally) likely is a GoG argument.
Again, note that a positive evidential claim for #2 would not be a GoG argument. IOW, it is not enough to argue that there is a theory #2 that could be consistent with what we know and the gaps. You need evidence, not gaps.
And I sure wish we could all gather at some good coffee shop in the middle of all our home locations, for a long talk. doctor(logic) I'll arm-wrestle you for the right to buy the first round!
Order up! This, this, or this please.
Ohhhh, you said a coffee shop. In that case, this will do.
DL:
It is possible the suspect was framed, but this theory is less likely than the theory that the suspect committed the crime.
....
However, certainty isn't necessary. Probability is all we need.
....
If you argue that #2 is more likely merely in light of the gaps in our knowledge, then you are making a GoG argument.
I agree you would want to side with the theory that had the higher probability of being correct (see, I can agree!). The problem is in the subjective nature of determining the probabilities. It's not a simple plug-and-chug formula and so there is plenty of room for debate, even among the "experts".
The philosophical arguments pose a particular problem because how do you assign probabilities to certain premises being correct?
- Prediction/verification? That's not going to work. If it could then all philosophical arguments would be settled.
- Intuition? Maybe.
In addition to this there is the problem of weighting. Does argument 'A' carry the most weight, or does argument 'B'? Can argument 'C' wipe out anything gained by arguments 'A' and 'B'?
As you can see, it's not a simple process and so your charge that God-of-the-Gaps reasoning is somehow different than other gap reasoning is unfounded.
DL: I noticed your Example #1 is similar to this example I cobbled together.
#1: Jesus was seen to have died and was buried in a tomb. Witnesses claimed to have seen Jesus resurrected just as he claimed before his death. Jesus' body has not been found.
#2: Jesus has been framed by an unspecified party (the leaders stole his body, he never existed, mass hallucination, etc). No evidence has been found to date.
RESULT: We reasonably conclude that Jesus is likely to have resurrected.
I fully expect your probability numbers to be quite different than mine. Explain why you think your numbers and weight distribution are better than mine.
doctor(logic) I'll arm-wrestle you for the right to buy the first round!Sure. But I must warn you that spending so much time in academic pursuits has left me feeble. :P
SteveK,
The problem is in the subjective nature of determining the probabilities. It's not a simple plug-and-chug formula and so there is plenty of room for debate, even among the "experts"I don't think it's that fuzzy. Bayesian analysis is fine. We just look at the frequencies and the noise.
Explain why you think your numbers and weight distribution are better than mine.Well, the problem with your numbers is that there aren't multiple witnesses. There's a document written by believers decades after the fact, circulated by those believers, that claims there were lots of witnesses (all of whom are now dead).
Furthermore, resurrection is rare. In fact, there have been no scientific cases of resurrection, no mystery outbreaks of resurrection, etc. Given human experience so far, resurrection is at least a billion to one against.
However, the incidence of people making up stories and religions is pretty high. There are new cults being invented every year, and claims of miracles every day. None of these claims has ever stood up to controlled testing, and a great many of them have been proven false.
So, conservatively, the relevant frequencies are:
Resurrection < 1 per billion years.
False paranormal beliefs > 100 per year. Include ghost stories, claimed miracle cures, psychic predictions, etc.
Political and religiously biased reporting > 100 per year. Count publications by cults and organizations asserting things that are not true, or things that are speculative, but expressed as fact. Note that while political smear campaigns are effective today, paranormal smear campaigns were effective in earlier eras. Accusing someone of being a witch would not work today, but it was effective long ago. People were more likely to believe in the paranormal then than now (e.g., pharaohs were said to be gods with magical qualities).
So, the resurrection is the signal you're looking for. The noise consists of the hundreds of false claims or beliefs presented per year. Your signal to noise ratio is 1 in hundreds, at the very least.
What you need is for there to be sufficient controlled evidence that your signal is noise-proof. That is totally lacking in the case of Jesus and the Resurrection. Sure, the Bible may well refer to truths (e.g., just like Tom Clancy's novels refer to truths about current places and current events), and the book may date from as little as 30 years after the period in question. However, that isn't evidence anymore than the truths and publication date of a novel makes all the novel's contents true.
Here's a comparable example. Suppose an old man is on trial for being a vampire who killed 10 people. Suppose that the evidence against the old man is a 200-year-old book written by a vampire-hunter cult that claims that someone matching the old man's description is a vampire. The book claims that 500 of its cult members (almost all of whom are not named) witnessed the vampire doing naughty vampire tricks (e.g., turning into a bat, coming back to life, etc.).
If this were the only evidence, would the court find the man guilty? I don't think they would. There's no scientific, controlled evidence that vampires are non-fictional (excepting the South American bat species). Yes, the man may be a vampire, and may be getting away with murder, but it's just not probable that he is. Even if the criteria for guilt was probable guilt rather than guilty beyond reasonable doubt, he still would be found innocent.
DL:
Resurrection < 1 per billion years.
A valid probability argument. I can offer up at least one argument to counter this.
- The First Resurrection* < 1 per 4 billion years
And now to the weighting issue. Does my argument do anything to eclipse the gains made by your arguments? Not saying it does, but how should this be evaluated?
* the creation of life on earth from non-living matter
Your signal to noise ratio is 1 in hundreds, at the very least.
What signal to noise ratio signifies something is more probable than not?
1 in 300?
1 in 47.9?
1 in 1.1?
Furthermore,
1) How do you know some of the noise wasn't really a signal, meaning the claim was actually true?
2) Does every noise/signal data point carry the same weight?
3) When is it reasonable to conclude a miracle has in fact occurred when by definition it is a highly-improbable, unnatural event?
4) If "God did it" is never a valid belief based on probability arguments, then why do you continue to ask for evidence for God? If it helps, I refer you to my previous comment on this conflicting requirement.
SteveK:
First, a fair question given DL’s ad hominem (despite his protestations to the contrary) application of the labels “delusional,” “irrational,” and “superstitious,” or his out-of-hand dismissal (by means of crude historicism) thinkers from previous centuries (thereby avoiding addressing the merits of their arguments): On what objective basis should anyone trust a person who assures the studio audience that they will “endeavor to be more diplomatic” when that person not only believes but promulgates moral relativism? (In this context, would it be out-of-bounds to worry the coffee DL offers to buy may be poisoned?) I believe Chesterton had a wonderful chestnut along those lines: it’s important to know the worldviews of those to whom you are considering renting an apartment.
Second, on the very day DL assures you of his alleged charitable spirit, he posts a whole-hearted approval (“LOL! I love it!”) of another person’s promotion of positivism and admonishment to kill those who don’t share her thoughts (“If you find anyone caricaturing the positivists in this way, kill them. It’s better for all of us.”)
This comment is not the place to expand on the error DL uncritically adopts in his post regarding what positivism (which, in the formal sense, is an abandoned philosophy), Ayer’s actual position—including his own eventual abandonment of the positivist project, and whether DL knows what analytic statements are or that Quine put all that to rest many years ago. Nor do we need to spill more ink on DL’s strange and unworkable conflation of prediction with explanation, his Idealism, his scientism, etc.
What is immediately troubling is DL’s support of capital violence against those who understand how false and self-defeating positivism is. We know DL espouses abortion-on-demand, embryonic stem cell research, pornography, homosexuality, euthanasia, transhumanism, etc. Is it wrong to think, applying DL’s logic, that there is a predictable pattern in the ideas he proposes? Is it wrong or “irrelevant” to request equal time to scrutinize the promotion of evil ideas by those who protest God as “evil” (per certain misunderstood Old Testament passages)?
Two quotes come to mind: “Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities,” (Voltaire) and “This is what the LORD Almighty says: ‘Give careful thought to your ways’” (Haggai 1:7).
Another nugget from the diplomat's blog.
" Christians have learned that if you just keep lying, you probably won't get called on your bullshit. "
http://doctorlogic.blogspot.com/...-
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