Thinking Christian Comments
Original Post: Why Would You Deny Objective Moral Values?
Well, having been banished by SteveK and Holo because I said I don't care whether there is an absolute truth, I don't know whether you want me to comment here, but I'll risk it anyway.
First let me just say that when I said I didn't care, I followed it up by saying that I didn't care because I think it's irrelevant to how we live. It's not that I don't care about morality in general, or even that, if absolute morality were proven I wouldn't care, it's that I think the question of whether there is absolute morality is unanswerable and I am more concerned about how we actually live in the absence of an answer to that question.
Now let me say that I feel a bit misrepresented by your post, Tom. You write, "...he most certainly could not say to the cigarette-wielding baby-burner, 'Stop it! That's wrong!'--for their moral basis would be as valid as his own." This is not what I think at all. I've said in comments that I think morality is feeling so strongly about an idea that we are willing to sacrifice for it, and that my morality obligates me to convince others that my positions are correct. My own authority is enough for me to act on; I don't need an outside source that verifies my morality.
Also, I did mention that there is a culture that treats their babies roughly in the belief that this prepares them for life. I'm not saying that I agree that this is a good thing, only that a member of that culture would believe this is a good thing. When you present a scenario and appeal to people's response to it as a defense of your argument, you are only appealing to people who live in a culture similar to yours, in a time and place similar to yours, so you prove nothing about absolutes.
I'm much more interested in knowing how your morality, based on your understanding of an absolute, guides your choices in everyday life.
I am not, btw, avoiding God. I've only recently come to atheism after a long trial with being a believer.
You could say, "Stop it! That's wrong!" But you would be wrong, if morality is defined by the culture. That's one of the more common versions of relativist morality. Maybe instead you think it's not that, though, for you said, "My own authority is enough for me to act on; I don't need an outside source that verifies my morality." In that case they could say, "We don't need you as an outside source to comment on our morality." Then if you want to be consistent with your own principles, you would have to agree. Either way, by your principles, there's nothing immoral in that culture about torturing babies.
If there is a culture that treats babies roughly to prepare them for life, either (a) they are doing it a lot less roughly than in the example I raised, or (b) they are wrong, morally (under moral realism), or (c) under relativism, they have perfect moral justification for torturing babies.
I accept that you are not avoiding God. I think a lot of moral relativists are. I still wonder why you would hold to moral relativism when it leads to such crazy conclusions, such as that torturing babies could be morally justifiable.
No, I wouldn't be wrong if morality is defined by the culture. I would be "right" according to my own morality, and "wrong" according to theirs. My task would be to convince them that my morality is more "right" than their morality. This is, in fact, what we actually DO all the time: We intervene when we believe other cultures are acting immorally (you would say because we believe it is immoral based on the absolute morality provided by God; I would say because we as a society believe our morality is more "right" than their morality.)
You are right that they could say they don't need me as an outside source to comment on their morality (and, in fact, this is what other cultures DO.) But, I don't have to agree to be consistent with my principles! I don't see why you keep saying that. I think it's because you believe that there is only one morality. I believe in multiple moralities, but also that I have an obligation to act according to my own (and there are many instances in which I do have to respect the other culture's morality and not intervene, as well.)
You are right that I would say that that culture does not consider their acts immoral. But I would not say that I consider those acts moral.
There is another option, Tom: (c) they are morally justified according to their cultural beliefs and they are not morally justified according to others' beliefs. They are both moral and immoral, depending on the perspective. THIS is moral relativism (at least, according to OS).
I hold to this moral relativism because it allows me to understand. I don't believe it leads to "such crazy conclusions," as I just demonstrated.
This is getting even more interesting. If your task is, as you said, to convince them your morality is more right than theirs, then there actually must be a morality that is more right.
But, I don't have to agree to be consistent with my principles!
Wow. Did you really mean to say that? Read it again, please.
Tom, you wrote, "In that case they could say, 'We don't need you as an outside source to comment on our morality.' Then if you want to be consistent with your own principles, you would have to agree."
You're right, I would have to agree that they did not need me as an outside source. But that wouldn't cause me to stop trying to convince them.
As for there having to be a morality that is more right: No, *I* have to *believe* that *my* morality is more right.
Tom,
First, I have to object once more to your use of terminology.
Os was unwilling to commit to Mother 1's actions being actually, really, more morally right than Mother 2's.I think you need to be more exlpicit here. You keep saying "actually" and "really," but that's not what you mean. What you mean is "absolutely." It comes out in a way you don't intend.
Instead of saying:
OS doesn't think Mother 1 is objectively more moral than Mother 2.
you have OS saying:
OS doesn't really think Mother 1 is more right than Mother 2.
Can you see the difference? In the latter case, you have OS saying he thinks Mother 2's actions are subjectively moral to him and that, by implication, he's happy to let Mother 2 go on torturing her baby.
Not only that, but we must conclude that if os landed in that culture somehow, he could not raise any moral objection to the way mothers treat their children. He could say he disagrees, that he finds their practice distasteful, not preferred; but he most certainly could not say to the cigarette-wielding baby-burner, "Stop it! That's wrong!"--for their moral basis would be as valid as his own.On the last thread, I showed that this argument fails outright. This statement of yours assumes there is an objective moral law that one cannot impose one's subjective preferences on someone else. This assumption is part of a moral realist picture. So you're finding fault with relativism because it violates the rules of moral realism. So, you are incorrect here. OS can say "Stop!" and he can do so without the slightest hint of contradiction.
I think you also misunderstand the relationship between culture and moral relativism. Moral relativism doesn't say that morality is one and the same as the cultural view. No, the relativist says that culture is one of the causes of an individual's moral values (the other causes being genetics and personal history). A cultural moral norm does not necessarily cause an individual to hold that norm as a positive value in later life.
IOW, just because a culture thinks Mother 2 is acting correctly does not mean that every individual in that culture (nor people outside that culture) will (or ought) think so.
Moral relativism is basically a description of how we feel what we feel, and a description of the way an individual's feelings create moral imperatives for that individual. It also describes the way that a society takes these individual values and forms social contracts and cultural moral norms.
You are misinterpreting relativism to be the moral realist theory that "culture determines morality." As if "objectively, do what the majority say." You then disprove your misinterpretation by showing that an individual outside of the culture may not change his moral convictions when he realizes that he opposes societal norms. I would say you were attacking a straw man, but the straw man in this case is an objective morality.
Finally, you still insist that there is such a thing as an external moral authority. I would like to see you substantiate that claim because I think it is completely bogus. If the Pope said "burn that baby" would you obey her because she was a moral authority? I think that's nonsense. You would listen to the person and see how that person's actions fit into your own moral values, then accept or reject it on that basis. It is your own internal moral values that are your authority in any argument.
This is why the relationship between objective morality and God is a non-existent one. It doesn't matter what God says I ought to do. If he commands me to kill my son, I don't suddenly think it is a good thing to do just because God told me to do it. I think that's total nonsense.
What's dangerous is this idea that people should defy their own conscience because someone else says they ought to. And in the case of religion, the person saying they ought to defy their conscience is a MAN who thinks he knows what God wants (if God even exists).
The atheism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is—in its origins and aims—a type of moralism: a protest against the injustices of the world and of world history. A world marked by so much injustice, innocent suffering, and cynicism of power cannot be the work of a good God. A God with responsibility for such a world would not be a just God, much less a good God. It is for the sake of morality that this God has to be contested. Since there is no God to create justice, it seems man himself is now called to establish justice. If in the face of this world’s suffering, protest against God is understandable, the claim that humanity can and must do what no God actually does or is able to do is both presumptuous and intrinsically false. It is no accident that this idea has led to the greatest forms of cruelty and violations of justice; rather, it is grounded in the intrinsic falsity of the claim. A world which has to create its own justice is a world without hope. No one and nothing can answer for centuries of suffering. No one and nothing can guarantee that the cynicism of power—whatever beguiling ideological mask it adopts—will cease to dominate the world. This is why the great thinkers of the Frankfurt School [a neo-Marxist philosophical movement in 20th century Germany], Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, were equally critical of atheism and theism. Horkheimer radically excluded the possibility of ever finding a this-worldly substitute for God, while at the same time he rejected the image of a good and just God. In an extreme radicalization of the Old Testament prohibition of images, he speaks of a “longing for the totally Other” that remains inaccessible—a cry of yearning directed at world history. Adorno also firmly upheld this total rejection of images, which naturally meant the exclusion of any “image” of a loving God. On the other hand, he also constantly emphasized this “negative” dialectic and asserted that justice—true justice—would require a world “where not only present suffering would be wiped out, but also that which is irrevocably past would be undone.” This, would mean, however—to express it with positive and hence, for him, inadequate symbols—that there can be no justice without a resurrection of the dead. (Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Saved in Hope, 30 November 2007, §42)
Holo,
All I can say is that what you point to is not my reason for atheism. I find much good in the world, much hope; I don't need God for that.
To protest against God in the name of justice is not helpful. A world without God is a world without hope. (cf. Ephesians 2:12) Only God can create justice. And faith gives us the certainty that he does so. (Ibid., §44)
Holo,
If you are responding to me, then you are way off. I never said I was protesting against God in the name of justice. And I said that I have hope, without God.
If you are simply making a personal statement or directly your comment to someone else, of course, that's fine.
[The non-Christian approach to life] means shrinking back through lack of courage to speak openly and frankly a truth that may be dangerous. Hiding through a spirit of fear leads to “destruction.” (Hebrews 10:39) “God did not give us a spirit of timidity but a spirit of power and love and self-control”—that, by contrast, is the beautiful way in which Timothy (1:7) describes the fundamental attitude of the Christian. (Ibid, §9)
IOW, just because a culture thinks Mother 2 is acting correctly does not mean that every individual in that culture (nor people outside that culture) will (or ought) think so.
Pardon me, doctor(logic), but there is no "ought" if moral relativism is just a description of what people do. Given you own definition, your statement there doesn't make sense.
What's dangerous is this idea that people should defy their own conscience because someone else says they ought to. And in the case of religion, the person saying they ought to defy their conscience is a MAN who thinks he knows what God wants (if God even exists).
So you're saying there is an overarching moral imperative not to violate someone's conscience? That it's wrong for that religious person to do so, in a way that would be meaningful in any way to that person?
Let me ask you this: have you ever had to convince someone they got a math problem wrong? Have you ever tried to convince someone that your favorite flavor of ice cream should be theirs? In which of the two are you more successful? If, as you say, morality is more like the latter, do you see how your moral persuation may be a rather pointless endeavor? You're trying to convince us that it is wrong for a man's conscience to be superceded by the demands of an outside moral authority. (Hypothetically) I'm glad that tastes good to you, but I find the opposite to be much better. Thanks for the autobiography.
Folks, it would be helpful in this discussion to remember a simple but oft-overlooked fact:
In regards to the question of objective morality, absolutely nothing follows from the fact that specific moral views differ among individuals and societies.
Aaron,
So, whereas I call these cultural differences different moralities, you would call them different interpretations of the one absolute morality?
Aaron,
Pardon me, doctor(logic), but there is no "ought" if moral relativism is just a description of what people do.Then I guess it's fortunate for me that moral relativism is not just a description of what people do! It also describes what they feel and how they came to feel it.
So you're saying there is an overarching moral imperative not to violate someone's conscience?Not at all.
Aaron, I am saying that your own moral values are your own moral authority. And I am appealing to that authority to reflect upon information that you may not yet have considered. If the authority of your personal values tells you that one man's conscience ought to be overridden overridden by another's, then my appeal will fail. Pretty simple, and no objective morality required.
As it happens, it did fail in your case. And, if respect for moral authority in others was a fundamental value of yours, then it would be prudent for me to give up trying to persuade you.
However, I doubt that respect for moral authority in others is fundamental for you. I rather suspect that you think that external moral authority is the way people are persuaded to act in accordance with your own wishes (which, not surprisingly, are your god's wishes), and it is behavior in accordance with your own wishes which is fundamental.
Thus, there is still hope for me, and so I will continue to explain to you that moral authority is in the receiver and not in the claimant.
Let me ask you this: have you ever had to convince someone they got a math problem wrong? Have you ever tried to convince someone that your favorite flavor of ice cream should be theirs? In which of the two are you more successful?Can you see now why these two cases differ from my perspective?
The prior moral values of the math student are that one ought to respect mathematical axioms and consistency. If I explain that the student has made an error, the student does not alter his calculation because of my authority. The student fixes the error because he can prove to himself that the fix is more in keeping with his own values. My appeal on the math error is an appeal to the student's prior values.
Likewise, when we debate ice cream flavors, it is not in the receiver's prior moral values that other people should impose on him a flavor of ice cream he does not want.
Holopupenko,
A world which has to create its own justice is a world without hope. No one and nothing can answer for centuries of suffering. No one and nothing can guarantee that the cynicism of power—whatever beguiling ideological mask it adopts—will cease to dominate the world.Without hope of... perfection? I can live with that.
But what a wonderful, perfect world you yourself must live in. Earthquakes, tsunami, murder, child abuse... no problem! Perfection guaranteed by God himself! Yes, a world in which the punishment of the murderer rectifies all, as if the victim had never died and those who loved the victim never mourned.
Yeah, I'm kinda skeptical.
DL,
I would add that we change other people's morality when we appeal to some other value they hold (actually I think you may already have said this somewhere else.)
For example, if I try to convince Tom's Mother 2 that it would be more moral not to burn her baby, I might be successful if I know that she values beauty, and explain that she is making her baby less beautiful. Something like that...
ALL:
I go back to the fact that there must be one reality to be perceive. If you and I are perceiving this one reality in the same way and from the same perspective it follows that we must perceive it the same or one of us is dead wrong (or both are).
DL's tries to avoid this fact by focusing on the individual perception instead of the singularity of reality, but that fails too.
Saying "Tom thinks vanilla tastes better than chocolate" is still an objective truth claim about the tastes of Tom. It is either true or false because there is only one reality. Here we are being asked to perceive it from the perspective of Tom only. What DL thinks about vanilla is an entirely different question.
Moral truth claims are also objective in the same way and for the same reason - one reality. "Tom thinks X is more virtuous than Y" is objective for the reasons stated above.
The claim "X is more virtuous than Y" is objective independent of Tom's opinion per the one reality requirement. We may not know if it is true or false, but we know it cannot be both when perceived in the same way and from the same perspective.
SteveK,
I don't understand how this could work. How could any two people perceive reality in the exact same way from exactly the same perspective?
Steve,
I agree with OS here.
I think your first statement was probably okay:
Saying "Tom thinks vanilla tastes better than chocolate" is still an objective truth claim about the tastes of Tom.My personal belief is that this is indeed the case. Our tastes are defined by our biology, our environment, and our history. I personally think all of these things are objective, and that if we had enough technology we could explain in detail exactly how we come to feel what we feel. All objective.
However, that doesn't make morality objective in the sense we are all talking about it. If I say "X is right," and Tom says "X is wrong," then the two don't conflict because they are not beliefs about the same thing in the same way. They are not beliefs about external absolutes regarding X. They are the results of our respective biologies and environments. They are claims about our respective feelings and preferences. IOW, our beliefs do not logically contradict, they conflict.
If you think chocolate tastes better than vanilla, and I think the reverse, our views do not contradict each other. As you say, they are not about the same thing in the same way. Indeed, we can both be right because you are stating your feelings, and I am stating mine. It is a cognitive and linguistic accident that I will declare "vanilla is better than chocolate!" as if it were an absolute, or as if I meant "Steve also thinks vanilla is better than chocolate!" It is a linguistic illusion that they appear to logically contradict.
As it happens, not only do our views on flavor not logically contradict, they also do not conflict. At least, that is, until one of us is denied our preference on account of the other. If we share $1, and we can only have one flavor between us, then our mere preference becomes a moral preference because there is conflict. If we each have our own dollar, there's no conflict.
Paganism - you have your god, I have mine. [relativism, postmodernism] (The Ukrainian word for "bad" is the same word as "pagan" but used as an adjective: pohanyi.)
Idolatry - My god is the only real god. [scientism, naturalism]
Christ - I AM the Way, the Truth, and the Life. [Christianity]
SteveK:
One has to be a bit more careful: sensory perception (first act of the mind) is one thing; knowing the thing perceived (i.e., judging what it is) is another (second act of the mind); reasoning to acquire new knowledge is yet another (third act of the mind). The only way we know things (as opposed to merely having sensory knowledge) is by “grasping” immaterially their intelligible aspect, i.e., their essence: the object known “objects” (in Latin: throws itself) at our minds—hence we have definitions (genus and difference). The only way we know things not accessible to our five primary senses (say, “predicate,” “causality,” “the day after tomorrow,” “the rules of chess,” Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems,” “causality writ large,” “the scientific method,” etc.) is to reason to them. Remember the principle: while all knowledge comes to us by means of the senses, not all knowledge is sensory knowledge.
DL and OS (and Paul) limit themselves only to sensory knowledge, i.e., to accidents of real being. Indeed, they are correct—say in the following example: different light waves impinge upon my retina than the ones that impinge upon DL’s retina, and the object ever so slightly changes while we observe it. And so, merely from the sensory-only perspective these guys DO see something slightly different from what you or I see. BUT, whereas they each see a concrete cat (albeit slightly different from each sensory perspective), they unfortunately reduce it to merely the sum of its accidents (observable properties), they deny the existence of “catness” as a universal concept as the essence shared by all cats... which, at the very least is debilitating to science: without universal concepts, science is impossible. Note it is not the eye/retina that “sees,” nor is it one of the posterior lobes of the brain: it is YOU who sees… and knows.
DL is, as I’ve often reminded him, far worse off for he asserts categorically the “ONLY things we know are the ideas[/patterns] in our minds.” This neo-Kantian idealism shuts DL inside himself with no possible contact with (knowledge of) the outside world—doubly damning to science.
I wish you a happy start of the Christmas season with tomorrow’s first day of Advent.
Other than criticizing DL yet again, Holo, what are you trying to say? Because when you say, "Note it is not the eye/retina that “sees,” nor is it one of the posterior lobes of the brain: it is YOU who sees… and knows" it sounds like you are defending my position, and making a statement about relativity. Because if the knowing lies in the person, and not in the object itself, then the knowing is subjective...
Unless you are trying to be sarcastic.
DL:
You are getting distracted by details that don't matter. Is there one reality or not? Answer this question, please.
If you answer yes as I do, then we have a grounding source for all possible perspectives - reality. Reality can be experienced/perceived from various perspectives just as a car can be perceived from above, below, inside, etc. All perspectives, though different, either reflect reality correctly or they don't. There are no other options available.
Because of this, different moral perspectives either reflect reality correctly or they don't. These are our only choices. The claim "X is more virtuous than Y" is objectively either true or false when compared to our only grounding source - reality.
Holo,
I'm purposely not addressing the process of HOW we know, rather I'm focusing on the objective grounding source and progressing from there. How we know is very important but I think the only way we can settle this matter is to do it this way.
Steve,
The claim "X is more virtuous than Y" is objectively either true or false when compared to our only grounding source - reality.No. You still misunderstand moral relativism.
Moral relativism doesn't cleave the world into realities for each individual. There is still one reality. However, under relativism, the statement "X is wrong" made by person P means no more than "I, P, feel that X is wrong."
Under moral relativism, the only "moral reality" consists of the real mechanisms that give a person his subjective moral intuitions.
Your argument about there being a single reality is totally irrelevant because there's a single reality in both of our models. You mistakenly think that if I forcefully assert "Z is wrong", I must think that Z is wrong for everyone absolutely in my personal reality. However, this is not the case. I believe Z is wrong subjectively (not absolutely) in our shared reality, AND yet I intend to persuade others to my moral perspective.
Furthermore, your own argument works the same way for every subjectivity:
The claim "chocolate is better than vanilla" is objectively either true or false when compared to our only grounding source - reality.
The theists here have spilled a lot of pixels denying that morals are preferences, but by your own standard morals are indistinguishable from preferences, and preferences ought to be accorded an absolute reality. In other words, you're saying that it is impossible for a man to have a subjective opinion about any objective fact. For example, if I like hip-hop, that's not a subjective opinion about the objective lyrics, melodies, sound waves, etc., but a perception of the absolute goodness of hip-hop. Isn't anything about my affinity for hip-hop in me instead of in hip-hop itself?
Suppose that I was brought up on abstract atonal music. When I hear this music, I think of the good times I had as a child. Is my adult appreciation for abstract atonal music a measure of the objective goodness of abstract atonal music in platonic musical reality? No. I'm not perceiving some musical reality wherein abstract atonal is good. I am perceiving some aggregate of my own memories as jogged by the music. There's something objective to this story to be sure, but it has nothing to do with "musical reality".
I'm working on porting this blog over to WordPress, along with getting the whole yard raked today, so I haven't been looking at comments today. But it's been busy!
doctor(logic),
I think you need to be more exlpicit here. You keep saying "actually" and "really," but that's not what you mean. What you mean is "absolutely." It comes out in a way you don't intend.
I think they mean the same thing, where "actually," and "really" have reference to something beyond a person's opinion. But your correction here is a fair one, in view of that:
Instead of saying:
OS doesn't think Mother 1 is objectively more moral than Mother 2.
On the last thread, I showed that this argument fails outright. This statement of yours assumes there is an objective moral law that one cannot impose one's subjective preferences on someone else. This assumption is part of a moral realist picture.
No. I did not say os "should not" raise any moral objection; I said that he "could not." It's not that it would be immoral for him to try to do that, it's that he would be logically incorrect. He would be saying something is wrong when it is not; for he would be saying they are committing some kind of violation, when in fact they are being perfectly moral according to their own culture. So you have misunderstood me here. This objection does not assume moral objectivity in a circular way; it assumes logical coherence instead.
think you also misunderstand the relationship between culture and moral relativism. Moral relativism doesn't say that morality is one and the same as the cultural view. No, the relativist says that culture is one of the causes of an individual's moral values (the other causes being genetics and personal history). A cultural moral norm does not necessarily cause an individual to hold that norm as a positive value in later life.
Understood. Perfectly. But the grounding for morality is still such that os could not go into that cigarette-wielding culture and (in a logically coherent way) say "Stop! That's wrong!"
You are misinterpreting relativism to be the moral realist theory that "culture determines morality." As if "objectively, do what the majority say."
No, again, no. I'm interpreting moral relativism to mean that people derive their moral values from a source they deem to be personal, cultural, biological, anything at all that's contingent rather than objective. But culturally-determined morality is one common version of moral relativity; and if there is a culture that deems cigarette-baby-torture to be a culturally accepted moral value, as in my example, then the example is valid even if there are other versions of moral relativism. That culture has a morality that os would be violating if he said they were wrong.
Finally, you still insist that there is such a thing as an external moral authority. I would like to see you substantiate that claim because I think it is completely bogus. If the Pope said "burn that baby" would you obey her because she was a moral authority? I think that's nonsense.
But of course, and of course not. I do insist there is an external moral authority, and I don't think it's the Pope. I do insist there is a transcendent Good, not a transcendent Evil or even a transcendent Maybe Good, Maybe Not. And I'm substantiating that by all of these arguments, many of which you have definitely misunderstood.
Aaron, excellent point:
So you're saying there is an overarching moral imperative not to violate someone's conscience? That it's wrong for that religious person to do so, in a way that would be meaningful in any way to that person?
And later doctor(logic) answered with an absolutely certain prescription for anarchy and moral chaos:
Aaron, I am saying that your own moral values are your own moral authority.
So the cigarette-baby-torturing mother is being consistent with her own moral values. Who are you, who am I, to impose your or my values on her? Why shouldn't her values be as good as ours? Why does dl impose his values on us?
os wrote,
For example, if I try to convince Tom's Mother 2 that it would be more moral not to burn her baby, I might be successful if I know that she values beauty, and explain that she is making her baby less beautiful. Something like that...
All you can convince her of, os, is that it would be more moral in your private opinion if she did not burn her baby. By her private opinion, you would be imposing your morality on her, or at least trying to, even if you were doing it by rational argumentation. Who are you to think your morality is more moral than hers?
This is a serious question and not a rhetorical question. In order to have a "more," there must be some directionality to morality. There must be some kind of vectors toward greater or lesser moralities. If everyone (or every culture) chooses their own moral values, then there is no such thing as "more moral," for every person is living up to their full moral vision.
So I close with this final question: what is it about your opinion about baby torturing that makes it more moral than the opinion of some person in a culture where baby torturing is considered ethical? Do you stand on higher ground, such that your private (or cultural) moral opinion is better than theirs?
I think doctor(logic) has stated quite clearly that you have no basis for this at all:
... under relativism, the statement "X is wrong" made by person P means no more than "I, P, feel that X is wrong."
DL:
but by your own standard morals are indistinguishable from preferences, and preferences ought to be accorded an absolute reality.
No they are not indistinguishable because I (and everyone else) claims there is a distinguishable difference. If there was no difference we'd be saying that.
Yes, preferences ought to be accorded an absolute reality in accordance with the claim. "I prefer vanilla over chocolate" is either true or false according to the claim "I prefer". This is different than the claim "vanilla tastes better than chocolate". If reality is such that this statement is universally true then so be it. I don't think anyone will say it's universally true, but then again 100% consensus doesn't impose truth upon reality.
In other words, you're saying that it is impossible for a man to have a subjective opinion about any objective fact.
I'm not saying that at all. Subjective opinions are possible as shown in my vanilla vs. chocolate example. The truth of the opinion in light of objective reality is often a separate question with a separate answer.
Furthermore, your own argument works the same way for every subjectivity
Of course. Every subjective claim made about perceived reality is either true or false. The question is "how do we best discover the answer?"
Tom,
No. I did not say os "should not" raise any moral objection; I said that he "could not." It's not that it would be immoral for him to try to do that, it's that he would be logically incorrect. He would be saying something is wrong when it is not; for he would be saying they are committing some kind of violation, when in fact they are being perfectly moral according to their own culture.There's no logical contradiction.
In the relativist view, we have:
1) When I say "Mother #2 is wrong" I really mean "I subjectively feel that Mother #2 is wrong."
2) Mother #2 subjectively feels that she is right.
3) I take action to persuade Mother #2 that she should desist from torturing her baby.
There's no failure of logical coherence here.
Now, IF I add to this list something like:
4a) Good and evil is objectively determined by social consensus within the society where the act takes place.
Or maybe this:
4b) It is objectively illogical to morally persuade someone else who holds a differing subjective view.
THEN I would have a logically incoherent set. However, relativists don't claim either (4a) or (4b).
But the grounding for morality is still such that os could not go into that cigarette-wielding culture and (in a logically coherent way) say "Stop! That's wrong!"Why? What do you think "Stop! That's wrong!" means?
The relativist takes it to mean "Stop! If you consider all of the consequences of your actions, you will likely find that your actions go against your own values. If, upon reflection, your actions do not go against your own values, I will respond to your actions such that you will likely find that your actions plus my retaliatory response go against your own values."
And later doctor(logic) answered with an absolutely certain prescription for anarchy and moral chaos:This brought a smile to my face. This "prescription" is what I believe happens in the real world, so I don't see how it can be a prescription any more anarchy and chaos than there already is. In fact, I think that it would result in some progress.
Aaron, I am saying that your own moral values are your own moral authority.
If you don't think it's how things happen in the real world, I would like you to find an example in which someone is persuaded by external authority instead of internal values. Even in cases where one is persuaded by a "transcendent moral authority", one must first possess moral values like "transcendent moral authorities ought to be obeyed" or "I ought to trust X as a moral authority" etc.
So the cigarette-baby-torturing mother is being consistent with her own moral values.Not necessarily. Maybe Mother #2 has not considered all of the consequences of her actions. She may actually be acting inconsistently with her own values (I suspect this is the case in most moral debates).
Who are you, who am I, to impose your or my values on her? Why shouldn't her values be as good as ours? Why does dl impose his values on us?Perhaps her values are objectively as good as mine to some indifferent observer. However, no one is indifferent to their own moral values. Every man believes his own moral values outweigh those of others, and is committed to act accordingly. You are still assuming that we need some sort of an objective excuse to impose our moral decisions on other people. We don't.
If everyone (or every culture) chooses their own moral values, then there is no such thing as "more moral," for every person is living up to their full moral vision.I don't think that's true. Suppose your key moral value is "reduce suffering." Suppose you did not realize that your smoking was indirectly causing more suffering. In that case, you would have discovered that you were not living up to your moral vision because you previously never got around to reflecting on your actions enough to see it.
So I close with this final question: what is it about your opinion about baby torturing that makes it more moral than the opinion of some person in a culture where baby torturing is considered ethical?It's not more moral an any absolute sense. My opinion is more subjectively moral to me. After reflection, the mother may also find it more subjectively moral. But if she is unconvinced, then her opinion is more moral to her.
Steve,
Yes, preferences ought to be accorded an absolute reality in accordance with the claim. "I prefer vanilla over chocolate" is either true or false according to the claim "I prefer".So far, so good.
This is different than the claim "vanilla tastes better than chocolate". If reality is such that this statement is universally true then so be it. I don't think anyone will say it's universally true, but then again 100% consensus doesn't impose truth upon reality.So, what makes morality absolute and not the chocolate vs. vanilla? You say consensus doesn't count (and I agree). Is it because you think we act as if morality is absolute, therefore it is absolute? Is that an argument from consensus? Or is it an argument that anyone who treats morality as absolute has already made a statement about personal faith in absolute moral reality as opposed to merely the reality of moral opinion?
1) When I say "Mother #2 is wrong" I really mean "I subjectively feel that Mother #2 is wrong."
2) Mother #2 subjectively feels that she is right.
3) I take action to persuade Mother #2 that she should desist from torturing her baby.
There's no failure of logical coherence here.
That's because there's no syllogism. It's not unlike:
1. I like chocolate
2. You like vanilla
3. I take action to offer you chocolate, even to suggest reasons you might like it
There are two statements of value that have almost nothing to do with each other, except they both have to do with preferences. Then there's a statement of action. That's a non sequitir, and it's getting yourself out of the issue far too easily.
Now, IF I add to this list something like:
4a) Good and evil is objectively determined by social consensus within the society where the act takes place.
Or maybe this:
4b) It is objectively illogical to morally persuade someone else who holds a differing subjective view.
THEN I would have a logically incoherent set. However, relativists don't claim either (4a) or (4b).
There's also
4c) I try to persuade Mother 2 because I think she is wrong.
That's a logical contradiction, because you can't begin to explain to her what is simply wrong about torturing babies. If she won't accept it on her own grounds, you don't have any way to say "wrong" to her.
You won't pay attention to that for some reason. You don't think "right" or "wrong" are even relevant here. Fine. I'm addressing these comments to people who think that Mother 1 is more right than Mother 2, and I'll let you go on your way thinking neither is more right than the other.
Your employment of power here is exactly like what Jacob said about the law of non-contradiction. He said it was all about the use of power. You're speaking his language:
The relativist takes it to mean "Stop! If you consider all of the consequences of your actions, you will likely find that your actions go against your own values. If, upon reflection, your actions do not go against your own values, I will respond to your actions such that you will likely find that your actions plus my retaliatory response go against your own values."
Man, you're talking about fighting over preferences, when you can't even persuade anybody that your preferences mean anything but a hill of beans! Well, they don't mean anything, but if you point a gun at me I'll say they mean something.
Perhaps her values are objectively as good as mine to some indifferent observer.
If you think that's really possible, if you think the debate is up to "some indifferent observer," we're all done with this discussion.
DL,
Much of what you said in your 8:37 comment I have already said here. I'm not objecting to your saying it again, but I do wonder why it needs to be said over and over again. What is it that is unclear to Tom et al?
It's not that I necessarily expect to change anyone's mind here, but I would think that at this point at least someone would say, "Oh, I see what you're saying!"
Tom writes,
"There's also
4c) I try to persuade Mother 2 because I think she is wrong.
That's a logical contradiction, because you can't begin to explain to her what is simply wrong about torturing babies. If she won't accept it on her own grounds, you don't have any way to say 'wrong' to her."
It's not a logical contradiction, Tom. It doesn't logically contradict 1) or 2). Unlike DL, I would say that your 4c follows, only I would say, "I persuade Mother 2 because I subjectively think she is wrong." And of course I have ways of explaining why it's wrong to her! I can use her own values to try to demonstrate it's wrong, or I can use a variety of other arguments.
You think that DL's statement that he would retaliate is about power. Well, maybe it is. But when to use power is also a moral issue. Is it morally "right" to use power to protect a baby when one believes the baby is at grave risk of harm?
DL:
So, what makes morality absolute and not the chocolate vs. vanilla?
I said both are absolutely true or false with respect to the truth claim made. Go back and read it again.
You are mixing truth claims to a fault. You think "I perceive X to be more virtuous than Y" is the same claim as "X is more virtuous than Y (independent of I)". They are not the same truth claim and so they can have different, yet objective, truth values.
You say consensus doesn't count (and I agree).
It counts as far as perception goes so it's not worthless. Just to be clear I said 100% consensus doesn't impose truth upon reality. By contrast, reality does impose truth upon 100% consensus. This is Tom's Christian motto in a nutshell.
Is it because you think we act as if morality is absolute, therefore it is absolute? Is that an argument from consensus? Or is it an argument that anyone who treats morality as absolute has already made a statement about personal faith in absolute moral reality as opposed to merely the reality of moral opinion?
It's because logic dictates that what I'm saying is true. If you start with one objective reality and work back to individual perceptions about that reality you will see this.
If you reverse the order then the only conclusion you can reach is "perception is reality". Do you want to do that? If so, then you believe in multiple realities which means objectivity is nonexistent.
SteveK,
The problem is that we don't know whether there is one reality. There might be. There might not be.
I should have said:
"If so, then you believe in multiple realities which means common objectivity is nonexistent."
DL:
Let's skip closer to the endgame. Even if what I say is true it doesn't mean you have to change your opinion about morality.
It only means that there is an objective answer to the opinions/questions we all have. The important question to ask is: How do we come to know the answers? Philosophy is the starting place for this.
You deny that God could reveal some of the answers directly -- not because it's impossible, lacks prediction/verification or is statistically improbable -- but because you philosophically think these are the only paths from which to get the answers.
Think that if you must, but don't try to deny the fact that it's a philosophical point of view you have about how reality works.
Tom, I've written before that trying to convince someone to change their moral behavior is possible when you can show that the behavior is contradictory with another moral value that the person holds (assuming they also hold consistency to be a value).
DL is right:
IOW, just because a culture thinks Mother 2 is acting correctly does not mean that every individual in that culture (nor people outside that culture) will (or ought) think so.
That's why relativistic morality boils down to individual opinion, and, therefore, is not really morality. And yet the relativist borrows from reality and pretends that his opinions should be normative. The relativist borrows all the tenets from absolute morality but renames it relativism.
It also describes the way that a society takes these individual values and forms social contracts and cultural moral norms.
DL is mistaken here on this theory of morality as well: morality is not an expression of social contract. If one violates the terms of a contract the offended party does not try to reason with him, he merely points to the contract. The offender is objectively wrong, within that contract, when he violates it. One need not re-negotiate it because it already stipulates the behaviours expected. If morality were a matter of contract there would likewise be no convincing or negotiating.
It is a cognitive and linguistic accident that I will declare "vanilla is better than chocolate!" as if it were an absolute, or as if I meant "Steve also thinks vanilla is better than chocolate!" It is a linguistic illusion that they appear to logically contradict.
But it would not be a linguistic accident to say "vanilla can never be preferred over chocolate". That is an intentionally absolute claim about an objective reality.
DL to Steve:
Moral relativism doesn't cleave the world into realities for each individual.
Tell this to OS. Why do you keep telling everyone whether or not they understand relativistic morality when your version is being contradicted right here, by another authority?
In other words, you're saying that it is impossible for a man to have a subjective opinion about any objective fact.
False. We've said countless times that everybody does have a subjective opinion about objective facts. And that is precisely why noting the subjectivity of the opinion does not negate the reality of the fact.
addendum: I see Steve already addressed this fallacious claim. Oh well, two heads, and all.
but by your own standard morals are indistinguishable from preferences, and preferences ought to be accorded an absolute reality.Actually, DL, you have demonstrated that morals are not merely preferences by your own standards. You agreed with me that preferences do not create distress when they do not affect us directly. You waved away this realization by claiming that not all preferences are moral preferences. When pushed several times you said that you are talking about preferences about actions but the same problem, unaddressed, still holds. You are left with the same incoherent and unjustified position as OS; that morals are distinguished from other preferences by virtue of being strong preferences. In other words, in the words of Demi Moore, you don't merely object, but rather you strenuously object.
If you don't think it's how things happen in the real world, I would like you to find an example in which someone is persuaded by external authority instead of internal values.
Case study #1: Charlie's internal values do not preclude the use of profanity.
God's authority does.
Charlie is persuaded that God knows best and follows said dictate.
Even in cases where one is persuaded by a "transcendent moral authority", one must first possess moral values like "transcendent moral authorities ought to be obeyed" or "I ought to trust X as a moral authority" etc.
Ahahahah. But of course. And all knowledge is justified by induction and all beliefs are based upon prediction - because DL defines the case as such.
So the moral realist is only subjectively moral because, although he accepts the objective morality of God's word, he subjectively values God's word. Right. And you figured that out statistically.
Every man believes his own moral values outweigh those of others, and is committed to act accordingly.Not a consistent relativist. Only one who borrows the tents of absolute morality and renames it relativism. Which brings me back to the beginning.
OS,
It's not that I necessarily expect to change anyone's mind here, but I would think that at this point at least someone would say, "Oh, I see what you're saying!"
Indeed. I can't believe I have read this blog for almost two and a half years and never see this from the atheists. This goes for virtually every subject.
But then, from your side of the aisle, we have two people saying two different things.
As per this:
The problem is that we don't know whether there is one reality. There might be. There might not be.
===
Is it morally "right" to use power to protect a baby when one believes the baby is at grave risk of harm?That depends. Which reality are you talking about?
Holopupenko:
BUT, whereas they each see a concrete cat (albeit slightly different from each sensory perspective), they unfortunately reduce it to merely the sum of its accidents (observable properties), they deny the existence of “catness” as a universal concept as the essence shared by all cats... which, at the very least is debilitating to science: without universal concepts, science is impossible.
Exactly! How can we communicate, learn, and even develop science if OS's position is true? Obviously we are seeing the same reality in a similar enough way to share information about it - or else there is no knowledge.
To deny this is to deny reason, rationality and even science.
Hi Paul,
As I wrote when you last wrote that, so what?
If value A contradicts value B then value B contradicts value A.
They are equally contradictory so neither ought to supersede the other. Each can apply as the offender deems appropriate.
Well Charlie, let me be the first to say that I see what you and the other objective moralists are saying. I disagree, but I understand your reasoning.
The trouble with reality is that in some ways there appears to be one reality, and in other ways there appears to be multiple realities, and in yet another way, we have no idea what reality is. Let me explain: We live our daily lives within the assumption that what we perceive as real is real and most people around us agree with much of what we perceive (a chair is a chair, the sun rises in the east and sets in the west, etc.) But there are people whose perception of what is real is very different than ours and the people around us. Some people, for example, believe in the efficacy of witchcraft. For them, that is real, and there is even evidence that witchcraft is effective for those who believe in its power. So, is that reality real? I would have to say it is for those who perceive it as such; but, I don't perceive it as such, so I would have to say it is a different reality than mine. Finally, there is all that is unknown about reality: What is real may be much different than what we currently perceive.
Based on my perception of what is real and my subjective morality, it is "right" to use power to protect a baby. However, if Mother 2's perception of what is real is that the cigarette burns make her child more beautiful and more marriageable (think foot-binding, female circumcision), then her perception of what is real and her subjective morality would make my use of power immoral--of course, I may use it anyway.
Good morning, OS,
Thanks for bringing up foot-binding.
In your reality, is it good that Christians imposed their morality upon the Chinese to end this thousand-year tradition?
Were they right to call it wrong? Or wrong?
Thanks also for admitting that you condone judging the woman, impose your morality upon her, and use power to do so.
Call that relativism if you like, but that appears to me, as I said to DL, just calling realism relativism.
It is a denial of what you claim to be true when asking others to leave you and your morality alone.
It is also a recognition that reality doesn't really appear relativistic, as you earlier said, but more absolute, as I had said.
By the way, thanks for saying that you understand my reaosning. But let's try an example and see if you really do.
Do you think that when most people who say "a woman should have the right to choose" they mean "I personally prefer that a woman be allowed to choose but your opinion is equally valid"?
Do you think that most people protesting an execution are saying "in my reality killing this man as a punishment is wrong" or are they saying "it is wrong to kill him, regardless of your opinion"?
How about the environment? Do environmentalsist think it is wrong to destroy the planet for future By the way, thanks for saying that you understand my reasoning. But let's try an example and see if you really do.
Do you think that when most people who say "a woman should have the right to choose" they mean "I personally prefer that a woman be allowed to choose but your opinion is equally valid"?
Do you think that most people protesting an execution are saying "in my reality killing this man as a punishment is wrong" or are they saying "it is wrong to kill him, regardless of your opinion"?
How about the environment? Do environmentalists think it is wrong to destroy the planet for future generations? Or merely that they feel it is wrong and that others, from their perspective, are right to want to destroy it?
Please, if you really want to try to respect my thinking do not merely wave these questions away, as you guys do each time, by tacking in the words "absolutely" and "subjectively" wherever you deem them appropriate to make your case.
I know where you would put them, and they don't go there. I am asking about what people who use the words "right" and "wrong", "should" and "ought" are actually thinking and how they actually mean the words to be taken.generations? Or merely that they feel it is wrong and that others, from their perspective, are right to want to destroy it?
Please, if you really want to try to respect my thinking do not merely wave these questions away, as you guys do each time, by tacking in the words "absolutely" and "subjectively" wherever you deem them appropriate to make your case.
I know where you would put them, and they don't go there. I am asking about what people who use the words "right" and "wrong", "should" and "ought" are actually thining and how they actually mean the words to be taken.
Sorry.
I pasted the version witht he typos removed right into the middle of that last comment without erasing the first copy.
Try to read only this amount of it :
By the way, thanks for saying that you understand my reasoning. But let's try an example and see if you really do.
Do you think that when most people who say "a woman should have the right to choose" they mean "I personally prefer that a woman be allowed to choose but your opinion is equally valid"?
Do you think that most people protesting an execution are saying "in my reality killing this man as a punishment is wrong" or are they saying "it is wrong to kill him, regardless of your opinion"?
How about the environment? Do environmentalists think it is wrong to destroy the planet for future generations? Or merely that they feel it is wrong and that others, from their perspective, are right to want to destroy it?
Please, if you really want to try to respect my thinking do not merely wave these questions away, as you guys do each time, by tacking in the words "absolutely" and "subjectively" wherever you deem them appropriate to make your case.
I know where you would put them, and they don't go there. I am asking about what people who use the words "right" and "wrong", "should" and "ought" are actually thinking and how they actually mean the words to be taken.?
Good words, Charlie.
Paul,
Tom, I've written before that trying to convince someone to change their moral behavior is possible when you can show that the behavior is contradictory with another moral value that the person holds (assuming they also hold consistency to be a value)
and os,
Tom writes,
"There's also
4c) I try to persuade Mother 2 because I think she is wrong.
That's a logical contradiction, because you can't begin to explain to her what is simply wrong about torturing babies. If she won't accept it on her own grounds, you don't have any way to say 'wrong' to her."
It's not a logical contradiction, Tom. It doesn't logically contradict 1) or 2). Unlike DL, I would say that your 4c follows, only I would say, "I persuade Mother 2 because I subjectively think she is wrong." And of course I have ways of explaining why it's wrong to her! I can use her own values to try to demonstrate it's wrong, or I can use a variety of other arguments.
Was I careless in my speech here? It's not logically contradictory to say to someone you think she's wrong in this context, because it's another pair of preferences followed by an action. It's not a syllogism any more than the three statements dl proposed yesterday.
I would think you would see the intent, however. I'll spell it out for you. The original was:
1) When I say "Mother #2 is wrong" I really mean "I subjectively feel that Mother #2 is wrong."
2) Mother #2 subjectively feels that she is right.
3) I take action to persuade Mother #2 that she should desist from torturing her baby.
Let's do this instead:
1) When I say "Mother #2 is wrong" I really mean "I subjectively feel that Mother #2 is wrong."
2) Mother #2 subjectively feels that she is right.
3) I have a moral duty to persuade Mother 2 that she is wrong.
There is definitely a failure of logic there. The moral duty sneaks in from nowhere. So suppose you find yourself visiting this hypothetical culture. Imagine telling yourself this when you hear the screaming, tortured, starving infants:
"I don't prefer this. It goes against my values. I will try to appeal to these mothers' values, to see if there's something they value that would overturn their preference for torturing their kids. But if there isn't, then I will acknowledge that their morality--the term I'm giving to what is actually their preference--on this issue is of equal validity to my own. They are not wrong to do this."
Charlie has also provided some other real-life examples of moralizing by people who tend not to accept moral realism. Some moral realists would certainly agree with liberal positions on these issues, but generally all moral relativists would, on at least two out of three of these. That's why these are useful examples: the right to choose, capital punishment, and environmentalism. Would you say it's wrong to pollute the planet? Would you say it's wrong to deny a woman's right to choose? That's the language we keep hearing. We don't hear, "a woman's right to choose is my preference, and you have your preference, and we acknowledge that your preference is as valid as ours."
So ultimately the contradiction is this: if you believe in moral relativism, you cannot, while staying consistent with your own principles, say that a person is wrong--not unless you change the meaning of "wrong." Instead of its usual meaning it has to become a power word used for persuasive, rhetorical advantage, wielded for the purpose of changing someone's mind, even though its only real reference is to what you find not to be preferable.
Well, Charlie, I will do my best to respond to your questions.
First, you ask, "In your reality, is it good that Christians imposed their morality upon the Chinese to end this thousand-year tradition?
Were they right to call it wrong? Or wrong?" I dont' think you're really asking me whether Christians should have intervened; I think you're asking me whether I think foot-binding is immoral. My answer is that yes, given my time and place, I think foot-binding is immoral. Obviously, however, a whole culture believed it was moral, so I would say that it was both moral and immoral at the same time, depending upon one's perspective.
I don't really understand what you're saying in your second comment.
In your third comment you say, "I am asking about what people who use the words 'right' and 'wrong', 'should' and 'ought' are actually thinking and how they actually mean the words to be taken." I don't really like to conjecture about what other people are thinking, but I guess I would have to say that most people, when using those terms, are using them in an absolute sense. But that doesn't mean that they're right about there being an absolute.
Tom, I don't acknowledge that others' preferences/morals are as valid as mine. I think mine are better, that's why I value them. What I acknowledge is that others' right to value their preferences/morals is as valid as mine.
Tom,
DL and I have both refuted this statement in other comments: "if you believe in moral relativism, you cannot, while staying consistent with your own principles, say that a person is wrong" but you continue to say it. I don't know any different way to respond than DL and I already have. Obviously you are not convinced, nor do you need to be, but I do think it's time to stop saying it.
The difficulty, os, is with the definition of the word "wrong."
I have understood what you have said, and I have re-posted with a clarification:
Instead of its usual meaning it has to become a power word used for persuasive, rhetorical advantage, wielded for the purpose of changing someone's mind, even though its only real reference is to what you find not to be preferable.
I contend that though you may use the word "wrong," you cannot use it in its commonly understood sense while remaining consistent with your principles. I further contend that the remaining way in which you can use it is just as I said: as a power term, expressing your own preferences. Please respond strictly to those two contentions, for I don't think either you or DL have addressed them successfully at all.
By the way, do you think even if I were to say the same thing over and over again, paying no heed to your responses, it would be wrong?
Tom,
By the way, do you think even if I were to say the same thing over and over again, paying no heed to your responses, it would be wrong?
It depends on whose reality you are talking about.
Tom, what do you think is the "commonly understood sense" of the word "wrong?"
Where's the error in me saying, "I believe that's wrong?"
No, I don't think if you keep saying it, it's wrong; I just think it may be something we have to agree to disagree about.
"Wrong" usually means incorrect in relation to some objective standard, or failing to match what is real.
When you use it the way you do, you take it out of that context and put it in the other one I described.
OS,
I don't acknowledge that others' preferences/morals are as valid as mine. I think mine are better, that's why I value them.
Translation (for those of us who see an objective standard by which two things may be compared when we see the word "better"): I like mine more than I like theirs.
This makes your statement read, "I like mine more than I like their's, that's why I value them." Is this what you meant?
What I acknowledge is that others' right to value their preferences/morals is as valid as mine.
This just pushes the question back a step. If "acknowledging others' right to value their preferences/morals" is your preference, while maintaining that I could have a different yet equally valid (to me) preference, then you are acknowledging that others' preferences/morals are as valid as yours, which you claimed you weren't doing. Acknowledging others' right to value their preferences/morals is itself a moral stance that you seemly want to smuggle in the back door.
Hi OS,
You really need to anticipate a little better if you are going to presume to tell people how they ought to respond.
You said to Tom:
Tom, what do you think is the "commonly understood sense" of the word "wrong?"
I already asked and got your clarification on this:
In your third comment you say, "I am asking about what people who use the words 'right' and 'wrong', 'should' and 'ought' are actually thinking and how they actually mean the words to be taken." I don't really like to conjecture about what other people are thinking, but I guess I would have to say that most people, when using those terms, are using them in an absolute sense.
I expected DL to get here before you and say "oh, but that doesn't make it true that morals are absolute". Of course that wasn't my point, although you seem to have presumed it was.
Tom picked up on it, or, more likely, was well ahead of me, when he asked about the common usage.
You, DL, and Paul, are using the words in a manner contrary to that understood by your listeners. This is established thoroughly.
It is also now established that you know you are doing this and that you continue to do so. This is equivocation and it is not appropriate.
I would now ask you to stop doing it.
Tom, I don't acknowledge that others' preferences/morals are as valid as mine.This is a nice admission. So there is an objective source of morality after all. And you are it.
This is what I meant about morality in your reality not being relativistic afterall. You admit you condone the use of power to impose morality (which is more right) and that only your morality is the most right of all. This is a direct disavowal of relativism. You do, in fact, presume the right to judge another's morality and the right to impose your own. It is only that you have set yourself up as the judge and jury. This is egoism and idolatry.
I dont' think you're really asking me whether Christians should have intervened; I think you're asking me whether I think foot-binding is immoral.Thanks for trying to answer, but rather than presume what I am really asking you could answer what I did ask.
Was it good for the Christians to impose their morality upon the Chinese?
Tom,
So for you the very word "wrong" assumes an objective morality. I can understand then why you are confused by my use of it. This is not, however, the only way this word is used; we also use it when referring to preferences (for example, if someone said to me that Paul McCartney was a better songwriter than John Lennon, I could say, "You're wrong!" and be using the word correctly.)
When I use the word "wrong" in a moral context, I mean that I feel that whatever act is being referred to is contrary to my values. You may not like the way I use the word, but I think it's an acceptable use.
Aaron, I think you are trying to simplify something that is really quite complicated. I can hold more than one value at a time. I can value the other person's right to value his own values, and also value my values; if the value I hold that is contrary to his value is one that I am very invested in, and there is an action on his part that challenges that value, then I may choose to take some action against it. That doesn't negate my value of his right to value his values; it only means that I have been forced to prioritize my values in that moment in time. Even as I take action against his value, I still value his right to value his value. Who said, "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it?" That is the sort of attitude I am trying to describe.
Charlie, you write,
"You, DL, and Paul, are using the words in a manner contrary to that understood by your listeners. This is established thoroughly.
It is also now established that you know you are doing this and that you continue to do so. This is equivocation and it is not appropriate.
I would now ask you to stop doing it."
What words would you have us use instead? And, since when are words restricted in their use by the understanding of the listener? I believe I am using these terms according to an acceptable and quite understandable usage, so although I am willing to flesh them out for you, I am not willing to stop using them.
Charlie, about my thinking my morals are more valid than others', you write, "This is a nice admission. So there is an objective source of morality after all. And you are it.
This is what I meant about morality in your reality not being relativistic afterall. You admit you condone the use of power to impose morality (which is more right) and that only your morality is the most right of all. This is a direct disavowal of relativism. You do, in fact, presume the right to judge another's morality and the right to impose your own. It is only that you have set yourself up as the judge and jury. This is egoism and idolatry."
No, me thinking I'm more right than someone else doesn't mean I think I'm more right than everyone else--if I did, then *that* would mean I thought there was an absolute morality. As it is, I think we *all* think our personal morals are more right than the morals of those who disagree with us--else why would we hold those particular morals and not the ones those who disagree with us hold? Of course, I understand that you think that you get your morals from God, so that gives you the right to think yours are better than the morals of those who disagree with you, but since I (and many others) don't believe in your God, then you attributing your superiority to another source means nothing to me.
Actually, I don't condone the use of power to impose morality, if by power you mean force. Really I think force is an absolute last resort and I would not use it except in the most dire of circumstances. What I do condone is the use of 1)example and 2)voting to communicate my sense of morality.
Of course I presume the right to judge others' morality, if by judging you mean making decisions about whether I agree or disagree with others. What I don't presume the right to is forcing others to live according to my morality, except when their doing so is harmful to others.
Oops, Charlie, forgot to answer your last question, about whether I think it was good for Christians to impose their morality on the Chinese.
Honestly, I don't think I know enough about the situation to form an opinion about it. My first reaction is no, but I might change my mind if I had more information.
os,
"if someone said to me that Paul McCartney was a better songwriter than John Lennon, I could say, 'You're wrong!' and be using the word correctly."
And then where would that discussion go? You might decide there is some objective standard according to which one really was a better songwriter than the other. In that case you would have to say something like, "I think you're wrong because..." -- and "because" would have to point toward some agreed standard that you share. Dare I say that standard is objective? I think so, for it would have to be something outside each of you, something external you could both look at, and somehow measure each of the songwriter's skills in relation to it. If the discussion is going to come out as anything other than trading opinions, you would in fact have to have an external standard against which you could objectively measure Lennon's and McCartney's skills.
Or you could agree that you have differing opinions, and that "wrong" is just a statement of your personal subjective belief. "Wrong" would not actually apply in that case to your friend's beliefs (nor to yours) in any useful sense of the word. It would mean no more than saying "you're wrong" when I say chocolate tastes better than vanilla.
"When I use the word 'wrong' in a moral context, I mean that I feel that whatever act is being referred to is contrary to my values. You may not like the way I use the word, but I think it's an acceptable use.
That's not how this works, os. Careful definition of terms is at the very heart of philosophical discussion. Otherwise you have the very famous fallacy, referred to by Charlie below, of equivocation.
What words would you have us use instead? And, since when are words restricted in their use by the understanding of the listener?
Use "preference" or "personal value" instead of "right" or "wrong." Again, in philosophical discourse, words are very frequently restricted in their use. For example in Kant the word "category" has a very restricted meaning, a restriction imposed by the necessity for clarity. It's not that we as listeners are trying to foist something on you, though. It's that we're trying to (yes) restrict the use of the word for the very legitimate purpose of preventing equivocation. This is standard practice.
(Post edited at 10:30 pm EST)
Hi OS,
Tom answered perfectly what words I think you ought to use instead of "right and wrong". The very words you end up using to define those terms when asked about them.
And, since when are words restricted in their use by the understanding of the listener?Since we are trying to communicate with listeners. And especially when you are using the words and the force and power they carry when you don't mean them in the same sense that has earned that force and power. You are writing cheques on an account without your name on it.
What I don't presume the right to is forcing others to live according to my morality, except when their doing so is harmful to others.
Of course you know you've set another absolute standard for morality.
So what if it is your preference that people not hurt other people? Why should you force anybody to live by any of your morals?
No, me thinking I'm more right than someone else doesn't mean I think I'm more right than everyone else--if I did, then *that* would mean I thought there was an absolute morality.You are contradicting yourself. Why are your morals not better than everybody else', given that you also say
As it is, I think we *all* think our personal morals are more right than the morals of those who disagree with us--else why would we hold those particular morals and not the ones those who disagree with us hold?
Or are you saying that you are not "more right" than only those whose morals are exactly coterminous with yours? Then you, along with those who agree with you, are the standard.
Of course, I understand that you think that you get your morals from God, so that gives you the right to think yours are better than the morals of those who disagree with you, but since I (and many others) don't believe in your God, then you attributing your superiority to another source means nothing to me.
But you and I both believe in the apparent rightness of our moral positions. I agree with you that we ought not hold beliefs that we don't actually believe in. Your mistake, of course, is acknowledging that there is something as moral superiority, but claiming at one time that you don't believe this and then at another mistakenly thinking you are the standard.
My first reaction is no, but I might change my mind if I had more information.
You say here that Christians should not have imposed their morality upon the Chinese when you admit that the Chinese were acting immorally. The Christians doing so, then, would have been immoral in your eyes. You should also realize that the Chinese were harming other people by this practice and you have given yourself permission to enforce your morality in such a case.
This is just another example of the incoherence of your position.
People who use moral language and then deny using it are like people who shout Stop!! or Don't Move!! and then claim they never intended it to be interpreted as a command, but as a suggestion. The urgency in their voice (if it's there) exposes the lie.
Tom, I'm a bit miffed (to put it nicely) that you are lecturing me about the definition of terms. I have on *numerous* occasions here asked for definition of terms and been ignored, so I can't say that now, so deep into this discussion, I'm willing to use terms based on your definitions. I'd be willing to use terms based on previously-agreed-on definitions in future, though.
Charlie, I only have an absolute standard for *my* morality. Did you read my response to Aaron, in which I said that it's all very complicated, and I can value more than one value at a time? I've also commented that my morality includes an understanding of group process and the social contract. These things play a large part, IMO, in how morality is enacted. I'm not trying to avoid answering your questions, but I'm tired of saying the same things over and over. Unless you want to begin a different discussion that includes the variables above, and *how your understanding of an absolute morality guides your moral choices in everyday life*, then I think I'm done here.
Hi OS,
I'd be willing to use terms based on previously-agreed-on definitions in future, though.
It has never been unclear that we rejected your definitions from the beginning and in comment after comment.
Likewise, we have rejected these definitions from Paul and DL for years now as well. This is why you guys keep trying to amend our statements about right and wrong with your terms "objectively" and "subjectively" when we say "actually" and "really".
It is only now, however, that we get your admission that you know you are not using the words the way we are or the way that people will interpret them when they hear them (DL has never denied this, as far as I can recall).
If you want to use them equivocally and thereby communicate ineffectively that is your choice, and you don't have to change your words now. But being "miffed" that you've been offered alternate and more accurate words for your beliefs is quite pointless since you explicitly asked me what words would be more appropriate.
Tom, OS,
I have no intention of conceding terminology to moral realism.
First, the facts. Humans have a bunch of moral behaviors. When we see a certain class of actions, we subjectively feel positively or negatively about them. By definition, that such actions are subjectively categorized as just or unjust. By definition, acts we subjectively dislike are called wrong, and acts we subjectively like are called right. It is a simple fact that these subjective feelings are what motivate us to persuade, argue and coerce. After all, these feelings are about what one subjectively ought to do, writ large.
All of these are facts, and philosophy does not change them.
Now, the moral realist philosopher says that these feelings are indicative of a moral reality. The realist says that our subjective feelings are subjective apprehensions of objective moral states of affairs.
The moral relativist says that the objective states of affairs are devoid of moral judgment. At best, the objective states of affairs describe why we feel what we feel. Our subjective moral feelings and imperatives are subjective preferences about what we ought to do.
You are claiming that the linguistic terminology that was based on the data (pre-philosophical reflection) has to be discarded if we reach a moral relativist philosophical conclusion. That's an unacceptable demand.
You might try to justify this by claiming that nearly everyone believes