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Thinking Christian Comments |
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But, I don't have to agree to be consistent with my principles! Wow. Did you really mean to say that? Read it again, please. |
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Os was unwilling to commit to Mother 1's actions being actually, really, more morally right than Mother 2's.I think you need to be more exlpicit here. You keep saying "actually" and "really," but that's not what you mean. What you mean is "absolutely." It comes out in a way you don't intend. Instead of saying: OS doesn't think Mother 1 is objectively more moral than Mother 2. you have OS saying: OS doesn't really think Mother 1 is more right than Mother 2. Can you see the difference? In the latter case, you have OS saying he thinks Mother 2's actions are subjectively moral to him and that, by implication, he's happy to let Mother 2 go on torturing her baby. Not only that, but we must conclude that if os landed in that culture somehow, he could not raise any moral objection to the way mothers treat their children. He could say he disagrees, that he finds their practice distasteful, not preferred; but he most certainly could not say to the cigarette-wielding baby-burner, "Stop it! That's wrong!"--for their moral basis would be as valid as his own.On the last thread, I showed that this argument fails outright. This statement of yours assumes there is an objective moral law that one cannot impose one's subjective preferences on someone else. This assumption is part of a moral realist picture. So you're finding fault with relativism because it violates the rules of moral realism. So, you are incorrect here. OS can say "Stop!" and he can do so without the slightest hint of contradiction. I think you also misunderstand the relationship between culture and moral relativism. Moral relativism doesn't say that morality is one and the same as the cultural view. No, the relativist says that culture is one of the causes of an individual's moral values (the other causes being genetics and personal history). A cultural moral norm does not necessarily cause an individual to hold that norm as a positive value in later life. IOW, just because a culture thinks Mother 2 is acting correctly does not mean that every individual in that culture (nor people outside that culture) will (or ought) think so. Moral relativism is basically a description of how we feel what we feel, and a description of the way an individual's feelings create moral imperatives for that individual. It also describes the way that a society takes these individual values and forms social contracts and cultural moral norms. You are misinterpreting relativism to be the moral realist theory that "culture determines morality." As if "objectively, do what the majority say." You then disprove your misinterpretation by showing that an individual outside of the culture may not change his moral convictions when he realizes that he opposes societal norms. I would say you were attacking a straw man, but the straw man in this case is an objective morality. Finally, you still insist that there is such a thing as an external moral authority. I would like to see you substantiate that claim because I think it is completely bogus. If the Pope said "burn that baby" would you obey her because she was a moral authority? I think that's nonsense. You would listen to the person and see how that person's actions fit into your own moral values, then accept or reject it on that basis. It is your own internal moral values that are your authority in any argument. This is why the relationship between objective morality and God is a non-existent one. It doesn't matter what God says I ought to do. If he commands me to kill my son, I don't suddenly think it is a good thing to do just because God told me to do it. I think that's total nonsense. What's dangerous is this idea that people should defy their own conscience because someone else says they ought to. And in the case of religion, the person saying they ought to defy their conscience is a MAN who thinks he knows what God wants (if God even exists). |
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IOW, just because a culture thinks Mother 2 is acting correctly does not mean that every individual in that culture (nor people outside that culture) will (or ought) think so. Pardon me, doctor(logic), but there is no "ought" if moral relativism is just a description of what people do. Given you own definition, your statement there doesn't make sense. What's dangerous is this idea that people should defy their own conscience because someone else says they ought to. And in the case of religion, the person saying they ought to defy their conscience is a MAN who thinks he knows what God wants (if God even exists). So you're saying there is an overarching moral imperative not to violate someone's conscience? That it's wrong for that religious person to do so, in a way that would be meaningful in any way to that person? Let me ask you this: have you ever had to convince someone they got a math problem wrong? Have you ever tried to convince someone that your favorite flavor of ice cream should be theirs? In which of the two are you more successful? If, as you say, morality is more like the latter, do you see how your moral persuation may be a rather pointless endeavor? You're trying to convince us that it is wrong for a man's conscience to be superceded by the demands of an outside moral authority. (Hypothetically) I'm glad that tastes good to you, but I find the opposite to be much better. Thanks for the autobiography. |
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Pardon me, doctor(logic), but there is no "ought" if moral relativism is just a description of what people do.Then I guess it's fortunate for me that moral relativism is not just a description of what people do! It also describes what they feel and how they came to feel it. So you're saying there is an overarching moral imperative not to violate someone's conscience?Not at all. Aaron, I am saying that your own moral values are your own moral authority. And I am appealing to that authority to reflect upon information that you may not yet have considered. If the authority of your personal values tells you that one man's conscience ought to be overridden overridden by another's, then my appeal will fail. Pretty simple, and no objective morality required. As it happens, it did fail in your case. And, if respect for moral authority in others was a fundamental value of yours, then it would be prudent for me to give up trying to persuade you. However, I doubt that respect for moral authority in others is fundamental for you. I rather suspect that you think that external moral authority is the way people are persuaded to act in accordance with your own wishes (which, not surprisingly, are your god's wishes), and it is behavior in accordance with your own wishes which is fundamental. Thus, there is still hope for me, and so I will continue to explain to you that moral authority is in the receiver and not in the claimant. Let me ask you this: have you ever had to convince someone they got a math problem wrong? Have you ever tried to convince someone that your favorite flavor of ice cream should be theirs? In which of the two are you more successful?Can you see now why these two cases differ from my perspective? The prior moral values of the math student are that one ought to respect mathematical axioms and consistency. If I explain that the student has made an error, the student does not alter his calculation because of my authority. The student fixes the error because he can prove to himself that the fix is more in keeping with his own values. My appeal on the math error is an appeal to the student's prior values. Likewise, when we debate ice cream flavors, it is not in the receiver's prior moral values that other people should impose on him a flavor of ice cream he does not want. |
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A world which has to create its own justice is a world without hope. No one and nothing can answer for centuries of suffering. No one and nothing can guarantee that the cynicism of power—whatever beguiling ideological mask it adopts—will cease to dominate the world.Without hope of... perfection? I can live with that. But what a wonderful, perfect world you yourself must live in. Earthquakes, tsunami, murder, child abuse... no problem! Perfection guaranteed by God himself! Yes, a world in which the punishment of the murderer rectifies all, as if the victim had never died and those who loved the victim never mourned. Yeah, I'm kinda skeptical. |
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Saying "Tom thinks vanilla tastes better than chocolate" is still an objective truth claim about the tastes of Tom.My personal belief is that this is indeed the case. Our tastes are defined by our biology, our environment, and our history. I personally think all of these things are objective, and that if we had enough technology we could explain in detail exactly how we come to feel what we feel. All objective. However, that doesn't make morality objective in the sense we are all talking about it. If I say "X is right," and Tom says "X is wrong," then the two don't conflict because they are not beliefs about the same thing in the same way. They are not beliefs about external absolutes regarding X. They are the results of our respective biologies and environments. They are claims about our respective feelings and preferences. IOW, our beliefs do not logically contradict, they conflict. If you think chocolate tastes better than vanilla, and I think the reverse, our views do not contradict each other. As you say, they are not about the same thing in the same way. Indeed, we can both be right because you are stating your feelings, and I am stating mine. It is a cognitive and linguistic accident that I will declare "vanilla is better than chocolate!" as if it were an absolute, or as if I meant "Steve also thinks vanilla is better than chocolate!" It is a linguistic illusion that they appear to logically contradict. As it happens, not only do our views on flavor not logically contradict, they also do not conflict. At least, that is, until one of us is denied our preference on account of the other. If we share $1, and we can only have one flavor between us, then our mere preference becomes a moral preference because there is conflict. If we each have our own dollar, there's no conflict. |
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The claim "X is more virtuous than Y" is objectively either true or false when compared to our only grounding source - reality.No. You still misunderstand moral relativism. Moral relativism doesn't cleave the world into realities for each individual. There is still one reality. However, under relativism, the statement "X is wrong" made by person P means no more than "I, P, feel that X is wrong." Under moral relativism, the only "moral reality" consists of the real mechanisms that give a person his subjective moral intuitions. Your argument about there being a single reality is totally irrelevant because there's a single reality in both of our models. You mistakenly think that if I forcefully assert "Z is wrong", I must think that Z is wrong for everyone absolutely in my personal reality. However, this is not the case. I believe Z is wrong subjectively (not absolutely) in our shared reality, AND yet I intend to persuade others to my moral perspective. Furthermore, your own argument works the same way for every subjectivity: The claim "chocolate is better than vanilla" is objectively either true or false when compared to our only grounding source - reality. The theists here have spilled a lot of pixels denying that morals are preferences, but by your own standard morals are indistinguishable from preferences, and preferences ought to be accorded an absolute reality. In other words, you're saying that it is impossible for a man to have a subjective opinion about any objective fact. For example, if I like hip-hop, that's not a subjective opinion about the objective lyrics, melodies, sound waves, etc., but a perception of the absolute goodness of hip-hop. Isn't anything about my affinity for hip-hop in me instead of in hip-hop itself? Suppose that I was brought up on abstract atonal music. When I hear this music, I think of the good times I had as a child. Is my adult appreciation for abstract atonal music a measure of the objective goodness of abstract atonal music in platonic musical reality? No. I'm not perceiving some musical reality wherein abstract atonal is good. I am perceiving some aggregate of my own memories as jogged by the music. There's something objective to this story to be sure, but it has nothing to do with "musical reality". |
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I think you need to be more exlpicit here. You keep saying "actually" and "really," but that's not what you mean. What you mean is "absolutely." It comes out in a way you don't intend. I think they mean the same thing, where "actually," and "really" have reference to something beyond a person's opinion. But your correction here is a fair one, in view of that: Instead of saying: On the last thread, I showed that this argument fails outright. This statement of yours assumes there is an objective moral law that one cannot impose one's subjective preferences on someone else. This assumption is part of a moral realist picture. No. I did not say os "should not" raise any moral objection; I said that he "could not." It's not that it would be immoral for him to try to do that, it's that he would be logically incorrect. He would be saying something is wrong when it is not; for he would be saying they are committing some kind of violation, when in fact they are being perfectly moral according to their own culture. So you have misunderstood me here. This objection does not assume moral objectivity in a circular way; it assumes logical coherence instead. think you also misunderstand the relationship between culture and moral relativism. Moral relativism doesn't say that morality is one and the same as the cultural view. No, the relativist says that culture is one of the causes of an individual's moral values (the other causes being genetics and personal history). A cultural moral norm does not necessarily cause an individual to hold that norm as a positive value in later life. Understood. Perfectly. But the grounding for morality is still such that os could not go into that cigarette-wielding culture and (in a logically coherent way) say "Stop! That's wrong!" You are misinterpreting relativism to be the moral realist theory that "culture determines morality." As if "objectively, do what the majority say." No, again, no. I'm interpreting moral relativism to mean that people derive their moral values from a source they deem to be personal, cultural, biological, anything at all that's contingent rather than objective. But culturally-determined morality is one common version of moral relativity; and if there is a culture that deems cigarette-baby-torture to be a culturally accepted moral value, as in my example, then the example is valid even if there are other versions of moral relativism. That culture has a morality that os would be violating if he said they were wrong. Finally, you still insist that there is such a thing as an external moral authority. I would like to see you substantiate that claim because I think it is completely bogus. If the Pope said "burn that baby" would you obey her because she was a moral authority? I think that's nonsense. But of course, and of course not. I do insist there is an external moral authority, and I don't think it's the Pope. I do insist there is a transcendent Good, not a transcendent Evil or even a transcendent Maybe Good, Maybe Not. And I'm substantiating that by all of these arguments, many of which you have definitely misunderstood. Aaron, excellent point: So you're saying there is an overarching moral imperative not to violate someone's conscience? That it's wrong for that religious person to do so, in a way that would be meaningful in any way to that person? And later doctor(logic) answered with an absolutely certain prescription for anarchy and moral chaos: Aaron, I am saying that your own moral values are your own moral authority. So the cigarette-baby-torturing mother is being consistent with her own moral values. Who are you, who am I, to impose your or my values on her? Why shouldn't her values be as good as ours? Why does dl impose his values on us? os wrote, For example, if I try to convince Tom's Mother 2 that it would be more moral not to burn her baby, I might be successful if I know that she values beauty, and explain that she is making her baby less beautiful. Something like that... All you can convince her of, os, is that it would be more moral in your private opinion if she did not burn her baby. By her private opinion, you would be imposing your morality on her, or at least trying to, even if you were doing it by rational argumentation. Who are you to think your morality is more moral than hers? This is a serious question and not a rhetorical question. In order to have a "more," there must be some directionality to morality. There must be some kind of vectors toward greater or lesser moralities. If everyone (or every culture) chooses their own moral values, then there is no such thing as "more moral," for every person is living up to their full moral vision. So I close with this final question: what is it about your opinion about baby torturing that makes it more moral than the opinion of some person in a culture where baby torturing is considered ethical? Do you stand on higher ground, such that your private (or cultural) moral opinion is better than theirs? I think doctor(logic) has stated quite clearly that you have no basis for this at all: ... under relativism, the statement "X is wrong" made by person P means no more than "I, P, feel that X is wrong." |
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but by your own standard morals are indistinguishable from preferences, and preferences ought to be accorded an absolute reality. No they are not indistinguishable because I (and everyone else) claims there is a distinguishable difference. If there was no difference we'd be saying that. Yes, preferences ought to be accorded an absolute reality in accordance with the claim. "I prefer vanilla over chocolate" is either true or false according to the claim "I prefer". This is different than the claim "vanilla tastes better than chocolate". If reality is such that this statement is universally true then so be it. I don't think anyone will say it's universally true, but then again 100% consensus doesn't impose truth upon reality. In other words, you're saying that it is impossible for a man to have a subjective opinion about any objective fact. I'm not saying that at all. Subjective opinions are possible as shown in my vanilla vs. chocolate example. The truth of the opinion in light of objective reality is often a separate question with a separate answer. Furthermore, your own argument works the same way for every subjectivity Of course. Every subjective claim made about perceived reality is either true or false. The question is "how do we best discover the answer?" |
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No. I did not say os "should not" raise any moral objection; I said that he "could not." It's not that it would be immoral for him to try to do that, it's that he would be logically incorrect. He would be saying something is wrong when it is not; for he would be saying they are committing some kind of violation, when in fact they are being perfectly moral according to their own culture.There's no logical contradiction. In the relativist view, we have: 1) When I say "Mother #2 is wrong" I really mean "I subjectively feel that Mother #2 is wrong." 2) Mother #2 subjectively feels that she is right. 3) I take action to persuade Mother #2 that she should desist from torturing her baby. There's no failure of logical coherence here. Now, IF I add to this list something like: 4a) Good and evil is objectively determined by social consensus within the society where the act takes place. Or maybe this: 4b) It is objectively illogical to morally persuade someone else who holds a differing subjective view. THEN I would have a logically incoherent set. However, relativists don't claim either (4a) or (4b). But the grounding for morality is still such that os could not go into that cigarette-wielding culture and (in a logically coherent way) say "Stop! That's wrong!"Why? What do you think "Stop! That's wrong!" means? The relativist takes it to mean "Stop! If you consider all of the consequences of your actions, you will likely find that your actions go against your own values. If, upon reflection, your actions do not go against your own values, I will respond to your actions such that you will likely find that your actions plus my retaliatory response go against your own values." And later doctor(logic) answered with an absolutely certain prescription for anarchy and moral chaos:This brought a smile to my face. This "prescription" is what I believe happens in the real world, so I don't see how it can be a prescription any more anarchy and chaos than there already is. In fact, I think that it would result in some progress. If you don't think it's how things happen in the real world, I would like you to find an example in which someone is persuaded by external authority instead of internal values. Even in cases where one is persuaded by a "transcendent moral authority", one must first possess moral values like "transcendent moral authorities ought to be obeyed" or "I ought to trust X as a moral authority" etc. So the cigarette-baby-torturing mother is being consistent with her own moral values.Not necessarily. Maybe Mother #2 has not considered all of the consequences of her actions. She may actually be acting inconsistently with her own values (I suspect this is the case in most moral debates). Who are you, who am I, to impose your or my values on her? Why shouldn't her values be as good as ours? Why does dl impose his values on us?Perhaps her values are objectively as good as mine to some indifferent observer. However, no one is indifferent to their own moral values. Every man believes his own moral values outweigh those of others, and is committed to act accordingly. You are still assuming that we need some sort of an objective excuse to impose our moral decisions on other people. We don't. If everyone (or every culture) chooses their own moral values, then there is no such thing as "more moral," for every person is living up to their full moral vision.I don't think that's true. Suppose your key moral value is "reduce suffering." Suppose you did not realize that your smoking was indirectly causing more suffering. In that case, you would have discovered that you were not living up to your moral vision because you previously never got around to reflecting on your actions enough to see it. So I close with this final question: what is it about your opinion about baby torturing that makes it more moral than the opinion of some person in a culture where baby torturing is considered ethical?It's not more moral an any absolute sense. My opinion is more subjectively moral to me. After reflection, the mother may also find it more subjectively moral. But if she is unconvinced, then her opinion is more moral to her. |
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Yes, preferences ought to be accorded an absolute reality in accordance with the claim. "I prefer vanilla over chocolate" is either true or false according to the claim "I prefer".So far, so good. This is different than the claim "vanilla tastes better than chocolate". If reality is such that this statement is universally true then so be it. I don't think anyone will say it's universally true, but then again 100% consensus doesn't impose truth upon reality.So, what makes morality absolute and not the chocolate vs. vanilla? You say consensus doesn't count (and I agree). Is it because you think we act as if morality is absolute, therefore it is absolute? Is that an argument from consensus? Or is it an argument that anyone who treats morality as absolute has already made a statement about personal faith in absolute moral reality as opposed to merely the reality of moral opinion? |
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1) When I say "Mother #2 is wrong" I really mean "I subjectively feel that Mother #2 is wrong." That's because there's no syllogism. It's not unlike: 1. I like chocolate 2. You like vanilla 3. I take action to offer you chocolate, even to suggest reasons you might like it There are two statements of value that have almost nothing to do with each other, except they both have to do with preferences. Then there's a statement of action. That's a non sequitir, and it's getting yourself out of the issue far too easily. Now, IF I add to this list something like: There's also 4c) I try to persuade Mother 2 because I think she is wrong. That's a logical contradiction, because you can't begin to explain to her what is simply wrong about torturing babies. If she won't accept it on her own grounds, you don't have any way to say "wrong" to her. You won't pay attention to that for some reason. You don't think "right" or "wrong" are even relevant here. Fine. I'm addressing these comments to people who think that Mother 1 is more right than Mother 2, and I'll let you go on your way thinking neither is more right than the other. Your employment of power here is exactly like what Jacob said about the law of non-contradiction. He said it was all about the use of power. You're speaking his language: The relativist takes it to mean "Stop! If you consider all of the consequences of your actions, you will likely find that your actions go against your own values. If, upon reflection, your actions do not go against your own values, I will respond to your actions such that you will likely find that your actions plus my retaliatory response go against your own values." Man, you're talking about fighting over preferences, when you can't even persuade anybody that your preferences mean anything but a hill of beans! Well, they don't mean anything, but if you point a gun at me I'll say they mean something. Perhaps her values are objectively as good as mine to some indifferent observer. If you think that's really possible, if you think the debate is up to "some indifferent observer," we're all done with this discussion. |
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So, what makes morality absolute and not the chocolate vs. vanilla? I said both are absolutely true or false with respect to the truth claim made. Go back and read it again. You are mixing truth claims to a fault. You think "I perceive X to be more virtuous than Y" is the same claim as "X is more virtuous than Y (independent of I)". They are not the same truth claim and so they can have different, yet objective, truth values. You say consensus doesn't count (and I agree). It counts as far as perception goes so it's not worthless. Just to be clear I said 100% consensus doesn't impose truth upon reality. By contrast, reality does impose truth upon 100% consensus. This is Tom's Christian motto in a nutshell. Is it because you think we act as if morality is absolute, therefore it is absolute? Is that an argument from consensus? Or is it an argument that anyone who treats morality as absolute has already made a statement about personal faith in absolute moral reality as opposed to merely the reality of moral opinion? It's because logic dictates that what I'm saying is true. If you start with one objective reality and work back to individual perceptions about that reality you will see this. If you reverse the order then the only conclusion you can reach is "perception is reality". Do you want to do that? If so, then you believe in multiple realities which means objectivity is nonexistent. |
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IOW, just because a culture thinks Mother 2 is acting correctly does not mean that every individual in that culture (nor people outside that culture) will (or ought) think so. That's why relativistic morality boils down to individual opinion, and, therefore, is not really morality. And yet the relativist borrows from reality and pretends that his opinions should be normative. The relativist borrows all the tenets from absolute morality but renames it relativism. It also describes the way that a society takes these individual values and forms social contracts and cultural moral norms. DL is mistaken here on this theory of morality as well: morality is not an expression of social contract. If one violates the terms of a contract the offended party does not try to reason with him, he merely points to the contract. The offender is objectively wrong, within that contract, when he violates it. One need not re-negotiate it because it already stipulates the behaviours expected. If morality were a matter of contract there would likewise be no convincing or negotiating. It is a cognitive and linguistic accident that I will declare "vanilla is better than chocolate!" as if it were an absolute, or as if I meant "Steve also thinks vanilla is better than chocolate!" It is a linguistic illusion that they appear to logically contradict. But it would not be a linguistic accident to say "vanilla can never be preferred over chocolate". That is an intentionally absolute claim about an objective reality. DL to Steve:
Tell this to OS. Why do you keep telling everyone whether or not they understand relativistic morality when your version is being contradicted right here, by another authority? In other words, you're saying that it is impossible for a man to have a subjective opinion about any objective fact. False. We've said countless times that everybody does have a subjective opinion about objective facts. And that is precisely why noting the subjectivity of the opinion does not negate the reality of the fact. addendum: I see Steve already addressed this fallacious claim. Oh well, two heads, and all. but by your own standard morals are indistinguishable from preferences, and preferences ought to be accorded an absolute reality.Actually, DL, you have demonstrated that morals are not merely preferences by your own standards. You agreed with me that preferences do not create distress when they do not affect us directly. You waved away this realization by claiming that not all preferences are moral preferences. When pushed several times you said that you are talking about preferences about actions but the same problem, unaddressed, still holds. You are left with the same incoherent and unjustified position as OS; that morals are distinguished from other preferences by virtue of being strong preferences. In other words, in the words of Demi Moore, you don't merely object, but rather you strenuously object. If you don't think it's how things happen in the real world, I would like you to find an example in which someone is persuaded by external authority instead of internal values. Case study #1: Charlie's internal values do not preclude the use of profanity. God's authority does. Charlie is persuaded that God knows best and follows said dictate. Even in cases where one is persuaded by a "transcendent moral authority", one must first possess moral values like "transcendent moral authorities ought to be obeyed" or "I ought to trust X as a moral authority" etc. Ahahahah. But of course. And all knowledge is justified by induction and all beliefs are based upon prediction - because DL defines the case as such. So the moral realist is only subjectively moral because, although he accepts the objective morality of God's word, he subjectively values God's word. Right. And you figured that out statistically. Every man believes his own moral values outweigh those of others, and is committed to act accordingly.Not a consistent relativist. Only one who borrows the tents of absolute morality and renames it relativism. Which brings me back to the beginning. |
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It's not that I necessarily expect to change anyone's mind here, but I would think that at this point at least someone would say, "Oh, I see what you're saying!" Indeed. I can't believe I have read this blog for almost two and a half years and never see this from the atheists. This goes for virtually every subject. But then, from your side of the aisle, we have two people saying two different things. As per this: The problem is that we don't know whether there is one reality. There might be. There might not be. === Is it morally "right" to use power to protect a baby when one believes the baby is at grave risk of harm?That depends. Which reality are you talking about? |
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BUT, whereas they each see a concrete cat (albeit slightly different from each sensory perspective), they unfortunately reduce it to merely the sum of its accidents (observable properties), they deny the existence of “catness” as a universal concept as the essence shared by all cats... which, at the very least is debilitating to science: without universal concepts, science is impossible. Exactly! How can we communicate, learn, and even develop science if OS's position is true? Obviously we are seeing the same reality in a similar enough way to share information about it - or else there is no knowledge. To deny this is to deny reason, rationality and even science. |
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Tom, I've written before that trying to convince someone to change their moral behavior is possible when you can show that the behavior is contradictory with another moral value that the person holds (assuming they also hold consistency to be a value) and os, Tom writes, Was I careless in my speech here? It's not logically contradictory to say to someone you think she's wrong in this context, because it's another pair of preferences followed by an action. It's not a syllogism any more than the three statements dl proposed yesterday. I would think you would see the intent, however. I'll spell it out for you. The original was: 1) When I say "Mother #2 is wrong" I really mean "I subjectively feel that Mother #2 is wrong." Let's do this instead: 1) When I say "Mother #2 is wrong" I really mean "I subjectively feel that Mother #2 is wrong." 2) Mother #2 subjectively feels that she is right. 3) I have a moral duty to persuade Mother 2 that she is wrong. There is definitely a failure of logic there. The moral duty sneaks in from nowhere. So suppose you find yourself visiting this hypothetical culture. Imagine telling yourself this when you hear the screaming, tortured, starving infants: "I don't prefer this. It goes against my values. I will try to appeal to these mothers' values, to see if there's something they value that would overturn their preference for torturing their kids. But if there isn't, then I will acknowledge that their morality--the term I'm giving to what is actually their preference--on this issue is of equal validity to my own. They are not wrong to do this." Charlie has also provided some other real-life examples of moralizing by people who tend not to accept moral realism. Some moral realists would certainly agree with liberal positions on these issues, but generally all moral relativists would, on at least two out of three of these. That's why these are useful examples: the right to choose, capital punishment, and environmentalism. Would you say it's wrong to pollute the planet? Would you say it's wrong to deny a woman's right to choose? That's the language we keep hearing. We don't hear, "a woman's right to choose is my preference, and you have your preference, and we acknowledge that your preference is as valid as ours." So ultimately the contradiction is this: if you believe in moral relativism, you cannot, while staying consistent with your own principles, say that a person is wrong--not unless you change the meaning of "wrong." Instead of its usual meaning it has to become a power word used for persuasive, rhetorical advantage, wielded for the purpose of changing someone's mind, even though its only real reference is to what you find not to be preferable. |
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Instead of its usual meaning it has to become a power word used for persuasive, rhetorical advantage, wielded for the purpose of changing someone's mind, even though its only real reference is to what you find not to be preferable. I contend that though you may use the word "wrong," you cannot use it in its commonly understood sense while remaining consistent with your principles. I further contend that the remaining way in which you can use it is just as I said: as a power term, expressing your own preferences. Please respond strictly to those two contentions, for I don't think either you or DL have addressed them successfully at all. By the way, do you think even if I were to say the same thing over and over again, paying no heed to your responses, it would be wrong? |
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By the way, do you think even if I were to say the same thing over and over again, paying no heed to your responses, it would be wrong? It depends on whose reality you are talking about. |
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I don't acknowledge that others' preferences/morals are as valid as mine. I think mine are better, that's why I value them. Translation (for those of us who see an objective standard by which two things may be compared when we see the word "better"): I like mine more than I like theirs. This makes your statement read, "I like mine more than I like their's, that's why I value them." Is this what you meant? What I acknowledge is that others' right to value their preferences/morals is as valid as mine. This just pushes the question back a step. If "acknowledging others' right to value their preferences/morals" is your preference, while maintaining that I could have a different yet equally valid (to me) preference, then you are acknowledging that others' preferences/morals are as valid as yours, which you claimed you weren't doing. Acknowledging others' right to value their preferences/morals is itself a moral stance that you seemly want to smuggle in the back door. |
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Tom, what do you think is the "commonly understood sense" of the word "wrong?" I already asked and got your clarification on this: In your third comment you say, "I am asking about what people who use the words 'right' and 'wrong', 'should' and 'ought' are actually thinking and how they actually mean the words to be taken." I don't really like to conjecture about what other people are thinking, but I guess I would have to say that most people, when using those terms, are using them in an absolute sense. I expected DL to get here before you and say "oh, but that doesn't make it true that morals are absolute". Of course that wasn't my point, although you seem to have presumed it was. Tom picked up on it, or, more likely, was well ahead of me, when he asked about the common usage. You, DL, and Paul, are using the words in a manner contrary to that understood by your listeners. This is established thoroughly. It is also now established that you know you are doing this and that you continue to do so. This is equivocation and it is not appropriate. I would now ask you to stop doing it. Tom, I don't acknowledge that others' preferences/morals are as valid as mine.This is a nice admission. So there is an objective source of morality after all. And you are it. This is what I meant about morality in your reality not being relativistic afterall. You admit you condone the use of power to impose morality (which is more right) and that only your morality is the most right of all. This is a direct disavowal of relativism. You do, in fact, presume the right to judge another's morality and the right to impose your own. It is only that you have set yourself up as the judge and jury. This is egoism and idolatry. I dont' think you're really asking me whether Christians should have intervened; I think you're asking me whether I think foot-binding is immoral.Thanks for trying to answer, but rather than presume what I am really asking you could answer what I did ask. Was it good for the Christians to impose their morality upon the Chinese? |
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"if someone said to me that Paul McCartney was a better songwriter than John Lennon, I could say, 'You're wrong!' and be using the word correctly." And then where would that discussion go? You might decide there is some objective standard according to which one really was a better songwriter than the other. In that case you would have to say something like, "I think you're wrong because..." -- and "because" would have to point toward some agreed standard that you share. Dare I say that standard is objective? I think so, for it would have to be something outside each of you, something external you could both look at, and somehow measure each of the songwriter's skills in relation to it. If the discussion is going to come out as anything other than trading opinions, you would in fact have to have an external standard against which you could objectively measure Lennon's and McCartney's skills. Or you could agree that you have differing opinions, and that "wrong" is just a statement of your personal subjective belief. "Wrong" would not actually apply in that case to your friend's beliefs (nor to yours) in any useful sense of the word. It would mean no more than saying "you're wrong" when I say chocolate tastes better than vanilla. "When I use the word 'wrong' in a moral context, I mean that I feel that whatever act is being referred to is contrary to my values. You may not like the way I use the word, but I think it's an acceptable use. That's not how this works, os. Careful definition of terms is at the very heart of philosophical discussion. Otherwise you have the very famous fallacy, referred to by Charlie below, of equivocation. What words would you have us use instead? And, since when are words restricted in their use by the understanding of the listener? Use "preference" or "personal value" instead of "right" or "wrong." Again, in philosophical discourse, words are very frequently restricted in their use. For example in Kant the word "category" has a very restricted meaning, a restriction imposed by the necessity for clarity. It's not that we as listeners are trying to foist something on you, though. It's that we're trying to (yes) restrict the use of the word for the very legitimate purpose of preventing equivocation. This is standard practice. (Post edited at 10:30 pm EST) |
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And, since when are words restricted in their use by the understanding of the listener?Since we are trying to communicate with listeners. And especially when you are using the words and the force and power they carry when you don't mean them in the same sense that has earned that force and power. You are writing cheques on an account without your name on it. What I don't presume the right to is forcing others to live according to my morality, except when their doing so is harmful to others. Of course you know you've set another absolute standard for morality. So what if it is your preference that people not hurt other people? Why should you force anybody to live by any of your morals? No, me thinking I'm more right than someone else doesn't mean I think I'm more right than everyone else--if I did, then *that* would mean I thought there was an absolute morality.You are contradicting yourself. Why are your morals not better than everybody else', given that you also say As it is, I think we *all* think our personal morals are more right than the morals of those who disagree with us--else why would we hold those particular morals and not the ones those who disagree with us hold? Or are you saying that you are not "more right" than only those whose morals are exactly coterminous with yours? Then you, along with those who agree with you, are the standard. Of course, I understand that you think that you get your morals from God, so that gives you the right to think yours are better than the morals of those who disagree with you, but since I (and many others) don't believe in your God, then you attributing your superiority to another source means nothing to me. But you and I both believe in the apparent rightness of our moral positions. I agree with you that we ought not hold beliefs that we don't actually believe in. Your mistake, of course, is acknowledging that there is something as moral superiority, but claiming at one time that you don't believe this and then at another mistakenly thinking you are the standard. My first reaction is no, but I might change my mind if I had more information. You say here that Christians should not have imposed their morality upon the Chinese when you admit that the Chinese were acting immorally. The Christians doing so, then, would have been immoral in your eyes. You should also realize that the Chinese were harming other people by this practice and you have given yourself permission to enforce your morality in such a case. This is just another example of the incoherence of your position. |
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I'd be willing to use terms based on previously-agreed-on definitions in future, though. It has never been unclear that we rejected your definitions from the beginning and in comment after comment. Likewise, we have rejected these definitions from Paul and DL for years now as well. This is why you guys keep trying to amend our statements about right and wrong with your terms "objectively" and "subjectively" when we say "actually" and "really". It is only now, however, that we get your admission that you know you are not using the words the way we are or the way that people will interpret them when they hear them (DL has never denied this, as far as I can recall). If you want to use them equivocally and thereby communicate ineffectively that is your choice, and you don't have to change your words now. But being "miffed" that you've been offered alternate and more accurate words for your beliefs is quite pointless since you explicitly asked me what words would be more appropriate. |
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